THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 NOVEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014960
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 21, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
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November 21, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( 11,121,13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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November 21, 1975
Table of Contents
Israel-Syria:
(Page 1)
Portugal: The government's suspension of activities
? yesterday represents an ultimatum to President
Costa Gomes. (Page 2)
USSR: The Soviet Union's first true aircraft carrier,
the Kiev, will soon be operational. (Page 3)
China: Peking has apparently secured Mao's endorse-
ment for policy changes that will permit the
elevation of academic training in China's uni-
versities. (Page .5)
Notes: USSR; Egypt-Israel; Spanish Sahara; Cyprus
(Pages 6 and 7)
At Annex we present the conclusions of a National
Intelligence Estimate on short-term prospects
in Spain.
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Israeli Reconnaissance Mission
TURKEY
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv?Yato
LEB ON
Beirut
Damascus
GOLAN
EIGHTS
SYRIA
IRAQ
(,)
Cairo
SINAI
PENINSULA
EGYPT
Gulf
of
Aqaba
NOFORN
5588AA :1-75 CIA
RED
SEA
SAUDI ARABIA
9 100
Nautical Miles
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ISRAEL?SYRIA
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PORTUGAL
the
Portuguese government's suspension of its
activities yesterday represents an ulti-
matum to President Costa Gomes to fire
security chief Otelo de CarvaZho and Army
Chief of Staff Carlos Fabiao. The gov-
ernment's action reportedly was endorsed
by all three anti-Communist factions, and
apparently their demands are not negoti-
able.
No resolution is likely for several days, but
Costa Gomes will probably propose various compro-
mises and in the end may bow to the government's
wishes. If he refuses to go along, he too could be
replaced.
Portuguese officials reportedly believe that a
showdown with Costa Gomes is necessary if the gov-
ernment is to function. While the Communists and
the far left are expected to fight back and the
risk of armed hostilities is high, the government
appears united and prepared to take risks to es-
tablish once and for all that its authority is based
on the support of the majority of the people.
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Kiev Carrier
558689 10-75 CIA
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USSR
The trappings of great-power status
for the USSR will soon be enhanced with
operational deployment of the first true
Soviet aircraft carrier, the Kiev.
Nine hundred feet long, with an angled flight
deck of about 600 feet, the Kiev will carry a mix
of some 30 to 40 helicopters and short-take-off-
and-landing aircraft to provide defense and recon-
naissance for cruise missile ships. Two additional
Kiev-class carriers will become operational around
the end of this decade; one is in the initial phases
of construction, and the other was recently launched
and will be operational in about two years.
The major significance of the carrier may lie
less in its role as flagship of an anti-submarine
task force than in its potential political utility
and in what it might portend for further naval devel-
opment. From a political standpoint, the decision
a decade ago to build the Kiev represented a sharp
break with naval thinking during the Khrushchev era,
which contended that it was costly and unwise to
follow the Western lead in developing forces with
a potential for distant, limited military action.
Under Brezhnev's leadership, the'rnavy has evi-
dently decided that Soviet possession of carrier
aircraft is militarily advantageous and politically
useful. Soviet navy men have periodically pointed
to the political utility of US attack carriers,
which can project US power in remote areas. The
main striking power of the Soviet navy, however,
will continue to be provided by submarine-launched
missiles, land-based aircraft, and surface ships.
The Kiev-class will be no military match for
US attack carriers, but this point could be lost
on all but the most sophisticated third-world audi-
ences. The very appearance of new Soviet aircraft
carriers will be interpreted in many parts of the
world as a demonstration of Moscow's determination
to support its clients.
(continued)
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There probably will be instances when the So-
viets can employ their carriers to affect regional
developments--in the Indian Ocean, for instance.
In the Mediterranean, where the new carrier is most
likely to operate initially, it could give the impres-
sion of reducing one area of clear-cut US superiority--
sea-launched air operations--although sophisticated
observers might note the obvious inferiority of the
latest Soviet warship in that role.
From a developmental standpoint, the Kiev-class
carrier may be part of a trend, initiated with the
appearance of the Moskva-class helicopter carrier
several years ago, toward a greater role for air-
craft at sea in the Soviet navy. Although the So-
viets have disavowed any intention of developing
carriers similar to those in the West, it is con-
ceivable that they will be swayed by the multi-pur-
pose advantages that attack carriers offer.
