THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 FEBRUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015042
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 28, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
February 28, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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February 28, 1976
Table of Contents
China: Teng Hsiao-ping is now being attacked by
name in wall posters in several parts of China,
apparently with official endorsement of some
leaders in Peking. (Page 1)
South Africa: Prime Minister Vorster is pessimistic
about recent developments in southern Africa,
but offers no new policy suggestions. (Page 3)
Notes: India; Angola-Zaire; Algeria; Saudi Arabia -
Jordan; Argentina; Congo-USSR (Pages 5, 6,
and 7)
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CHINA
The beleaguered Teng Hsiao-ping is
now being attacked by name in wall posters
in several parts of China, apparently with
the official endorsement of some leaders
in Peking. The public attacks make Teng's
position more precarious and reduce the
likelihood that he can retain all of his
present positions.
While Teng's mounting troubles cast further
doubt on his political future, they also illustrate
his long-standing vulnerability in any succession
plans. China's leaders, we now know, became aware
that Chou En-lai was terminally ill in 1972. At the
time, the leadership had been drastically reduced
by the fall of defense minister Lin Piao and his as-
sociates.
Given the paucity of choices at the time, Mao
and Chou probably had little choice but to bring
Teng back from political obscurity. Teng's built-
in liability as a once-disgraced official was imme-
diately seized upon by the political left. Teng was
rehabilitated in 1973 amid a leftist propaganda bar-
rage defending the "fruits of the cultural revolu-
tion," a theme that re-emerged last December in the
context of the education debate and which seemed
aimed indirectly at Teng.
It is obvious now that Teng's ascension to power
was opposed at every step by the left.
Mao--undoubtedly wanted to put Teng on
at the party congress in August 1973.
was not elevated to that body until
December of that year--an
some urgency because the pre-
Chou--and
the Politburo
Teng, however,
appointment made with
mier was dying.
It was not until the party and government meet-
ings in January 1975--meetings that apparently were
delayed by backstage wrangling--that Teng finally
emerged as a leading figure in the party, government,
and military bureaucracies and the man in line to
succeed Chou.
(continued)
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Teng's new power gave him enormous confidence,
and his behavior throughout 1975 bordered on cocki-
ness. He seemed oblivious to his political vulner-
ability as the only man in the top leadership who had
been ousted during the cultural revolution. Instead
of trying, as Chou did, to placate his opponents, he
seemed to go out of his way to antagonize them.
Starting with his speech at the party plenum in
January 1975, which included an attack on the cul-
tural revolution, Teng moved to discredit the left
in ways that Chou never would have. Teng presumably
felt it necessary to pursue this course in order to
neutralize his opposition and consolidate his own
power. These heavy-handed tactics probably only
stiffened leftist opposition to him when the time
came to name the new. premier.
Teng may also have generated opposition to him-
self within the Politburo. He probably incurred the
enmity of Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien by appar-
ently planning to replace him as commander of the
Peking Military Region. Politburo member Chang Chun-
chiao could have been instrumental in discrediting
Teng because this would leave Chang as the only ma-
jor figure with important posts in the party, govern-
ment and army. In addition, Chang, who rose to prom-
inence during the cultural revolution, may have been
dismayed at Teng's high-handed treatment of the left.
Finally, Teng has not been as deferential to
Mao as Chou was. Foreign visitors have been sur-
prised at Teng's total lack of reference to him, and
the Chairman has complained over the past year that
no one listens to him. This was a complaint Mao made
specifically about Teng prior to the cultural revo-
lution--a concern he did not express when Chou was
active.
The array of forces against Teng thus could
be quite considerable and may well have been partly
of his own making. The propaganda attacks on people
in the party taking the capitalist road--a pointed
reference to Teng--and the wall poster criticism of
him confirm that the left is now engaged in an all-
out effort to purge him. Others may merely want to
reduce his power.
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Southern Africa
Cameroon
Equatteat
Guinea
, Gabon
Cabind
Central African Republic
Congo
Luanda
Angola
?
oSa da Bandeira
Mocarnescies
Ruacaoa Ca.lueque
Th
?Serpa Pinto
South-West Africa
(Namibia)
Walvis Bay
(S. At.)
