THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 DECEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014972
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 5, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
December 5, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category,515(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized CopyAr;p-rO?ved-f-o-r-R-e-le.a-S-e-201-6/07/1-4-:-CIA--kDP79T00936A012900010030-1
December 5, 1975
Table of Contents
USSR: Soviet officials recently have indicated that
---- this year's grain harvest was the lowest since
the mid-1960s. (Page 1)
Portugal: The Revolutionary Council has pressed
ahead with plans to prosecute those responsible
for the paratroopers' uprising on November 25
and 26. (Page 2)
Turkey: Renewed student unrest and violence between
leftist and rightist street gangs are heighten-
ing political tension and exasperating the
military. (Page 3)
Spanish Sahara: Morocco and Algeria are intensify-
ing their bitter propaganda exchanges as Rabat
moves rapidly to consolidate its foothold in
Spanish Sahara. (Page 4)
Thailand - North Vietnam - China: Hanoi apparently
has begun to challenge China's long-standing
dominance of the Thai Communist Party. (Page 5)
Notes: UN-PLO;
6 and 7)
USSR (launchers); Iceland-UK
(Pages
(This brief, with information as of 1:00 P.M. EST,
was cabled on this date to the President in
Asia.)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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USSR
Soviet officials recently have in-
dicated that this year's grain harvest
was the lowest since the mid-1960s.
A published statement by a middle-level Soviet
official indicates that the harvest may have been
about 137 million tons. Soviet Agriculture Minister
Polyansky gave some figures
that point to a crop of between 142 and 152 million
tons. This could mean the
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the weather in 1975 was the worst in a hundred
years.
A harvest of 137 million tons would leave the
USSR short of at least 40 million tons of grain
even if it imports all it can. The Soviets have
bought 26.5 million tons so far this year and, un-
der the existing agreement, they can buy only an-
other 3.5 million tons from the US. Because only
minimal amounts are available from other suppliers,
we estimate that total imports will not exceed 30
million tons. The Soviets thus would have to cur-
tail domestic consumption sharply.
Our latest estimate of the Soviet grain crop
is 150 to 155 million tons; that of the Department
of Agriculture is 160 million tons. Earlier, un-
official estimates given by Soviet officials had
been in the range of 160 to 170 million tons.
So far, the Soviet leadership has not employed
all-out tactics for curtailing consumption such as
limiting the sale or drastically reducing the qual-
ity of bread, or delivering public harangues against
waste. We have, however, good evidence of distress
slaughtering of livestock, reductions in feed ra-
tions, and increases in the prices of farm products.
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PORTUGAL
The Revolutionary Council has
pressed ahead with plans to prosecute
those responsible for the paratroop-
ers' uprising on November 25 and 26.
The Council has continued to get rid
of its pro-Communists. Arrests of
foreign leftists are also reported
to be under way.
The Council named an air force officer, Luis
Araujo, to head a commission of inquiry to look
into the uprising and instructed investigating units
to prepare legal proceedings against participants.
Approximately 100 soldiers have been arrested and
others still are being sought. The purge has claimed
36 members of Prime Minister Azevedo's personal
staff. All of those implicated thus far have been
military personnel, but the government says they
were part of a larger plot with broad political im-
plications.
The Council announced the arrest Thursday of
a navy member of the Council, Almada Contreiras,
and issued a warrant for the arrest of his deputy
as part of the continuing purge of leftist officers.
Contreiras is the fifth member of the Council re-
moved for leftist political leanings. His depar-
ture leaves only one pro-Communist still on the
Council--another navy officer, Martins Guerreiro.
The military purge prompted an outcry from the
Communist Party newspaper, Avante, on December 4.
In a front-page editorial, the paper appealed for
an end to the purge and the arrests, branding them a
witchhunt conducted by reactionaries. The Commu-
nists are on the defensive, but they still appear
unprepared to accept the conditions recently set
forth by the Socialists for continued Communist
participation in the cabinet--repudiation of the
military uprising and a pledge of loyalty to the
Azevedo government. Avante said that a capitula-
tion by the party on such matters of principle was
not possible.
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TURKEY
Renewed student unrest and violence
between leftist and rightist street gangs
are heightening political tension and ex-
asperating the military.
Officers on the general staff reportedly ex-
pected their chief, General Sancar, to relay the
military's growing impatience with government pro-
crastination to Prime Minister Demirel on December
5. The officers thought that Sancar would warn
Demirel--as he reportedly did early last month--
that the armed forces do not wish to see the po-
litical climate deteriorate to a point requiring
a military ultimatum to the government similar
to that which forced Demirel to resign in 1971
under similar circumstances. Sancar is expected
to advise Demirel to begin preparations for de-
claring martial law in Istanbul and Ankara prov-
inces. Perhaps in anticipation of a warning from
the chief of the general staff, Demirel held a
lengthy cabinet meeting on December 4 after which
the government announced that it is taking all nec-
essary measures against "those who would provoke
anarchy."
Disquiet in the military may have been height-
ened by the murder earlier this week of two students
in Istanbul and the sympathy demonstrations that
followed in Ankara and Izmir as well as in Istanbul.
The incident and the demonstrations provoked an-
other round of bitter recrimination among Turkey's
major political parties. Demirel's ruling party
accused Ecevit's opposition party of "moving the
political struggle into the streets" in an effort
to seize power. The opposition responded by charg-
ing that the disorders were being used to divert
public attention from internal divisions in the
government coalition and from Turkey's increasingly
serious economic and social problems.
