THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 FEBRUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015041
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 27, 1976

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
The President's Daily Brief
February 27, 1976
2
op etre/
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Exempt from general
declassification uhedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
6 I - - ? -"="
- L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
February 27, 1976
Table of Contents
USSR-Turkey: The first known visit by Soviet naval
ships to a Turkish port is taking place this
week. (Page 1)
Thailand:
USSR:
Argentina:
(Page 3)
(Page 4)
Notes: Israel-Egypt; Cuba-Angola; Portugal; OPEC
(Pages 5 and 6)
At ANNEX we present a dollar comparison of Soviet
and US defense activities.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
25)0
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
firmmw Yrwimmi ?????=m,0 112?11111CILI
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for-R-elea-Se--2016-70771-4-:-cik-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
USSR-TURKEY
The first known visit by Soviet navy
ships to a Turkish port is taking place
this week.
Two naval hydrographic research ships arrived
at Antalya in southern Turkey on Monday and are ex-
pected to stay until Saturday. The visit underscores
the Soviet navy's continuing policy of showing the
flag wherever possible around the Mediterranean.
The visit appears to be part of broader con-
tacts between the USSR and Turkey. The port call
follows by two months Soviet Premier Kosygin's trip
to Ankara. Turkish officers were invited--under the
terms of the Helsinki agreement--to attend Soviet
military maneuvers in the Caucasus earlier this
month, and General Kenan Evren, the deputy chief of
the Turkish General Staff, reportedly has been in-
vited to visit Moscow this spring.
Since late 1975, the Soviets have been involved
in low-key efforts to exploit Turkish-US friction.
The Turks have been receptive to the Soviet over-
tures, in part because of the growing acceptability
of detente and in part out of a desire to remind
the US that it cannot take Turkey for granted.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized-Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
_ _ _
THAILAND
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
-
' __ ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
USSR
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
1 lJ11., 1 111, 1 II,1_:?J11?/.L.d1 N L.. 1
ARGENT INA
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
25X11
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
NOTES
Eight Cuban ships are en route to the Congo-
Angola area or have recently arrived. The voy-
ages now under way will bring to 25 the number
of such trips since the beginning of the year.
(continued)
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ogvi
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016707[14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Portuguese political parties and military
leaders yesterday signed an agreement to return
the country to civilian rule.
Preliminary reports on the pact indicate
that the president will have wide-ranging powers
to oversee a parliamentary system of government.
Several political parties are expected to support
the candidacy of a military officer for president
in order to ease the transition to civilian rule.
The president is to be chosen by direct popular
election no sooner than two months after the
parliamentary election. The only political respon-
sibilities left to the military will be to advise
the president and to guarantee the operation of
the elected government.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries can be expected to institute another
general price increase in July unless the Saudis
are willing to expend a good deal of political
capital to prevent it.
Iran and its supporters are likely to press
hard for an increase of 10 percent or more and
may demand a further OPEC price review at the end
of the year. Venezuela and Iran now face worse
financial prospects than they did last September,
when they led a drive that resulted in a 10-per-
cent price hike. Both countries are beset by
sharply reduced liftings of heavy crudes, and
both feel they are in a revenue squeeze.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
US Expenditures and
Estimated Dollar Costs of Soviet Defense Programs
? BILLION 1974 DOLLARS
100
80
20
20
1
LL
Figure 1
JL
? 1965 ,67 69 71 73 75
US
USSR
CUMULATIVE 1965-75
RDT&E
/ 1,060
1,100
NOW The dollar figures for the USSR are estimates of what the Soviet forces and programs would cost if developed, purchased and operated in the US. For
operational forces the figures are obtained by costing directly individual Soviet forces and programs. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet ROTH
are derived in the aggregate using a less certain methodology and should be viewed only as rough measures. For this reason they are shown
separate from the dollar costs of operational forces. The US defense expenditure series is based on Total Obligational Authority (TOA) data from The
Five-Year Defense Program,January I976(Department of Defense). The US data are in fiscal year terms and the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
programs are in calendar year terms.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
1J. I.V1-,J1 1.-,1-d '4 L l 1 ,4 .L.a
DOLLAR COMPARISON OF SOVIET
AND US DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
In this annex we present the results
of CIA's latest "dollar cost" comparison
of Soviet and US defense activities.
