THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 FEBRUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015023
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 6, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
February 6, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(1)(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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February 6, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon-Syria: The government has announced that
President Franjiyah will make his long-planned
trip to Syria tomorrow. (Page 1)
Morocco-Algeria: The silence following the close
of Egypt's effort to mediate the dispute sug-
gests little progress was achieved. (Page 2)
Nigeria-Angola: Nigeria reportedly plans to give
the Angolan Popular Movement some limited mili-
tary aid for the first time as well as substan-
tial new economic assistance. (Page 4)
Thailand: We present a condensation of an Inter-
agency Intelligence Memorandum on the Thai
Election and Its Implications for the US.
(Page 6)
Notes: Italy; France-Somalia (Page 9)
At Annex
Sino-Soviet
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LEBANON-SYRIA
The Lebanese government has announced
that President Franjiyah will make his long-
planned trip to Syria tomorrow. Franjiyah
and Syrian President Asad presumably will
work out the remaining details of a polit-
ical settlement for Lebanon.
The political agreement probably will be made
public soon after it is approved by the two presi-
dents. Announcement of an agreement should lead to
a general relaxation of tensions in Lebanon. Prime
Minister Karami has stated that it will open the
way for an expansion of the Lebanese cabinet to
include representatives of all political factions.
Palestine Liberation Organization chairman
Yasir Arafat has announced that he will go to
Damascus today. Arafat almost certainly will seek
assurances that Damascus will refuse the expected
request from Franjiyah that Syria tighten controls
on fedayeen movements in Lebanon.
One battalion of Palestine Liberation Army
forces was withdrawn from northern Lebanon to
Syria yesterday. This is the first significant
indication that Syria may be confident that nego-
tiations will succeed and is willing to relax its
control over events in Lebanon.
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NORTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
200
I.
4?0
STATUTE MILES
Madeira Islands
(Port)
,Canary Islands (7
(Spain)
LISBON?4
PORTUGAL
ibraltar nea?
K j editerra
sea
RABAT
Bechar
Bou
Lad ham
EL AMON
,Tindouf
IA (
SPANISH
SAHARA
NOUAKCHOTT
MAURITANIA
MA
556264 2-76
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MOROCCO-ALGERIA
Moroccan and Algerian officials
kept silent yesterday at the close of
Egyptian Vice President Mubarak's week-
long effort to mediate their dispute
over Spanish Sahara. This suggests
little progress was achieved.
In a press conference on his return to Cairo
yesterday, Mubarak sounded a note of optimism but
offered few details about his talks in Rabat and
Algiers. Mubarak said that the explosive nature
of the situation had been defused and implied fur-
ther diplomatic efforts will be made in the next
few days.
The Egyptian's public statements are not worth
very much in this case. The Egyptians sought to
mediate in the Algerian-Moroccan crisis because
they wanted to look like international Arab lead-
ers after they had failed to influence the Lebanese
situation.
The Moroccans, meanwhile, are continuing to
strengthen their militar forces in the south.
10 Boeing
ig ts have carried munitions to El Aaiun since
January 27. According to a source of the defense
attache in Rabat, there are 9 F-5 fighters now fly-
ing operations from El Aaiun. The air force group
there has requested additional pilots for its 13
helicopters. The defense attache also reports that
many army reservists have been called up recently.
A Foreign Ministry official in Rabat said that
Moroccan forces occupied Tifariti, some 65 miles
east of Amgala, without opposition on February 4.
Our embassy in Rabat reports that a Moroccan offi-
cial said on Tuesday the military sweep in Spanish
Sahara is being conducted in a deliberate manner
to give mediation efforts a chance. The official
indicated Mahbes, a Polisario stronghold near the
Algerian border, would be the final objective.
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(continued)
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The Algerians are also rapidly build-
ing up their forces
Satellite photography of early January confirms
an increase in Algerian troop strength at Tindouf.
Armored strength has been increased from a company
to two battalions of tanks in less than a month,
and the number of personnel tents has grown five-
fold since December to over 300. We estimate that
Algeria may now have up to two brigades garrisoned
in the Tindouf area.
Six SU-7 fighter-bombers at Bechar and nine
MIG 15 or 17 fighters that were seen in photography
at Bou Ladham for the first time in late December
were not there in the January photography. MIG
squadrons do remain at Bechar and Tindouf, and a
new warning radar also has been erected near the
Tindouf airfield.
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NIGERIA-ANGOLA
Nigeria reportedly plans to give the
Angolan Popular Movement some limited
military aid for the first time as well
as substantial new economic assistance.
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A Nigerian delegation visited Luanda late last
month and worked out a tentative agreement
The impending agreement underscores Nigeria's
strong commitment to the Popular Movement to which
Cit has already extended some $20 million in assist-
ance. With its projected new aid, Lagos also may
be trying to show the Popular Movement that it does
not have to look exclusively to the Soviet Union
and Cuba for assistance. The Nigerians view the
extensive Soviet and Cuban role in Angola as a
necessary expedient, but are deeply concerned that
the Luanda regime may find itself irretrievably
wedded to Moscow and Havana.
Soviet and Cuban military support to
the MPLA increased markedly during J,anuary.
