THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 FEBRUARY 1976

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0006015039
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 25, 1976
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PDF icon DOC_0006015039.pdf223.81 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 The President's Daily Brief February 25, 1976 2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 Exempt from general declasufication schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category, 58( l),(2)(3I declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 Ell 7) 'T'TJT7 TMT7CTTNT:XT'D TINT T N7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 February 25, 1976 Table of Contents USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev gave an impressive performance in delivering his report to the So- viet party congress yesterday. (Page 1) Thailand: Egypt-USSR: The two governments may have reached an informal understanding that could resolve, at least temporarily, the problem of Cairo's debt for economic and military assistance. (Page 6) Egypt - USSR - Western Europe: Cairo continues ef- forts to reduce its dependence on the Soviets for the maintenance of front-line combat equip- ment. (Page 7) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 'T'll L" DDT', CT FIE' Nr-r TYNT T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 USSR General Secretary Brezhnev gave an impressive performance in delivering his five-hour report to the Soviet party con- gress yesterday. His stamina, enuncia- tion, and aura of command seemed better than at any time during the past two years, according to our embassy. Brezhnev devoted unusual attention to foreign policy. He stressed continuity and said that detente has been successful and will be maintained. The Soviet leader characterized this policy, de- spite its problems, as the leading trend in world affairs. He was realistic, however, and underscored Soviet concern over the difficulties detente has encountered in the West. On China, Brezhnev was abrupt and tough. He even omitted standard Soviet references to eventual rapprochement in implying that all concessions must come from Peking. Brezhnev gave considerable emphasis to "prole- tarian internationalism," a phrase that connotes Soviet leadership of the Communist world. This clearly was meant as a retort to the French, Ital- ian, and other parties that have been making in- creasing efforts to emphasize their "independence" of Moscow. Brezhnev stated unequivocally that there can be no compromise on views that contra- dict communist ideology. In his discussion of domestic affairs, Brezh- nev reasserted past policies, gloried in his lead- ership's successes, and defended traditional ideo- logical positions. He focused particular attention on the Central Committee meeting of May 1972 which approved former president Nixon's visit to Moscow, despite the war in Vietnam. Brezhnev hinted that there was opposition at this "turning point" and boasted of his correct decision. (continued) 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 L?nD 'TLTE DDECTrIENT'D fINTT \7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 Brezhnev's review of economic performance and plans hit the same themes as outlined to the USSR Supreme Soviet in December. He was disappointed in last year's results in the agricultural and consumer sectors but promised to do better during this five- year plan period. Brezhnev referred to the 15-year plan and the new constitution he had once promised for the Congress, saying that work on these items had not been completed. 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 1-'1-171 P7'7" TT' TITIT'OTTlT7NT'D rINTT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 THAILAND 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 T 1 TOT VT" /-17k IT N7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 ( 4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 rnn ,7"T Tr DT) PC' VIE 7W-1' nNT T X7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 V711). T1JT DDL'CTTIL'Nrr (NTT V Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 EGYPT-USSR Egypt and the USSR may have reached an informal understanding last December that could resolve., at least temporarily, the problem of Cairol's debt for economic and military assistance. 25X1 25X1 The Egyptians do not acknowledge their own agreement, but the understanding apparently has been incorporated into the 1976 Soviet-Egyptian trade protocol which assumes an Egyptian surplus of about $140 million. This would continue the arrange- ment on debt retirement that has been employed since 1973. High cotton prices in 1974 gave the Egyptians a trade surplus with the USSR that permitted re- tirement of $165 million of their debt. Last year, Cairo sold most of its cotton crop to the USSR and Eastern Europe, creating the probability of a siz- able trade surplus again. Cairo undoubtedly hopes to buy time with these repayment terms. As long as the Western cotton market remains weak and the USSR is willing to buy large amounts of Egyptian cotton, repayments would not constitute a serious economic burden for Egypt. Soviet officials still consider the debt ques- tion unresolved and see it as a source of pressure on Cairo. As Western armaments are gradually in- tegrated into the Egyptian military and Western export markets recover from the current recession, Egypt's bargaining position will improve. When that time comes, Cairo may balk at meeting annual debt repayments to the Soviet Union. 6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 'nv TLIV DDLTTTIVNTT (M1 V Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 EGYPT - USSR - WESTERN EUROPE Cairo is continuing to try to reduce its dependence on the Soviets for main- taining front-line combat equipment. President Sadat told our ambassador last week that Egypt has signed a contract with Rolls Royce of Britain to overhaul MIG-17 and MIG-21 aircraft engines. The work is to be carried out in Egypt. The move to sign the engine overhaul contract with Rolls Royce undoubtably was prompted by Moscow's decision last month to stop servicing the engines. Last year the Egyptians were seeking Italian and British electronics equipment to equip or mod- ernize many of their fighters and naval craft. As a result of the changeover from Soviet arms to a mix of Communist and Western equipment, the short-term outlook for Egypt's military is one of reduced effectiveness. The cutback in Soviet arms deliveries already has impaired Egypt's military readiness. Moreover, substantial deliveries of many types of West European arms are still a long way off. 7 25X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013200010004-6