THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 MARCH 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015053
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 12, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
March 12, 1976
2
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B(I M2).(3)
declassified on1)1 on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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March 12, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon: Neither President Franjiyah nor coup at-
tempt leader General Ahdab has emerged in con-
trol. (Page 1)
USSR:
South Africa - Angola:
(Page 2)
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iPeru:
(Page 5)
Notes: Morocco - Western Sahara; Rhodesia-Zambia;
USSR; Turkey-Greece (Pages 6 and 7)
At Annex we present conclusions from an estimate
on the likelihood and consequences of further
conflicts in southern Africa over the next
six months.
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LEBANON
The leader of the coup attempt yes-
terday, Sunni Muslim General Ahdab, claims
to have the backing of the Christian army
commander and all important army units.
In fact, however, many high-ranking offi-
cers have not declared for either Ahdab
or President Franjiyah.
Private Lebanese militias and Palestinian
forces yesterday seized most areas of Beirut with
almost no fighting. These groups so far have sim-
ply reestablished control where they have tradition-
ally dominated, giving no clue as to whether Fran-
jiyah or Ahdab will emerge on top.
We do not know for sure whether Damascus
played a role in the coup attempt, but tend to be-
lieve that the Syrians were surprised by the move
and were uncertain how to respond. The Syrians--
and the Palestinians--will be tempted to back Ahdab
if he shows signs of succeeding.
Israeli forces along the Lebanese border went
on alert yesterday because of the increasing num-
bers of Lebanese army bases occupied in the south-
ern part of the country this week by rebel Muslim
forces. We doubt that the Israelis will intervene
directly even if the government in Beirut is seized
by Ahdab--a conservative Muslim.
The potential for armed clashes involving Is-
raeli troops in Lebanon remains high if Tel Aviv's
troops continue to patrol as aggressively as they
have over the past two weeks. They have carried
out three cross-border raids since February 26.
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USSR
(continued)
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The Soviets are giving selective coverage to
the US election campaign. In contrast to their mod-
est treatment of the New Hampshire primary and their
total blackout on Massachusetts, the media have pro-
vided a detailed rundown on Florida.
Pravda yesterday carried a fairly straightfor-
ward report of Florida's primary results and added
that former governor Reagan "practically lost the
possibility of advancing his candidacy to the post
of president." Red Star printed a harsh political
biography of Senator Jackson, describing his career
as having rested on the pillars of "oil, aviation,
and Zionism." It alleged he lack public support
and contrasted his policies with those pursued by
the administration.
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SOUTH AFRICA ? ANGOLA
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PERU
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559450 3-76
C'=
NORTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
9
200 40 LISBON CZ
STATUTE MILES PORTUGAL
S'13 A I N
Madeira Islands
(Port.)
Canary Islands
(Spain)
EL AAION
WESTERN
SAHARA
r/Ausert.
/NOUAKCHOTT
sea
'Gibraltar
(U K I M editer
RABAT'
Foum el Hassant
?
Zouerate
Hausa..
Bir Moghrein
ALGERIA
MAURITANIA
MALI
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NOTES
Fighting has broken out for the third time in
two
weeks between Polisario guerrillas and Moroccan
forces
in Western Sahara.
ele-
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ments
at a Moroccan Infantry battalion in southern
Morocco and a battalion in Western Sahara clashed
with guerrilla forces on Wednesday. Rabat expects
more of such attacks and has ordered additional se-
curity measures. Polisario guerrillas [
//need a military
success to prove the Polisario Front and the newly
created Saharan Democratic Arab Republic are entities
worthy of international recognition.
Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith is expected to
send a high-level delegation shortly to Zambia for
talks with President Kaunda.
The delegation/;
/wants to
explain Smith's "new terms" for a peaceful settle-
ment of the Rhodesian problem. We have no informa-
tion on these terms, but there is no evidence sug-
gesting that the talks are intended to be anything
other than another play for time. Smith met again
yesterday with black nationalist leader Joshua
Nkomo.
(continued)
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Soviets
Turkey has postponed indefinitely the Aegean
air defense exercise that was to have been held
in the vicinity of the Greek island of Lesbos.
Originally scheduled for March 9 and 10, the
exercise had been twice delayed because of weather.
