THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 DECEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014973
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 8, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
-
v
December 8, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category, 5B( 11,12).13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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December 8, 1975
Table of Contents
Indonesia - Portuguese Timor: Indonesian troops
have captured Dili, the capital of Portuguese
Timor
(Page
1)
Portugal: The centrist Popular Democratic Party
has averted a showdown over Communist partici-
pation in the government. (Page 2)
Spain: Prime Minister Arias is moving toward re-
organization of the government. (Page 3)
Notes: Israel; Netherlands-Indonesia (Page 4)
At Annex we present a memorandum on the Prospects
for Peace in Lebanon.
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BA :VOA SEA
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PORTUGUESE
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558918 12-75
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INDONESIA - PORTUGUESE TIMOR
Indonesian troops have captured
Dili, the capital of Portuguese Timor.
Yesterday, marines and airborne troops
equipped with US weapons mounted a
full-scale attack against the city fol-
lowing a naval bombardment. The units
met little resistance from Fretilin,
the group that had declared Timor inde-
pendent.
Fretilin troops fled the city before the at-
tack. In anticipation of the fall of the city,
several weeks ago they began moving their supplies
and ammunition into the mountains from where they
plan to wage guerrilla war against the Indonesians.
Jakarta, meanwhile, is attempting to portray
its invasion in the best possible light. Foreign
Minister Malik told reporters yesterday that Indo-
nesian "volunteers" had landed in Timor after Dili
had fallen to indigenous anti-Fretilin forces, and
in response to a request from these forces for as-
sistance.
Malik denied that Indonesian forces were in-
volved in any heavy fighting or that they had bom-
barded or carried out an air attack. He indicated
that a delegation representing the four pro-Indone-
sian Timorese parties soon would depart for the UN
to lobby for approval of the absorption of East
Timor by Indonesia.
Portugal has broken relations with Indonesia
because of the invasion. Lisbon will ask the UN
Security Council to order Jakarta to cease military
operations.
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PORTUGAL
The centrist Popular Democratic
Party has dropped its inflexible stand
against Communist participation in the
government, averting a showdown over
the issue.
At a national congress over the weekend, Popu-
lar Democratic delegates voted to allow the party
to continue to participate with the Communists in
the government under certain conditions.
Many of the conditions either have already been
met or could be met by the government without ex-
treme difficulty.
Popular Democratic leaders backed away from a
conflict with the Antunes faction and the Socialists
over the Communist issue. The final resolution may
have been a compromise to avoid splitting the con-
servative and leftist wings of the party.
Party Secretary General Francisco Sa Carneiro
had been calling for the ouster of the Communists
for weeks because of their efforts to undermine the
government.
Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal, mean-
while, told 20,000 supporters in Lisbon yesterday
that the party had not withdrawn from the government
because such a move would only strengthen the right-
ists. He said a new threat from the right must be
overcome by changing the policies of the Socialists
and the ruling faction in the Armed Forces Movement.
Cunhal told the rally--the Communists' first
since the coup attempt of November 25-26--that the
rebellion had been "disastrous," and he placed the
blame on the far left. He said a bloody rout of
the workers had been narrowly avoided when the
Communists failed to support the uprising.
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SPAIN
Prime Minister Arias is taking steps
to begin reorganizing the government after
agreeing on Friday to King Juan Carlos'
request to remain in office.
Arias and members of his cabinet reportedly
have readied a decree authorizing the Prime Minister
to carry out the reorganization without seeking ap-
proval of the rightist-dominated parliament. Formal
announcement of the decree apparently will be held
up until Arias can announce his new cabinet. The
delay suggests Arias is meeting resistance to some
of his plans.
Two Communist-led anti-regime demonstrations
in Madrid over the weekend brought a stern police
crackdown. The police reaction will make it dif-
ficult for the King to project a liberal image of
his government. The demonstrations will also arouse
concern on the right and complicate Arias' efforts
to bring men favoring political liberalization into
the new cabinet.
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_
NOTES
Israel's approval of four new settlements in
the Golan Heights is an answer to recent UN Security
Council actions.
Our embassy in Tel Aviv reports that the new
communities will be of a paramilitary nature and
will be established between two existing fortified
settlements in order to close a "security gap" used
by fedayeen infiltrators. Israeli press reports
indicate that the new settlements may be ready for
occupancy within two weeks. Syria will view the
developments as further evidence of Israel's inten-
tion to retain control of the Heights. Israelis
who are pushing for more settlements in the occupied
territories will be encouraged to press their de-
mands all the harder.