Zaire
Sudan Ethiopia
Rw nda
Lake
Tanganyika
Zambia
Botswanna
,Cariba
Lake
Rhodesia
Pretoria?
Swaziland
South
/Lesotho
Africa Africa
Lake
Nyasa
Malaw
Kenya
Mozambi
5,9369 2-76
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SOUTH AFRICA
Prime Minister Vorster, in a con-
versation last week with our ambassador,
conveyed a strong note of pessimism and
disillusionment about recent develop-
ments in southern Africa, but offered
no new policy suggestions.
Vorster said that South African troops are
stationed just inside Angola and at four refugee
camps "along or near" the Angolan-Namibian border.
He said that Popular Movement and Cuban forces are
located some 120 miles from the South African posi-
tions. Vorster expects any further advance south-
ward by Popular Movement forces to be done cau-
tiously.
The Prime Minister emphasized that his govern-
pent had had no direct contacts with the Popular
Movement, but said other countries have offered
their assistance in helping the two sides reach an
understanding. He stated that any agreement would
have to include:
--Assurances that Pretoria can complete con-
struction of the Ruacana-Calueque hydroelec-
tric and irrigation projects, which will take
another two years, and agreement on the joint
use of these projects.
--Arrangements for the care of Angolan refu-
gees, whom the South African government has
been supporting at a cost of some $5 million
in four camps along the border.
--Assurances that Namibian insurgents would
not be given sanctuary in Angola from which
to launch attacks across the border.
Regarding Namibia, Vorster said that events in
Angola had not convinced him that he should accel-
erate the pace of constitutional changes to allow
greater participation in government by the terri-
tory's different ethnic groups. The Prime Minis-
ter still believes that two to three years is a
realistic time frame.
(continued)
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Vorster believes that the next target for in-
surgency will be Rhodesia rather than Namibia. He
noted the upswing of guerrilla activity there
al-
ready and said that in time the Soviets and Cubans
would be involved in the same way they have been in
Angola.
Vorster declared that he has gone as far as he
is prepared to go to pressure Prime Minister Ian
Smith into arranging a negotiated settlement with
Rhodesian nationalist leader Nkomo. Vorster stated
emphatically that he would not try to coerce Smith
with "sanctions." He has, however, again told Smith
that Rhodesia cannot count on South African assis-
tance in the event of a stepped-up insurgency.
Vorster believes Smith is gambling that public
opinion in South Africa will force Pretoria to sup-
port Rhodesia, particularly if insurgency escalates
to a point where white women and children are being
killed. He admitted that in this case there would
be intense pressure from within South Africa, but
gave no hint whether it would cause him to change
his policy.
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114 Indian
Jammu C/ aim
Laccadive Sea
Maldives
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NOTES
The head of the Indian Department of Atomic
Energy has revealed that India has definite plans
for a second nuclear test.
He refused to discuss its timing with US mis-
sion officials and indicated that a test site had
not yet been selected. If a site has not been
chosen, a test could not occur for two or three
months.
Negotiations on the resumption of Canadian nu-
clear aid to India--suspended after the first test--
are scheduled to begin next week. The Canadians
have said that they will suspend aid indefinitely
if a second test is conducted.
Radio Angola announced yesterday that Popular
Movement President Agostinho Neto will meet with
Zaire's President Mobutu in Brazzaville this week-
end.
The two presidents, ideological foes for more
than a decade, have been working through interme-
diaries for several weeks in an effort to reach a
political accommodation.
(continued)
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The Algerian-backed Polisario Front proclaimed
the formation yesterday of the Democratic Saharan
Arab Republic, according to Algeria's official news
agency.
The Front controls little territory and has in
effect set up a government in exile. The announce-
ment is intended to detract from the Moroccan-domi-
nated Saharan territorial assembly's endorsement
on Thursday of the agreement with Spain dividing
control of the territory between Morocco and Mauri-
tania.
Moroccan officials are jittery about the pos-
sibility of a major Algerian attack in Sahara to
back the Polisario guerrillas.
Saudis
Jordan
(continued)
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Argentine
* * *
Con o
USSR
*
*
*
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Top Secret
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