We have no evidence that the generals are pre-
pared to go beyond putting pressure on the govern-
ment to act, but the violence and the near paral-
ysis of the government are testing their patience.
Most of them appear at this time to have little
desire to take on the burden of dealing with Tur-
key's seemingly intractable problems. Some junior
officers may not share their seniors' reluctance.
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SPANISH SAHARA
Morocco and Algeria are intensify-
ing their bitter propaganda exchanges as
Rabat moves rapidly to consolidate its
foothold in Spanish Sahara.
Numerous Moroccan officials have traveled to
the Spanish Saharan capital of El Aaiun to partici-
pate in the new administration; postal service, air-
line connections, and telephone links with Rabat
have been set up. Morocco's claim that Saharan
views are being taken into account is in part based
on the Saharan territorial general assembly's ap-
proval last week of the Spanish-Moroccan-Mauritan-
ian agreement and the announcement of its fealty to
King Hassan. A Spanish correspondent claims, how-
ever, that less than one third of the members at-
tended the special meeting.
Algeria, meanwhile, has accused Spanish offi-
cials of facilitating Rabat's takeover. The press
and radio are highlighting the allegations of the
Polisario Front--a Saharan independence movement
backed by Algiers--of Moroccan atrocities against
civilians. Clashes between Moroccan troops and
Polisario guerrillas have been occurring for sev-
eral weeks, but most have probably been skirmishes
instead of the fierce battles described by the
Front. Algeria also reinforced its borders with
Morocco and Spanish Sahara last month and is con-
tinuing to take other limited military steps.
The Spanish are accelerating their withdrawal
from Sahara to avoid hostilities with Morocco,
the Polisario Front, or Algiers.
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THAILAND - NORTH VIETNAM - CHINA
Hanoi apparently has begun to chal-
lenge China's long-standing dominance of
the Thai Communist Party.
at least
some Thai insurgent leaders in northeast
Thailand are complaining that North Viet-
nam is now obstructing the flow of Chi-
nese assistance in order to pressure the
movement into accepting guidance from
Hanoi rather than Peking.
During the Vietnam war years, the North Viet-
namese facilitated the movement of men and supplies
between Thailand and China, and also channeled Chi-
nese funds to the Thai communists. The North Viet-
namese themselves provided material support and
training to the insurgents.
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The shift in Hanoi's stance apparently occurred
last summer. In August, insurgents in Thailand be-
gan to notice a drop in deliveries of supplies and
funds from China. By November, the communications
route through Vietnam to China was closed, and the
insurgents were unable to send personnel to China
for training.
Hanoi later ordered All routes closed, alleg-
ing that Thai government border operations along
the Mekong made the routes unusable. The insur-
gents, however, have concluded that North Vietnam
is deliberately blocking these channels in order
to pressure the Thai party into adopting a more
pro-Hanoi orientation. In early November, an in-
surgent province chief sharply criticized the Viet-
namese for following the "revisionist line" of the
Soviets and dismissed the Lao communist party as a
lackey of Hanoi. Although he admitted that the
Thai Communist Party still depends on Vietnamese
material aid, he vowed that the Thai party would
never accept "the Soviet line."
Over the past few months, China and North
Vietnam have expressed growing differences, both
directly and indirectly, over such matters as sov-
ereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands, the
Soviet "threat" in Southeast Asia, and the issue of
detente.
It is too early to tell whether their competi-
tion for influence will lead to an overall weakening
of the insurgent movement in Thailand.
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NOTES
The UN Security Council on December 4 invited
the Palestine Liberation Organization to take part
in its debate over the recent Israeli bombings of
refugee camps in Lebanon. The vote was nine to
three with three abstentions. The US, Britain, and
Costa Rica opposed the move, while France, Italy,
and Japan abstained. The session was held at the
request of Egypt and Lebanon.
Egypt doubtless will claim the vote is a vic-
tory for its efforts on behalf of the PLO in hopes
of receiving some of the credit for the PLO's en-
hanced position at the UN. Syria was instrumental
earlier this week in getting the Security Council
to invite the PLO to participate in a general dis-
cussion of the Middle East problem next month. In
anticipation of the outcome of the vote, Israel
boycotted the debate.
(continued)
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Two more SS-7 above-ground launchers were seen
being dismantled at the USSR's Svobodny ICBM com-
plex.
This brings to 38 the number of launchers for
older ICBMs that have been or are being dismantled
in accordance with the SALT Interim Agreement, which
allows older launchers to be dismantled and re-
placed by launch tubes on ballistic-missile subma-
rines. All launchers dismantled to date have been
above ground, but the Soviets may have started to
dismantle older ICBM silos for the first time.
The doors for three silos at Svobodny were open
and the silos were empty, and there was some dig-
ging in the vicinity of the control bunker.
Iceland may take its fishing dispute with the
UK to the UN.
Reykjavik is determined to attract world at-
tention and sympathy to its cause, and after de-
ciding not to withdraw from NATO, the government
may believe that a UN resolution will advance its
case. Its objective at the UN would be a resolu-
tion in the General Assembly branding the UK an
aggressor. According to a high official in the
Icelandic Foreign Ministry, the recent "irrespon-
sible actions" of the General Assembly would make
approval of Iceland's case there "a certainty."
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Top Secret
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