THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 DECEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014988
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 26, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
December 26, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 511(1),f 2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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December 26, 1975
Table of Contents
China: Chinese diplomats abroad and other officials
with access to thinking in Peking have described
your trip to China in positive terms. (Page 1)
USSR?Angola:7
(Page 3)
Angola: Even if present frictions between the Na-
tional Union and the National Front can be
smoothed over, longstanding differences between
the two groups and their leaders raise barriers
to the development of a lasting coalition.
(Page 4)
United Kingdom: Recent union election results seem
to confirm a less militant trend in the trade
union movement. (Page 7)
Notes:
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CHINA
Chinese diplomats abroad and other
officials with access to thinking in
Peking have described your trip to China
in positive terms.
Clearly under instructions from Peking, these
officials have privately told US diplomats(
--Peking is satisfied with Sino-US relations,
and the Shanghai communique remains the frame-
work for further improvement;
--Peking and Washington hold common views re-
garding many international issues, particularly
with respect to "hegemony," and this could re-
sult in a common approach to other problems;
--the visit strengthened Washington's hand in
future dealings with Moscow.
Peking seems anxious to dispel speculation that
the absence of a communique meant the trip produced
no important results or that the two sides failed to
agree on any significant matters.
Peking has taken the line that the talks on
international issues constituted the most important
part of your visit.
Your speech in Honolulu has also been well re-
ceived in Peking. Lengthy excerpts from the speech
were carried in the PRC-press in Hong Kong, and one
of the newspapers there commented that whereas the
Nixon Doctrine meant a limited US withdrawal from
Asia, the Ford Doctrine means holding the line.
This, the paper claimed, is a spearhead directed
against Moscow.
(continued)
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China's treatment of the detente issue further
reflects Peking's contention that the visit produced
a clearer definition of mutual Sino-US interest in
containing Soviet influence. Major Chinese public
statements during your visit virtually avoided the
detente question and tendpd toward a strictly anti?
Soviet position.
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Denunciations of detente by local Communist 25X1
officials have not been repeated since this briefing.
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lJL'. 1111_, 1 1A.L.011.11_,1 NI 1. k.../1. N1_, I
USSR?ANGOLA
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ANGOLA
Even if present frictions between
the National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola and the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola can
be smoothed over, longstanding differ-
ences between the two groups and their
leaders raise barriers to the transfor-
mation of their marriage of convenience
into a lasting coalition.
Jonas Savimbi of the National Union and Holden
Roberto of the National Front formed an alliance
last summer and fall to counter the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola. That alliance is now
badly strained,
Early this week, the senior
representative of the National Front in Huambo,
capital of the nominal joint government proclaimed
by the two organizations last month, reported "heavy"
fighting in that city between troops of the Front
and the Union.
Those forces of the National Front that are in-
volved in the clashes are loyal to Daniel Chipenda,
a former central committee member and military com-
mander of the Popular Movement. Chipenda left the
Movement about a year ago after he failed to oust
its leader, Agostinho Neto. Subsequently Chipenda
and a few hundred of his troops joined the National
Front. The number of these forces that has partici-
pated in clashes with the National Union is not
known.
Fighting between Chipenda's troops and those
of the National Union apparently started this month
By agreement with the Front, the Union is
in charge of all military operations in Central
Angola. When Chipenda's troops refused to submit
to the discipline of either the National Front or
the National Union, National Union troops took
reprisals.
Despite efforts of senior officials of both
organizations to restore discipline, fighting quickly
spread to other locations. At the request of National
Front officials, Zairian President Mobutu has met with
both Roberto and Savimbi about the problem, but the
clashes have continued.
(continued)
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Chipenda
Chipenda's loyalty to the Front is nominal at
best, and he is distrusted by both Roberto and
Savimbi. He operates virtually as a free agent, ap-
parently obtaining much of his support directly from
South Africa. He has never hidden his political am-
bitions. His attempts to oust Neto from the Popular
Movement, while applauded by the Front at the time,
have made Roberto cautious of him. Roberto appar-
ently prefers to keep Chipenda in central Angola,
where he can undermine National Union leader Savimbi
but cannot challenge Roberto.
Chipenda, like Savimbi, is a member of the
dominant tribe in central and southern Angola--the
Ovimbundu. Savimbi and other National Union leaders
view Chipenda as a formidable political rival be-
cause of his family ties, his fame as a soccer
player, and his reputed skill as a military leader.
Savimbi undoubtedly holds Roberto ultimately re-
sponsible, however, for the disruption Chipenda has
caused.
Savimbi and Roberto
Savimbi's alliance with the National Front
nominally re-established an earlier association with
Roberto. Savimbi was in charge of foreign relations
in the National Front in the early 1960s, but he
broke with that organization in 1964 when Roberto
refused to open a second front against the Portu-
guese in southern and central Angola.
The National Front, dominated by Bakongo
tribesmen of northwestern Angola, preferred to re-
strict the insurgency to the north. Front leaders
regarded Savimbi's proposal as divisive and po-
tentially challenging to Bakongo domination of the
rebellion. Two years after withdrawing from the
Front, Savimbi established the National Union and
began operations against the Portuguese in central
Angola.
Savimbi regards the National Front as the weaker
of the two groups. The Front has been unable to
maintain pressure from the north against the Popular
Movement, even with Zairian support. The National
Union, with important help from South Africa, is
bearing the burden of the military effort. Unless
the National Front can resume the offensive, Savimbi
may eventually conclude that the Front is irrelevent
and terminate the alliance.
(continued)
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Savimbi has stated on numerous occasions that
he has not ruled out a political accomodation with
the Popular Movement. Such a position can only in-
crease Roberto's uneasiness. Roberto regards the
struggle against the Popular Movement as a military
one not open to political settlement.
The feuding between the two sides does not ap-
pear to have extended to National Union campaigns
in eastern Angola, perhaps because of South African
direction of Savimbi's military efforts. Should
South African forces withdraw, a key element in the
military effort against the Popular Movement would
be lost, Savimbi's control over operations in central
Angola would be seriously affected, and there would
be even greater division between him and Roberto.
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UNITED KINGDOM
Recent union election results seem
to confirm a less militant trend in the
trade union movement.
Moderates now control the country's second
largest union, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering
Workers. Its policy committee recently voted sub-
stantial support for the government's wage restraint
policy--a reversal of an earlier decision. Last
month, centrist forces within the National Union of
Teachers blunted a strong drive by the leftwing to
take over the presidency of the union. The Electri-
cal, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing
Union has also withstood a challenge from the left
for seats on the union's executive.
Election results from the country's largest
labor organization, the Transport and General
Workers' Union should be available soon. This
election should show whether the rank and file sup-
port the middle-of-the-road domestic policies of
the union's leadership.
The most important factor behind the success
of the moderates has been the economic slump which
has brought on record unemployment. Other reasons
include the system of postal balloting--which
neutralizes militant minorities by promoting broad
participation--coupled with intense media interest.
Communist Party fortunes are also on the de-
cline. Membership is dropping and circulation of
the party newspaper, The Morning Star, is decreasing.
The party, however, retains representation on the
general council of the Trades Union Congress, on
the executives of some of the country's most power-
ful unions, and at regional and local levels in key
industries.
Although the recession has generated a sense
of sobriety and moderation, it also makes union
leaders even more conscious of protecting the
workers' economic position. Trade union leaders
will continue to do battle with management on such
issues as pay and working conditions.
Basic socio-economic problems will also encourage
continued trade union militancy. / 1 25X1
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Top Secret
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