THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 DECEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014987
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 24, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
December 24, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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December 24, 1975
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USSR-Palestinians:
(Page 1)
Egypt-Lebanon:
(Page 2)
Lebanon: As a result of Prime Minister Karami's
visit to Damascus on Monday, the two govern-
ments may try to limit the flow of arms to the
warring parties in Lebanon. (Page 4)
Portugal: New appointments to the Revolutionary
Council appear to complete the purge of left-
ists from the highest levels of the armed
forces but serve notice that the military does
not intend to abandon its political role en-
tirely. (Page 6)
Spain: The government is moving discreetly to en-
courage the less radical Socialist leaders and
to isolate the Communists. (Page 8)
Notes: USSR - West Africa; Cuba-Angola; USSR-Laos;
UN-Austria (Pages 9 and 10)
We present on Page 11 a CIA view of the future of
the Soviet commitment in Angola.
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USSR?PALESTINIANS
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EGYPT?LEBANON
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LEBANON
Lebanon and Syria have issued no of-
ficial statement on Prime Minister Karami's
visit to Damascus on Monday. Generally
reliable press reports say that an effort
will be undertaken to limit the flow of
arms to the warring parties in Lebanon.
This is part of a wider understanding
that includes plans for implementing the
cease-fire, resuming high-level negotia-
tions on political reform, and holding a
meeting of Syrian and Lebanese heads of
state.
President Franjiyah has been hoping that Presi-
dent Asad will invite him to Damascus to meet with
Saudi King Khalid tomorrow. Franjiyah probably
calculates that such a meeting would bolster his
political standing even if it did not help end the
fighting in Lebanon. A Lebanese official has said
that Palestine Liberation Organization chairman
Yasir Arafat may also join the group.
Franjiyah and Asad have not met since January,
before this year's fighting began. A meeting of the
two has been under consideration for some months as
a means of stimulating progress in the endless po-
litical negotiations.
Asad, however, may abandon any plans to meet
with Franjiyah as the result of allegations by Leba-
nese Christian leaders this week that Syrian or
Syrian-controlled Palestinian forces have joined in
the fighting in Lebanon. Both Damascus and the PLO
have denied these charges.
Some troops from Fatah's Yarmuk Brigade, Saiga,
and the Palestine Liberation Army--all heavily in-
fluenced or controlled by Syria--apparently did par-
ticipate in the heavy clashes at Zahlah. They joined
radical fedayeen and local leftist militias to form
a combined force of approximately 2,000 to attack
the predominantly Christian town.
(continued)
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_ _
PORTUGAL
New appointments to Portugal's all-
military Revolutionary Council appear to
complete the purge of leftists from the
highest levels of the armed forces, while
at the same time serving notice that the
military does not intend to abandon al-
together its political role.
The vacancies on the Council resulting from
the dismissal of two leftist navy officers follow-
ing the November 25 military uprising have been
filled by two navy officers who also serve as cab-
inet ministers. Commanders Almeida e Costa and
Vitor Crespo were confirmed during an all-night
meeting of the Revolutionary Council that approved
the economic austerity measures adopted earlier by
the cabinet.
Both officers are strong anti-Communists, but
their appointments otherwise maintain the balance
on the Council between the so-called political of-
ficers, who are led by Foreign Minister Melo Antunes,
and the "professionals," who seem to be gravitating
toward newly appointed army Chief of Staff Eanes.
The "professionals" generally emphasize the
need for strict discipline in the armed forces and
dedication to their military ?function. The Antunes
group seems intent on carving out a continuing po-
litical role for itself.
The differences between the two groups appear
to be largely a matter of degree; even the "profes-
sional" officers are unwilling to give the civilian
politicians a free hand. The point of divergence
comes on whether the military should lead the na-
tion to "democracy and socialism"--as Antunes main-
tains--or should merely provide order and stability
and let the people decide whether they want social-
ism.
The squabbling among the politicians will tend
to confirm the officers' belief that the military
must continue to play at least a limited role in
government if anything is to be accomplished.
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(continued)
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.?-.4 ',LAN, ,11- LI S. ? Al VA
Quarrels among the political parties are fo-
cusing again on the issue of representation in the
cabinet. Popular Democratic leader Sa Carneiro told
a party rally on Monday that the proposed reorgan-
ization of the Azevedo government, which would give
the Socialists four ministers, the Popular Democrats
three, and the Communists two, was unacceptable be-
cause it would double Communist representation. The
Socialists as well as Foreign Minister Antunes have
argued that Communists should be in the government
in order to share responsibility for the tougher
economic measures that must come.
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SPAIN
The new Spanish government may be
moving discreetly to encourage and
strengthen the less radical Socialist
leaders and to isolate the Communists.
