THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 DECEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014970
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 3, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
The President's Daily Brief
December 3, 1975
2
Top S8crt-25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 511(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on aPProvn1 of
the Director of Central Intelligence
: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized -6-4"; Approved for Release 2016/07/14:Cii-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
December 3, 1975
Table,of Contents
Indonesia - Portuguese Timor: Indonesia apparently
has decided against further efforts to resolve
the problem of Portuguese Timor through nego-
tiations with the Portuguese or international
mediation. (Page 1)
TUrkey:
the Turks may be wi11ig to back off a bit
from their tough position in the negotiations
with the US for a new defense cooperation
agreement. (Page 37
Lebanon: French mediator Couve de Murville is op-
timistic that the Lebanese government's effort
to expand the cabint will help ease the coun-
try's turmoil. (Page 4)
Portugal: The democratic political parties are
again pressing for a reduction in the mili-
tary's dominant political role. (Page 6)
USSR: Speakers at the December 2 session of the
Supreme Soviet projected an increase in indus-
trial production during 1976 of 4.3 percent,
the lowest planned rate since 1961. (Page 7)
China
Notes: Laos; USSR (Infrared); USSR (satellite);
USSR (drydock); USSR (ABM radar); USSR (Kosy-
gin) (Pages 9 and 10)
(This brief, with information as of 1:00 P.M. EST,
was cabled on this date to the President in
Asia.)
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 201-6/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
INDONESIA - PORTUGUESE TIMOR
Indonesia has apparently decided
against further efforts to resolve the
problem of Portuguese Timor through ne-
gotiations with the Portuguese or inter-
national mediation. Jakarta asserts that
the unilateral declaration of Timorese
independence by the left-wing Fretilin
party last week has radically altered
the situation. Foreign Minister Adam
Malik told reporters during a trip to
Timor this week that diplomatic efforts
have ended and that military force now
offers the only solution.
Malik visited Timor to talk with pro-Indone-
sian Timorese who, on the day following the Fre-
tilin party's announcement of independence, had
declared the colony part of Indonesia. Malik prom-
ised integrationist leaders full support in their
struggle but made no specific offers of assistance.
Jakarta has
ordered Indonesian commanders in Timor to increase
their military operations against Fretilin. Jakarta
plans to send additional troops and supplies to the
island, which would bring Indonesia's total strength
there to well over 10,000 men. This increased sup-
port should be enough to maintain the present momen-
tum against the Fretilin military forces.
Suharto is still concerned that open military
intervention might strain relations, particularly
with the US and Australia, and would generate in-
ternational criticism. Should he decide that in-
vasion by regular forces is necessary, it would be
an easy matter to arrange an invitation from the
integrationists for Indonesian intervention.
Suharto will undoubt-
edly raise the question of Timor during talks with
you in an effort to determine US reaction to overt
intervention.
(continued)
1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
During the past week, Indonesia captured a
Fretilin stronghold 35 miles southwest of Dili, the
capital of Portuguese Timor. Dili, controlled by
Fretilin, is suffering a severe food shortage, and
troops there are low on supplies and ammunition.
Fretilin leaders in Dili are unsure of the loyalty
of some of their troops.
Fretilin's independence declaration last Friday
was an effort to focus greater international atten-
tion on Timor and on Indonesian military support to
integrationist forces. Fretilin leaders probably
hoped to take advantage of the current media inter-
est in Indonesia stimulated by your visit to Jakarta.
