THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 JANUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015015
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 28, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
January 28, 1976
2
Top ecr 25X1
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category,58(1).(2),(3)
declassified ?Mal on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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January 28, 1976
Table of Contents
Angola: Popular Movement and Cuban forces have re-
sumed their advance against the National Front's
remaining positions in northern Angola.
(Page 1)
Morocco-Algeria: Tensions between the two countries
sharply increased yesterday when the Algerian
press service accused Moroccan troops of at-
tacking an Algerian army unit in the Sahara.
(Page 2)
Spain: Prime Minister Arias is expected to confront
the establishment with some hard choices on
the extent of changes to be introduced into the
Spanish political system when he presents his
program to parliament today. (Page 4)
Lebanon: The cease-fire is now in effect in almost
all areas of Beirut. (Page 7)
Note: USSR-China (Page 8)
At Annex we present a memorandum on the Prospects
for Angola.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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BRAllAVILLE
KINSHASA
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SOUT -WEST AFRICA
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1
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ANGOLA
Popular Movement and Cuban forces
have resumed their advance against the
National Fronts remaining positions
in northern Angola.
Late last week they drove Front troops out of
Damba and occupied it. Popular Movement forces are
now expected to move against the Front's last two
major strongpoints in the north--Sao Salvador and
Santo Antonio do Zaire.
The Popular Movement is also pressing ahead in
central Angola, where it is advancing on Huambo (
(Nova Lisboa), Bie (Silva Porto), and Lobito. The
Movement probably will try to take Huambo before
making a serious move on Bie. Forces targeted
against Lobito already have advanced as far as Novo
Redondo.
National Union President Savimbi reportedly
sees this week and next as "critical" for his group.
In anticipation of heavy fighting for Huambo, he is
moving his political headquarters from there to Bie,
the Union's major military base. Huambo also has
served as the seat of the nominal joint government
proclaimed last November by the National Front and
National Union.
The Soviet military airlift to An-
gola continues unabated.
Since January 21, eight AN-22 heavy transports
have flown to Luanda, and two more aircraft arrived
in Conakry from Moscow yesterday. They are expected
to fly on to Luanda sometime today. The Soviet
Kresta II cruiser that left Conakry last Saturday
is in the Gulf of Guinea and should rendezvous with
the landing ship there today. The LST has been op-
erating some 300 to 500 miles west of Pointe Noire
for over two weeks. The Kotlin destroyer and three
naval oilers remain at Conakry.
1
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26
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ATLANTIC
OCEAN ce.ta
(SO Sp.)
Rabat
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Canary Is. M
SPAN I$
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MAURITANIA
Nouakchott
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ALGERIA
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CANARIA
Spanish Sahara
FUERTEVENTURA
CANARY ISLANDS
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MAURITANIA
Tindouf
50 100 Miles
50 100 Kilometers
26-
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MOROCCO-ALGERIA
Tension between Morocco and Algeria
sharply increased yesterday after Alge-
rian media accused the Moroccans of at-
tacking Algerian army troops assigned to
transport food and medicine to Saharans
north of the town of Guelta in Spanish
Sahara.
This is the first confirmed encounter between
troops of the two countries since the trouble over
Spanish Sahara started; it is also the first open
acknowledgment by Algiers that its forces are in-
side the territory.
President Boumediene yesterday convened an
emergency joint session of the Revolutionary Coun-
cil and the Council of Ministers to discuss the in-
cident. A communiqu4 issued afterward charged that
the Moroccan attack was "extremely serious" and
warned that the situation could get out of hand if
such incidents continued. The communique said fur-
ther that the government has decided to take meas-
ures. According to an intercepted message, all Al-
gerian army combat veterans have been ordered to re-
port to the nearest gendarmerie station today.
Algeria quickly contacted other Arab states
about the incident.
