THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 FEBRUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015031
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 16, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
February 16, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 513(1).(2)A3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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February 16, 1976
Table of Contents
Nigeria: General Obasanjo, the country's new head
of state, promised yesterday to continue the
policies of his predecessor. (Page 1)
Note: Morocco - Algeria - Spanish Sahara (Page 2)
At Annex we examine the Lebanese political settle-
ment announced on Saturday.
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NIGERIA
General Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria's
new head of state, promised yesterday to
continue the policies of his predecessor
Murtala Muhammed who was assassinated dur-
ing an abortive coup on Friday. Report-
edly named head of state by unanimous
vote of the ruling Supreme Military Coun-
cil, Obasanjo was the number two man and
armed forces chief of staff in the pre-
vious hierarchy.
Nigeria's new leader was among those who helped
to shape Lagos' position favoring the popular Move-
ment in Angola and who tried to develop a Nigerian
image of more decisive leadership in Africa. He is
strongly anti-South African and can be counted on
to continue a hard line on South African issues.
Last month, Obasanjo seemed to suggest to a
foreign policy seminar for senior officers that the
regime should consider the use of oil as a political
and economic lever. He stated that "sooner or later"
Nigeria "might have to take into account the tremen-
dous importance of oil" in pursuit of the country's
national interests.
Aged 38 and born a Catholic in western Nigeria,
Obasanjo is a member of the Yoruba tribe, one of the
country's three major tribal groups. The regime's
present leadership continues to preserve a good bal-
ance among Nigeria's competing tribal and regional
interests. Obasanjo himself has a reputation for a
non-tribal approach in decision making.
In the wake of the attempted coup, Lagos and
the rest of the country are reported to be generally
quiet. Borders and airports are closed, and a cur-
few is in effect. Support for the plotters appar-
ently was limited to a few rebel units in Lagos and
in two of Nigeria's 19 states; one military governor
was also assassinated. The coup leader still has
not been apprehended.
Rumors are circulating in Lagos and elsewhere
alleging US complicity in the plot arising from US-
Nigerian differences over Angola. University stu-
dents demonstrated briefly yesterday against the US
consulate in Ibadan, a town in western Nigeria.
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NOTE
Moroccan King Hassan yesterday challenged Al-
gerian President Boumediene either to accept an
internationally guaranteed peace or openly declare
war, according to a Moroccan radio broadcast.
King Hassan accused Boumediene of breaking
promises not to use Algerian troops in the Sahara.
Hassan stated that "Algerian troops" had attacked
Moroccan forces Saturday at the Amgala oasis where
clashes occurred in late January between Moroccan
forces and Algerian troops supporting Polisario Front
guerrillas.
Algeria responded today with a statement imply-
ing that Polisario guerrillas had carried out the
attack. A Polisario spokesman claimed last week
that guerrillas had reoccupied the oasis.
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LEBANON
The political reforms announced by
President Franjiyah on Saturday meet most
of the demands of Lebanon's old-line Mus-
lim leaders, yet they preserve the most
important prerogatives of the country's
Christian minority. Although the reforms
do not include the fundamental political
changes sought by the radical leftists
and some Muslim religious leaders, they
may lead to greater leftist representa-
tion in parliament, and they promise a
variety of social and economic reforms.
If these reforms are implemented soon, Lebanon
may win a period of peace that could last several
months or even a few years. If the Christian lead-
ers attempt to delay implementation of the reforms,
however, or to introduce qualifications, the fight-
ing probably will begin again. Renewed fighting
might prompt Syria and the main Palestinian fedayeen
groups to withdraw their support from the present
political compromise.
The Reforms
In outlining the reform package, Franjiyah
sought to balance concessions for the Muslims with
reassurances for the Christians. He promised the
Muslims that Lebanon's constitution will continue
to "evolve by experience" to accommodate needed
changes in the political system, that the government
is committed to social justice, and that the country
will never abandon its "Arab character." At the
same time, he assured the Christians that the 1943
National Covenant will be preserved, that the Pales-
tinians will be expected to adhere to their past
agreements with the Lebanese government, and that
Lebanon will retain its "sovereignty."