Thus far, Fretilin's bid has had little effect
even among third-world states. Australia and Por-
tugal have rejected the independence declaration
outright. Some former Portuguese colonies and rad-
ical third-world countries that dislike the Suharto
regime may recognize the Timor regime, but such sup-
port is unlikely to alter the dim prospects that
Fretilin can make independence for Portuguese Timor
stick.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
TURKEY
the Turks may be willing to
back off a bit from their tough posi-
tion in the negotiations with the US
for a new defense cooperation agreement.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
The US approach to the negotiations, which Turkish
military leaders reportedly believe has been rea-
sonable and fair so far, also helped persuade the
generals to be more flexible.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Turkishnegotiators have recently indicated
that compromise may be possible on a number of is-
sues. There have been no signs, however, that the
Turks are prepared to back down from their demand
for a guaranteed annual compensation for US use of
the bases. The general staff is said to be urging
the Turkish negotiators to press for a minimum of
$150 million annually, which compares with the $1.5
billion the Turks first mentioned.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
LEBANON
French mediator Couve de Murville,
who completed preliminary talks with
Lebanese leaders this week, is opti-
mistic that the government's effort to
expand the cabinet will help ease the
turmoil in Lebanon. Couve told US Am-
bassador Godley he thought a cabinet
including representatives of the major
factions could be put together within
the week if the current cease-fire holds.
The French envoy apparently is encouraged by
hints of moderation shown recently by Christian
Phalangists and the Maronite clergy. Couve also
believes leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt may be pre-
pared to back away from his previous refusal to be
represented in a cabinet including the Phalanges
Party.
The unusual show of unity between President
Franjiyah and Prime Minister Karami last weekend
will make the task of expanding the cabinet easier.
Karami has been trying to broaden his government
since his appointment as Prime Minister in July,
but until now has not had the backing of the Presi-
dent. As expected, Karami appears to be having some
difficulty with Jumblatt and other leftists who
rightly perceive advantages for the Christians in
an enlarged government.
Expansion of the cabinet would reduce the im-
portance of the national dialogue committee, in
which Lebanese leftists are over-represented, and
thereby would benefit the Christians. Moving the
focus of political debate from the committee to the
cabinet would also give the Christians a better
chance to delay or influence any political changes
that would erode their dominant position.
Karami's ability to control and direct a re-
form program would be improved should he succeed in
eclipsing the national dialogue committee with a
broadly based cabinet. The Prime Minister does not
chair the committee and has been unable to exert
effective control over it.
(continued)
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
Difficulties with leftist leaders may delay
formation of the cabinet until next week. Renewed
tensions in the north and around Tripoli and Zagharta
and fighting in the eastern city of Zahlah may in-
crease the reluctance of warring factions to cooper-
ate with the government.
Beirut has reacted sharply to the heavy Israeli
air strikes Tuesday on fedayeen camps in northern
and southeastern Lebanon. Following an emergency
cabinet meeting on December 3, Prime Minister Karami
announced that his government will request a UN Se-
curity Council meeting to discuss the attacks. The
call for a special council session is a departure
from Lebanon's usual practice of only issuing a
formal complaint.
The raids were the first in about three months
and were the farthest north that the Israelis have
bombed in nearly three years. According to US of-
ficials in Beirut, well over 100 non-combatants are
feared dead. Many apparently were women and chil-
dren. The raids have blunted--at least temporarily--
efforts of the Lebanese army and Palestinian secu-
rity forces to bring radical elements under control
as all attention is now focused on the Israeli
challenge.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
111_, 1 IN1_,J11/1_,./. V/1 .1_, J.
PORTUGAL
Portugal's democratic political
parties are again pressing for a reduc-
tion in the military's dominant polit-
ical role.
The popularly elected constituent assembly took
up the issue on December 2 when it met for the first
time since the collapse of the leftist military mu-
tiny last week. Military participation in the gov-
ernment had been formalized last spring. The then
leftist military leadership, dominated by the pro-
Communist Vasco Goncalves, had forced the political
parties to agree to a key role for the military for
three to five years. The military, under the agree-
ment, was given the right to veto presidential can-
didates and key cabinet ministers and to override
decisions of an elected government.
At the assembly session the Socialist Party
announced it is willing to take part in renegotiat-
ing the pact with the military. The Socialists are,
however, reluctant to challenge the military just
now. The party has cooperated closely with the
anti-Communist Antunes group since the overthrow of
the Goncalves government and hopes to use its fa-
vored position in the Azevedo government as a spring-
board in the general election promised for next year.