Further agitation of the incident by the Alge-
rians--especially if they repeat the charge that Al-
gerian troops were attacked--could presage a strong
response. If Algiers has reached such a decision,
it might opt for an attack by aircraft based at Tin-
douf, rather than a ground operation. Such action
could, nevertheless, lead to additional clashes
with Moroccan forces.
(continued)
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Rabat is continuing to strengthen its forces in
the Sahara and in southeastern Morocco.
three infantry bat-
talions, totaling over 2,500 men, are to be moved
into those areas this week. Two of the battalions
will be stations at Semara and the third will be
positioned near the Algerian border. Rabat also
has ordered a "maximum number" of F-5 fighter air-
craft to move to El Aaiun as soon as possible.
25X1
The additional Moroccan forces going to the
Sahara may have been assigned a role in a reported
joint Moroccan-Mauritanian offensive aimed at sweep-
ing the guerrillas from the Sahara. Algeria prob-
ably has learned of the planned drive and may have
sent in a supply column to aid the Polisario forces.
Any such drive against the guerrillas is likely to
have only limited success at best.
3
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SPAIN
When Prime Minister Arias presents
his program to the Cortes (parliament)
today, he is expected to confront the
establishment with some hard choices on
the extent of changes to be introduced
into the Spanish political system.
Arias is expected to propose measures that will
permit political parties, with the exception of the
Communists and various extremist groups, to partic-
ipate legally in the electoral process.
Arias is also expected to call for the estab-
lishment of a commission to find ways to provide
greater autonomy for the Basque and Catalan minori-
ties, and to announce economic measures designed to
improve the lot of the middle class. He wants to
schedule a constitutional referendum later this year
to cover a number of the reforms he is proposing.
Most members of parliament and the conserva-
tive 17-man Council of the Realm will regard the
government's program as a direct attack on the sta-
bility of the Franco era and the privileged position
they have enjoyed. The current constitution is
vague as to whether these two bodies can prevent the
cabinet from redistributing political power. What-
ever the case, the present cabinet would prefer to
have their cooperation and will work for a compro-
mise solution.
Rightist Challenge
The government has already faced one rightist
challenge. Last Friday the Council of the Realm
voted against postponing parliamentary elections
(now scheduled for March) for one year. The gov-
ernment wants the additional time to implement re-
forms that will make the new parliament more repre-
sentative. The Council later reversed its vote but
in effect served notice that the far right would
oppose the government's liberalization plan.
(continued)
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The far right is strongly represented in the
security forces, and there still is strong conserv-
ative sentiment in the upper ranks of the military.
By all accounts, however, the military is determined
to keep out of politics unless liberalization seems
to be proceeding at an unhealthy pace or there is a
general breakdown of public order. The government's
success in quelling recent demonstrations and strikes
will have reassured the military on these points.
Rightist extremists have apparently been lying
low since police in Barcelona arrested ten of their
number--a move unprecedented under Franco. They
may attempt to spark a confrontation at future left-
ist demonstrations, or they could opt for mass ral-
lies of their own. So far there has been no sign
of this, and it may be that they fear poor turnouts
from a population that, on the whole, seems to de-
sire change.
View from the Left
The left, already highly vocal under the new
government, will not be satisfied by Arias' program
either. It will continue to clamor for complete
amnesty for all political prisoners, legalization
of all political parties including the Communists,
free trade unions, and unlimited rights of assembly,
speech, petition, and strike.
The left is split over how fast certain changes
should be implemented and how much pressure should
be exerted on the government. The most radical
groups, led by the Communists, want an immediate
"rupture" with the Franco system and are willing to
exert whatever pressure is necessary--including a
general strike that would cripple the country eco-
nomically--to achieve it. The more moderate ele-
ments, mainly Christian Democrats, are inclined to
try to work through the system to speed up the pace
of change.
Tension within the left will probably increase
if the government follows through with its inten-
tion to legalize the non-Communist parties. To pre-
vent the government from isolating their party from
the rest of the leftist opposition, the Communists
have sought to strengthen ties with other leftists.
