THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 NOVEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014963
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 25, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
November 25, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 51311),(2)0)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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November 25, 1975
Table of Contents
Lebanon: The suspension of the national dialogue
committee meeting yesterday will reduce further
the chances for success in private talks going
on between Christians, Muslims, and the Pales-
tinians. (Page 1)
Cuba-US: Havana's interest in improving relations
with Washington seems to have abated. (Page 2)
Cuba-Angola:
(Page 4)
Thailand: Foreign Minister Chatchai, who arrives
in Washington today, hopes to gain national
stature as the man who liquidated the American
role in Thailand. (Page 5)
Notes: Egypt-Syria; Saudi Arabia - France;
Portugal; (Pages 6 and 7)
At Annex we discuss the Spanish opposition, its
strength, and the role it hopes to play in
post-Franco Spain.
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LEBANON
The suspension of the national dia-
logue committee meeting yesterday will
reduce further the chances for success
in private talks going on between Leban-
ese Christians, Lebanese Muslims, and the
Palestinians, and probably will prolong
the fighting in Beirut.
The continued fighting and the reduced ability
of all government bodies to function effectively ap-
pear to have reinforced the determination of the
Christian leaders to stay in office and to resist
making political concessions.
The Christians apparently have held to this
hard line in their talks with French mediator Couve
de Murville. Maronite spokesmen on Sunday report-
edly rejected outright a tentative French suggestion
that the Christians might reasonably offer the Mus-
lims a 50-50 split in parliament.
The situation in Lebanon reportedly has created
serious problems within the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization and the large, less radical fedayeen
groups./
/their groups have become preoccupied
with Lebanon's domestic problems to the neglect of
the struggle against Israel.
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CUBA-US
Havana's interest in improving re-
lations with Washington seems to have
abated.
In late 1974 and up until mid-1975, there were
signs that the Castro regime--partly because of pres-
sure from Moscow--wanted to better its relationship
with the US. Since then interest has appeared to
wane. A reversal of this trend in the next several
months is unlikely because:
--Havana insists on its "right" to press the
Puerto Rican independence issue.
--Escalation of the fighting in Angola has
reaccentuated the mutually antagonistic roles
of the US and Cuba.
--Pressure from Moscow for better relations
between Cuba and the US appears to have less-
ened.
--The partial lifting of US economic sanctions
in August has reduced pressures to achieve a
reconciliation.
--Havana's first party congress next month is
expected to include heightened anti-US rheto-
ric.
--The visit of Panama's General Torrijos to
Cuba in January is likely to produce further
anti-US rhetoric from Havana in support of
Panama's canal claim.
(continued)
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Regime officials appear convinced that Cuba has
more to lose from compromising its revolutionary
reputation than from retarding progress toward im-
proved relations with Washington.
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CUBA-ANGOLA
More Cuban troops and materiel appear moving
to Africa. A Cuban merchant ship seems to be
headed there, and a second ship, which reportedly
had earlier taken troops to Angola, was seen by a
Western diplomat loading cargo and "many young
men" in Havana harbor in late October. If these
sailings are confirmed, they will bring to at
least seven the number of trips made by Cuban ships
carrying men and arms to Angola for the Popular
Movement.
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THAILAND
Foreign Minister Chatchai will ar-
rive in Washington today to discuss the
future of US airbases in Thailand, the
disposition of aircraft flown to Thailand
from Vietnam in the last days of the Viet-
nam war, and the status of US military
and economic assistance. Chatchai may
request US assistance in establishing an
indigenous arms industry and may seek to
reduce the number of military advisers
by at least one third.
According to the US embassy in Bangkok, Chat-
chai hopes to gain national stature as the man who
liquidated the American role in Thailand. In the
early days of the Khukrit government last spring,
Chatchai was responsible for the policy statement
calling for the withdrawal of US forces by March
of 1976.
Chatchai also successfully reduced the author-
ity of the military command in dealing with the US
presence in Thailand. Chatchai and his ministry
have acquired an increasingly important voice re-
garding the closure of US bases and related problems.
