THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 NOVEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014966
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 29, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
November 29, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I ),12),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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November 29, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: Anti-Communist military leaders moved
yesterday to bring much of the radical Portu-
guese press under direct government control.
(Page 1)
Saudi Arabia: The Saudis have stated their inten-
tion to continue adherence to the Arab boycott
against firms doing business with Israel, even
if it jeopardizes their "special relationship"
with Washington. (Page 2)
North Yemen - USSR - Saudi ,Arabia
Laos: The communists are apparently ready to dis-
card the facade of a coalition government.
(Page 4)
Notes: USSR; Turkey (Page 5)
At Annex we present the precis of an interagency
memorandum on short-term military and politi-
cal prospects in Angola.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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PORTUGAL
Anti-Communist military leaders moved
yesterday to bring much of the radical
Portuguese press under direct government
control?further indication that they in-
tend to capitalize on their victory this
week. The general staff has been running
Portugal by fiat since martial law was de-
clared a few days ago during the rebellion
Zed by leftist paratroopers.
Following the forced resignation of Army Chief
of Staff Fabiao and security chief Carvalho on
Thursday, the management and editorial boards of
eight newspapers and magazines, most of them domi-
nated by the Communists or the far left, were dis-
missed. The general staff has announced that the
publications will remain suspended until the gov-
ernment can appoint new administrators.
According to a decree issued yesterday, all
labor contract negotiations will be suspended until
the end of the year, and the government will define
a wage policy aimed at eliminating large wage in-
equities. The decree apparently is intended to
reverse recent wage concessions made by the gov-
ernment to Communist-led construction workers and
to indicate that a program of economic stabiliza-
tion will be coming.
Prime Minister Azevedo indicated last night
that the state of emergency in the Lisbon military
region will be lifted soon and that the government
will resume its normal functions.
Other actions which reportedly are being con-
sidered include:
--Military action to end Communist-inspired
occupation of farms in the south.
--Disarming of illegally armed civilians,
possibly by means of a nationwide house-to-
house search.
--A crackdown on foreign revolutionaries,
mostly Latin Americans who, according to some
reports, have formed an international brigade
to assist Portuguese leftists.
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SAUDI ARABIA
The Saudis have stated their inten-
tion to continue adherence to the Arab
boycott against firms doing business with
Israel, even if it jeopardizes their "spe-
cial relationship" with Washington.
In a demarche to Ambassador Akins on Thursday,
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud asked for clari-
fication of your recent statements on US actions to
fight foreign discriminatory practices. Prince Saud
said that Saudi Arabia does not intend to relax its
boycott rules in the absence of an Arab League deci-
sion--a stand that gives the Saudis little room for
flexibility.
He was less specific about Riyadh's reluctance
to grant visas to Jews. He reiterated the Saudi
rationale for treating Jewish visa applicants with
caution but noted that, in practice, most Jews who
apply are admitted.
Saud said that Riyadh does not want to see its
economic relations with the US harmed. He was nev-
ertheless firm and unemotional, according to Ambas-
sador Akins, in pointing out that the problems posed
by recent US actions are of crucial importance to
Saudi Arabia, and that his country has no intention
of changing its policies.
The Saudi presentation was clearly designed
to persuade the US not to push Riyadh too hard on
these issues, and may have been deliberately over-
drawn. Nevertheless, the Saudis show little incli-
nation to compromise./
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NORTH YEMEN ? USSR ? SAUDI ARABIA
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_ _ _
LAOS
The communists are apparently ready
to discard the facade of a coalition gov-
ernment. They launched a well-rehearsed
campaign against it yesterday in Vientiane.
The communist party newspaper featured a speech
by Pathet Lao cabinet member Khamouane Boupha call-
ing for the replacement of the coalition with a
people's democratic government." Demonstrations
began later in the day in several areas of Vien-
tiane calling for the abolition of the coalition.
One group of about 1,000 marched to the residence
of Prime Minister Souvanna demanding his removal.
Radio Pathet Lao also carried appeals from local
revolutionary councils in several parts of the
country requesting the dismantling of the coalition
government.
Four days earlier, most of the remaining non-
communist politicians in Vientiane were flown to
the communist headquarters near Sam Neua, in north-
eastern Laos, ostensibly to attend a meeting of the
coalition joint national political council. It is
likely that they will be detained there indefinitely,
joining other former ranking politicians and mili-
tary officers in lengthy reindoctrination sessions.
Prime Minister Souvanna was hustled off to
Luang Prabang on November 27--perhaps to prevent
him from attempting to escape into exile. One of
Souvanna's sons fled to Thailand when he learned
that most non-communists had been flown to Sam Neua.
