THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 JANUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015006
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 17, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
January 17, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B( I ),( 2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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11%, 1II1_, 1 1\1_,01.1_,1_,1 _I. LIiNJ,1
January 17, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon: The Asad-Franjiyah meeting, originally
set for today, has been put off until steps
have been taken to halt the dangerous escala-
tion in the fighting. (Page 1)
USSR: There has been little change in the status
of Soviet ships in the western Mediterranean
and African waters since yesterday. (Page 4)
Notes: USSR-China; Panama-Cuba; Iceland-UK
(Pages 5 and 6)
At Annex we present an assessment of the signifi-
cance of the military collapse of the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola.
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Palestinian Refugee Camps
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559119 1-76
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LEBANON
The Asad-Franjiyah meeting, origi-
nally set for today, has been put off un-
til steps have been taken to halt the dan-
gerous escalation in fighting. To under-
score the Syrians' sense of urgency,
President Asad sent his chief of staff to
Beirut yesterday to bolster Prime Minister
Karami's efforts to arrange another cease-
fire.
The Christians are insisting on a reduction in
the fighting before opening negotiations, but this
may be only a tough negotiating tactic or an effort
to delay serious negotiations while they seek to
consolidate their military gains in the area of the
refugee camps. The result of President Franjiyah's
consultations with Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and
Greek Catholic leaders clearly suggests that when-
ever he and Asad do meet, Franjiyah will insist
first and foremost on discussing the Lebanese-Pales-
tinian problem rather than the Muslims' demands for
political and economic reforms.
Moderates on both sides as well as the Syrians,
however, apparently recognize the urgent need to
defuse the present situation because of the larger,
more open involvement of both the Palestinians and
Lebanese armed forces on opposing sides.
Meanwhile, there was no let-up in the fighting
in the north around Tripoli and Zagharta or east of
Beirut around Zahlah. In the capital, Phalangist
and other Christian positions in the commercial and
hotel districts were becoming more precarious as a
result of the combined leftist-Palestinian counter-
attack to relieve the pressure on the two besieged
refugee camps, Tall Zatar and Jisar al-Basha. The
Palestinians claimed late yesterday that they had
captured the headquarters of the Phalangists and Na-
tional Liberals' militia in that area.
(continued)
1
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _
PLO chief Yasir Arafat probably is under in-
creasing pressure to commit more of his forces to
avert a repetition of the Palestinian rout in Jor-
dan in 1970. A large portion of the Palestinian
forces in northern and central Lebanon probably is
already involved in the fighting. Despite his re-
luctance to become more heavily involved during the
UN Security Council debate, Arafat may commit more
of his forces in southern Lebanon, as he did yester-
day to reinforce Damour. He is likely, however, to
resist uncovering the Palestinians' southern flank.
There are no military indications of Egyptian
preparations to intervene. Activity of the Egyp-
tian armed forces appears to be normal. President
Sadat and Foreign Minister Fahmi both have reiter-
ated within recent days their view that neither
Arab nor other foreign intervention would solve the
Lebanese problem.
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CUBA-ANGOLA
Havana's decision to continue its
buildup in Angola beyond 1,000 troops may
have been a Cuban initiative only belat-
edly accepted by the Soviets.
This is the first assertion we have seen that
the Cubans took the initiative in expanding their
combat force in Angola, or that the Soviets had
qualms about the buildup. We have assumed--and
still do--that substantial Cuban combat forces ori-
ginally entered the conflict at Soviet behest. It
would appear, however, that the heavy buildup that
followed may have resulted from Cuba's assessment
that more combat personnel were necessary to pro-
tect and capitalize on its initial investment of
troops.
We cannot confirm these casualty figures and
suspect they are exaggerated. Nevertheless, Cuba's
losses so far probably have been higher than Havana
expected, which would explain the government's re-
luctance to provide the Cuban people with any de-
tails of the role Cuban troops are playing in the
war.
3
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VP\
?.
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Gull of Cadir
Strait o,
Ra)
Morocco
Conakry
Abidjan
Atlantic Ocean
559!23 1-76 CEA
Gulf of Guinea
590 lop() Miles
500 10'00 Kilometers
' Pointe Noire
0
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_ _ _ . _ _
USSR
There has been little change in the
status of Soviet ships in the western Med-
iterranean and West African waters since
yesterday.
One change is impending--the movement of the
Kresta-II-class cruiser from the vicinity of Cona-
kry to a rendezvous with the landing ship currently
south of Ivory Coast. We do not know when or where
this will take place. The cruiser is probably off
Conakry in company with the Kotlin-class destroyer
that has been in the area for several days.