This comparison provides a general appre-
ciation of the relative size and trends
of the defense programs in the two coun-
tries during the past decade. The ap-
proach is to estimate how much individual
Soviet military programs would cost in
dollars if they were reproduced in the US,
and then to compare these estimates with
US defense expenditures. All values are
given in constant US 1974 prices to can-
cel out the effect of inflation and show
magnitudes and trends in real terms.
A note of caution: this cost anal-
ysis does not measure actual Soviet de-
fense expenditures or their burden on
the economy. These questions are ad-
dressed by different analytical tech-
niques yielding estimates of the ruble
costs of Soviet military programs. Also,
dollar cost figures alone are not a valid
index of military capabilities.
The overall trend in recent years, as illus-
trated in Figure 1, is a widening gap between the
growing dollar costs of Soviet programs and dimin-
ishing US defense authorizations. The estimated
dollar costs of Soviet defense programs have in-
creased continuously at an average rate of about
3 percent per year over the period 1965-1975. The
US, in contrast, has experienced a decline in de-
fense authorizations (expressed in constant dollars)
since the peak of 1968, and in 1975 they were lower
than they were a decade earlier.
The crossover point was in 1970, when the esti-
mated dollar costs of Soviet defense programs were
about equal to US defense authorizations. After
that the Soviet total moved increasingly into the
lead, and by 1975 it was more than 40 percent
higher than the comparable US authorization. (If
the costs of pensions are subtracted from both sides,
the gap would be closer to 50 percent.) Because
of the initial US lead reflecting large Vietnam
(continued)
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
A
X
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
costs, however, the estimated dollar costs of So-
viet defense programs for the entire period are not
significantly different from the cumulative US
total.
In Figure 1, the costs of Research, Develop-
ment, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) are segregated
from those of other programs because the analytical
problems involved in estimating the dollar costs
of Soviet RDT&E are much more difficult than for the
other elements of Soviet defense and the uncertainty
in these estimates is substantially higher.
To give an appreciation of the composition of
the dollar costs of the defense programs (includ-
ing nuclear warheads) of each country we have de-
veloped comparisons by military missions and by re-
source categories. (Figure 2.) For comparative
purposes, the Soviet estimates are shown as a per-
cent of US defense expenditure authorizations in
each year.
Comparisons by Mission
Intercontinental Attack. The estimated dollar
costs of Soviet intercontinental attack programs,
excluding RDT&E costs, have exceeded the US figures
since 1966, when deployment programs for most of
the current US systems had been completed. This
trend reflects the ambitious Soviet programs for
fielding new strategic missile systems which began
in the mid-1960s and have continued unabated to the
present. For the 1965-75 period as a whole, the
estimated dollar costs of these Soviet programs
were about 50 percent greater than the US level and
in 1975 were twice as large.
? Most of this disparity ?is accounted for by the
heavy and continuing Soviet emphasis on ICBMs.
Over the entire period Soviet ICBM program costs,
expressed in dollar terms, were more than four times
higher than the comparable US figure, and in 1975
they were seven times the US level. In their bal-
listic missile submarine programs, estimated Soviet
dollar costs begin to exceed US totals in 1968, and
in 1975 they were 30 percent greater.
(continued)
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Dollar Cost of Soviet Programs as a
Percent of US Defense Expenditures*
Total Defense Cost
200
175
150
125
100
75
1965 67
Strategic Defense
Limo ?
1974 DOLLAR VALUES
69
800
600
400
200
^
Intercontinental Attack
200-
175
150
125
100
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
' 75
71 73 75 1965 67 69 71 73 75
Figure 2
Note: Scale far this graph is significantly
different (fern others.
US =100%
1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1
1965 67 69 71 73 75
Investment Cost
200
175
150
125
100
75
1965 67
US =100%
General Purpose Forces
200
Operating Cost
200-
175
150
125
100
US =100%
1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
75
69 71 73 75 1965 67 69 71 73 75
'Department of Defense Total Obligational Authority data have been.
adjusted to attain comparability with the Soviet data.
