THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 JANUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014993
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 2, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
January 2, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(31
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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January 2, 1976
Table of Contents
USSR: Pravda on New Year's Day published an author-
itative statement on strategic arms limitations
that reaffirms Soviet interest in a new agree-
ment. (Page 1)
Cuba: The political composition of Cuba's leader-
ship remains basically unchanged following
the Communist Party Congress last week. Fidel
Castro took the occasion to voice strong sup-
port for the Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola and to warn against US interven-
tion. (Page 2)
Italy: Socialist Party leader De Martino has
threatened to withdraw Socialist parliamentary
support from the Moro government next week--
a move that would lead to the collapse of the
government. (Page 4)
Notes: USSR (crops); USSR ; USSR
(credits); USSR-Angola; PLO-UN; Thailand
(Pages 5, 6, and 7)
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USSR
Pravda on New Year's Day published
an authoritative statement on strategic
arms limitations that reaffirms Soviet
interest in a new agreement. The arti-
cle was signed "Observer," indicating
Kremlin endorsement.
None of the issues currently under discussion
is addressed. Instead, the article lashes out by
name against US citizens who have charged the USSR
with failure to comply with existing strategic arms
limitations agreements. It accuses such people of
trying to frustrate US-Soviet detente for "various
selfish political aims." It labels as "concoctions"
allegations that the USSR has exceeded limits on
ballistic-missile launchers or is seeking to inter-
fere with technical means of verification. The
article cites statements by President Ford, secre-
taries Kissinger and Rumsfeld, and former secretary
Schlesinger to the effect that Moscow is not in vio-
lation of existing agreements.
Pravda does acknowledge that "certain ques-
tions" may arise regarding fulfillment of strategic
arms limitations and states that such issues must
be resolved by the standing consultative commission.
To show that not all ambiguities concerning adher-
ence are of Soviet making, the article notes some
of the USSR's questions regarding US compliance
with strategic arms limitations agreements have not
been "fully eliminated." It does not, however, ac-
cuse the US of violating any agreement.
The discussion of compliance is unusual and
appears intended to channel complaints into estab-
lished forums. It is also a sign that such com-
plaints will not interfere with the business of
negotiating a new agreement. The article puts the
Soviets on record as being ready for a new accord,
but it gives no hint whether Moscow will modify
its negotiating positions in order to bring about
another agreement.
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CUBA
The political composition of Cuba's
leadership remains basically unchanged
following the Communist Party Congress
last week. Fidel Castro clearly still
looks to his former guerrilla comrades
as his primary source of support. Castro
concluded the final congress session by
voicing strong support for the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola
and warned against US intervention.
Although 13 members of the Central Committee
were removed and 35 others added, more than two
thirds of the group still comes from the "guerrilla
elite"--those among the leadership who fought under
Castro during the revolution in the late 1950s or
joined forces with him shortly thereafter. Most
have a military background; some are currently in
the military or security services and others have
retired from the military establishment to assume
high political or administrative posts.
Castro justified support for the Popular Move-
ment as a reaction to attempts by "the imperialists"
and South Africa to "devour" Angola. Responding to
foreign criticism, Castro emphasized that Cuba de-
fends Angola "as a result of our principles, our
ideology, our convictions, and our blood." He
tried to discourage US intervention in the war by
saying that it would be a mistake for the US to
associate itself with the South Africans. He
argued that the Popular Movement has guaranteed
the security of US citizens and petroleum installa-
tions.
Cuba's involvement in Angola has drawn a mixed
reaction in Latin America. Leftist governments are
giving mild support to the Popular Movement. Some
moderate governments, like those of Colombia and
Venezuela, which have recently normalized relations
with Cuba, have found the Cuban actions somewhat
embarrassing. Right-wing governments, like those
in Chile and Uruguay, have responded with predict-
able denunciations of Havana.
(continued)
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The Venezuelan government is following the
Angola situation closely. Officials in Caracas
are said to feel that US prestige requires a firm
stand to prevent the fall of Angola into the Soviet
camp. Elsewhere, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry
has been under strong attack in the press for its
quick recognition of the Popular Movement. The
ministry has been forced to deny that President
Geisel was displeased over the handling of Angolan
policy.
The departure of the Brazilian special repre-
sentative from Luanda--officially for reasons of
health--has fueled speculation, however, that
Geisel is reconsidering Brazil's position on Angola.
The press continues to intimate that Foreign Min-
ister Silveira is in trouble with the President
over Angola, and there are signs that influential
military conservatives also are displeased.