Ankara apparently believes it has accomplished one
of its purposes in scheduling the exercise--that
of re-emphasizing the international character of
the waters and air space that separate mainland
Greece from the Aegean islands and hence Turkey's
right to use these areas.
7
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Southern Africa
Cameroon
-"\
Malabo
/`C
Equatral
Guirea
Yaounde
thiopia
Pointe Noi.ril3
Cabinda
Mombasa
Dar es ?
Salaam
Luanda
Bengue
Mocimedes
mbique
Beira
Walvis Bay (
(S. At)
Luderitz
aputo
ane
Atlantic Indian
Ocean
Cape T
East London
Durban Ocean
Nacala
559449 3-76
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SOUTHERN AFRICA
We present below conclusions from
an estimate on the likelihood and conse-
quences of further conflicts in southern
Africa over the next six months. The es-
timate was approved yesterday by the US
intelligence board.
Likelihood of Expanded Conflicts in Southern Africa
In Rhodesia:
--An expansion of insurgent activity against the
white Rhodesian government will be avoided only
if a political settlement is reached in the next
six to eight weeks. This is unlikely to happen,
and the momentum of preparations for an expansion
of guerrilla warfare will probably become irre-
versible.
--The USSR will probably concentrate in coming months
on developing closer ties with Mozambique, Zambia,
and Tanzania and strengthening both materially and
politically those insurgent elements that are amen-
able to its support and direction. It will also
support a more aggressive African policy vis-a-vis
Rhodesia, calculating that this would allow for an
expanded Soviet (and Cuban) role in supporting the
insurgents.
--China will provide additional training and advisory
personnel and materiel support to the insurgents,
but because of its limited resources, Peking may
have to resign itself to some loss of influence to
Moscow and Havana.
--Until near the end of the six-month period covered
by this estimate, the increase in guerrilla war-
fare will probably be fairly modest. Once the
rainy season--which favors the insurgents--begins
in October, however, an appreciably larger in-
crease in the insurgency is likely, and the in-
surgents will be able to operate more freely in
Rhodesia.
Al
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--The chances are better than even that by the end
of the six months covered by this estimate some
Cuban military personnel will be in combat with
the insurgents inside Rhodesia. It is unlikely,
however, that the Cubans in this period will have
initiated large-scale conventional operations
using heavy equipment.
--Throughout the period, Rhodesian security forces
should be able generally to contain the insurgency
to border areas but will have some difficulty in
maintaining order in urban areas and in insulating
the rural populace from guerrilla influence.
--By the end of the six months, the insurgents will
have extended their areas of operation to cover
most of the Mozambique-Rhodesia border, and they
will be in a substantially stronger position, both
relatively and absolutely, than they are now.
The increased insurgency and the effects of Mozam-
bique's imposition of sanctions will place severe
strains on the Smith regime and probably lead it
to offer token negotiating concessions, but will
not cause its collapse or compel it to sue for
peace.
--Beyond six months, the Cuban presence is likely to
increase, with the magnitude and nature of the in-
crease depending on Havana's and Moscow's assess-
ment of developments within Rhodesia and on the
attitudes of Mozambique and other insurgent sup-
porters toward an expanded Cuban involvement.
In the Namibia/Southern Angola Region:
--The odds are that Angola and South Africa will
reach a political understanding resulting in the
withdrawal of South African military forces from
Angolan territory.
--Given the constraints on both sides, we do not
believe that the likelihood of a major confronta-
tion between South African military units and
Cuban forces is very high. Neither Luanda nor
Pretoria appears to be seeking a confrontation.
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--If no agreement is reached, the MPLA and the Cubans
might launch a military probe against South African
forces in southern Angola to determine whether they
would quickly withdraw. The Soviets probably would
not urge this course on Neto over the next six
months, but they also probably would not withhold
support if it were requested. They would advise,
however, that if a military effort were undertaken,
it be a cautious one.
--In any case, the Soviets would probably argue vig-
orously against pushing on into Namibia. The Cu-
bans undoubtedly know that they could not achieve
a military victory there even with forces substan-
tially larger than those now in Angola.
--Guerrilla activity by the South-West Africa Peoples
Organization will increase, and the Soviets, Cubans,
and MPLA will provide assistance to SWAPO. Never-
theless, even with substantial outside assistance,
SWAPO insurgents will be unable to expand their
capabilities in the next six months to the point
where they cannot be easily contained by South Af-
rican security forces.
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