But there still is enough residual distrust of the
Communists among Socialists and Christian Democrats
to make a united opposition unlikely.
(continued)
5
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The Socialist Workers' Party appears to be the
only viable alternative to the Communists with poten-
tial appeal to the workers. Reaching an agreement
with them could, therefore, be the government's key
to coming to terms with the workers and the left in
general.
In sum, Arias' program is likely to draw flak
from the right and the left. Both sides are aware
of the other's capacity to create trouble, however,
and the spirit of compromise that has prevailed
since Franco's death should continue. The Council
of the Realm's last minute approval of the election
postponement was one sign of this. Arias probably
won that round, however, at the cost of toning down
the reform package he unveils today.
6
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LEBANON
The cease-fire is now in effect in
almost all areas of Beirut. Christian
and Muslim militiamen withdrew from their
positions in the hotel district late Mon-
day, and the Christians lifted their
blockade of Palestinian refugee camps
yesterday.
Opposing militia forces have not yet withdrawn
from one troublespot in the southern part of the
city; isolated clashes continue outside the capital
in eastern Lebanon. These are not likely to upset
the cease-fire as long as the political talks con-
tinue to progress.
Limited commercial activity has resumed in
Beirut. Basic foodstuffs and heating oil have been
distributed to most areas of the city, and shortages
are no longer acute.
Representatives of the various Lebanese fac-
tions reportedly are near agreement on concrete po-
litical reforms. The cabinet is scheduled to meet
today, presumably to approve the tentative agree-
ment so that it can be presented to parliament.
Neither group is likely to delay endorsement of any
compromise already approved by leaders of the prin-
cipal Christian and Muslim factions.
The politicians reportedly are negotiating now
more for form than substance. Their commitment to
the projected accord is still so tenuous that either
the Christians or Muslims might raise objections
serious enough to derail the talks. Ultra-conserv-
ative Christians are resisting concessions by their
leadership. Elements within both the Christian and
conservative Muslim communities are complaining
about the Syrian and Palestinian "occupation" of
Lebanon.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam returned to
Damascus yesterday, telling reporters he would be
back in Beirut today. He is expected to make ar-
rangements for President Franjiyah's long-awaited
trip to Syria for consultations with President Asad.
7
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Siino-SovileitlEowdev:NlewDefferasiveSitgioroglPoirots
Tran'Sbayk
Military
District
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Transb ykal Military District
Tsugol
Olovyannaya
LINE D
66 firing positions
LINE B
65 firing positions
Bezrechnaya
B orzya
Dosatuy
MONGOLIA
540
MILES 0
114
LINE A?
0 firing positio
CHINA
18 Shenyang Military Region
50?
559193 1-76 CIA
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NOTE
Recent satellite photography shows that the
Soviets are constructing another series of defen-
sive strong points along their border with China.
This is the second static defense area we have
seen opposite northeastern China, which has been
a target of a fairly intensive Soviet reconnais-
sance program over the past year. To increase
their capability to respond to developments in
the eastern USSR, the Soviets also recently moved
a heavy-lift regiment from Moscow to the Siberian
Military District. This regiment, with some 250
transporters, will substantially improve the mo-
bility of Soviet armored forces in the area, en-
abling them to deploy their armored vehicles
quickly.
8
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PROSPECTS FOR ANGOLA
Once the conventional military bat-
tles in Angola have come to an end, the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola?which holds a clear superiority
of power--is likely as time passes to
change its no-compromise posture and
attempt at least a token reconciliation
with its two rivals, the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola and
the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola. Neither FNLA President Holden
Roberto nor UNITA President Jonas Savimbi,
however, is likely to be offered a role
in any such reconciliation.
