THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 NOVEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014954
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 14, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
November 14, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedule of CO. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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_ _ _
November 14, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: A major test between the government and
Communist-led workers apparently ended early
this morning with agreement on a new collec-
tive labor contract. (Page 1)
Angola-Cabinda: The invasion of Cabinda by Zairian-
led forces has been pushed back by the Popular
Movement. (Page 2)
USSR-CSCE: Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko's
substantive response to a US demarche on CSCE
implementation indicates that Moscow feels
obliged to engage in a serious dialogue on
some implementation issues. (Page 4)
Notes: USSR; Syria-Israel; Spanish Sahara; Lebanon
(Pages 5 and 6)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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PORTUGAL
A major test between the government
and Communist-Zed workers apparently ended
early this morning with agreement on a
new collective labor contract.
While there has been no official announcement
of the details of the settlement, initial press re-
ports say Prime Minister Azevedo bowed to the work-
ers' wage demands. He apparently refused to fire
Labor Minister Rosa, but the press says he agree
to an investigation of the Labor Ministry, which
has been a target of the Communists in recent weeks.
The workers evidently were placated enough to end
their siege of Sao Bento palace, where Azevedo had
been a hostage the past two days.
There was a danger yesterday that the workers'
protest, which began Wednesday, would develop into
a major crisis when the workers demanded not only
a 44-percent wage hike, but also the return to power
of pro-Communist former prime minister Vasco Goncalves.
Last night, President Costa Gomes appealed to a
nationwide radio audience for calm and for support
for the sixth provisional government.
The government will have serious problems if
it has agreed to the construction workers' demands
for a 44-percent wage increase, especially after
details of a new austerity program were published
in the Lisbon press this week. The document out-
lines the need for increased prices, reduced real
wages, rationing of essential foodstuffs, and ad-
justments in the escudo exchange rate to put Portu-
gal on the road to economic recovery.
Before implementing this program, the govern-
ment will have to weigh very carefully its ability
to withstand the tension the program is bound to
create against the chaos that might result if some-
thing is not done to improve the economy. The
Communists have already attacked the program for
demanding sacrifices of the working class.
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ANGOLA-CABINDA
The invasion of Cabinda by Zairian-Zed
forces of the Front for the Liberation of
the Enclave of Cabinda that was launched
from Zaire last week has been pushed back
by troops of the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola.
The failure to dislodge the Popular Movement
will be a blow to Mobutu. He seems to have counted
on the element of surprise and expected the force
to move rapidly and capture the city of Cabinda,
some 35 miles from the border. Should he decide to
renew the attack, he will probably have to commit
substantially more Zairian troops.
Mobutu, however, may not want to risk further
involvement in Cabinda immediately, particularly in
light of growing Cuban support for the Popular Move-
ment and reports that the MIG aircraft may soon be
operational, piloted by Cubans. He may prefer to
wait in the hope that military pressures on the Pop-
ular Movement in Angola proper eventually will force
the Movement to withdraw troops from the enclave.
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_ _ _ _ _ _
USSR-CSCE
Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko's
substantive response to a US dgmarche on
CSCE implementation indicates that Moscow
feels obliged to engage in a serious dia-
logue on some implementation issues.
The USSR consistently has held that the provi-
sions of the Helsinki agreement are not automati-
cally self-implementing, but must be negotiated
bilaterally. With a follow-on meeting of CSCE sig-
natories scheduled to take place in Belgrade in 1977,
the Soviets have an interest in appearing to be co-
operative and responsive to Western initiatives.
Moscow would like to appear to be living up to
the letter and spirit of the agreements. Thus, the
Soviets have asserted that, in contrast to the US,
they have widely disseminated the text of the agree-
ment. They also have approved multiple exit and
entry visas for US journalists; the same arrangement
was reached with the French as a result of President
Giscard's visit.
Appearances notwithstanding, the Soviets are
laying out the limits to which they will go. They
?have been particularly unreceptive on the military-
?
related aspects of CSCE, the so-called confidence-
building measures, refusing either to acknowledge
Western advance notification of military exercises
or to send observers to them. They also have
stressed the aspects of the conference document
they regard as advantageous, especially the state-
ment on "inviolability of frontiers."
In addition to putting forth their own inter-
pretations of what the Helsinki agreement does and
does not require, the Soviets, as well as the East
Europeans, have been trying to put the West on the
defensive. Korniyenko complained about problems
the Soviets have had in obtaining US visas and the
inadequate dissemination of the CSCE text in the US.
He also threw in an attack on Radio Free Europe,
Radio Liberty, and Voice of America broadcasts as
incompatible with the Helsinki agreement.
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NOTES
Satellite photography obtained in October shows
that the Soviets have started to dismantle two more
above-ground launchers for the SS-7 ICBM and have
resumed the dismantling of eight other launchers.
The launcher dismantling program now involves
at least 36 SS-7 launchers. As of last month, the
Soviets had 775 launchers on submarines that were
then operational or on sea trials. Under the stra-
tegic arms limitation interim agreement, the Soviets
are allowed to build more than 740 launchers for
modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles on
nuclear-powered submarines if older missile launch-
ers--equaling the number of SLBMs in excess of 740--
are dismantled.
(continued)
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Spanish, Moroccan, and Mauritanian officials
apparently have made little progress toward a firm
agreement on the future of Spanish Sahara after two
days of talks in Madrid.
Algerian opposition to a partition of the ter-
ritory between Morocco and Mauritania is a major
factor in Madrid's decision to stand by its earlier
promises to seek a UN role involving a referendum
in the disputed territory. Algiers is on record as
favoring a UN-supervised referendum. Meanwhile,
the evacuation of Spanish civilians from the terri-
tory is virtually complete. Any evacuation of mili-
tary forces will depend on the outcome of the nego-
tiations.
Security in Beirut has deteriorated this week,
although the principal combatants seem to be trying
to forestall heavy fighting.
Efforts by Lebanese and Palestinian politicians
to find a solution have so far achieved no result.
The committee considering political reform has been
meeting regularly, however/
/Prime Minister Karam_ s
security committee has also been meeting, primarily
to seek ways to stop the recurring waves of kid-
napings. The cabinet goes through the formality of
meeting but the split between Christian and Muslim
members is as deep as ever.
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???
Top Secret
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