(continued)
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The value of this support is estimated to be
at least $88 million--almost half of the total
amount provided during the entire March-December
1975 period. This raises the total value of Soviet
and Cuban support to the MPLA since March 1975 to
an estimated $267 million. The bulk of the increased
assistance in January stems from the vastly expanded
Cuban effort to support the 12,000 Cuban troops now
estimated to be in Angola. The expanded levels of
Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA appear de-
signed to enable the MPLA and Cuban troops to win
a quick military victory.
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THAILAND
We present below a condensation of
an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on
the Thai Election and Its Implications
for the US.
With elections scheduled for April, Thailand
is experiencing a growing sense of malaise concern-
ing the country's experiment with parliamentary de-
mocracy.
--This sentiment is expressed by King Phumi-
phon, the military, and many prominent civil-
ian figures.
In these circumstances, there is a strong pos-
sibility that the military might decide to assume
control. For the moment, the King appears to be
against such a course, and many military leaders
would be loath to act against the King's wishes.
The situation is fragile, however, and subject to
quick change.
--Some younger officers are maneuvering to
force their superiors to take a stand on the
question of a military takeover.
--Given the rivalries within the military, it
is also possible that one or another military
leader might attempt a preemptive coup.
Other developments which would increase the
likelihood of a coup are:
--A sharp deterioration of the security situ-
ation.
--A breakdown in public order caused by wide-
spread strikes or anti-government disorders.
--The prospect of a left-of-center coalition
coming to power which would threaten the
vested interests of the military and conserv-
ative elements in Thailand.
Short of a coup, there is also a possibility
that the elections may be postponed, leaving Khu-
krit, the present caretaker prime minister, ?to rule
through emergency decree.
(continued)
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--Khukrit, the military, and the King may well
come to prefer this alternative over going
through with the elections.
Implications for the US During the Election Campaign
--By the March 20 deadline on removal of US
combat forces, the US will probably be able to
complete the negotiations now in train with the
Khukrit government regarding the residual US
military presence.
--But there is no assurance that an agreement
signed by Khukrit will be honored by a new
government.
--The election campaign probably will compli-
cate Thai-US relations. The US presence is
likely to become an issue in the campaign, and
campaign pressures may force some candidates
to insist on a total US military withdrawal.
--The recent appointment of Anan Panyarachun,
former ambassador to the US, as the Foreign
Ministry's Undersecretary adds another element
of uncertainty to Thai-US relations. Anan,
who takes office at a time when Foreign Minis-
ter Chatchai will be concentrating most of his
attention on the election, may try to take ad-
vantage of the situation to give Thai foreign
policy a more neutralist cast.
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'Implications for the US After an Election
--If an election is held, it would be likely
to bring another centrist-conservative govern-
ment into power.
--Such a government would probably be as frag-
mented and contentious as the present govern-
ment, but it would keep Thai policy toward the
US more or less along present lines.
(continued)
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--A less likely possibility is either a coali-
tion based exclusively on rightist elements,
or one which included the Socialists.
--A rightist government would be cooperative
with US interests, but would still be restrained
by political considerations on how far it could
go, or appear to go, in accommodating the US.
--A government in which the Socialists had a
strong voice would make it difficult, if not
impossible, for the US to maintain any military
presence in Thailand. Such a government, how-
ever, could prompt the military either to
force the government to resign or to overthrow
it.
In the event of a military takeover, the resul-
tant government would be sympathetic to US interests.
--It would be unlikely, however, to reverse
the long-term trend toward a more nonaligned
Thai foreign policy. Nevertheless, a military
government might call for a substantial in-
crease in US assistance if faced with a greatly
expanded insurgency or a breakdown of civil
order in the country.
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NOTES
The way has been cleared for Aldo Moro to form
a Christian Democratic minority government in Italy,
although his party colleagues still have misgivings
about doing so.
The Socialists and Republicans agreed yester-
day to abstain on Moro's package of emergency eco-
nomic measures, enabling the Christian Democrats to
win a confidence vote and secure approval of their
economic legislation. This falls short of the "ma-
jority support" on economic policy the Christian
Democrats wanted. The new Moro government would
have a narrower parliamentary base than any formed
in recent years and would be open to criticism by
all parties if the economy continued to deteriorate.
Such a government would probably last only a few
months, but it would give the Socialists and Chris-
tian Democrats time to hold scheduled party con-
gresses and to debate the pros and cons of a par-
liamentary election.
The border between Somalia and the French Ter-
ritory of Afars and Issas remained quiet yesterday
following a clash between French and Somali forces
on Wednesday.
France has flown some two hundred gendarmes to
the territory as reinforcements; local French of-
ficials fear pro-Somali forces might stir up trou-
ble. Wednesday's shooting incident occurred when
French troops stormed a school bus near the border
to free 30 French school children held hostage by
guerrillas of the Front for the Liberation of the
Somali Coast, a paper organization run by Somalia.
One of the children is still being held in Somalia.
France and Somalia were already at odds over French
plans for the territory's eventual independence.
President Siad has refused to abandon Somalia's
historical claim to the territory, and he reportedly
is prepared to support an insurgency there if France
does not make independence arrangements acceptable
to Somalia.
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CHINA?USSR
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Top Secret
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