THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 DECEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014975
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 10, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
The President's Daily Brief
December 10, 1975
2
710p S/tc.ge,t 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 513( I
declassified on on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
LATE ITEM
Baucau, the second largest city in
Portuguese Timor, fell to Indonesian
forces this morning.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
N
December 10, 1975
Table of Contents
Lebanon: Radical Muslim forces have gained con-
trol of some previously contested ground dur-
ing the heavy fighting in Beirut this week.
(Page 1)
Indonesia - Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian task
force is assembling off the east coast of
Portuguese Timor in preparation for an attack
on Baucau. (Page 3)
Greece-Cyprus: The Greek and Cypriot governments
do not like the recent Turkish proposals for
the resumption of intercommunal talks but
have kept the door open for discussions at
the NATO ministerial meetings this week in
Brussels. (Page 8)
USSR: Georgy Arbatov, Moscow's most prominent ac-
ademic authority on the US, last week gave
Ambassador Stoessel his views on bilateral
relations. (Page 7)
China-Angola: The Chinese are maintaining a policy
of strict neutrality toward conflicting forces
in Angola. (Page 8)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Areas off Heavy Fighting
.....:
, :
sl.,
or_MOUSSAITIIEH,Q .. LI
2 , ;?, - ,
4 it cicV 714 :37041TIA:314ij
-:11.10
k 2'?cry
6N IDgy.,7.b.Q
***,..
c:,... ,..., ..
DE39?
061
1SAINRYPtn,
t5g-539.3cIii; [Kw
pen\!_,-A EIrs?1100D)
uaac3
Rd. Pl. 45
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
LEBANON
Radical Muslim forces have gained con-
trol of some previously contested ground
during the heavy fighting in Beirut this
week. The leftists, who occupied the St.
Georges Hotel on Monday, still hold it
this morning. Army troops control the
Phoenicia and the Holiday Inn.
The Christian and Muslim combatants as well as
the Lebanese security forces are trying to gain con-
trol of the hotels in order to gain a commanding
field of fire over the adjoining neighborhoods.
Right-wing Phalangist militiamen suffered heavy
casualties when their Muslim opponents moved in
heavy weapons, including anti-aircraft guns supplied
by the fedayeen.
The Phalangists, who claimed last night to
have made gains in other areas, are holding out
along a front that extends from the hotel district
to Beirut port. They use this corridor to supply
their forces in the hotel district from more se-
cure Phalangist strongholds south of the port.
The leftist forces are led by Ibrahim Qulaylat,
a radical Lebanese Muslim backed by Libya and some
Palestinian fedayeen groups. His Independent Nass-
erite Movement has some 400-500 militiamen and can
draw on substantial backing from rejectionist Pal-
estinians, radicals within the major fedayeen
groups, and Lebanese communists.
Qulaylat yesterday repeated charges that Leb-
anese army troops were firing on Muslim forces and
said his followers would retaliate. According to
press reports from Beirut, several army vehicles
were fired on by Muslim and Palestinian forces, and
at least two army commandos were killed.
Lebanon's political leaders so far have come
up with nothing to end the renewed fighting. The
best hope is that the leftists--who are claiming
victory--will convince themselves that their lim-
ited military gains constitute sufficient revenge
(continued)
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
111_, 1 1\1_011-.11,1N 1 l,./1 N.L.,
for the murder of Muslims by Phalangists last week-
end. Interior Minister Shamun is threatening to
resign, and leftists are criticizing the govern-
ment's use of the army to try to restore some order.
The Id al-Adha Muslim holiday that starts late
this week may provide an excuse for both sides to
stop the fighting.
25X1
25X1
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
8.4 .V D A S 8 .4
(LEA DL
/ ATAURO
LI Er. ST RA IT
(5
Diu .8aucau
PORTUGUESE TIMOR
S U
PORT.
TIMOR
INDONESIA
1=37 ?
00.
MILES
50
OIL s 400
tteiebei
Lesser Sunda Islands
????,
00?
5*-.
PORTUGUESE
TIMOR
Surnfle:).