Such an approach is the only practical one
from the MPLA's standpoint. The Movement professes
to be multi-racial and multi-tribal, but it is
basically urban-based and relies heavily on mulat-
tos and the Kimbundu tribe for support. Its links
to the Bakongo and Ovimbundu, who provide the
basic support for the FNLA and UNITA respectively,
are virtually non-existent.
Angola's economic prospects are heavily de-
pendent upon the interrelationship of the terri-
tory's three major tribal areas. Angola's once-
thriving coffee plantations, in the Bakongo north,
have traditionally been cultivated by Ovimbundu
from the south. The major port capable of handling
coffee shipments is Lobito, which is in Ovimbundu
territory.
Exploitation of Cabinda's oil production
should present no major problems for the MPLA,
although technical difficulties would delay full-
scale resumption of production for several months.
The MPLA has gained effective military control
over the enclave, and opposition from the miniscule
Front for the Liberation of Cabinda will become
less significant as time passes. Continued oil
production will require foreign technical assist-
ance, but that can be obtained from the Soviet
Union or other Communist states.
(continued)
Al
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Implications for Angola's Neighbors
Zaire. The MPLA is likely to be in a strong
position to curtail extensive external support to
any FNLA or UNITA guerrilla operations. Now that
the FNLA has collapsed, there are indications that
Zairian President Mobutu, who has supported the
Front for a decade, is having serious doubts about
continuing his backing. Any effort by Mobutu to
underwrite guerrilla operations by either the FNLA
or UNITA would draw immediate retaliation in kind
from the Popular Movement against Zaire's copper-
producing Shaba (formerly Katanga) region. In ad-
dition, Zaire has pressing economic problems. Re-
viving the economy rests in considerable part on
regaining access to the Benguela railroad and the
port of Lobito as the most economically efficient
means of moving Zaire's exports and imports.
Mobutu probably will give no more than small-
scale assistance to the National Front--enough to
keep it alive as an exile organization.r-
Mobutu's immediate chances of improving his
relations with the MPLA are not good, but if he
cuts his support of the Front, the Popular Movement
probably will allow him access to the Benguela
railroad, and thereby to the sea.
Zambia. Zambian President Kaunda will also
be forced by economic necessity and his need to
get the Benguela railroad reopened to seek an ac-
commodation with the Popular Movement. Kaunda is
on much firmer ground than Mobutu. Despite his
personal dislike for Neto, Kaunda has not publicly
attacked either the man or his organization di-
rectly. He has openly criticized the Soviet and
Cuban presence in Angola, but his remarks have
been moderate, emphasizing the need for withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Angola and an African
solution to the Angolan problem--a position that
is not likely to be held against him. Zambia's
support for the National Union for the Total In-
dependence of Angola was modest.
(continued)
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South Africa. A decisive MPLA victory is not
likely to cause South African leaders to reverse
their decision to withdraw the South African forces
that had been supporting FNLA/UNITA operations in
northern and central Angola. Pretoria decided to
keep troops in southern Angola along the Angola-
Namibia border and to protect the major Cunene hy-
droelectric complex--originally a joint Portuguese
South African project--that is already providing
power and water for Namibia.
Pretoria's future moves in Angola presumably
will be shaped by debates in Parliament during the
next few weeks, by the unfolding of the MPLA's
strategy toward Namibia as its forces approach the
border, and by international reactions to South
Africa's strengthened but defensive military pos-
ture along the Angola-Namibia border.
Whatever South Africa decides, an MPLA victory
in Angola will give new heart to the various insur-
gent movements targeted against South Africa. We
believe that the MPLA, as well as Cuba, will find
it expedient to encourage such groups and to pro-
vide them both sanctuary and support. The South
West African Peoples Organization, the Namibian
nationalist organization that has maintained a
small guerrilla force in Zambia, is apparently in
contact with the MPLA.
