THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 NOVEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014962
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 24, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
November 24, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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November 24, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: The leader of the anti-Communist ruling
faction has warned that the country will be
plunged into civil war if the Azevedo govern-
ment falls. (Page 1)
Angola: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola accelerated its operations north of
Luanda over the weekend. (Page 2)
Note: Lebanon (Page 3)
At Annex we present the key judgments of a National
Intelligence Estimate, Soviet Forces for Inter-
continental Conflict through the Mid-1980s.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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_I.
PORTUGAL
Major Melo Antunes, the leader of the
anti-Communist ruling faction, has warned
that the country will be plunged into civil
war if Prime Minister Azevedo's government
falls. Antunes, interviewed by a French
newsweekly magazine, said the Communist
Party is preparing to seize power and that
the result of the ensuing struggle will be
a return to fascism.
The Communists, Antunes said, are engaged in a
campaign to subvert the armed forces and paralyze
the state, but will wait until the country becomes
ungovernable to make their move. Government paral-
ysis, he said, has reached an advanced stage.
Socialist party leader Mario Soares seconded
Antunes' attack on the Communists at a party rally
yesterday in Lisbon. He called on the Communists
to leave the government and said that the non-Commu-
nist ministers had no intention of resigning. Soares
said that the Socialists would take up arms if neces-
sary in order to defend democratic freedoms.
Like Antunes, Soares blamed the present govern-
ment impasse on Communist subversion of the military,
but the Socialist leader severely criticized Presi-
dent Costa Gomes for allowing his actions to be too
easily influenced by pro-Communist demonstrations.
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So far the government's ultimatum to Costa
Gomes to restore authority in the military has been
a failure. When the government's demands were put
before the Revolutionary Council last week, the
council not only criticized the government, but
revived a scheme to establish direct ties between
the military and the people which is anathema to
the democratic parties.
1
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j II
16 24
ONGO
Brazz
Kins has
Areas controlled by:
?(MPLA) Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
? (FNLA) National Front for the Liberation of Angola
A (u NITA) National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
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Cabinda
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SOU H-WEST AFRICA
(Intern tional Territory)
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ANGOLA
The Popular Movement for the Liber-
ation of Angola accelerated its operations
north of Luanda over the weekend and is
exerting heavy pressure on the forces of
the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola and the Zairian army.
The combined Front-Zairian force
is showing signs of demoraliza-
tion and disarray. Following heavy rocket attacks,
the Front has abandoned its positions near Quifan-
gando and retreated in disorder towards Caxito.
the
Front may have even abandoned Caxito and may now
be trying to establish a new defensive line along
the Lifune River. Movement forces apparently remain
in the vicinity of Quifangando but may soon try to
push north if the Front's disarray continues.
Somalia's call for an emergency meeting of the
Organization of African Unity to discuss the situ-
ation in Angola is gaining momentum. Supporting
Somalia's proposal are the ten African states that
recognize the Popular Movement's "government" in
Luanda and other states that are sympathetic to-
ward the Movement but still adhear to the OAU's
request to remain neutral.
African backers of the Popular Movement under
Agostinho Neto clearly hope to use the meeting to
gain official OAU endorsement of the Neto regime
as the legitimate government of Angola. The con-
sent of 30 of the OAU's 46 members is required to
convene an emergency conference; Somalia has so far
obtained the approval of 21 nations for its proposal.
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NOTE
Lebanon's political leaders are demoralized
following the collapse of the three-week-old cease-
fire. They acknowledge that they have run out of
ideas for negotiating peace.
Prime Minister Karami said on Friday that
"Lebanon is on the verge of collapse." The state-
ment apparently was an attempt to shock the coun-
try's warring factions into stopping the fighting.
President Franjiyah had scheduled a major address
for Lebanon's national day on Saturday, but can-
celed it at the last minute.
The talks between Karami and Franjiyah that
are supposed to result in specific proposals for
political and economic reforms have not yet begun.
The national dialogue committee apparently will
meet today despite the increase in fighting. The
session will be important as an indicator of whether
the country's principal political groups remain in-
terested in negotiating a settlement.
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USSR
We present the key judgments of
National Intelligence Estimate 11-3/8-75,
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Con-
flict through the Mid-1980s, which was
approved last week by the US Intelligence
Board.