Minister of Information Manuel Fraga Iribarne
recently met the leader of the Popular Socialist
Party, Tierno Galvan. Fraga told Ambassador Stab-
ler that he hopes to wean Tierno Galvan away from
the Communists and encourage the development of a
Socialist coalition composed of factions outside
the largest Socialist group, the Socialist Workers
Party.
Following the meeting, Tierno Galvan told the
press he believes the government is moving in a
positive direction. He also announced the forma-
tion of a confederation made up of his own Popular
Socialists and various regional Socialist parties
now affiliated with the Communist-dominated Demo-
cratic Junta. The participating groups reportedly
are concerned that the leadership of the Socialist
Workers Party may be increasingly influenced by the
Communists.
The government's recent decision to grant an
amnesty to Rodolfo Llopis, who is now in exile,
may be part of the effort to undercut the Socialist
Workers. Llopis claims that his group represents
the traditional right wing of the Socialist Party,
and he opposes any cooperation with the Communists.
Llopis will reportedly return to Spain next month.
The bickering Socialist factions will find it
difficult to resolve their differences and compete
with the Socialist Workers Party. The latter is
the major non-Communist force on the Spanish left
and is the only Spanish party recognized by the
Socialist International. The party receives sup-
port from West European Socialists, and its leader,
Felipe Gonzalez, has recently traveled to West Ger-
many and Sweden to strengthen his contacts there.
Gonzalez has stressed that the opposition should
form a broad alliance and that the Communist Party
should be legalized.
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NOTES
The Soviet guided-missile destroyer moving
down the coast of Africa was about 60 miles east
of the Canary Islands early today.
Two tankers are accompanying the destroyer,
which at its present speed will reach Conakry,
Guinea, on Saturday or Sunday. The Soviets have
used the port facilities at Conakry since 1960.
We do not know now whether the destroyer will stop
there or proceed to the vicinity of Angola.
(continued)
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The Soviet Union has begun to airlift food and
petroleum from Hanoi to Laos to help alleviate
shortages caused by the closure of the Thai border;
so far, only one AN-12 is being used.
The Soviets had hoped, in addition, to move
supplies by air from Bangkok to Vientiane. Thai
Foreign Minister Chatchai told the press on Monday,
however, that he would permit such an airlift only
after the border is reopened. Chatchai said that
the border could be reopened after Thai and Lao of-
ficials have met to discuss the continued influx of
refugees from Laos, the smuggling of arms into Thai-
land and commodities into Laos, and "other problems."
Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Phoun Sipraseut on Monday publicly ruled out any
talks with Bangkok until Thailand reopens the bor-
der and "sincerely displays a friendly attitude of
true neighborliness."
Chancellor Bruno Kreisky hopes to persuade UN
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim not to seek re-
election when his current term expires next year.
Waldheim has mentioned his disappointment with
the UN post on several occasions/
/Although not a member of any party, he has
been more closely associated with the opposition
People's Party than with Kreisky's Socialists.
Prior to last October's election, when Kreisky
thought he might not get a majority, the Chancellor
talked of forming a government of experts of varied
political backgrounds. Waldheim's presence in the
government would broaden its support. He served
as foreign minister in the last conservative gov-
ernment between 1968 and 1970.
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USSR-ANGOLA
The following is a CIA view of the
future of the Soviet commitment in An-
gola.
Moscow's performance in Angola over the past
several months bespeaks a rather tough and unyield-
ing cast of mind regarding its support for the MPLA.
The Soviets have been unflinching in the face of
the countervailing pressures that have arisen, both
in Africa and the US, during those months. Moscow
seems to be saying, both on the ground in Angola
and in its public utterances, that it is willing
to go a significant distance to support an MPLA
victory.
Moscow is also saying that appeals to the idea
of detente will not deter the Soviet Union from
pursuing what it regards as its legitimate role as
a world power. Angola has become the occasion,
perhaps intentionally, more likely fortuitiously,
for the Soviets to make a point that they have been
anxious to assert since the brouhahas over Vietnam
and Somalia, namely, that the Soviet Union will not
allow the US to establish the ground rules of de-
tente.
This means that if the US, for domestic rea-
sons, cannot bring its power to bear in a given
arena, then it will be compelled to accept the
consequences. The Soviet Union will not, out of
a magnanimous spirit, forego opportunities to
strengthen its position in the world or use its
influence to protect US interests.
In their present frame of mind, the Soviets
are unresponsive to arguments that their actions
in Angola will unduly complicate their broader re-
lations with the US. The detente atmosphere was
palpably soured over trade, emigration, and SALT II
before Angola became a political issue between the
two countries. The Soviets are also likely to view
as hypocritical complaints about the incompatibil-
ity of detente and Angola in the light of exten-
sive US publicity over Chile and assassinations and
against real US gains at Moscow's expense in Egypt
and elsewhere in the Middle East, as well as in
Portugal.
