THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 MARCH 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015045
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 3, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
March 3, 1976
2
7) S e 25X1
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category 5B( I ),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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WM?INMImir YEMNINNE.1 IM.INOPC*
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March 3, 1976
Table of Contents
USSR: Some prominent Soviets recently have implied
that Moscow is tailoring its public statements
on the US with an eye to influencing the US
election. (Page 1)
USSR-Egypt: Soviet diplomats in Cairo reportedly
believe that increasing popular discontent
with President Sadat may force Egypt to take
some sort of initiative this year to improve
relations with Moscow. (Page 2)
Jordan - Saudi Arabia - Syria:
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(Page 3)
Notes: Morocco-Sahara; USSR; South Africa; Portugal;
Iceland-UK; Italy (Pages 4, 5, and 6)
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USSR
Some prominent Soviets have recently
implied that Moscow is tailoring its pub?
lic statements on the US with an eye to
influencing the US election.
A senior member of the USA Institute in Moscow
recently told a US embassy officer that his insti-
tute had drafted its contribution to Brezhnev's re-
port to the 25th party congress with US domestic
politics in mind. He said that the institute was
pleased that the resulting speech was optimistic
about the future of bilateral relations.
In yet another conversation with a US official,
Anatoly Gromyko, son of the Soviet foreign minister,
noted the careful preparation which had gone into
Brezhnev's report to the congress, calling attention
to the "friendly and non-polemical" treatment of the
US.
The younger Gromyko said he was confused about
the results of the New Hampshire primary and its im-
plications for the "spirit of Vladivostok," which he
strongly endorsed. The Soviet central press seems
similarly perplexed by the results.
In an effort to shed more light on US political
affairs, the USA Institute, according to one of its
senior members, is engaged in a thorough study of
each major presidential candidate. He professed
confidence in the future of Soviet-US relations re-
gardless of the outcome of the presidential contest,
but conceded that the USSR would prefer to see you
returned to office "because we know him personally."
At the same time, the institute's study of
Governor Reagan, whom the Soviet media have taken
to task for his views on Soviet-US relations, had
concluded that there is "a great difference between
his words and his deeds."
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USSR-EGYPT
Soviet diplomats in Cairo report-
edly believe that increasing popular
discontent with President Sadat may
force Egypt to take some sort of initi-
ative to improve relations with Moscow
this year.
The Soviets think that Egypt's failure to at-
tract sufficient Arab or Western capital has led to
a deteriorating economic situation. They also be-
lieve that Sadat's inability to score additional
diplomatic successes has led to popular frustration
and growing disillusionment with Egypt's connection
with Washington.
There is no indication that the Soviets think
a coup against Sadat is likely in the near future.
Their assessment of Sadat's political trouble--
which is very similar to our own impressions--is a
significant change in the thinking of the same So-
viet officials who a few months ago said that Sadat
was firmly entrenched./
/the Soviets perceive a
change in the Egyptian mood. Moscow undoubtedly
will keep up military and economic pressure on Sadat
to make some favorable gesture.
During the past few months, in fact, there have
been signs--such as decreased criticism of the Krem-
lin--which suggest that Cairo is signaling a some-
what more accommodating attitude toward Moscow.
These signs, however, have only seemed to encourage
the USSR to maintain the pressure--by refusing, for
example, to sell spare parts for and overhaul the
engines of Egypt's MIG-21s.
2
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JORDAN ? SAUDI ARABIA ? SYRIA
3
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(:PORTUGAL
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NOTES
The Moroccans may soon begin further military
operations in Sahara against the Polisario guerril-
las, according to the US defense attache in Rabat.
The purpose would be to eliminate Polisario
forces Rabat believes are located in the Zemmour
mountains around Guelta in Sahara and in the area
north of Bir Moghrein in Mauritania. The sweep
would also be directed at guerrilla pockets in
southern Morocco near the Algerian border. A reli-
able Moroccan source told US officials last week
that Rabat believes Polisario forces are poised for
operations in these areas.
The Soviets appear determined to do what they
can to minimize differencesbetween Moscow and the
West European Communist parties and to avoid any
sense of irreversible estrangement.
The Soviets have not tried to conceal the ex-
istence of dispute. At the same time--beginning
with Brezhnev's opening speech at the party con-
gress--they have not hesitated to make their own
views clear.
The Soviets have reported the speeches of both
sycophants and independents, and Brezhnev has met
with both Cunhal of Portugal and Berlinguer of It-
aly--representatives of the two groupings. Pravda
even put a photo of the Brezhnev-Berlinguer meet-
ing on its front page. The Soviets can thus make
a plausible case that they have treated everyone
with relative even-handedness.
For the first time, the South Africans are
preparing contingency plans in the event of an in-
surgent threat from Mozambique and Angola.
South African defense forces have begun to
identify targets in the neighboring countries. De-
fense officials apparently have concluded that ex-
panded assistance from Mozambique to Rhodesian
guerrillas and the potential for trouble in Namibia
present a significant security threat to South Af-
rica.
(continued)
4
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T) ?DIY 7' 7-1 T1 T, T 7"/"V TT AT
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A bitter disagreement that emerged yesterday
among Portugal's top military officers could fore-
shadow an open split between left- and right-wing
factions in the Revolutionary Council.
Conservative newspapers have published a strong
attack by air force Chief of Staff Morals da Silva
on President Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Melo
Antunes, both left-leaning members of the Council.
Up to now, Council members have successfully papered
over their differences in order to present a united
front against the Communists and the far left.
Morals da Silva's attack may mean that Council unity
has been ended and rightist officers have decided
to press for the removal of Costa Gomes and Melo
Antunes now, even though the coming elections prob-
ably will sweep both of them from power.
Icelandic Prime Minister Hallgrimsson has
agreed to explore means to reduce tension in the
cod war with the UK and to get the talks started
again.
Hallgrimsson's proposal calls for the UK to
pull out all warships and all but 15 trawlers from
the 200-mile zone around Iceland. In return, Ice-
land will promise not to harass the remaining Brit-
ish trawlers. The Prime Minister apparently visu-
alizes an agreement of about six months' duration.
By the end of this time, he presumably expects a
favorable UN Law of the Sea Conference ruling on
200-mile economic zones. The Icelandic cabinet,
by Hallgrimsson's own admission, is still divided
on whether to ne otiate with
(continued)
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The Italian Socialist Party's national con-
gress, which opens today, and that of the Christian
Democrats, which will convene later this month, will
determine whether the two parties can settle on a
formula for a new coalition and avoid an early elec-
tion.
Only the Socialist Party, Italy's third larg-
est, can guarantee the Christian Democrats a non-
Communist majority in parliament. For the short
term, the Socialists appear willing to collaborate
with the Christian Democrats, provided the latter
give the Socialists more influence over policy in
a new government and agree to consult the Communists
openly, rather than behind-the-scenes, in order to
make the Communist Party more responsible for gov-
ernment actions. The Socialist congress is likely
to reiterate that the party's long-term goal is a
grouping of leftist forces, including the Communists,
that would replace the Christian Democrats as the
nation's dominant political force.
The Christian Democrats have so far been un-
able to reconcile internal differences over how to
respond to the Socialist Party's conditions. Most
party members favor giving the Socialists more in-
fluence in the government but oppose actions that
would publicly modify the Christian Democrats'
traditional opposition to the Communists.
6
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Top Secret
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