Guyana seems inclined to recognize the Popu-
lar Movement, but may wait to follow the lead of
the Organization of African Unity. Two Cuban air-
lift flights have transited Guyana, but Prime Min-
ister Burnham's government apparently has not made
a firm decision on whether to allow the flights to
continue. The Prime Minister now appears to be
wavering, however, under pressure from the Cubans
and representatives of the Popular Movement who
were recently in Georgetown.
Cuba will soon call up 3,000 military reserv-
ists for 18 months to replace troons now in Angola,
The
length of the call-up underscores that Havana is
prepared for a long-term involvement in Angola.
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ITALY
Socialist Party leader De Martino
has threatened to withdraw Socialist par-
liamentary support from the Moro govern-
ment next week--a move that would lead to
the collapse of the government and possi-
bly to early parliamentary elections. A
final decision may be made at the Social-
ist directorate meeting next Wednesday.
De Martino's position until now had been that
no decision should be made on continued support for
Moro until after the Socialist Party congress in
February. Several factors, however, probably en-
couraged him to take a harder line. His rivals in
the party maintain that continued support for Moro
limits the Socialists' ability to compete with the
Communists in the next elections. This view seems
to be gaining support and this worries De Martino.
The Socialists have found themselves increasingly
isolated in parliament on issues important to their
constituency, such as the medium-term economic plan
and legalized abortion.
If the Socialists follow through on their
threat, the ensuing government crisis is likely to
be one of the most difficult and protracted of the
postwar period. The Christian Democrats cannot form
a workable non-Communist government without Social-
ist cooperation. The Socialists, however, are not
likely to cooperate unless some formula can be found
that increases Socialist influence in the government
substantially, or associates the Communists with the
government in some way short of actual participation
in the cabinet. The Socialists believe that they
cannot compete with the Communists at the polls un-
less the latter are forced to take some responsibil-
ity for government actions.
Such a formula would likely prove elusive be-
cause the Christian Democrats, who are preparing for
a party congress in March, remain deeply divided
over hoyi to respond to Socialist demands. The col-
lapse of the Moro government in present circumstances
would, thus, increase the possibility of the parties
resorting to early parliamentary elections in an ef-
fort to break the deadlock. Some Socialist leaders
favor that alternative since they feel their party
stands to gain more if the elections are held next
spring instead of in May 1977, as now scheduled.
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USSR
Snow Cover Protection Against Winterkill,
Mid-December 1975
PM Adequate (More than 8") 71 Borderline (3"-8") FT Inadequate (Less than 3")
Percentage of Normal Soil Moisture,
1 December 1975
MI Greater than 100%
559034 1-76
50-100%
ni 25-50% n Less than 25%
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NOTES
Below-normal temperatures and inadequate snow
cover are seriously jeopardizing the USSR's fall-
sown grain crops. The prospect of extensive win-
terkill is heightened because the seedlings entered
winter dormancy weakened by drought.
If heavy snowfalls do not occur soon, cold
temperatures could kill up to one third of the
crop. The low levels of soil moisture also will in-
hibit the growth of spring grains planted to re-
place winter-killed plants. Moreover, similarly
low soil-moisture reserves in several major spring
grain areas are a harbinger of poor sowing condi-
tions this May. The scars of this year's drought
have not healed in the Urals and surrounding regions,
and considerable above-normal precipitation will
be essential for average or better yields.
Soviets
(continued)
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Continued large hard-currency trade deficits
are causing the Soviets to rely more heavily on
Western government-backed credits. In recent weeks
they have approached the French, Italians, and
Canadians for further credits, even though the
major share of the $4.2 billion in general-purpose
credit lines already granted by these countries
remains unused.
Moscow has warned US officials, however, that
the lack of Eximbank credits is causing the US to
lose a substantial amount of Soviet business. The
Soviets have said that, despite their preference
for US equipment, the lack of these credits will
force them to divert purchases to foreign subsidi-
aries of US firms or West European and Japanese
companies. While these statements are designed to
highlight the adverse effects of a lack of Eximbank
financing, the USSR's shortage of hard currency and
growing debt service will force it to secure the
best credit terms available at the expense of US
purchases.
The USSR is embarked on a diplomatic and
propaganda campaign to influence next week's emer-
gency summit meeting of the Organization of Afri-
can Unity to adopt positions favorable to the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
The Soviets also are throwing cold water
on the notion of a unity government in Luanda. A
recent Izvestia article labeled such proposals
as "senseless," saying that the Popular Movement
cannot align itself with groups that rely on
South African support.
(continued)
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Palestine Liberation Organization
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Thailand
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Top Secret
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