THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 NOVEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014964
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 26, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
November 26, 1975
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Exempt from general
declauification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(21,(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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,?-?? ? I\ .?-?? -11 J
LATE
-
LATE ITEM
The Indian government is reacting very strongly
to the attempt this morning to assassinate its high
commissioner in Bangladesh (Page 7). The possibility
of an Indian military move into Bangladesh is high,
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November 26, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: Anti-Communists in the military appear to
be in a stronger position following the rebel-
lion yesterday by leftist paratroopers. (Page 1)
Lebanon: Prime Minister Karami has intensified his
attacks on Christian leaders, claiming that
their hostile attitude is preventing him from
doing anything to restore order. (Page 2)
Syria-Israel: Damascus is taking a tough stand on
the political concessions it requires in return
for agreeing to another extension of the UN
forces on the Golan Heights. (Page 3)
USSR
Angola: the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
captured both Caxito and Barra do Dande from
the National Front last weekend. (Page 5)
Spain: King Juan Carlos' initial efforts have been
primarily aimed at wooing the military, appar-
ently in the hope that firm support in the
armed forces will help free his hand in the
political sector. (Page 6)
Notes: India-Bangladesh; Syria-Israel; USSR; North
Vietnam - Thailand; China (Pages 7, 8, and 9)
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jjj j ILJ1LJL1NIl./1 L., 1
PORTUGAL
Anti-Communists in the military ap-
pear to be in a stronger position follow-
ing the rebellion yesterday by leftist
paratroopers.
At last report, the government had regained con-
trol of the three air bases and the Lisbon region air
force headquarters that were occupied by the rebels
yesterday. The mutinous paratroopers, however, have
regained control over their home base at Tancos, some
77 miles north of the capital, after temporarily
losing it to loyalist forces.
Backed by several members of the Revolutionary
Council--including a subdued Otelo de Carvalho--Pres-
ident Costa Gomes last night told the nation he had
imposed a state of seige in the Lisbon military re-
gion, ordered a midnight-to-six curfew, and banned
publication of all newspapers in the region today.
Despite broadcast pleas for leftists and workers
to come into the streets to support the paratroopers,
the only significant civilian participation was by
anti-Communists in a town north of Lisbon who assisted
in recapturing the local base from the rebels. The
Communist Party took no ac-
tion.
The Communists' failure to join in the rebellion
has prompted Labor Minister Tomas Rosa to speculate
that the party may have encouraged the effort in the
hope it might spark a countercoup from the right. The
Communists presumably reasoned that the rightists
would meet swift resistance and the Communists would
be able to reclaim some popular support. Whatever
the Communist role yesterday, the party must regard
the outcome as a reversal. The party, however, still
has most of its political assets.
Anti-Communists in the military, as well as the
non-Communist political parties, are in a strong po-
sition to exploit the incident, just as the left ex-
ploited the abortive rightist coup last March 11.
The campaign to purge radical leftist officers from
the military could be given a strong boost.
Whether the anti-Communists are prepared to fol-
low through, however, is another question. President
Costa Gomes appears to have read the trend yesterday
in time to side with the stronger force, but he pre-
fers a balance of forces and may try to rein in any
group that seeks to capitalize on the situation.
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LEBANON
Prime Minister Karami in the past
two days has intensified his attacks on
President Franjiyah and Interior Minister
Shamun, the two key Christians in Leb-
anon's government. Karami, a Muslim, has
said he can do nothing to restore civil
order in the face of their "hostile atti-
tude."
In a speech to parliament yesterday, the Prime
Minister condemned Christian leaders in general for
their refusal to allow political reform and the ref-
erences some of them have made to the possible par-
tition of Lebanon. Karami acknowledged that his
government's failure to restrict the flow of arms
to all combatants had contributed to the resumption
of heavy fighting, but defended his continued re-
fusal to call in the Lebanese army.
Shamun acknowledged publicly yesterday that
his militia is involved in the current fighting.
