THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 JANUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015000
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 10, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
January 10, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B( I ),(2),(3)
declassified onIV on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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January 10, 1976
Table of Contents
USSR: The actions of a Sverdlov-class cruiser in
the Mediterranean suggest that it too may be
en route to Atlantic waters off Africa.
(Page 1)
Nigeria-US-Angola: The Nigerian military regime's
emotional commitment to the withdrawal of South
African forces from Angola is reflected in its
denunciation of your letter. (Page 3)
Portugal-Angola: Portugal's neutrality toward the
warring factions in Angola is again a conten-
tious issue in top military circles. (Page 4)
Portugal: Prime Minister Azevedo professes to be
optimistic about the political situation, al-
though he is concerned about the threat from
political extremists. (Page 6)
USSR-China: Moscow probably anticipates no early
change in China's policy toward the Soviet
Union as a result of Chou En-lai's death.
(Page 7)
World Grain: World grain supplies, excluding rice,
will remain tight in 1975/76 and demand for
imported wheat will be up. (Page 8)
Notes: Lebanon; Israel; USSR; Rhodesia; Ecuador
(Pages 9, 10, and 11)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Gulf of Cadiz _
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TUNISIA
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LIBYA
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Pointe Noir , Brazzaville
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ANGOLA
Soviet Kresta ll-Class
'Guided Missile Cruiser
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USSR
The actions of a Sverdlov-class
cruiser in the Mediterranean suggest that
it too may be en route to Atlantic waters
off Africa.
The Kresta II-class cruiser that left the Med-
iterranean last Sunday was detected early this morn-
ing 300 miles northwest of Conakry, Guinea. It
could arrive there today or tomorrow.
We have no further information on the Soviet
intelligence collection ship that left the Gulf of
Cadiz on Thursday and which may be heading for An-
golan waters.
(continued)
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NIGERIA-US-ANGOLA
Nigeria's blunt denunciation of your
letter on Angola reflects the depth of the
military regime's emotional commitment to
the withdrawal of South African forces
from Angola and the ruling majority's in-
security about its internal position.
The official reaction has been accompanied by
shrill anti-US blasts in the controlled Nigerian
press and small-scale student demonstrations at the
US consulates in Kaduna and Ibadan on Thursday and
Friday. A demonstration is planned today in Lagos
against our embassy.
The regime of Brigadier Murtala Muhammed, which
came to power last July, recognized the "government"
of the Popular Movement in November, mainly in re-
action to South African involvement in Angola. It
has since given the Movement $20 million in aid and
reportedly has considered sending a token military
contingent to help combat the South Africans.
Having staked so much on all-out support for
the Popular Movement, Muhammed and his closest sup-
porters seem to view any argument for a government
of national unity in Angola and the withdrawal of
all foreign forces as undermining their own posi-
tion in Nigeria. A minority within the ruling 22-
man Supreme Military Council apparently has been
arguing that Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola
presents a greater danger to Africa than the small
South African presence.
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PORTUGAL-ANGOLA
Portugal's neutrality toward the
warring factions in Angola is again a
contentious issue in top military circles.
Military leaders are split over recognition of 25X1
the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola
The group favoring early recog-
nition--which reportedly includes Foreign Minister
Antunes and members of his "political" faction--
argues that this might prevent the Popular Movement
from becoming too dependent upon Soviet financial
and technical assistance. They also believe the
US and South Africa are about to withdraw their sup-
port from the two opposing factions, and that this
will assure the victory of the Popular Movement.
Unless Lisbon recognizes the Popular Movement soon,
they reportedly reason, Portugal's future relations
and influence with Angola and its other former Af-
rican territories will be seriously undermined, and
the considerable Portuguese financial interests in
Angola will be jeopardized.
The opposing group in the council, led by
Prime Minister Azevedo and the apolitical "profes-
sional" officers, argues that recognition of the
Popular Movement now would split the Portuguese
armed forces, enrage the recently returned Angolan
refugees, and possibly plunge the country into
civil war. Azevedo claims his group now has a ma-
jority in the council on this question, but he is
not sure how long this view will prevail in the
face of mounting pressure against it.
In recent meetings with Senator McGovern and
Ambassador Carlucci, Azevedo averred that Lisbon
is anxious to pursue an Angola policy which is in
harmony with that of the US.
He also responded favorably to the US demarche
on the refueling in the Azores of Cuban military
flights to Angola, repeating earlier assurances
from a presidential aide that transit facilities
for such flights would be terminated. The Foreign
Ministry, however, continues to assert that the
Portuguese government "has no proof" that the
(continued)
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Cuban flights are military in nature, despite Azor-
ean press reports that five aircraft carrying mili-
tary personnel and equipment transited the islands
in late December.
Azevedo also expressed a willingness to inter-
cede with the Cape Verde government, which has ex-
tended the Cubans similar transit facilities. The
close ties recently cultivated by Havana with the
former Portuguese territory suggest that such an in-
tercession is unlikely to be successful.
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PORTUGAL
Prime Minister Azevedo presented an
essentially optimistic review of the Por-
tuguese political situation in a recent
tour d'horizon with Ambassador Carlucci,
although he expressed concern over the
threat from political extremists, partic-
ularly on the far right.
Azevedo claimed that only minor jurisdictional
disputes between the Socialists and the centrist
Popular Democrats over sub-cabinet posts are delay-
ing a final announcement on the government reorgani-
zation.