In any case, Soviet leaders seem at present
unwilling to concede to the US a continued monopoly
of any highly visible symbols of military and polit-
ical power.
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CHINA
Peking has apparently secured Mao's
endorsement for policy changes that will
permit the elevation of academic train-
ing in China's universities.
The renewed concern for academic quality, in
line with China's drive to modernize the economy
by the end of the century, would reverse the edu-
cational policies adopted during the Cultural Rev-
olution of the mid-1960s. Those policies empha-
sized politics rather than scholastic achievement
and rendered China's universities virtually inef-
fective as institutes of higher learning.
According to a document circulating within
China, Mao has called for more study of basic sci-
entific theory and has warned students to learn
from their teachers rather than waste time stating
their opinions. The Chairman's turnabout on the
educational issue is the latest and most startling
confirmation that he has now abandoned some of his
visionary ideas of the late 1950s and 1960s and that
the party left wing is currently in eclipse.
Possibly emboldened by Mao's show of support
for the new educational policies, the minister of
education made a speech in September in which he
strongly criticized the educational policies of
the Cultural Revolution. The minister claimed
that the goal of education is not to send students
to the rural areas to work as common laborers but
to equip them with fundamental knowledge that they
can apply to their field of work.
As a result of the minister's speech, Peking
and Tsinghua universities, two of China's best,
announced that current curricula will be revamped,
that science and research will be emphasized, and
that entering students will be required to take
examinations.
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NOTES
'Soviet
he E. ptiah-Israeli disen-
gagement area
major changes
forces.
no
in either the Egypt-tan or the Israeli
The Israelis continue
to withdraw units from the canal area. Hawk sur-
face-to-air missiles and launchers have been re-
moved from the site southeast of Ras Sidr.
(continued)
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Algeria's denunciation of the Spanish-Moroccan-
Mauritanian agreement on Spanish Sahara paves the
way for UN debate on the future of the territory.
In a formal note attached to UN Secretary Gen-
eral Waldheim's latest report on the Spanish Sahara
problem, Algeria declared the agreement null and
void. Algeria is unlikely to initiate direct mili-
tary intervention but will continue to provide arms,
training, and possibly some "volunteers" to the
pro-independence Polisario Front. The Front is in
fact quietly acquiring a foothold in the Sahara. A
French official recently told Ambassador Handyside
in Nouakchott that elements of the Front have estab-
lished themselves along the Mauritanian-Saharan bor-
der now that Spain has withdrawn from two thirds of
the territory.
The UN General Assembly last night voted over-
whelmingly for a resolution supporting the Greek
Cypriot case against Turkey. This will make the
Greek Cypriots more amenable to resuming intercom-
munal talks with the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks,
smarting from this rebuff at the UN, will probably
hesitate to resume negotiations.
The vote dramatizes Turkey's increasing isola-
tion, even from the Muslim states on whose support
it had counted. Although this may increase the
Turks' flexibility in the long run, for the time
being they are likely to assume a tough line. At
the same time, the Turks are mindful that the ques-
tion of military aid will again come before the US
Congress next month. This could prompt a unilat-
eral gesture, such as the withdrawal of more Turk-
ish troops from Cyprus.
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SPAIN
We present the conclusions of a Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate, Spain:
Short-Term Prospects, that was approved
yesterday by the US Intelligence Board.
The transfer of powers from Franco to Prince
Juan Carlos has so far proceeded without surprises,
but has also done little to resolve the serious
problems the government will inevitably face. The
difficulties of reconciling a political system born
in the Civil War and dominated for decades by Franco
with a socio-economic system that has changed rapidly
since the early 1960s will remain acute.
The critical question is whether a controlled
liberalization can gain broader support for the
regime without triggering reactions from the Franco
right--which may still be able to obstruct polit-
ical change--and without being exploited by Spain's
clandestine Communist Party and separatist groups.
The significant leaders and groups--inside
and outside the governing establishment--look to
the future with varying combinations of hope and
apprehension; all share the uncertainties. Despite
many inherent unknowns, prospects for the succes-
sion and short-term maintenance of the regime are
favorable.