He told parliament that the private Christian mili-
tias have taken matters into their own hands be-
cause government security forces are inadequate to
restore order or to prevent "destructive elements"
from overthrowing the government.
The unrestrained activity of Shamun's group
apparently has embarrassed even the right-wing
Phalangists. Party leader Jumayyil has tried to
calm Muslim tempers by playing up the importance
of the national dialogue committee, and his party
has issued a statement urging an end to "ideolog-
ical quarrels."
The fighting between the Christian militias
and the Muslim leftists remains heavy and wide-
spread, although it has not yet reached the level
of late October.
Syria may soon revive its efforts to mediate
the Lebanese dispute as a result of the increased
fighting and because of reports from Beirut that
Egypt may attempt to negotiate a settlement.
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SYRIA-ISRAEL
Damascus is taking a tough stand on
the political concessions it requires in
return for agreeing to another extension
of the UN forces on the Golan Heights.
How far the Syrians believe they can go
in using the mandate as a bargaining
lever is not clear. Indeed, we believe
the Syrians themselves may not make a
final decision on the matter until per-
haps as late as next Sunday, when the
mandate expires.
Asad has told Secretary General Waldheim that
Syria wants the UN Security Council to become the
main forum for future peace negotiations and the PLO
to be invited to participate in its deliberations.
Asad, however, may simply accept minor changes
in the wording of the renewal resolution to justify
an extension of the mandate because he believes al-
lowing the mandate to lapse would be too great a
risk. Even if Asad has decided that non-renewal is
an acceptable risk, we believe it is unlikely that
he would at this time make military moves that might
provoke a major conflict with Israel.
By championing the Palestinian cause as they
have recently, the Syrians appear to have concluded
that they can expect little from the US during the
next few months and to have decided therefore to
stake out a hard-line position, partly in anticipa-
tion of a long diplomatic stalemate. They are likely
to continue their efforts to embarrass and isolate
Egypt as well as keep the pressure on the US and
Israel. At least for the time being, these tactics
would help shield Asad from attack by his domestic
critics and his most persistent Arab critic, Iraq.
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin reportedly told
Waldheim yesterday that Israel could not accept any
Syrian condition regarding the extension of the
forces' mandate. The Israelis remain interested in
obtaining Syrian agreement to renew and might agree
to minor changes in the wording of the renewal reso-
lution. Rabin still does not appear prepared to take
the initiative and, instead, will continue to look to
the US to find a way to break the deadlock.
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USSR
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J12
ONGO
Bran
nshasa
Areas controlled by:
? (MPLA) Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
? (FNLA) National Front for the Liberation of Angola
A (UNITA) National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
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CAW
Cabinda
ntested e
ARE
mbrizete
Carrnona
Barra do Band
LUAND
Quitangando
Henrique
e Carvalh
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
ort Amboi
Novo Redondo
RAOP
Serpa Pi to
ocamedes
SOU H-WEST AFRICA
(Intern tional Territory)
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5588.. 11-75
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ANGOLA
Recent military successes by forces
of the Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola north of Luanda follow the
arrival this month of substantial addi-
tional military assistance from the USSR
and Cuba. r
/the Popular Movement captured]
both Caxito and the neighboring coastal
town of Barra do Dande from the National
Front last weekend.
The loss of the two towns is a serious setback
for the National Front, which has now been pushed
back to a line along the Lifune River more than 40
miles from Luanda.
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We do not have
late
news regarding
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operations
of the National
Union
column approaching
Luanda from the south.
Meanwhile, the National Front and National
Union have finally announced the composition of the
coalition government they proclaimed on November 11
in opposition to the Luanda-based regime headed by
the Popular Movement's Agostinho Neto. According
to press reports from Kinshasa, the two groups have
set up a 16-man government with two co-equal prime
ministers, each of whom will hold office alternately
a month ata time.
The prime ministerial posts are to be filled
by Johnny Eduardo Pinnock of the National Front
and Jose Netole of the National Union. They had
been the ranking representatives of their respec-
tive groups in the transitional government that
collapsed last summer.