The Prime Minister confirmed that elections
for a legislative assembly have been set, but ex-
pressed concern that the Communists and the far
right would try to polarize the country in the pe-
riod leading up to the April vote. He fears that
rightist agitation may play into the Communists'
hands.
Azevedo was especially worried about rightist
efforts to mobilize peasants in the north and re-
ferred to a planned rally by disaffected farmers
this Sunday in the northern city of Braga as an oc-
casion ripe for exploitation by followers of former
president Spinola. The farmers are gathering to
protest the agrarian reform program and to demand
higher prices for farm produce, but the rally could
degenerate into an anti-Communist forum. The gov-
ernment apparently fears that this could trigger
strong Communist reaction at several leftist
rallies scheduled for next week in Lisbon.
In a more positive vein, Azevedo expressed
confidence in his government's ability to solve
the Azores problem. An Azorean delegation hopes
to meet with Azevedo today and with the Council of
Ministers on Tuesday in an effort to obtain signif-
icant changes in the decree law issued last month
that fell far short of Azorean expectations of
greater autonomy. If the talks fail, the issue
will likely trigger a strong protest in the Azores.
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USSR-CHINA
Moscow probably anticipates no
early change in China's policy toward
the Soviet Union as a result of Premier
Chou En-lai's death.
The Soviets respected Chou's skills in pro-
moting China's interests in the international
arena, frequently at the expense of the USSR, but
they also saw him as a force for moderation in
China's dealings with Moscow. In this sense, his
death is a setback to the prospect of less hostile
Sino-Soviet relations.
The Soviets do not think well of Chou's suc-
cessor, Teng Hsiao-ping. They well remember that
it was he who violently attacked Khrushchev at the
international Communist conference in 1960, who
oversaw the bitter polemics between the two sides
in the early 1960s, and who traded nasty words
with Brezhnev at the Romanian party congress in
1965. The Soviets are also aware that one of the
factors that allegedly persuaded Mao to rehabili-
tate Teng in 1973 was his negative attitude toward
the USSR. They have consistently deprecated Teng's
capacities as a leader over the past year and have,
to foreigners as well as among themselves, por-
trayed him as a transitional figure.
Despite their misgivings about Teng and the
oft-expressed belief that there will be no funda-
mental change in China's policy toward the USSR
until well after Mao is dead, Moscow will want to
make fresh soundings about the possibility of
change in the wake of Chou's death. This is es-
pecially true since the release of the Soviet
helicopter crew may cause uncertainty in Moscow
about where China now stands vis-a-vis the USSR.
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WORLD GRAIN
World grain supplies, excluding
rice, will remain tight in 1975/76.
Instead of a 3-percent increase in
global production, we now expect no
change. At the same time, demand
for imported wheat will be up an
estimated 11 percent from 1974/75,
while demand for feedgrain will jump
18 percent.
Total world wheat production is estimated at
342.8 million tons, some 8 million tons below last
year (marketing year July 1974-June 1975). The de-
cline reflects a Soviet harvest that was worse than
expected, and which is only partially offset by im-
proved prospects in Argentina, Australia, and Canada.
Total world production of feedgrain in 1975/76 is
forecast at 594.2 million tons. This is 8 million
tons above 1974/75.
World trade in grain probably will reach a
record 141 million tons in the 1975/76 marketing
year because of large Soviet imports. Foreign de-
mand for US wheat and flour is likely to reach a
record 34.9 million tons and for US corn 37.3 mil-
lion tons. Despite these projected exports, a small
buildup of US stocks is likely. Stocks elsewhere
probably will decline.
Grain prices have drifted downward since late
summer owing to the harvesting of record US crops,
the temporary end of the Soviet buying spree, and
the favorable outlook for wheat harvests in the
southern hemisphere. For the time being, prices
seem to have settled within a narrow trading range.
are:
Developments that could force a price increase
--Southern hemisphere crops, especially the
key Argentine corn crop harvested early this
year, could fall below current expectations.
--The outlook for winter wheat crops in the
USSR and US may continue to deteriorate.
--Additional Soviet grain purchases for delivery
by October 1 might exceed the 3 to 5 million
tons now projected.
--India and other developing countries may in-
crease imports to support stockbuilding poli-
cies.
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Beirut, Lebanon
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NOTES
Heavy fighting continued undiminished in the
Beirut suburbs around the Tall Zatar refugee camp
and spread to the hotel district early this morning.
Both sides seem to see the battle as a major test
of strength and show little inclination to negotiate
a cease-fire.
Each warring faction claims to have made major
gains, but
the fighting is stalemated. The Pales-
tinians thus far have refrained from attacking the
Christian quarters in central Beirut and are con-
centrating their efforts on lifting the blockade of
Tall Zatar. They reportedly are insisting that the
siege be lifted unconditionally before agreeing to
a cease-fire.
The only hopeful sign is a report that Presi-
dent Franjiyah sent a special emissary to Damascus
on Thursday, apparently to seek Syrian President
Asad's help in ending the fighting.
Israel
(continued)
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The Soviet Union's unclassified earth resources
satellite program apparently is being slowed by a
Zack of proper data processing equipment.
According to the Soviets, their current pro-
gram is based mainly on photography from Salyut
spacecraft. This photography is not suitable for
some uses because its coverage is limited and it is
not timely; the film must be returned to earth phy-
sically in contrast to the US Landsat system. The
Soviets have been trying unsuccessfully for several
years to buy data processing equipment comparable
to that associated with Landsat. They have also
inquired about the purchase of earth resources
satellite sensors such as multispectral scanners
and cameras.
Rhodesia
(continued)
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? Ecuador
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Top Secret
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