The young men holding hostages on a Dutch
train and at the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam
are not representative of the 35,000 Moluccans
living in the Netherlands.
Refugees from an unsuccessful South Moluccan
revolt against Indonesia in 1950 formed the nucleus
of the expatriate colony in the Netherlands. Most
of the Moluccans have long since abandoned dreams
of independence, and many would like to return to
the islands. The Hague and Jakarta have had such
a move under discussion for some time. The ter-
rorists probably have never seen the South Moluccas
and do not speak for those now living there.
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L .L I IL. I Iv NI I l../1 N
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN LEBANON
Lebanon's principal Christian and
Muslim political leaders over the last
two weeks have shown some willingn.ess to
negotiate their political differences.
This change of positions?although quali-
fied and probably only temporary--may al-
low Prime Minister Karami to enlarge his
cabinet to include representatives of im-
portant groups across the political and
religious spectrum, and subsequently to
begin consideration of specific political
reforms.
Renewed tensions in Beirut over the
weekend and the possibility that the
cease-fire again might collapse will make
Karami's task more difficult. The Prime
Minister, however, almost certainly will
persist in his efforts which, if success-
ful, provide some hope for progress to-
ward ending the civil strife. The cabi-
net and parliament will resist any changes
that would end Christian political domi-
nance, but they may agree on modest re-
forms to keep the fighting at a low level
at least until the parliamentary elections
next April.
Franjiyah's Outlook
President Franjiyah, after months of silence
and political passivity, expressed on November 26
a willingness to have the government consider any
"well-studied plan" for political, social, or eco-
nomic reforms. On November 29, he joined with
Karami in appealing for an end to the fighting in
Beirut, and in endorsing--albeit in the most gen-
eral terms--a government program of political re-
form. Because Franjiyah and Karami are the coun-
try's leading Christian and Muslim politicians,
their reconciliation created hope among many Leba-
nese that the fighting can at least temporarily be
ended.
(continued)
Al
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Franjiyah's conciliatory public position
presumably is designed to placate the many mediators
who have appealed to him to be, or at least to ap-
pear, more cooperative. Such advice has come from
French emissary Couve de Murville, Vatican envoy
Cardinal Bertoli, Western and Arab diplomats in
Beirut, and a number of Lebanese politicians.
In addition, Franjiyah has been urged by repre-
sentatives of the right-wing Phalanges Party and
Christian officers of the Lebanese army to be more
assertive so he can resist basic political changes,
or at least use his office to assure that changes
come in the areas least objectionable to the Chris-
tian community.
The President recently has agreed to allow his
personal representative to engage in private talks
with the Palestine Liberation Organization. In the
past, Franjiyah and other Christian politicians have
generally preferred to deal with the Palestinians
through intermediaries. This shift reflects partly
recognition that the PLO chief, Yasir Arafat, is now
a major force in Lebanese politics, and partly an
effort to undermine the uneasy alliance between the
Palestinians and the Lebanese radical left.
Franjiyah so far has not mentioned any specific
reform that he would support, and his tactics sug-
gest that he is not prepared to change the essen-
tials of Christian policy. Above all, he will in-
sist that a Christian retain the presidency and
that the strength of the office not be undercut by
a formal transfer of powers to the prime minister.
Franjiyah may, however, be prepared to:
--Allow informally greater prerogatives to
the prime minister.
--Equalize Christian and Muslim representation
in parliament and the civil service.
--Establish a joint Christian/Muslim command
of the Lebanese army.
Other Christian Leaders
Leaders of the Phalanges Party, which has the
largest Christian militia, are showing some willing-
ness to compromise. Party leader Pierre Jumayyil
(continued)
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_ _ _ _
was in Damascus this weekend for consultations with
President Asad, and Phalangist representatives have
for the past few weeks been negotiating with lead-
ers of Fatah, the largest fedayeen group. The Pal-
estinians and several mediators are optimistic that
the Phalangists will consider limited economic and
political reforms.
Jumayyil's willingness to enter negotiations
is prompted by the restraint shown by the major
fedayeen groups during the fighting in Lebanon this
year. If the Palestinians respect the existing
agreements outlining their rights and responsibili-
ties in Lebanon--the Cairo Agreement of 1969 and
the Melkart Agreement of 1973--and limit their as-
sistance to or help control the radical Lebanese
leftist groups, the Phalangists may make concessions
to Lebanon's traditional Muslim leaders.