558925 12-75
r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
IiL I Ik1-311-/L1 N L
INDONESIA - PORTUGUESE TIMOR
An Indonesian task force is as-
sembling off the east coast of Portu-
guese Timor in preparation for an at-
tack on Baucau, the second largest city
in the Portuguese half of the island.
The assault will probably be similar to that
against Dili earlier this week, when marines went
ashore following a naval and air bombardment. Air-
borne troops may also participate in the attack.
The capture of Dili last Sunday was generally well
executed, although elements of the Indonesian task
force had problems coordinating their attack against
the city.
Meanwhile, Indonesia's carefully orchestrated
campaign to convince world opinion that military
intervention in Timor was justified is running into
difficulty, in part because of the unexpectedly
strong reaction from Portugal.
Jakarta claims that it had to act to restore
an orderly decolonization process in Timor because
the Portuguese had abdicated responsibility for the
colony's future. Lisbon has broken relations with
Indonesia, and the Portuguese foreign minister has
branded Jakarta's actions an "unqualified act of
armed aggression." Lisbon may be speaking for
Portuguese domestic consumption, but more impor-
tantly because it wishes to remain on good terms
with its former African colonies, which are in the
forefront of those criticizing Jakarta. The Portu-
guese statements, nonetheless, will give encourage-
ment to Indonesia's other antagonists.
Jakarta probably would like to follow the same
procedure in Timor that it used in 1969 with the
former Dutch territory of West New Guinea, which
was incorporated into Indonesia after an Indonesian-
managed plebiscite was held under UN auspices. In-
donesia, before Sunday's invasion, already had
sponsored a resolution in the UN decolonization
committee calling on the administering power in
Timor to create conditions leading to self-deter-
mination for the Timorese people.
(continued)
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
PUK 11-IL PKLJIDEIV1 ONLY
Although the resolution was directed originally
at the Portuguese, Jakarta evidently expected that
once its own control was established, the UN committee
would merely substitute Indonesia for Portugal. Now,
however, several members of the decolonization com-
mittee, pressed by former Portuguese colonies in
Africa, are sponsoring amendments to the resolution
that will condemn Indonesian aggression against Timor.
At the same time, Portugal itself has asked for a
Security Council session to consider Indonesian ag-
gression.
Most members of the international community
would probably prefer not to stand up and be counted
on the issue. Whether or not Indonesia's opponents
will be able to do more than cause Jakarta temporary
embarrassment probably will depend on how quickly
Indonesian troops can restore order and create a
stable administration in Timor.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
TIM 1 tih PKOIDLIN 1 VINLY
GREECE-CYPRUS
The Greek and Cypriot governments
do not like the recent Turkish proposals
for the resumption of intercommunal talks
but have kept the door open for discus-
sions at the NATO ministerial meetings
this week in Brussels.
Both Greece and Cyprus were unenthusiastic over
Ankara's suggestion to broaden the talks to include
Greek and Turkish representatives. The Greeks
clearly prefer to avoid direct involvement in talks
that can only result in a settlement unfavorable to
the Greek Cypriots.
Cypriot Foreign Minister Christophides told
Ambassador Crawford yesterday that progress on re-
sumption of the talks hinges on Ankara's willing-
ness to accept some link between the negotiations
and previous UN resolutions. According to Christoph-
ides, such linkage could be established by a con-
tinued role for UN Secretary General Waldheim in
the talks--an issue on which the Turks have indi-
cated some flexibility. Christophides also noted
that no settlement will be possible if the Turks
insist on retaining the Greek Cypriot section of
Famagusta.
The Cyprus problem may be further complicated
on Friday when the Security Council begins deliber-
ations on an extension of the mandate for the UN
peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Angry at the resolu-
tion favoring the Greek Cypriots adopted in the Gen-
eral Assembly last month, the Turkish Cypriots at
one point threatened to oust the force from their
zone and have already sharply curtailed its human-
itarian activities.
At Ankara's request, Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash has toned down his attacks on the force.
Turkey will apparently insist that the UN make a
separate agreement with the Turkish Cypriot admin-
istration on the force's role in the Turkish Cyp-
riot zone.