Increased insurgent activity, most likely in
Namibia, could provoke Pretoria to launch pre-
emptive strikes beyond the presently contemplated
defensive perimeter. This is a course of action
Prime Minister Vorster hopes to avoid. Any mili-
tary venture outside South Africa is a politically
sensitive matter for Vorster because the South Af-
rican Defense Force is comprised largely of youth-
ful white conscripts. The Angolan intervention
has already necessitated an extension of the one-
year terms for those who were sent to Angola and
a call-up of at least 8,000 white reservists.
Implications for Cuba
A substantial Cuban presence in Angola is
likely even after an MPLA military victory. The
size of this presence will largely be determined
by:
(continued)
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--the MPLA's ability to secure and administer
the country;
--the MPLA's need for technical assistance in
the political, administrative, and economic
fields;
--the cost to Havana of maintaining a large
contingent there.
The Cubans have been unfavorably impressed
with the MPLA's organizational weaknesses and its
questionable behavior in combat. They are there-
fore aware of the impact an abrupt withdrawal would
have. Thus, the Cuban military force that remains
will be strong enough to enable the MPLA to over-
come any military threat that might arise either
,internally or externally; it will also be large
enough to assist the MPLA in policing the entire
country and in organizing, training, and developing
Angola's national security forces.
In addition to combat troops, the remaining
Cuban military contingent will probably include
military advisers for organizing and training air,
naval, and ground forces; militia training teams;
Interior Ministry advisers for the creation of a
national police force and a secret political police
force; and technical personnel to maintain--and
train Angolans to maintain--weapons and materiel.
The Cubans must also maintain their own supply
system until the MPLA can carry out this function
satisfactorily.
The Cubans will almost certainly try to fill
at least part of the economic vacuum created by
the departure of the managerial, supervisory, and
technical personnel of the colonial era. For this,
Havana may send to Angola Cuban technical experts
and economic advisers now in other African coun-
tries.
To help the MPLA broaden its political base,
the Cubans will probably send political cadre and
experts in the formation of mass organizations.
Havana will probably also send technicians and
advisers to create a system of mass communications.
(continued)
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Cuban resources are limited, and Havana will
look to Moscow for relief from a large part of the
bill for Angolan assistance.
In Africa, Havana will continue to support
politically, militarily, and technically those
governments and those movements it believes to
have adequate revolutionary potential. The Cuban
presence in Angola will almost certainly include
elements responsible for liaison with the South
West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and other
such organizations. It is difficult to imagine
Havana's passing up the opportunity to channel
aid to SWAPO or other rebel groups across Angola's
borders. The Cubans may also conduct subversive
operations against the governments of South Africa
and Zaire.
The Cubans will be quick to make political
capital out of an MPLA victory. Cuban media will
be full of claims of a US defeat and, although
the Cuban role may be downplayed somewhat out of
respect for Cuban domestic sensitivities, will
describe the MPLA victory as further evidence that
the balance of forces in the world has shifted in
favor of the socialist countries. Havana will at-
tempt to link the US with South Africa in an ef-
fort to drive a wedge between the US and the rest
of black Africa. Cuba will also cite its partici-
pation in the Angolan civil war as proof of its
continued commitment to revolutionary principles
and may use it to demand a greater voice in a
leadership role among the countries of the third
world.
Implications for the Soviet Union
Moscow's investment in Angola has grown con-
siderably over the past six months. Because of
the great international attention and concern and
because of Moscow's substantial and undeniable role
in bringing the MPLA to power, Angola is likely to
be seen in Africa and the third world as a test
of the USSR's effectiveness as a patron--particu-
larly when it faced pressures from the US to de-
sist in the name of detente.
(continued)
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The Soviets almost certainly have mixed feel-
ings about the Angolan venture. There would be
disgruntlement in Moscow about this use of the So-
viet Union's resources. The Soviets are also well
aware that ventures in the third world have a way
of not paying off: how can they be certain that
Neto will stay in power, or even if he does, that
he will not prove to be an ingrate?
Such reservations are likely to be subordinated
to other calculations. The Soviets will congratu-
late themselves on having pushed the MPLA over the
top to the instruction of other struggling "libera-
tion" movements in southern Africa and elsewhere.