Chatchai is by no means free to determine
policy, even though he has a significant impact on
its formulation.
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The success of Bangkok's efforts to improve
relations with China has allowed Chatchai's oppo-
nents to argue effectively that with close links
to Peking there is no longer a compelling reason
for extensive concessions to Hanoi.
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NOTES
Egyptian Vice President Mubarak told an inter-
viewer in Sudan last week that Syria could not nec-
essarily count on Egyptian support ifit initiated
an attack on Israel.
Mubarak's statement was the most direct sug-
gestion by an Egyptian official that Cairo might
stand aside in such circumstances. President Sadat
and other Egyptians have always skirted the issue
by affirming their belief that Syria would not at-
tack in any case. Mubarak said Egypt supports
Syria but that coordination would be necessary be-
fore any warfare is begun. The statements were
picked up by all major Egyptian papers.
Egypt's critics will regard Mubarak's remarks
as proof of their charge that Cairo has turned its
back on other Arabs since the second Sinai agree-
ment.
Saudi Arabia
France
(continued)
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A military aid to Portuguese President Costa
Gomes told the press early this morning that Captain
Vasco Lourenco would replace leftist General Otelo
de Carvalho as commander of the Lisbon military
region.
President Costa Games, who as armed forces
chief of staff had to approve the change of com-
mand, had been reluctant to move against Carvalho.
The leftist forces will see the decision as a major
setback; Communist-led workers yesterday held a
two-hour work stoppage to show support for Carvalho.
The Communist Party might seek to use worker demon-
strations to force Carvalho's reinstatement and
block what it will say is a major shift to the
right.
Even if the anti-Communist faction can make
the changes stick this time, Carvalho may stay on
as commander of the internal security forces, al-
though he would have no direct command of troops in
that position.
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SPAIN
The tranquility of the transition
period in Spain will depend in large
measure on the reaction of the political
opposition to what it perceives to be the
attitude of King Juan Carlos toward polit-
ical liberalization.
The initial reaction of the opposi-
tion to the King's accession speech last
Saturday was mixed. Christian Democratic
leader Ruiz Gimenez said he thought it
was the most the King could say to the
Cortes, which is dominated by right-
wingers who would have been affronted
by a liberalizing gesture on the eve of
Franco's burial.
Other opposition leaders expressed
disappointment that the King did not an-
nounce specific steps toward opening the
political process. The leader of the
Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Car-
rillo, and some of his colleagues in the
Communist-dominated Democratic Junta coa-
lition found the speech totally unaccept-
able.
An analysis of the opposition,
its strength, and the role it hopes to
play in post-Franco Spain follows.
The Spanish opposition, weakened by nearly four
decades of proscription, is composed for the most
part of poorly organized remnants of former politi-
cal parties and regional groups. Many of them have
both exile and domestic organizations. Personali-
ties are often as important as ideology in determin-
ing political loyalties.
The Communists tried to develop a coalition of
opposition factions in the summer of 1974, when they
announced the formation of the Democratic Junta.
Most elements of Spain's two major non-Communist
political groupings--the Socialists and the Chris-
tian Democrats--refused to join, and have formed
their own coalition.
(continued)
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The Communist Party
The Communist Party is the strongest and best
organized force in the Spanish opposition. It has
an estimated 5,000 active members in Spain and at
least twice that many abroad, mostly in France. Out-
lawed since the end of the Civil War, the party has
been harshly repressed by the Spanish government--
in contrast to the official toleration given many
other opposition parties--and its leaders rarely
venture into Spain. Santiago Carrillo Solares, now
60 years old, has been secretary general since 1960.
The principal source of Communist strength lies
in its dominance over most of the Workers Commissions--
illegal labor groups that appeared in the 1960s. Com-
munist organization, discipline, and financial backing
have helped make the commissions the most effective
protest mechanism available to the Spanish worker.
They will provide an important means of exerting pres-
sure on Franco's successors, particularly if Juan
Carlos does not establish other avenues to express
worker grievances to management.
The Communist Party also has at its disposal a
well-oiled propaganda machine in Radio Espana Inde-
pendiente, which broadcasts from Romania. The party
has support in the universities and is said to have
good connections in the media.