In this estimate, we call particular attention
to current and prospective developments which could
markedly increase Soviet strategic capabilities
during the next ten years:
--The Soviets are steadily deploying new types
of ICBMs. In about 1980 they will have a force
of up to 900 missiles of these types, most of
them with MIRVs. They are also moving ahead
with the development of several ICBMs beyond
those now being deployed.
--The capability of the Soviet ICBM force to
destroy US Minuteman silos is growing. It
will probably pose a major threat in the early
1980s. A more rapid increase in this threat
is possible but unlikely.
--The Soviets have the potential to make the
task of penetration by bombers to targets in
the USSR considerably more difficult by 1985
than it is today.
--The Soviets are pursuing extensive research
and development in such areas as submarine de-
tection and defensive lasers.
Large Uncertainties
We also call attention to the large uncertain-
ties about some aspects of Soviet strategic policy
and forces, especially about the quality of key
weapons and supporting systems in the future. Fore-
casts of the strategic environment over the next
ten years must therefore be made with varying de-
grees of uncertainty:
--It is almost certain that, despite prospective
improvements in Soviet forces, the USSR will not
acquire deployed forces capable of launching a
nuclear attack so effective that the US could
not cause devastating damage to the USSR in
retaliation.
(continued)
Al
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--It is probable that US and Soviet strategic
capabilities will remain in roughly equal
balance,* although the long-standing US qual-
itative superiority in strategic weapons and
supporting technology will come under increasing
challenge.
--It is possible but unlikely that the Soviets
will acquire capabilities that would be per-
ceived as providing them with more strategic
power to back up their policies than that avail-
able to the US.
Offensive Force Developments
In strategic offensive forces, the Soviets
continue their broad program of major improvements.
The trends are about as we had forecast in last
year's estimate, but the diversity of the ballistic
missile submarine program and the potential hard-
target capabilities of ICBM systems are somewhat
greater than we had expected. The main things we
have learned during this past year are:
--The new ICBMs are being deployed at a moder-
ate pace. About 100 of the new ICBMs, most of
them with MIRVs, are now operational in new
and converted hard silos. In accordance with
the Interim Agreement, the Soviets have
started to deactivate older, soft ICBM launch-
ers in exchange for new SLBM launchers.
--Despite some continuing developmental prob-
lems, the new ICBMs are estimated to have
better accuracies and higher yields than we
had expected, implying somewhat better capa-
bilities to destroy hard targets like Minute-
man silos.
*The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force, believes there is lit-
tle reasonable doubt that the Soviets are striving
for general strategic superiority over the US by
the end of the next decade. If the current massive
Soviet R&D programs achieve the breakthroughs being
sought, an important shift in the USSR's favor in
the strategic balance could occur by 1985.
(continued)
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--Development of a land-mobile ICBM could now
be complete, but there is as yet no sign of
its deployment.
--Two and possibly three models of ballistic
missile submarines capable of carrying long-
range SLBMs are believed to be in production.
A new and large type of ballistic missile sub-
marine may have started construction. A new
small SLBM and a new or modified large SLBM
have begun flight testing; a MIRV payload has
very recently been identified on the latter.
--The Soviets continue to maintain only a few
ballistic missile submarines on patrol stations.
Limited probes near North American coasts were
conducted this year, possibly portending changes
in patrol patterns. There is also an increas-
ing number of SSBNs with missiles of sufficient
range to reach targets in the US at any given
time, even without leaving port.
--The Backfire bomber has been deployed in
small numbers this year, both in Naval Aviation
and in Long Range Aviation at bases occupied by
intermediate-range bombers. The Backfire has
extensive capability for use in various missions
in Eurasia and for naval missions over the open
seas. We continue to believe it has capabili-
ties for operation against the continental US.
There are differing views within the Intelligence
Community about Soviet intentions to use it for
this purpose.
--We have obtained no confirmation of Soviet
hints that a new heavy bomber is being devel-
oped.
--There is no evidence that the Soviets are
developing long-rang cruise missiles, but they
have the design and development experience to
be able to do so.
Defensive Force. Developments
The ?Soviets continue to devote more resources
to strategic defense than they do to forces for in-
tercontinental attack. In addition to routine im-
provements in what is by far the largest air defense
system in the world, the following are the main de-
velopments in Soviet strategic defenses we have
noted during the past year:
(continued)
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--The Soviets continue to construct ballistic
missile detection and tracking systems to close
small gaps in existing coverage, to increase
their assurance of reliable warning, and per-
haps to provide some additional warning time.
