THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 MARCH 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015052
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 11, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
March 11, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 512( I 1(21.13)
declassified only on approval or
the Director of Central Intelligence
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March 11, 1976
? Table of Contents
China: Peking's most authoritative statement to
date on the campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-
ping has linked Mao Tse-tung directly to this
effort. (Page 1)
Japan:
(Page 3)
Lebanon: Rebellious Muslim soldiers in southern
Lebanon reportedly were ordered late yesterday
by their leader to stop all military action.
(Page 4)
Notes: USSR; Saudi Arabia - South Yemen; Peru
(Page? 6 and 7)
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CHINA
Peking's most authoritative state-
ment to date on the campaign to criti-
cize Teng Hsiao-ping has linked Mao Tse-
tung directly to this effort.
The statement was contained in a People's
Daily editorial, which comes closer to establishing
an official position on the campaign than previous,
less official pronouncements. The editorial quotes
Mao on the need to "narrow the target" of the at-
tack, implying that Teng alone should be criticized,
but leaves the door open for criticism of other of-
ficials who are associated with Teng and who, like
him, were returned to public office after being
ousted a decade ago.
While the editorial stops short of calling for
Teng to be overthrown, stating only that he should
be criticized, Teng is separated from other offi-
cials who, the editorial notes, should be "helped"
to correct their past mistakes.
The party's left wing undoubtedly will use the
editorial's statement, which is linked directly to
Mao, that it is unpopular to "reverse previous ver-
dicts"--a reference to the rehabilitation of offi-
cials overthrown during the Cultural Revolution--to
broaden the attack on Teng to include many of the
rehabilitees who once again hold important party,
military, and government positions. The editorial
nevertheless calls for people to remain "coolheaded"
and strictly prohibits the kind of disruptive polit-
ical activity that characterized the Cultural Revo-
lution.
These prohibitions, which are at the operative
heart of the editorial, strongly suggest that more
moderate-leaning members of the leadership still re-
tain a major voice in defining the scope of the cam-
paign. These leaders almost certainly prefer at
the least to limit the attacks to Teng himself and
to keep the campaign from gaining enough momentum
to encompass large numbers of rehabilitated offi-
cials and to undercut major domestic and foreign
policies.
(continued)
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In a briefing for foreign diplomats in Peking
on March 6, a university official stated that Teng
is the only target of the current attack and implied
that he could remain in power if he agreed to admit
his mistakes. He added, however, that Teng had not
yet done so. The general low-key tenor of his com-
ments suggests that Peking is making a concerted
effort to play down the campaign for foreign audi-
ences--and that important elements in the leader-
ship are concerned about the possible impact that
indications of political instability may have
abroad.
In the meantime, the party's left wing con-
tinues its active pursuit of Teng. The Ministry
of Culture, which is closely associated with left-
ist political leaders, has withdrawn from circula-
tion all films in which Teng appears. Posters have
been sighted in Shanghai and in Kwangtung Province
calling for Tenq's ouster.
Equally important, there are signs that civil-
ian leftists are courting the military as allies
in the current campaign. The military was conspic-
uously absent during the campaign's initial stages,
but some units are now beginning to participate in
the criticism of Teng.
Military support would give a boost to those
who are most actively pursuing the current campaign
because at present they do not appear to have the
muscle to enforce their demands. The support of
the military is equally important to those who
would like to keep the current campaign from getting
out of hand. Thus far, the military has not deci-
sively tilted toward either side.
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JAPAN
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MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
'Aramant.:
\
or
/1 toe
Tripoli
1.;
SeC 70,
f
/?
W.4
./
fA
?
559442 3-76
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LEBANON
The Israelis are closely monitoring the situa-
tion, but top government leaders have so far re-
frained from any comment that would inflame the
situation. Israeli press articles suggest that the
leadership is unsure of the implications for Israel
of recent developments in Lebanon, and has not de-
cided on what, if any, action it should take.
Successes already achieved by the rebel Muslim
forces have sparked concern among Lebanese Chris-
tians that the rebels intend to form a renegade Mus-
lim army encircling the core Christian area of the
country.
(continued)
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Prime Minister Karami yesterday tried to gloss
over the deepening controversy between Christian
and Muslim leaders over the Muslim mutineers. Left-
ist leader Kamal Jumblatt--an outspoken supporter of
the Muslim rebels--apparently has so alienated Chris-
tian leaders on the mutiny issue, however, that they
have refused to participate in further political
talks until the problem is solved.
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NOTES
The Soviets have begun construction of a new
class of small, surface warship.
The boat is some 145 feet long and is armed
with launchers for surface-to-air missiles and anti-
ship missiles. The sizes of these launchers do not
equate to known Soviet systems, suggesting that
they may be for new or modified weapons. The size
of the new boat suggests that it is a follow-on to
the Osa-class coastal defense patrol boat. The
array of armaments on the new boat, however, offers
significant improvement over the Osa.
Saudi Arabia and South Yemen announced in a
joint statement yesterday their intention to nor-
malize relations, capping a reconciliation process
initiated by Cairo in 1974.
The communique said the two countries would
refrain from interfering in each other's internal
affairs. It also expressed both countries' opposi-
tion to "foreign interference" in the Arabian Pen-
insula. This reference is broad enough to encom-
pass both the Saudi objection to the Soviet pres-
ence in South Yemen and Aden's opposition to Iran's
military role in Oman.
South
Yemen's willingness to negotiate probably was dic-
tated by economic necessity. The prospects for
making South Yemen into a moderate state, however,
are not very promising.
(continued)
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Peru
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Top Secret
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