Neither Holden Roberto nor National Union
leader Jonas Savimbi will hold an official posi-
tion in the arrangement. They are both unwilling
to be closely identified with the fragile coalition
regime, which so far has won no international rec-
ognition.
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SPAIN
King Juan Carlos' initial efforts
have been primarily aimed at wooing the
military, apparently in the hope that
firm support in the armed forces will
help free his hand in the noZit-ira7.
sector.
report that the
military to the King so far has been
enthusiastic.
reaction of the Spanish
The King's efforts may already be paying divi-
dends. The three service ministers reportedly con-
tacted a leader of the extreme right to warn against
using military veterans' organizations to attain po-
litical objectives. The restrained behavior of the
Falangists and veterans at Franco's burial may re-
flect this warning.
While giving tentative signals that some degree
of political liberalization will eventually emerge
in Spain, Juan Carlos is also paying attention to
Franco's old supporters. The King moved to placate
some far rightists, who were angered by his failure
to mention Franco's National Movement in his acces-
sion speech, by giving his first official audience
to the National Confederation for Veterans, which
includes many ultrarightists.
The Catholic Church in Spain has offered its
support to the King and for evolutionary change.
The King's standing with the opposition could
be improved by the announcement last night of an am-
nesty that will reduce prison sentences, except for
convicted terrorists. More important, all death sen-
tences have been commuted.
The first violence since the death of Franco
was the assassination of the mayor of a small Basque
town on Monday, apparently by members of a Basque
terrorist group. This organization may fear that
recent gestures by Juan Carlos and the government to
accommodate regional aspirations will diminish the
appeal of terrorism. The terrorists probably hope
to resume the cycle of violence and repression in
order to keep alive Basque resentment against the cen-
tral government.
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NOTES
The attempt on the life of the Indian high
commissioner in Dacca early this morning will
prompt New Delhi to intensify its pressure on
Dacca and increases the chances that India will
intervene militarily in Bangladesh.
An official spokesman in New Delhi has an-
nounced that India takes a "grave view" of the
incident. The Indians have complained for sev-
eral days that the government in Dacca has refused
to take action to stop a growing anti-Indian cam-
paign in Bangladesh. The spokesman linked the
shooting of the high commissioner directly to Dacca's
refusal to put a stop to the campaign.
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We now expect the Soviet hard currency trade
deficit in 1975 to be close to $5 billion.
A weak gold market this fall has forced Moscow
to borrow heavily in Western money markets, and the
Soviets are already lining up credits for 1976. If
Soviet exports continue to be sluggish, Moscow may
be forced to trim imports at some point next year.
The USSR will finance its 1975 deficit through a
combination of Western credits, gold sales, revenues
from shipping and tourism, and probably a reduction
in foreign exchange holdings. Arms sales should
provide substantial earnings this year--perhaps $300
to $500 million in hard currency.
Soviet efforts to raise loans in Europe and in
the US, which have shown a marked upswing since mid-
year, are probably aimed at meeting next year's
anticipated obligations. Grain imports, judging
from purchases already concluded or anticipated,
will amount to between $3 and $4 billion in 1976.
North Vietnam has intensified its demands that
Thailand abandon cooperation with the US on security
matters. Hanoi obviously wants to drive home this
message in view of Foreign Minister Chatchai's talks
in Washington.
A recent Vietnamese broadcast, for example,
labeled as "nonsense" Chatchai's condemnation of
Hanoi's public support for the Lao communists during
Thai-Lao border clashes last week. The broadcast
maintained that Bangkok was seeking to justify con-
tinued Thai "collusion" with the US. The North Viet-
namese recently have gone well beyond their earlier
demands for the return of the aircraft flown to Thai-
land last April and are now publicly pressing Bangkok
to end U-2 flights from Thailand and to remove com-
pletely all the remaining vestiges of the US military
presence.
(continued)
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- ? -A. -s- `I J.
Early this morning China placed a satellite
into orbit.
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Top Secret
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