Leaders in the third world are likely to be more
respectful of the Soviet Union's power and less
concerned at being sacrificed at some point to the
USSR's larger interests.
The Soviets will probably come quickly to the
aid of the Angolan economy and almost certainly
will try to get the oil flowing again from Cabinda.
If a market is needed, the Soviets will provide it.
The Soviets will provide technical assistance and
the wherewithal to get the Benguela railroad oper-
ating, and to repair the damage that has been done
to important roads, bridges, and factories. The
Soviets, or perhaps the Cubans, will help out with
the coffee plantations.
Oh the administrative side, the Soviets will
help out with training funds, and advice. Programs
that are already underway to strengthen the tech-
nical capability of the MPLA's armed forces and
security service will go forward.
There is, of course, a potential for competi-
tion between the Soviets and the Cubans. Our guess
is that Neto will try to play the two socialist
allies against each other and, to some degree, he
may succeed. The Cubans will have the advantage
of having shed blood on behalf of the socialist
cause; the Soviets have controlled the resources
and paid the bills. The essential coincidence of
view between Havana and Moscow seems likely to con-
tinue in Angola, at least for the near future.
The Soviets will send greater numbers of their own
technical personnel, but will see no compelling
reason to displace the Cubans.
(continued)
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Moscow's advice to Neto is likely to emphasize
the need to fashion an organization that can bring
all of Angola firmly under the MPLA's control.
the So-
viets are likely to advise Neto to co-opt as many
former adversaries as he can in the interest of ex-
tending his writ over the badly fragmented country.
The Soviets are also likely to believe benefits
are to be gained both for Neto and themselves by a
non-belligerent attitude toward Zaire and Zambia.
If Neto proves unwilling or unable to go this
course, Moscow would back a less conciliatory pol-
icy.
The Soviets would like to use their position
in Angola to gain new influence in Zaire, Zambia,
and Mozambique. The Soviets will present them-
selves to Mobutu and Kaunda as the potential friend
in Neto's court. But this cannot work if Neto
proves intransigent in dealing with his neighbors.
The connection is somewhat different in Mozambique.
The Moscow hope that its support for Neto, in con-
trast to China's opposition to him, and Neto's own
good words to his long-time ally Machel will move
Mozambique away from China and toward the USSR.
Moscow will also attempt to use its MPLA con-
nection to strengthen contacts with such African
revolutionary movements as SWAPO, and with such
nationalist figures as Nkomo and Sithole in Rho-
desia. The latter, who heretofore has been asso-
ciated with the Chinese, evidently will soon go to
the Soviet Union. Although Moscow will turn a
benign face to Mobutu and Kaunda, the Soviets will
also make use of their position in Angola, and
their new prestige, to support leftist elements
working against both men.
As for the US, Moscow will expect that Wash-
ington will gradually accustom itself to the con-
solidation of the MPLA's position in Angola, and
that, in the process, Angola will recede as an
irritant to bilateral relations.
Implications for African Attitudes Toward US
In addition to encouraging nations like Zaire
and Zambia toward accommodation with the MPLA, the
collapse of the UNITA/FNLA position could encourage
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anti-American sentiments in these and other black
African states. In Africa as elsewhere there is
truth to the adage that nothing succeeds like suc-
cess. Both Mobutu and Kaunda will feel that they
have been let down by the US, and as a result they
will feel it increasingly necessary to demonstrate
their "African" loyalties. The attitudes of other
black African governments toward the US will be
affected in varying degrees. In general, there
will be increased skepticism over US resolve and
reliability. The Nigerian military government,
for example, which has tended to blow hot and cold
in its relations with the US, will undoubtedly be
pushed a few more degrees toward the cold end of
the spectrum. Ethiopia's basically neutral atti-
tude toward the US is likely to veer toward the
negative.
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Top Secret
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