(continued)
5
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
a- ??a_ La, L
The Makarios government is opposed to a change
in the wording of the force's mandate and will call
on the Security Council to endorse the recent As-
sembly resolution on Cyprus. Indications are, how-
ever, that the two sides will reach a compromise.
In a related event, Denktash, at Ankara's re-
quest, has indefinitely postponed holding elections
and a referendum on the question of independence
for the Turkish Cypriot zone.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
- - -
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
1 VA, illli rILJ11JLINi tJ/ L, /
USSR
Georgy Arbatov, Moscow's most promi-
nent academic authority on the US, last
week offered Ambassador Stoessel his
latest views on bilateral relations.
Arbatov's views, frequently and freely con-
veyed to Americans, are often plainly self-serving.
He apparently enjoys Brezhnev's confidence as a
substantive expert, however, and is evidently at-
tuned to the mood in Moscow. On occasion, as in
his recent article in Izvestia against Western
critics of Soviet behavior, Arbatov seems to serve
as a quasi-official conduit for points his patrons
want made to the US.
During his conversation with our ambassador,
Arbatov predicted that Soviet detente policy would
be reaffirmed at the party congress next February.
He said, however, that criticisms are being heard
in the USSR and that there have been "discussions"
about detente within the Soviet leadership. He
implied that Moscow is closely following the in-
creased criticism of detente in the US, especially
as the issue showed signs of becoming a center of
debate in the US election campaigns.
Arbatov acknowledged that there is uncertainty
about who will be the leaders in both the US and
the USSR a year from now. He was careful to point
out, however, that Brezhnev is in "good shape" and
will definitely be around for a while. Arbatov
advised that both sides ought to strive for as
much bilateral progress as possible under the pres-
ent leaderships, succession uncertainties notwith-
standing. He singled out SALT as one "central"
issue on which both sides could and should show
flexibility "before it is too late."
Responding to a comment about Soviet involve-
ment in Angola, Arbatov observed blandly that dif-
ferences between Moscow and Washington would in-
evitably arise, but argued that these problems
should not prevent progress in other areas.
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
it
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
kJ, I
CHINA-ANGOLA
The Chinese are maintaining a policy
of strict neutrality toward conflicting
forces in Angola. Peking's approach--for
the short term at least?is once of oppo-
sition to the USSR's support for the Pop-
ular Movement. There is no evidence of
any significant resumption of covert Chi-
nese assistance to the National Front and
National Union.
As long as other outside powers continue to
shoulder the burden of military assistance to the
opponents of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement,
China can be expected to maintain a low profile
with its former clients.
Although evidence is
reached agreement
to divert to
lacking, Peking may have
Angola certain types of
equipment
as long as Peking is
left with a plausible case for denying any direct
role of its own.
The prospect that the Organization of African
Unity may reverse its policy of neutrality toward
the civil conflict in Angola or that OAU members
may decide to go separate ways on the subject must
concern the Chinese. Peking is already on the op-
posite side of the fence from Tanzania, Mozambique,
Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea as well as a
number of other states that have followed Moscow's
lead in extending formal recognition to the Popu-
lar Movement. A decision by the OAU to waffle on
Angola would almost certainly lead to wider Afri-
can and Third World recognition for the Movement.
The Popular Movement, for its part, has care-
fully avoided closing the door to future ties with
Peking by avoiding direct attacks on the Chinese.
The Movement's second in command has specifically
(continued)
8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
. _
stated that his group has resisted Soviet pressures
to take sides in the broader Sino-Soviet ideological
dispute. There are no signs, however, that Peking
is seriously considering switching its political
support. On the contrary, the expanded Soviet and
Cuban role can only have darkened Chinese views of
the Movement.
a proposal tor an emergency summit
session on the Angolan problem has now been approved
by the required two thirds of the OAU members.
a preliminary foreign ministers'
meeting to convene in Addis Ababa on December 19 to
set the date and agenda for the summit. The summit
itself, however, apparently is not likely to be held
until after the first of the year.
9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Lammas Vekimissist annein rommer- sammer- Asemsnowiturimow
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010001-1