--No combination of opposition elements ap-
pears able effectively to challenge the state
in the short run at least.
--Terrorism will harden attitudes and make
liberalization difficult, but it will not
threaten the government's control.
--A large proportion of the people are not
politically involved. They are reasonably
satisfied with the regime, have prospered
under it and do not support any rapid, radi-
cal transformation of the system.
(continued)
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There will almost certainly be some opening
up of the system to accommodate democratic opposi-
tion groups heretofore excluded. This will prob-
ably stop short of legalizing the Communist Party.
--Most opposition groups are, for some months
to come, likely to prefer cautious tactics
rather than risk the kind of showdown that
would strengthen hard-line rightists and under-
mine liberalization.
--Opposition forces will nonetheless step up
their activities and will be pushing for a
speedier opening up of the system than the
regime will want to permit.
--The Communist Party is the best organized
force on the left; it dominates the clandes-
tine workers' commissions and thus has con-
siderable influence in labor.
--If the Communist Party remains excluded from
the political process, it can be expected to
resort to more militant tactics; it would
have some support from the non-Communist left,
notably the Socialists.
--Pressures for regional autonomy in the
Basque provinces and Catalonia are likely to
rise.
Thus, there is likely to be considerable po-
litical turbulence and Juan Carlos will play a
pivotal role, certainly in the near term. There
is little positive enthusiasm for him or the mon-
archy, but there is a widespread disposition to
support him for lack of a more viable alternative.
At the moment, Juan Carlos must be considered
an untested figure, and confident predictions can-
not be made about precisely how he will come out
on specific issues. If he succeeds in preserving
law and order while gradually opening up the polit-
ical process, he will gain more positive acceptance.
But the task will be formidable and we are far
from certain that he has the qualities to meet it.
(continued)
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The unity and loyalty of the armed services
will be a decisive factor in the orderly transition
and subsequent government strains. We estimate that
the government can count on effective military back-
ing for the short term. Some of the political and
social tensions of Spain as a whole are incipient
in some quarters of the officer corps, and while
that body remains generally conservative, a polar-
ization of Spanish politics would have some un-
settling effect--particularly at junior and middle
levels.
At least for the next six months or so, how-
ever, we estimate that the military is not likely
to intervene in political situations unless one or
all of three contingencies occur: a breakdown of
law and order that the civil authorities appear
unable or unwilling to control; a radical shift to
the left in Spanish politics signaled, for example,
by legalizing the Communist Party; and/or the emer-
gence of a significant group of young officers call-
ing for faster political change. None of these con-
tingencies appears probable in the short term.
If the right proves able to frustrate signif-
icant liberalization, this is likely over time to
lead the forces of the left and center into more
aggressive opposition. If major disorder ensues,
the military would have to intervene. Although
the military would probably be able to restore
order in the short term, its new role would widen
fissures within the military itself and perhaps
even lead to precipitate action by politicized
junior- and middle-level officers. In such cir-
cumstances, the situation could deteriorate rapidly.
The new government will value good relations
with the US, although differences over specific
economic and political issues will persist. One
sore spot could be a tendency to portray the new
base agreement as the result of Washington's having
taken advantage of Madrid at a particularly vul-
nerable moment; the Spanish may press to reopen
the negotiations.
Madrid's European ties will improve from the
recent low point reached after the execution of
the terrorists, but the question of accepting
Spain into Europe will continue to be a conten-
tious one.
(continued)
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Some improvement in European attitudes will
result simply from Franco's leaving the scene,
but more tangible progress toward incorporation
into NATO and the EC will be impeded for some time
by insistence on more liberalization than the Span-
ish regime will believe possible without risking
loss of effective control over radical groups.
Spanish relations with Portugal will continue to
be wary on both sides.
The foregoing estimates take account of Spain's
current economic slowdown, and the fact that the
dramatic economic progress of the past is not likely
to be repeated. In time, this could produce polit-
ical dissatisfaction, but it is not likely to be
a critical factor in the next six months or so.
Certain contingencies that are difficult to
predict could throw considerably more uncertainty
on the prospects for Spain.
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