If the main fedayeen groups revert to obstruc-
tionist policies, however, or demand that the Chris-
tians negotiate with or make changes that would di-
rectly benefit the Lebanese far left, the Phalangists
will no longer bargain seriously.
The Phalangists, like the other Christian
groups, are pessimistic that the Palestinians or the
Muslims will temper their political demands to al-
low agreement on fundamental issues. Party leaders,
nevertheless, have an interest in keeping negotia-
tions alive; talks of any kind buy time to rearm and
allow the Christians to contend that they are heed-
ing the advice of mediators who have counseled a
conciliatory attitude.
The Phalangists' concessions and demands in
future negotiations are likely to grow out of a
statement of policy issued last August. The party
at that time called for more vigorous action by
government security forces to restore order and de-
fended Lebanon's 30-year-old National Covenant as
a "unique and model formula."
It asked that the PLO honor its agreements
with Lebanon and refuse to "be used" by those seek-
ing to overturn Lebanon's system of power-sharing
between Christians and Muslims. The Phalangists,
however, also called for government sponsorship of
social and economic reform, reiterated their backing
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for the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative"
of the Palestinian people, and took care to avoid a
flat rejection of change in the country's constitution.
The head of Lebanon's predominantly Christian
National Liberal Party, Camille Shamun, has until
recently appeared to be the Christian leader least
interested in serious political negotiations with
the Muslims or the Palestinians. His hard line has
been designed primarily to check the erosion of sup-
port among right-wing Christians that followed the
more cooperative stand he adopted when he joined
Karami's "national salvation cabinet" last summer.
At that time, the Phalangists and ultra-con-
servative Maronite groups were competing to be the
most ardent defender of Christian interests. When
continued heavy fighting and growing political pres-
sures later forced the Phalangists to soften their
position, Shamun's National Liberal Party still moved
toward a more intransigent stand. The National Lib-
eral's militia played a central role in the fighting
last month.
Stone-walling
Shamun's obstinacy resulted in an almost com-
plete lack of progress in his group's private talks
with the Palestinians. The National Liberal strat-
egy was to resist making concessions that would
weaken the Christian hold of the government and con-
trol over internal security. This was in keeping
with the long-time policy of Shamun's party, which
since its formation in 1958 has been the most ex-
treme of the Maronite groups in opposing the growth
of Arab nationalism in Lebanon.
Despite his propensity to take arbitrary ac-
tions in the interest of his political position,
Shamun is interested in coordinating his tactics
with the other Christians. Accordingly, last Thurs-
day, he proposed that he, as interior minister,
should serve with Arafat as co-chairman of a new
committee formed to facilitate talks on coexistence
between the Lebanese and Palestinians.
(continued)
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Even the arch-conservative Christian groups--
the Order of Maronite Monks and the Maronite League--
may be tempering their opposition to political change
with realism. There is no chance these groups will
support political change, but if they reduce their
opposition, conservative Christians like Franjiyah
would have more freedom to negotiate.
Leaders of the arch-conservative groups appar-
ently were advised by Cardinal Bertoli last month
to back away from the hard-line paper they had pub-
lished in mid-October. That statement had, in ef-
fect, called on the President to dismiss Karami,
call in the army to stop the fighting, and shelve
proposals for political reform until the Palestinian
problem had been solved.
Maronite Patriarch Antonios Khreish, who is in
Rome for consultations with the Vatican, is much
more temperate than the extremist leaders. He
strongly advocates social reform, and recognizes
that Muslims must be given assurances that predomi-
nant Maronite political power is a thing of the
past.
Nevertheless, neither he nor leaders of the
Christian militias have been willing to criticize
the extremists in the absence of evidence that Chris-
tian concessions would bring a dependable peace.
The arch-conservative Christian groups are influen-
tial far beyond their small size; they have close
ties to Franjiyah, and have long provided heavy po-
litical, financial, and military aid to the Chris-
tian militias.
The Muslim Stand
Muslim leaders ?have not reduced their demands
in any way likely to elicit concessions from the
Christians. In fact, the traditional Muslim poli-
ticians--Karami in Tripoli and Saib Salam in Beirut--
have lost considerable support to the Muslim far
left, and are under increasing pressure to move to-
ward more radical positions. According to some
(continued)
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accounts, these long-time political leaders might
even lose their parliamentary seats to
Muslim radicals, like Faruq Muqaddam
oh, and Ibrahim Qulaylat in Beirut.
in Trip-
Despite his apprehension about his eroding
power base, and his inability to compromise basic
Muslim interests, Karami has been taking steps to-
ward a political settlement. He has endured attacks
from several quarters after saying that he aims only
to reinterpret--rather than amend--the National Cov-
enant. In addition, he has indicated that he would
accept changes less sweeping than those presented by
the dialogue committee.