Communist efforts to infiltrate the military
have apparently met with little success. The mili-
tary forces have been a prime target for many years,
but there is no evidence of significant penetration.
The basic Communist aim is to assure the neutrality
of the military during the post-Franco evolution of
Spain's political system.
The Communists have not been spared internal
dissension. A serious rift reportedly exists be-
tween the Madrid Central Committee and the exiled
senior leadership in Paris over present party tac-
tics.)
/The party is said to be losing "consid-
erable numbers" of young workers and university
students to more extremist groups.
(continued)
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On international issues, Spanish Communist at-
titudes and positions are close to those of the
Italian Communist Party. Carrillo's relations with
Moscow have been strained ever since he denounced
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Like
the Italians, Carrillo makes a point of stressing
his party's independence from Moscow and has criti-
cized Portuguese Communists for their hard-line, rev-
olutionary tactics.
Carrillo professes to favor a more gradual ap-
proach in bringing about change. He recently claimed,
for example, that he cannot object to the US military
bases in Spain as long as the Soviets keep troops in
Czechoslovakia.
Rival Coalition
The Platform of Democratic Convergence was
formed last summer as a counter to the Communist-
controlled Junta. Dominated by Socialists and Chris-
tian Democrats, the Platform is composed of some 15
opposition parties, organizations, and trade unions.
Their program calls for the eventual drafting
of a new democratic constitution setting up a fed-
eral state that would grant autonomy to the component
regions. Most of the groups in the Platform would
accept a gradual evolution toward Western style dem-
ocracy, although there is considerable squabbling
over how gradual the evolution can be.
The dominant force in the Platform coalition
is the Spanish Socialist Workers Party?the major
Socialist faction in Spain. The Party and its af-
filiated illegal trade union, the General Union of
Workers, will provide the principal competition to
the Communist Party during the transition period.
Although clearly smaller and less well organized
than the Communists, the Socialists are believed
to enjoy widespread popular support.
Four Christian Democratic factions have joined
the Platform, and a fifth is expected to join soon.
Two Christian Democratic leaders claim that the
various factions are collaborating closely. Effec-
tive unification, however, appears unlikely.
(continued)
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Cooperation Between Coalitions
Cooperation between the Democratic Junta and
the Platform of Democratic Convergence has been
limited. The two coalitions have issued two joint
communiques?the first in September condemning the
decree law on terrorism and the government's death
sentences, and the second in October setting out
"objectives" for the transition period.
Agreement was reached after two weeks of ardu-
ous negotiations and then only because the Commu-
nists made major concessions.
Major differences separate the two coalitions:
--The Communists and other leaders of the Junta
reportedly hope to fuse the two coalitions into
one "popular front." Platform leaders are not
prepared to go further than establishing a com-
mittee of coordination.
--The Junta believes the structure of the gov-
ernment should be completely reorganized. Plat-
form leaders feel that modification of the exist-
ing structure would be sufficient.
--There are differences over how to handle de-
mands for autonomy in the Basque provinces and
Catalonia.
--Long-standing personal rivalries inhibit
joint activity.
There is general agreement, however, on the two
most immediate issues that Juan Carlos will have to
confront--amnesty for political prisoners and the
legalization of political parties. There is deep
disagreement within the government as to whether
such actions should be taken and whether they should
include the Communists.
At this point, Juan Carlos seems likely to ex-
clude the Communists from the benefits of a freer
political system. Some members of the opposition
(continued)
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believe that this isolation would only benefit the
Communists, who could be challenged more effectively
if they were compelled to compete openly. It would
also hurt Juan Carlos' chances of keeping order be-
cause the Communists are almost certain to respond
by playing a more active spoilers' role.
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/ Jose
Antonio Giron--a powerful politician of the old
Falangist school--and other figures of the far right
have publicly condemned political parties. Giron and
his followers played a major role during the past year
in scuttling Prime Minister Arias' moves toward lim-
ited pluralism, and they believe there can be no com-
promise on the principles of the regime.
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Top Secret
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