568850 2-76
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
These differences are offset to some extent by
the consistently greater emphasis the US has given
to intercontinental bombers. The estimated dollar
costs of Soviet intercontinental bomber programs
have averaged only about one fifth the US total
during the entire period.
Strategic Defense. The Soviet Union has tra-
ditionally maintained much larger strategic defense
forces than the US. The cumulative dollar costs of
Soviet programs over the 1965-75 period were four
times the US figure, the biggest difference being
in surface-to-air missile and fighter-interceptor
programs. By 1975, the ratio reached approximately
nine to one.
General Purpose Forces. The estimated dollar
costs of Soviet general purpose forces surpassed
the level of the US in 1970. In 1975 they exceeded
the US by 70 percent. The US level grew rapidly
during the Vietnam involvement but by 1971 had de-
clined to the 1965 level.
Among the factors that account for this dis-
parity, the most significant one is the much larger
size of Soviet ground forces--particularly in man-
power. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet ground
forces were three times the US figure in 1975. In
general purpose naval forces, the 1975 figure for
the Soviets is about 25 percent higher than for the
US. Soviet tactical air forces have grown rapidly
since 1970, but their estimated dollar costs were
still less than three quarters of the US level in
1975.
Command, Support, and Other. This covers ac-
tivities involved in command and general support, as
well as all other activities--except RDT&E--which
cannot be allocated among combat missions. It also
includes nuclear weapons programs. The trends in
dollar costs for this category parallel those of
the combat missions, and in 1975 the dollar costs
for Soviet programs were slightly higher than those
of the US.
Comparison by Resource Category
Dollar costs of military forces can also be
expressed in terms of investment and operating costs.
(continued)
A3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
US and. Estimated Soviet Active Military Manpower
MILLION MEN (mid-year)
5 ?
4
Figure 3
USSR
3
2 US
?
?
1965 67 69 71 73 75
NOTE: The manpower series for the USSR includes border guards, internal security troops,
and construction troops, for which the US Armed Forces have no counterpart. 568851 2-76
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
- - - -C7-7=J- _r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized EOPiA13-Pi:oVed for Release 2016707/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Investment. It is in this category, involving
investment in new military equipment and facilities,
that Soviet and US dollar-cost trends have diverged
the most sharply. The estimated dollar costs of
Soviet military investment programs (excluding
RDT&E) have exceeded the US level for comparable
programs since 1970. The dollar costs of Soviet in-
vestment have risen rapidly, beginning in 1973. US
authorizations have declined sharply in the wake of
the Vietnam buildup. The estimated costs of Soviet
investment programs in 1975 exceeded the 1972 level
by 15 percent, while US authorizations in 1975 were
nearly 25 percent less than in 1972. In 1975, the
estimated investment costs of Soviet programs were
85 percent greater than those of the US.
One of the key factors here has been the pro-
curement of new generation Soviet ICBMs beginning
in 1973, while US procurement of missiles has de-
clined. The estimated dollar procurement costs for
Soviet missile systems in 1975 were about three and
a half times higher than those of the US. Simi-
larly, the dollar costs of Soviet aircraft procure-
ment have remained high while that of the US had
dropped, and in 1975 the Soviet figure was 30 per-
cent higher than the US total. In the procurement
of naval ships, the dollar-cost estimate for the
Soviets in 1975 was 90 percent higher than for the
US.
Operating Costs. The major component of opera-
ting costs is the cost of military personnel. The
estimated level of Soviet military manpower has ex-
ceeded that of the US in every year from 1965 to
1975. (Figure 3.) Soviet military manpower grew
about 1 million men during the period. Most of
this increase has been in the ground forces, al-
though there were some increases in strategic forces
as well. On the other hand, US manpower in 1975
was below its 1965 level.
The Soviets have historically maintained a
large military force with a broader range of respon-
sibilities than the military has in the US. The
Soviet manpower series includes border guards, in-
ternal security troops, and construction troops--
activities for which the US has no counterparts.
The Soviet manpower total is higher than that of
the US throughout the period, however, even if
these forces are excluded.
A4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010006-4