Karami is presently attempting to enlarge his
cabinet to include all major political factions, a
move that will effectively move consideration of
political reforms from the dialogue committee, where
the leftists are over-represented, to the cabinet.
The Prime Minister has much greater control over
the cabinet than over the committee, and will be
able to ensure that any move toward reform is worked
out beforehand by himself and Franjiyah.
Karami has sought to avoid antagonizing either
the Muslims or the Christians by speaking of reform
only in general terms. The nearest he has come to
making specific proposals was on November 15, when
he elicited agreement from the cabinet that he and
Franjiyah should come up with specific ways to en-
sure Muslim and Christian equality in parliament
and the civil service, limit unemployment, and stim-
ulate the economy.
Such goals are in line with Karami's earlier
recommendations to the government and his past ex-
pressions of personal aims. In two major policy
speeches he made soon after becoming Prime Minister,
Karami advocated comprehensive economic reforms--
they would concentrate on housing and assistance to
the poor of Beirut--and the need to abandon the
system of religious balance on which the country's
National Covenant is based.
Karami has emphasized the need for a greater
Muslim role in the command of the army, and de-
clared in late July--primarily for political effect--
that he considers himself, a Muslim, a candidate
for the presidency next year.
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Libyan Puppet
The religious head of the Sunni Muslim commun-
ity, Sheikh Hassan Khaled, is much more intransigent
than any major Muslim political leader. Couve found
that only Khaled insisted that the Muslims secure
the presidency in any political settlement of the
Lebanese crisis. Khaled/
jis likely for the short term to remain a Libyan
puppet; he will not soften his stand.
Imam Musa Sadr, head of the Shia Muslims, has
played a generally constructive role in working to-
ward civil peace. Although he receives some help
from Libya, he is backed primarily by the major fed-
ayeen groups and by Syria. His militia plays only a
small role in the fighting.
The spokesman for Lebanon's leftist groups,
Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, is much less flexibile
than the Muslim politicians. For the moment, at
least, he is holding to a demand that some economic
and political reforms be enacted before he joins an
expanded government under Karami. This requirement
probably is only part of a tough bargaining position
designed to secure heavy Muslim representation in a
new cabinet and promises from the Christians that
the expanded group will move quickly to implement
meaningful reforms.
Jumblatt's limitless ambition--he would like
the system altered so that he, a Druze, could be-
come president or prime minister--impels him to
drive a hard bargain, but also induces in him some
sense of realism that in the end probably will prompt
him to take what he can. Jumblatt has been pushed
toward accepting a compromise by Palestinian lead-
ers and the Syrians, from whom his militia receives
arms and training. He presumably received the same
message from conservative Arab leaders during his
recent tour of Gulf states, and from some moderate
Lebanese Muslim politicians.
Jumblatt almost certainly will not hold out
long against such pressure/
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Despite his politically motivated attacks on
Karami, Lebanese Christians, and the US, Jumblatt
promotes a relatively moderate reform program. His
party's platform calls for extensive education and
social welfare programs, a merit system in the civil
service, proportional representation in parliament,
an independent judiciary, electoral reform, and some
reduction in the powers of the president. Jumblatt
prefers that all reform proposals be debated by the
dialogue committee, where he and his leftist col-
leagues are more heavily represented than they have
been in any recent cabinet.
Views from Outside
Many foreign governments and the PLO are try-
ing to facilitate a negotiated settlement in Lebanon.
France, the Vatican, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and sev-
eral Western governments have urged the warring par-
ties to compromise.
The Syrians, while deeply involved in the sit-
uation, have generally worked toward ending the fight-
ing. Israel, another concerned party, supports the
Christian cause against the Muslims, but for the most
part has played only a peripheral role in the dispute
over Lebanon's system of government.
Only Libya and Iraq are heavily involved in
Lebanon's domestic problems in ways that perpetuate
the fighting.
Should the Lebanese fail in their current ef-
forts to find a political solution and heavy fight-
ing resumes, the chances will increase that foreign
powers--especially Syria and Israel--will be drawn
into the conflict. This, in turn, could spark wider
hostilities in the Middle East.
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