--They are placing additional emphasis on sur-
veillance systems and training for defense
against aircraft at low altitudes, though there
are no indications of major improvements in per-
formance.
--We have obtained additional evidence support-
ing earlier indications that nuclear warheads are
available for a significant number of Soviet
surface-to-air missiles.
--The Soviets continue their research and de-
velopment on ABM systems (at a pace not signif-
icantly reduced from that which existed prior
to the ABM Treaty), on radars, on SAMs designed
for low-altitude air defense, and on directed-
energy systems which probably include lasers
with capabilities against low-orbiting satel-
lites.
--They have continued their extensive investi-
gation of techniques for overcoming their de-
ficiencies in detecting and tracking SSBNs at
sea. Soviet attempts to trail US SSBNs near
our operating bases have resulted in no known
successes.
Soviet Objectives
Our judgments about the strategic objectives
of the Soviet leaders are based on what they say
(in public and sometimes in private), on what we
observe of their programs, and on our appreciation
of the internal and external forces operating on
them in the present period of risky opportunities.
It is apparent that they see no contradiction be-
tween their policies of detente and arms-limitation
negotiations and their continuing buildup of stra-
tegic forces.
Much that we observe in their present posture
and programs can be attributed to a combination of
traditional defensive prudence, a military doctrine
which stresses war-fighting capabilities, superpower
competitiveness, worst-case assumptions about US cap-
abilities, and a variety of internal political and
institutional factors.
(continued)
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But the scope and vigor of these programs, at
a time when the USSR has achieved a powerful deter-
ent as well as recognition as the strategic equal
of the US, raise the elusive question of whether the
Soviet leaders embrace as an objective some form of
strategic nuclear superiority over the US.
Deeply held ideological and doctrinal convic-
tions impel the Soviet leaders to pose as an ulti-
mate goal the attainment of a dominant position over
the West, particularly the US, in terms of political,
economic, social, and military strength. We do not
doubt that, if they thought they could achieve it, the
Soviets would try to attain the capability to launch
a nuclear attack so effective that the US could not
cause devastating damage to the USSR in retaliation.
Although the Soviet leaders may now entertain
some hope--and, in the view of some agencies, al-
ready believe--that US resolve as a strategic com-
petitor is weakening, they know realistically that
the US need not concede the USSR a superior posi-
tion in the next ten years. Nevertheless, they are
probably striving for a strategic posture which has
some visible and therefore politically useful ad-
vantages over the US and which would give the USSR
better capabilities than the US to fight a nuclear
war.
Objectives Under SALT II Accord
The Soviets probably view SALT as having the
potential for limiting the costs and risks of the
strategic arms competition. Their objectives for
the SALT process probably include constraining US
options (especially in areas where they fear they
may be less able to compete), and leaving open their
own options to the extent possible.
Considering the history of Soviet strategic
policy and force improvement programs, we believe
that under a SALT II agreement based on the Vladi-
vostok accord, the Soviets would probably seek in
their strategic programs:
--To ensure deterrence of all forms of nuclear
attack on the USSR.
--To improve war-fighting capabilities, aimed
at the survival of the USSR as a national en-
tity should deterrence fail.
(continued)
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--To counterbalance, with both peripheral and
intercontinental forces, the combined nuclear
strengths of the US and its allies and of China.
--To narrow or close the gap between the US and
the USSR in important weapon technologies and
to hedge against future US force improvements.
--To acquire strategic advantages, real or per-
ceived, should US behavior permit.
Without SALT II Accord
If a SALT II agreement is not achieved, we be-
lieve that the Soviet leaders' objectives for their
strategic forces would be much the same. But they
would be free of SALT II restrictions, which would
have forced them in 1977 to make a small reduction
in the number of their intercontinental delivery
vehicles, and thereafter to have confronted the dif-
ficult choices involved in trading old weapons for
new to stay within the 2,400 aggregate ceiling.
In the absence of such restrictions, we would
expect the Soviets to build and retain strategic
offensive forces larger than the limits proposed at
Vladivostok and considerably larger than US pro-
gramed forces. Increases in force levels would be
especially likely if US-Soviet relations signifi-
cantly worsened. In any case, the Soviets would
not expect quantitative competition to alter the
strategic balance.
