THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 OCTOBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014941
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 30, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
The President's Daily Brief
October 30, 1975
5
_)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5WI1(2/(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
October 30, 1975
Table of Contents
Lebanon: The continued inability of political lead-
ers to negotiate an end to the fighting in
Beirut has again prompted calls for President
Franjiyah's resignation. (Page 1)
Syria:
President Asad is giving consider-
ation to not renewing the mandate for the UN
observer force on the Golan Heights, but we do
not believe he has made a final decision.
(Page 3)
France-USSR: The cool treatment that French Presi-
dent Giscard received during his visit to the
USSR earlier this month has raised speculation
in France that the "special relationship" be-
tween France and the USSR has ended. (Page 4)
Syria-Israel-Egypt:
Korea: Passage of both conflicting resolutions on
Korea by the UN General Assembly's Political
Committee sets the stage for some hard bargain-
ing when the plenary session of the assembly
takes up the Korea issue early next month.
(Page 6)
Note: Bangladesh (Page 7)
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LEBANON
The continued inability of political
leaders to negotiate an end to the fight-
ing in Beirut has again prompted calls
for President Pranjiyah's resignation.
He is expected to resist as long as pos-
sible.
Franjiyah is a Maronite Christian who sympa-
thizes with the right-wing Phalangists. Lebanese
Muslims and the Palestinians believe he is rein-
forcing the Phalangists' reluctance to make polit-
ical concessions that could end the fighting.
Hard-line Phalangists, however, are exasperated
with his reluctance to take more forceful steps to
end the fighting. Moderate Christians are increas-
ingly moving toward the view that Franjiyah's de-
parture would be an acceptable price to pay for
peace.
Christian
peace negotiators have shown a qualified willing-
ness to accept general Palestinian proposals but
have been reluctant to discuss specific concessions.
Fatah officials are apprehensive that the Christians
may only be stalling and say they have received word
of US efforts to convince the Christians to be flex-
ible. The Fatah officials believe the Phalangists
may now be inspired to compromise out of a realiza-
tion that the US will not enter the battle on their
side.
Prime Minister Karami made slow progress yes-
terday in his attempt to convene the new ten-man
security committee that is to implement a cease-
fire. Socialist Kamal Jumblatt, apparently respond-
ing to urgings by Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat,
grudgingly agreed to participate, but reiterated
his doubts that the group would accomplish anything.
Neither Phalangist leader Jumayyil nor Interior
Minister Shamun, the two most powerful Christians
on the committee, has yet reported to Karami's of-
fice, although Jumayyil has said he will endorse
any decisions reached by the group and will join
in its deliberations as soon as security conditions
permit.
(continued)
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The Prime Minister apparently plans to assemble
the security committee, then ask religious and Pal-
estinian leaders to join it in a "summit conference"
that could hammer out a political solution. Karami
has believed in the need for such a meeting since
his appointment as prime minister in early July.
Still another cease-fire was announced late
Tuesday night, but had no effect. Heavy fighting
continued in all areas of Beirut yesterday. Leba-
nese leftists and the Palestinians still have been
unable to rout Phalangist snipers out of three
hotels in the western section of the city.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052 8
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SYRIA
President Asad
is giving serious consideration to not
renewing the mandate for the UN observer
force on the Golan Heights. He is also
weighing the possibility of a limited
war of attrition." We believe Asad
has not yet made a final decision on
these options and that he clearly wants
to create uncertainty about his inten-
tions.
Asad not renew the
mandate but will allow the UN forces to remain in
place at least temporarily.
Asad believes he
cannot obtain a satisfactory disengagement agree-
ment at present, nor can he risk opening hostilities
against Israel. Therefore,
he would hope that his refusal to renew the
mandate would raise tensions and force the US to
pressure Israel into agreeing to disengagement terms
acceptable to Damascus.
Asad
has not yet made up his mind about the mandate and
is leaning toward renewing it.
Asad
thought renewing the mandate
would be a good idea, provided some political ges-
ture, such as a new UN resolution, accompanied it.
Asad may have intended that his suggestion for
a new UN resolution should reach US officials.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
25X1
25)(1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
20A1
25X11
25X1
ogvi
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
FRANCE-USSR
The cool treatment that President
Giscard received during his visit to
the USSR earlier this month has raised
speculation in France that the "special
relationship" between France and the
USSR--nurtured by De Gaulle--has ended.
The French-Soviet relationship has al-
ways had a strong element of mythology
and opportunism, and Paris has not been
under any illusions about its impor-
tance to Moscow once the Germans recon-
ciled themselves to partition and de-
tente was under way with the US.
The Soviet rebuff of the French President in
Moscow probably resulted largely from Giscard's
exaggerated expectations of what he could expect
on implementation of the humanitarian issues agreed
upon at the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. The French were in the forefront of
those who had pushed for Soviet commitments at CSCE,
and Giscard reportedly felt a responsibility--and
opportunity--as the first Western head of state to
visit Moscow after Helsinki to gain a broad bilat-
eral implementation agreement,/
A senior French official in Moscow has said
that vigorous French Communist Party pressure also
was partially responsible for the treatment accorded
Giscard. Knowledgeable sources in Paris have told
our embassy that the French Communists shared with
the Soviets an interest in putting a damper on Gis-
card's visit.
The results of the visit are unlikely to have
a lasting effect on French domestic politics. The
trip was initially interpreted by some French news-
papers and political leaders as personally damaging
to Giscard. An opinion poll taken after his return,
however, showed 60 percent of the people supported
his tactics in Moscow.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
25X1
Declassified in Part - 'Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SYRIA-ISRAEL?EGYPT
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052 8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
KOREA
The passage Last night of both con-
flicting resolutions on Korea by the UN
General Assembly's Political Committee
sets the stage for some hard bargaining
when the plenary session of the assembly
takes up the Korea issue early next month.
The pro-Seoul resolution--emphasizing the need
to maintain the Korean Armistice Agreement and
Seoul's right to participate in future security
arrangements--passed by a vote of 59 to 51, with
29 abstentions.
The pro-Pyongyang draft--featuring a call for
the unconditional dissolution of the UN command and
the withdrawal of all "foreign" forces--passed 51
to 38, with 50 abstentions.
The vote reflected Pyongyang's growing diplo-
matic support in Southeast Asia and among the non-
aligned countries. Australia, the Philippines,
Turkey, and Greece were among the countries that
shifted from votes against the pro-Pyongyang draft
last year to abstentions.
There will be strong pressures at the plenary
for a compromise. The North Koreans, having for
the first time won a UN endorsement of their views--
however ambiguous--will strongly resist abandoning
their major positions. The only viable formula
may be one that leaves the major Korean security
issues unsettled for yet another year.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTE
Two Bangladesh army officers, who were key or-
ganizers of the coup last August, have approached
the US embassy in Dacca twice in the last ten days
with informal requests for military assistance.
The two officers said that aid is needed to
thwart what they assert are efforts by India, with
Soviet backing, to undermine the government of Pres-
ident Mushtaque. Among other things, they allege
that India is giving aid and sanctuary to a group
of armed guerrillas led by a die-hard supporter
of former president Mujib.
It is unclear whether the of
were speaking for or with the knowledge of
Mushtaque, but they are almost certainly reflecting
the fears of Indian intentions held by Mushtaque
and other Bengalee leaders.
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010052-8