(continued)
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The Soviets are skeptical that Washington will
step back from a SALT agreement because of Angola,
or will refuse to market its surplus grain in the
Soviet Union because the MPLA strengthens its hold
on Luanda. The Soviets probably calculate that real
interests of the two countries are at the heart of
the actual rather than the rhetorical detente rela-
tionship and that the impact of Angola is not likely
to be of lasting consequence.
This kind of analysis would commend itself to
Brezhnev because he has strong domestic political
reasons for pursuing a tough line now on Angola. It
is a place where he can demonstrate that detente not
only creates opportunities for "social progress,"
but also does not inhibit the Soviet Union from tak-
ing advantage of them. Angola, to some extent, off-
sets Cunhal's reversal in Portugal, the disappoint-
ment of Helsinki, the policy debacle in Egypt. With
detente providing few concrete gains, and the Party
Congress approaching, he probably finds it politic to
stress orthodox ideological themes.
The Near Future
The factors which have contributed to Moscow's
Angola policy could change in significant ways over
the next few months. For one thing, there is some
evidence of disagreement in the Kremlin on Angola.
it is possible that Moscow
will be inclined to show some restraint if it looks
as if it will have to pay a substantial price for
continuing the current tough policy.
If Brezhnev gets through the Party Congress in
good shape, politically as well as physically, he
may feel under less pressure to show that he is
willing and able to stand up to the Americans. The
pain associated with the setbacks in agriculture
and the economic entrenchment may be less obstru-
sive. The Soviets may therefore feel somewhat less
defensive vis-a-vis the US and less compelled to
demonstrate that they are dealing from a position
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of strength. Any progress on bilateral issues such
as SALT would tend to refocus attention on the de-
tente relationship and relegate, in the eyes of the
world as well as the leaders in Moscow, Angola to
the wings. This would then make it easier for Mos-
cow to cut a deal on Angola.
As we move into the next year, the Soviets will
also be paying more attention to the impact of their
actions on US politics. The Kremlin will, of course,
want to avoid giving the US reason to believe that
it has significant leverage because of Moscow's de-
sire to abet the election fortunes of the supporters
of detente. But Angola is the kind of place where
the Soviets can afford to show some restraint in the
interest of not poisoning the atmosphere during the
election period.
But whether such "restraint" will be forth-
coming will also depend greatly on the situation
on the ground in Angola. At one end of the spectrum,
the Soviets are unlikely to show much restraint if
there is a serious threat to the continued existence
of the MPLA in Luanda. Moscow cannot afford another
highly visible defeat, particularly between now and
the Party Congress, and particularly in a situation
like Angola where the "victor" would seem to be the
US. If this contingency threatened, we would expect
the Soviets to send in more arms, more Cubans, and
more of their own advisers. We strongly doubt that
the Soviets will commit their own ground forces in
significant numbers. The Soviets are likely to as-
sert a presence with a token force of a few ships
out of the Mediterranean, and respond to any larger
US show of naval force.
At the other end of the spectrum, Angola does
not yet figure so prominently in Soviet priorities
that Moscow feels a strong imperative for an early
and decisive victory there. But Moscow is not
likely to apply significant pressure on Neto or the
Cubans to refrain from significantly strengthening
their territorial position, or routing the FNLA and
UNITA if that seems possible with the forces and
material at hand or in the pipeline.
The dynamic of the patron-client relationship
is such that the Soviets would have a hard time
keeping the MPLA reined in if victory appeared to
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be ahead. The problem is made worse by the Cubans
who would make league with Neto in arguing that the
Soviets should not rob them of the fruits of their
efforts for reasons unrelated to Angola. Under these
circumstances, it would be very hard for Brezhnev,
or any other Soviet leader, to actively thwart the
MPLA, (for example, by constricting the supply flow)
at the behest of Washington.
This does not mean that the MPLA has a blank
check. A gradual victory in Angola, which minimized
the complications on the detente front while giving
the Soviet Union what it wants, would be the ideal
outcome for Moscow. If the Soviets judged that
events were moving in this fashion, they would prob-
ably resist pressures from their clients to support
a course aimed at a dramatic early victory.
If the conflict seemed to settle into a pro-
longed and indecisive stalemate, strong MPLA pres-
sures would arise for an increase in aid, but it
would also probably lead other Africans to argue
more strongly for a political compromise. The So-
viets probably have not yet made up their minds
about how to handle this possibility. If it con-
fronted them, the state of their relations with the
US in general would be a factor in their reaction
and we believe would lead them to accept some com-
promise solution rather than holding out and pressing
for an MPLA "victory" over vigorous US countersup-
port of the FNLA and UNITA. If they had to make
such a decision now, however, it looks as though
they would opt for raising their Angolan stake, in
the belief that the US is not likely to engage suf-
ficiently to prevent them.
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