Implicit in the Vladivostok accord was a So-
viet judgment that the USSR could not achieve signif-
icant advantages over the US by continued competi-
tion in numbers of strategic weapons. The Soviets
have evidently come to recognize that the strategic
environment in the 1980s will be affected most im-
portantly by the qualitative aspects of the forces
of the two sides. Their progress in this area will
be largely independent of SALT II.
Dramatic near-term changes in Soviet strategic
policy would not be likely under a post-Brezhnev re-
gime. The policies now being pursued have emerged
from the interplay of many factors which would re-
main unaltered. To the extent that Brezhnev as an
individual may be a moderating influence, any changes
would likely be in the direction of increases in
strategic capabilities, especially if SALT II fails
to produce an agreement.
(continued)
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Other adjustments in Soviet policy for strate-
gic forces could result from the USSR's own tech-
nological advances or from US-Soviet confrontations
over the next ten years. Finally, changes could
emerge in response to US force developments such as
improvements in hard-target kill capabilities; de-
ployment of small, accurate long-rang cruise mis-
siles; and concepts and options for the selective
use of nuclear weapons in limited intercontinental
warfare.
Future Capabilities
Varying degrees of uncertainty characterize
our estimates of Soviet strategic policy and of the
quantity and quality of Soviet forces. Forecasts
for the next few years can be made with relatively
high confidence by extrapolating from current evi-
dence.
For the period of primary concern, five to ten
years hence, estimates of system characteristics
and force composition must be based on very limited
evidence and indirect considerations. A SALT II
agreement based on the Vladivostok accord would
considerably reduce quantitative uncertainties
about forces for intercontinental attack.
We warn, however, that uncertainties about
the quality of strategic weapons and forces--which
exist now and will persist in the future--are in
some areas large enough to affect judgments about
important aspects of the future strategic balance.
Future Offensive Forces
Our best estimate of Soviet offensive force
development over the next ten years, assuming a
SALT II agreement, is that deployment of new systems
will continue at about the pace now demonstrated,
that ICBM accuracy will continue to improve, and
that force survivability and flexibility also will
improve. Soviet ICBM forces will probably pose a
major threat to US Minuteman silos in the early
1980s, assuming that,the Soviets can perfect tech-
niques for precisely timed two-RV attacks on a sin-
gle target. This is somewhat earlier than forecast
last year.
Moreover, by the early 1980s Soviet offensive
forces will lead programed US forces in numbers of
missile RVs, though the US will retain a large lead
in the total number of missile and bomber weapons
combined.
(continued)
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?
We have examined a number of other alternatives
for future Soviet forces, which are all plausible
but not equally consistent with past trends and cur-
rent evidence. These range from (a) a force the So-
viets might regard as meeting minimum requirements
for strategic parity and military effectiveness
against currently programed US forces under a SALT
II agreement, to (b) a force the Soviets might build
if the SALT process failed, US-Soviet relations
worsened, and the Soviets achieved high rates of
deployment and technological advance.
The principal differences in the countersilo
capabilities of these alternative forces are encom-
passed by the large range of uncertainty in our es-
timates of such key weapon characteristics as ICBM
accuracy. At the more threatening but highly unlikely
extreme of this range of uncertainty, Soviet ICBMs
would pose a major threat to Minuteman silos by the
end of the 1970s.
The Soviets could increase the threat against
US bombers on alert by deploying some of their SSBNs
closer to the US coastline to reduce the potential
warning time of an attack. In assessing the mili-
tary advantages of adopting this more threatening
posture, the Soviets would have to consider planned
introduction of the B-1 bomber and countermeasures
available for existing bombers.
We believe the Soviets would conclude that the
US could preserve the survivability of most of its
alert bombers against attacks by SLBMs throughout
the next ten years.
Future Defensive Forces
In the field of strategic defense, it is un-
likely that the Soviets will significantly improve
their low-altitude air defenses before 1980. The
most likely improvements we foresee in their air
surveillance and control, interceptors, and SAM
systems would have the potential for overcoming
most of the technical deficiencies in their capa-
bilities to counter low-altitude bombers by 1985,
but it might be possible for them to do so earlier
with a very high level of effort. Assuming rapid
and widespread deployment of such systems, low-
altitude penetration of Soviet air defenses by
bombers will be considerably more difficult by 1985
than it is today.