The communists have been laying the ground-
work for Souvanna's retirement since last September,
but the Prime Minister had expected to remain until
the completion of national elections in April.
Now the communists have apparently decided that
they have neutralized all opposition and can effec-
tively operate the government. They have the elec-
tion process well under way throughout the country
and see no reason to maintain the occasionally
cumbersome coalition structure.
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_1 AV 1 A. A-- J. I -L.
NOTES
Soviet
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Student violence in Turkey has spread to nearly
every part of the country and could threaten Prime
Minister Demirel 's fragile coalition government.
Several deaths and numerous injuries have led
to the temporary suspension of classes at univer-
sities and technical schools. The problem appears
to have spread to secondary schools. Urged on by
the press, government and opposition leaders have
flailed ineffectually at each other on the subject.
The military leadership is doubtless watching
the situation closely, particularly given its con-
cern about renewed activities by the radical left.
Earlier this month the chief of the general staff
warned Demirel's government that the military
could not tolerate continuing serious student vio-
lence.
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ANGOLA
We present the precis of an inter-
agency memorandum on short-term military
and political prospects in Angola.
The prospects for Angola are bleak. The fight-
ing shows every sign of continuing indefinitely.
Neither the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA) nor its adversaries--the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola umpo and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA)--can hope to gain effective military con-
trol over all of Angola in the near term. Pros-
pects for a political solution are equally remote,
since at present there exists no basis for agree-
ment among the three movements for participation
in a government of national unity.
The military advantage in Angola already ap-
pears to be shifting once again in favor of the
MPLA, largely owing to substantially increased for-
eign military assistance. Angola's strong ethnic
and regional divisions, reflected in the three lib-
eration movements and reinforced by the fighting
among them, will make it exceedingly difficult for
any one movement to gain effective political and
military control over the entire country. Never-
theless, it may soon be possible for the MPLA to
challenge the FNLA and UNITA in their ethnic strong-
holds in the north and south and to extend its mil-
itary presence throughout much of the territory.
Even so, the MPLA would continue to be threatened
by serious political and military opposition, and
its Luanda-based regime would be both politically
and economically unstable, possibly for years to
come.
Ideally, some kind of political solution
could be found in which all three of Angola's lib-
eration groups could participate in a government
of national unity. The major obstacle to a gov-
ernment of national unity is the MPLA, which has
arrogated to itself the role of Portugal's succes-
sor. It has been encouraged to maintain an un-
compromising stand toward its rivals by the massive
military and political support it is receiving from
the Soviet Union and Cuba.
--continued
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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The future of the FNLA and UNITA depends on
their ability to force the MPLA, either militarily
or politically, into accepting them into a govern-
ment of national unity. While this seems to be
UNITA's preferred option, it is less certain that
the FNLA would even now be prepared to accept a
power-sharing arrangement with the MPLA. Their
ability to force a military stalemate depends in
part on their obtaining continued military assist-
ance on a par with that provided the MPLA by Moscow
and Havana. Without this support FNLA-UNITA strength
is likely to erode gradually, leaving them dependent
on foreign political pressure to convince the MPLA
to agree to a coalition government.
Equally important is the ability of the two
movements, which have both suffered serious organ-
izational weaknesses in the past, to survive the
likely intensification of MPLA military pressure.
Moreover, given the undercurrent of mistrust and
suspicion that still exists between the FNLA and
UNITA, their continued political and military co-
operation cannot be counted as certain.
The MPLA's political dominance is by no means
assured. The MPLA's African supporters have mounted
a campaign to reverse the Organization of African
Unity's (OAU) policy of neutrality toward Angola
and gain OAU endorsement of the MPLA. The longer
the fighting continues without a political solution
in sight, the greater will be the pressure within
the OAU to grant recognition to the MPLA in order
to avoid protracted and acrimonious debate over
the Angola problem, which has already placed severe
strains on African unity.
Initially, Portugal's refusal to recognize
either of the self-proclaimed "governments" in An-
gola influenced many non-African countries to re-
main neutral. Leftist pressures in Lisbon and
"radical" African pressure on the OAU to recognize
the MPLA continue, however. If Lisbon and the OAU,
or even significant numbers of OAU members, recog-
nize the MPLA regime, there .will be little reason
for other countries not to follow suit. If Lisbon
refuses to extend recognition, its position even-
tually will become irrelevent--if it hasn't al-
ready--and more countries will look to the OAU
for guidance on recognition.
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