The Sverdlov cruiser has remained just inside
the Strait of Gibraltar since yesterday. It is
still being accompanied by two F-class submarines.
The cruiser's brief trip through
the Strait of Gibraltar and back suggests that
Moscow may have changed its original orders to the
cruiser, whatever these were.
Meanwhile, the Kashin-class destroyer which
arrived in the Gulf of Cadiz on January 11 is
still there. It has begun to shadow the US carrier
group due to arrive in Rota later today.
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NOTES
An article on China in Pravda yesterday--the
most authoritative Soviet commentary on China since
Chou En-Zai's death and the release of the Soviet
helicopter crew--took a very critical Zine on Mao
and studiously avoided any conciliatory note.
The main theme, although not a new one, was
that it is Mao and his "henchmen" who stand in the
way of better relations between the two countries.
The article, however, mentions that there are Chi-
nese "patriots" who oppose Mao's policies--an un-
usually explicit reference to the possible exis-
tence of individuals or factions within China who
advocate less hostile relations with the USSR.
A specific reference to several anti-Soviet
articles that have appeared recently in the Chinese
press may be a warning to the Soviet people not to
jump to any conclusions that the release of the
helicopter crew means China's policy toward the
Soviet Union has changed. It may also have been
intended to put the Chinese on notice that they
will have to tone down their rhetoric before they
can expect any reciprocal gesture from Moscow.
Panamanian leader General Torrijos' behavior
during his visit to Cuba from January 10 to 15 and
the final, mildly wo27-15-7 communique' demonstrated
considerable concern for US sensitivities and the
prospects for eventual ratification of a new canal
treaty.
The communique skirted delicate topics with
general statements supporting self-determination,
territorial integrity, and anticolonialism. Tor-
rijos did receive enthusiastic support from Castro
for Panama's effort to reassert sovereignty over
the canal. In speeches during the visit, however,
both leaders stressed the need for Panama to nego-
tiate calmly with the US, and both noted the dif-
ferences between the Panamanian and Cuban exper-
iences. Castro held his news conference--at which
Angola and US relations were raised--after Torrijos'
plane departed, possibly in deference to the Pana-
manian's concern about avoiding such sensitive sub-
jects during his visit.
(continued)
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-1 A- L L J L., I.
Icelandic Prime Minister HaZZgrimsson said
yesterday that Reykjavik would postpone a break in
relations with the UK for a week to allow Britain
to withdraw its frigates from Icelandic waters.
The Icelandic delay is apparently a response
to Foreign Secretary Callaghan's offer to withdraw
all British vessels from Icelandic waters for one
week in return for a pledge from Reykjavik to com-
promise on the size of the British annual catch.
When talks broke off last November, Iceland refused
to budge beyond 65,000 tons. London wanted a
110,000-ton figure but indicated a willingness to
compromise. The breathing spell will give NATO
Secretary General Luns an opportunity to confer
with Callaghan next week.
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LUANDA
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
ZAMBIA
559116 1-76 CIA
SOU H-WEST AFRICA
(Intern tional Territory)
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ANGOLA
The military collapse of the National
Front is the first major turning point in
the Angolan civil war since it began last
summer. As such, it presents new options
to the struggle's participants.
It is highly unlikely that the National Front
will be able to regain its former military status
in northern Angola as long as the Cubans continue
to aid the Popular Movement. Given time to recuper-
ate, however, the Front probably could maintain a
low-level insurgency in the north as it did against
the Portuguese.
Zaire
The National Front's collapse presents Zairian
President Mobutu, the Front's major backer, with
some hard choices of his own. He might be tempted
to underwrite an insurgency in northern Angola, but
he would have to give serious consideration to the
consequences.
Zairian assistance to Front insurgent opera-
tions might invite retaliation in kind by the Popu-
lar Movement, possibly against Zaire's copper-pro-
ducing region. The Movement has the allegiance of
perhaps 4,000 exiled followers of the late Moise
Tshombe's Katangan secessionist movement who have
lived in Angola since the Katangan regime collapsed
in 1963.
The Katangans have been fighting with the Pop-
ular Movement against the National Front. Even when
the Portuguese controlled Angola, Mobutu viewed
them as a potential threat, and a mere suggestion
from the Popular Movement that they might be sent
into Zaire may be enough for Mobutu to keep the
National Front on a tight rein.
Moreover, Zaire's copper industry relies heav-
ily on Angola's rail and port facilities, and Mo-
butu cannot jeopardize access to those facilities,
(continued)
Al
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particularly since Zaire's economy is in desperate
straits. For Mobutu, then, there is little return
in escalating his support for the National Front,
and he may eventually tell Front president Holden
Roberto that nothing more can be done.