The other democratic parties have no such re-
luctance and are likely to push the issue now that
the Socialists have opened the door. Francisco Sa
Carneiro, head of the Popular Democratic Party, has
on several occasions called on the military to re-
turn to the barracks. He recently urged the popular
election of a civilian to succeed General Costa
Gomes as president. The Social Democratic Center,
a center-right party, can be expected to throw its
weight behind the proposal to reopen the question
of the military's political role.
Popular sentiment for an end to military rule
has been on the increase, and there is support for
such a move within the military as well. The pres-
ent military leaders, however, have given no indi-
cation that they intend to withdraw from politics
completely.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
-
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
1%, 1 1 A L 1 '4
USSR
Speakers at the December 2 session
of the USSR Supreme Soviet projected an
increase in industrial production during
1976 of 4.3 percent, the lowest planned
rate since 1961. Production has grown
by an average of 6 percent a year since
1971.
Nikolay Baybakov, Moscow's chief economic
planner, ascribed this unusually low forecast to
anticipated shortages of agricultural raw materials
resulting from a poor harvest this year and to de-
lays in completing new production facilities.
Baybakov did not provide an official estimate of
the harvest, but other Soviets have described it
as "terrible" and "disastrous." Consumer goods
and services probably will bear the brunt of the
reduced industrial growth next year, although
heavy industry will be cut back too.
Baybakov said the USSR's national income this
year will be up by 4 percent; the plans had called
for 6.5 percent. Baybakov foresees national in-
come growing by 5.4 percent next year, a goal that
is probably based in large part on the assumption
that the harvest will be better.
The report on the state budget for 1976 by
Minister of Finance Garbuzov was unremarkable. As
he has in recent years, Garbuzov gave a figure for
projected defense spending--17.4 billion rubles--
which was about the same as in recent years. The
parts of the speech available to us do not include
a figure for the large and growing "science" cate-
gory, which, we think, contains a substantial share
of the actual defense budget.
The announced figure for next year's defense
spending has little meaning in terms of the size
of Soviet defense programs, but announcing defense
outlays at the same level as this year helps
buttress the detente image the Soviets are attempt-
ing.to project both at home and abroad.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
1 Wit .1 L LL L i1 AL' .1_ V./ 'I
CHINA
Peking announced on December 2 that the man-
made satellite China launched on November 26 had
returned to earth as scheduled.
Peking has re-
portedly given high priority to developing mili-
tary reconnaissance and communications satellites
in its space program.
8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
L===.1 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized, Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14,: CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
NOTES
The Laotian communists on December 3 announced
that a two-day "National Congress of People's Repre-
sentatives" had accepted the abdication of King Sa-
yang Vatthana and dissolved the coalition govern-
ment. The monarchy has been abolished, and Laos is
now a "people's democratic republic."
According to the announcement, a president of
the republic will soon be named, along with a "su-
preme adviser to the president." Souphanouvong,
the head of the Lao Patriotic Front, presumably will
be the president, and other front personalities will
compose a new cabinet. Real power, however, will
rest with the Lao communist party headed by Kaysone
Phomvihan. The communists may reveal the fate of
the now deposed Souvanna Phouma at a press confer-
ence scheduled for December 4 in Vientiane.
USSR
(continued)
9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
N
A large soviet floating drydock was towed into
Berbera on Monday.
The size of the drydock--an estimated 8,500
tons--suggests that it is intended for Soviet, not
Somali use. The Soviets will now be able to per-
form major repairs in Berbera on ships and subma-
rines of their Indian Ocean Squadron, and can thus
extend the operational time of their ships in the
Indian Ocean.
Soviet Premier Kosygin failed to attend the
opening day's session of the Supreme Soviet on De-
cember 2.
We have no ready explanation for his absence.
At 71, he appears to enjoy relatively good health
and works hard. He may have suffered a sudden in-
disposition, or he may have had other official
duties that prevented his attending the session.
Politburo members do not play an active role in
these meetings, but usually attend to add lustre
to the gathering. Kosygin's major role at the
25th party congress next February, like that of
General Secretary Brezhnev, was announced at the
Central Committee plenum this week.
10
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
25X1
immorm woman" 'aiffm ?rommor ammo lammut trommiug Nolonnul wmial inaumew
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010028-4