(continued)
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The actual effectiveness of Soviet air defenses,
however, would continue to depend heavily on the de-
gree of degradation resulting from ballistic missile
strikes and on the performance of US electronic
countermeasures and bomber penetration aids and
tactics. Neither we nor the Soviets would likely
be able to predict these effects with confidence.
The future effectiveness of Soviet defenses
against ballistic missile submarines on patrol will
depend in large part on how successful the Soviets
are in detecting and tracking SSBNs in broad ocean
areas. From our understanding of the technologies
involved and research and development programs in
the US and the USSR, we conclude that the Soviets
have little potential for achieving success in
either of these areas in the next ten years.
Moreover, improvements in US SSBNs and expan-
sion of their operating areas will compound the
Soviet problem of finding, tracking, and attacking
them. These judgments must be qualified, however,
by gaps in our knowledge
of possible future Soviet
developments.
The Soviets will almost certainly continue to
develop their strategy and capability for detection
of SSBNs, and we expect improvements in their capa-
bilities to detect and destroy SSBNs in confined
water areas. We conclude, however, that these im-
provements will not overcome deficiencies in open-
ocean detection and submarine tracking, and that
Soviet ASW capabilities will fall short of being
able to prevent most US submarines on station from
launching their missiles.
Formidable Problems
Despite prospective improvements in their forces,
the problems and uncertainties which the Soviets
would face if they contemplated attacking the US
would remain formidable for the next ten years:
--The Soviets would be uncertain about the out-
come of an attack on US Minuteman silos and
would probably expect a considerable number to
survive.
--They would almost certainly consider their
ASW forces to be unable to locate and simul-
taneously destroy more than a few US ballistic
missile submarines at sea.
(continued)
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--Under the ABM Treaty their ABM defense would
be insignificant.
--They would still not have high confidence in
their ability to defend against US bombers.
--They would probably expect their civil defenses
to be able to preserve a political and economic
cadre and to contribute to the survivability of
the Soviet Union as a national entity, but they
would have to expect massive casualties, indus-
trial destruction, and a breakdown of the econ-
omy.
Under these circumstances, with the forces and
weapons we can foresee, it is extremely unlikely that
during the next ten years the Soviet leaders would
come to believe that either side could launch an
attack which would prevent devastating retaliation.
During the period, however, Soviet offensive forces
will gain considerably relative to the US in such
quantitative measures as missile throw weight and
missile RVs, although SALT II limits would estab-
lish and preserve symmetry in total delivery ve-
hicles and MIRVed missile launchers.
Furthermore, the long-standing US qualitative
superiority in strategic weaponry and supporting
technologies will come under increasing challenge.
Under the most threatening but unlikely circum-
stance of very rapid Soviet technological advance,
especially if combined with a large Soviet buildup
in the absence of a SALT II agreement, the USSR
could achieve capabilities that might be perceived
as giving it more strategic power to back up its
policies than that available to the US. Foresee-
able Soviet strategic forces, however, would not
eliminate the USSR's vulnerability to retaliation.
A crisis resolution, therefore, probably would
not rest on the strategic weapons balance, but
rather would depend on other factors, such as the
comparative strengths and dispositions of US and
Soviet conventional forces.
We have reexamined Soviet R&D programs and
prospects for major advances in fields having
strategic offensive and defensive applications that
might seriously erode US deterrent capabilities.
We have given particular attention to lasers for
use in air and missile defense and to systems for
(continued)
A10
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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detecting and trailing US ballistic missile sub-
marines. The Soviets are working actively in both
fields, and there are gaps in our knowledge of this
work.
The available evidence, together with our appre-
ciation of the physical, engineering, and operational
hurdles which must be overcome, leads us to rate as
small the chances that the Soviets can sharply alter
the strategic balance through technological advance
in the next ten years.*
Nevertheless, the scope and progress of Soviet
R&D, particularly in strategic air defense and ASW,
bear especially close watching in the years ahead.
*The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force, believes that the USSR
is embarked on a directed-energy weapons research
program of such magnitude that it could have a
major if not decisive impact on the strategic
balance before 1985.
All
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010020-2
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010020-2