The most realistic option open to Mobutu--who
is a realist--is to strengthen his ties with the
National Union, through whose tribal territory the
currently severed Benguela railroad passes, and to
support a political coalition between the National
Union and the Popular Movement.
At the moment, however, Mobutu's most immedi-
ate concern is that the Angolan civil war has
reached Zaire's border in two places--at Santo An-
tonio do Zaire in northwestern Angola and at Teix-
eira de Sousa in eastern Angola. The 1,000 or so
Zairian troops who fought in Angola have been
routed and have fled back to Zaire. Mobutu must
have serious misgivings about the effectiveness of
his army and may not want to commit Zairian troops
to further fighting at this time, despite belli-
cose statements from Kinshasa that recent clashes
between Popular Movement and Zairian forces at
Teixeira de Sousa could lead to war.
The National Union
The National Front's collapse will quickly put
new pressure on its military and political ally,
the National Union. The alliance was always tenu-
ous at best and did not fulfill its tactical goal
of forcing the Popular Movement into a political
compromise by squeezing its forces on two fronts.
In essence the National Union regarded the Front's
military capabilities with skepticism from the very
beginning and for the most part conducted its own
operations as if there were no alliance.
Nevertheless, the National Front
to the Popular Movement in the north,
served the National Union by tying up
of the Popular Movement's resources.
sources can now be shifted to central
Angola.
's opposition
however weak,
a good part
Those re-
and southern
(continued)
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South Africa
Any escalation of military operations in cen-
tral and southern Angola will present serious prob-
lems for South Africa. Pretoria already is giving
substantial assistance to the National Union and
probably has the resources to increase signifi-
cantly its present levels of support. Pretoria
cannot, however, hope to match the levels of as-
sistance available to the Popular Movement from
Cuba and the Soviet Union.
Moreover, although Pretoria has probably been
encouraged by the failure of the Organization of
African Unity to condemn its involvement in Angola,
any sudden and dramatic build-up of the South Af-
rican presence would only bring forth new efforts
to condemn Pretoria.
South Africa ordered its troops to withdraw
from active combat zones prior to the OAU summit.
These forces appear to be sitting tight in defen-
sive positions and have not returned to the front,
suggesting that Pretoria has not yet agreed to any
future South African participation. There seems to
be no marked increase in the level of fighting in
central and southern Angola between the National
Union and the Popular Movement, although the Move-
ment may be getting ready to push south. The Na-
tional Union appears to be holding its own in the
fighting that is taking place.
Political Options
The main question raised by the new military
situation is whether or not the withdrawal of the
National Front--historically the Popular Movement's
main adversary--opens new approaches for a politi-
cal settlement between the Popular Movement and the
National Union. The National Union is on record in
favor of a political compromise and would not be
held back by its political alliance with the Front.
Publicly, the Popular Movement is proclaiming
that the collapse of the National Front changes
nothing and that it will continue to fight. A
number of Popular Movement officials have pointed
out, however, that a coalition with the National
Union is possible if South African forces withdraw
from Angola and National Union president Jonas
Savimbi resigns.
(continued)
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The fragmentary information we have suggests
the Popular Movement is not a monolithic organiza-
tion. Although the military hardliners in the or-
ganization will be encouraged by the collapse of
the National Front to advocate a military solution,
the organization's politicians might be sensitive
to political pressures.
It is quite possible that African leaders, in-
cluding a number of those who support the Popular
Movement, may conclude that the Movement can now af-
ford to be more flexible. These leaders may attempt
to use whatever influence they have to resolve the
Angolan problem politically.
The USSR
Moscow may also be looking at the possibility
of a political solution in Angola./
/the
USSR is beginning to think seriously about the pos-
sibility of some sort of coalition in Angola. They
made it clear that such a coalition should be
weighted heavily in favor of the Popular Movement
and be designed to enable the Movement to emerge
eventually as the dominant force in Angola.
moderate African
states, which in the Soviet view are searching
desperately for a way out of the Angolan impasse,
might acquiesce in a virtual takeover by the Pop-
ular Movement in order to bring an end to the
fighting.
some proposal
for a coalition may be forthcoming after Moscow
finishes its assessment of the OAU session. Soviet
press commentary on the OAU has thus far given
little hint that a coalition would be acceptable to
the USSR at the present time.
Admittedly, however, it is still too early to
discern any trends emerging from recent develop-
ments. Moreover, it is difficult to judge how much
external pressure, if it is applied at all, will be
needed to convince so individualistic a person as
Agostinho Neto to accept a political compromise.
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