As outlined by Franjiyah, the most important
points of the reform package provide for:
--Continuation of the present distribution of
top political posts: the president will be a
Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni
Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia
Muslim.
(continued)
Al
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--Equal Christian and Muslim representation
in parliament and revision of the electoral
law to provide for proportional representation
of sects within each major religion and for
unspecified "better representation" of the
population.
--Election of the prime minister by parliament
instead of his selection by the president.
--Changes in parliamentary voting procedures
requiring a 55-percent majority for the elec-
tion of the president and a two-thirds majority
for unspecified "issues of destiny."
--Transfer of some power from the president to
the prime minister.
--Decentralization and a merit system in the
civil service.
--Drafting of a new defense policy and strength-
ening of the army.
--Establishment of a special body to plan eco-
nomic development and a commitment to "univer-
sal social justice" through economic and social
reform.
The president did not say when these reforms
are to be implemented, nor did he confirm press re-
ports that Prime Minister Karami's cabinet will be 25X1
expanded to oversee implementation of the accord.
a
new cabinet will be formed soon, and all parties 25X1
to the political settlement agree that some action
toward implementing each reform will be taken within
a month after a more representative government is
installed.
Party and Factional Positions
The old-line Muslim leaders are likely to con-
clude that the increased representation they have
won in parliament is insignificant. Their major
gain is in the increased power of the Muslim prime
minister relative to that of the Christian president.
Prime Minister Karami, a Sunni Muslim and a
strong prime minister, gains most from the new agree-
ment. In the future, the strong control he already
exercises over parliament probably will be threatened
(continued)
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slightly less by the Christians and only a little
more by radical Muslims or leftists. In addition
he can claim that he has won the bulk of the reforms
he has been seeking since his appointment last July.
These include equal Christian and Muslim representa-
tion in parliament and the civil service, "reinter-
pretation" rather than amendment of the national
covenant, and a variety of economic and social re-
forms.
Although the leftists received no satisfaction
of their fundamental demands, they are not likely
to try to start new hostilities until they see
whether the government implements the promised eco-
nomic and social reforms. Some of the leftists will
be satisfied with limited reforms; others will be
forced into inaction by ?the military presence in
Lebanon of the Syrian-controlled Palestine Libera-
tion Army and by the decision of the major fedayeen
groups to cooperate with the Liberation Army in en-
forcing the cease-fire.
The only leftist who has promoted a coherent
set of political reforms over the past several months
has been Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt. His
party platform calls for extensive education and
social welfare programs, a merit system in the civil
service, proportional representation in parliament,
an independent judiciary, electoral reform, and some
reduction in the powers of the president.
Although Jumblatt probably will complain that
the promised reforms do not fully meet his demands,
he may conclude--if the reforms are actually imple-
mented--that he has won as much as he could reason-
ably expect. If his party--which has the largest
leftist militia--is satisifed and counsels respect
for the cease-fire, the other leftists almost cer-
tainly will find themselves forced to observe it as
well.
Leaders of the large Christian political par-
ties presumably decided to accept the reform package
because it perpetuates Christian control of the pres-
idency and--theoretically, at least--leaves in
force the 30-year-old national covenant. In addi-
tion, the Christians, even before endorsing the
final version of the package, received Syria's re-
affirmation of its guarantee that the Palestinians
would respect past agreements limiting fedayeen ac-
tivities in Lebanon.
(continued)
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A policy statement issued by the right-wing
Phalanges Party last August had indicated that the
group would approve political concessions if the
national covenant were retained, if the Palestinians
honored their commitments to the Lebanese govern-
ment, and if security were restored in Lebanon.
The army is now partially disarmed and wholly
demoralized and is unlikely to play an effective
role in internal security for several months. Peace
in Lebanon will depend on the continued willingness
of Syria and the large Palestinian groups to control
the Lebanese and fedayeen radicals and on the will-
ingness of the leaders of Lebanon's private militias
to cooperate in implementing the current political
agreement.
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