THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 OCTOBER 1975

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0006014925
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 11, 1975
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon DOC_0006014925.pdf416.64 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-R15-1'79T-0-0936A012800010036-6 The President's Daily Brief October 11, 1975 5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category 5B( 1),(2),(3) declauified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence f Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY October 11, 1975 Table of Contents Lebanon: Prime Minister Karami has got- ten Syrian President Asad and leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization to agree on a new peace plan. (Page 1) Lebanon: We present the major judgments of an In- teragency Memorandum on Lebanon. (Page 2) USSR Portugal: Government leaders continue their tough public line against leftist-inspired disorders and military indiscipline, but so far they have taken no decisive action. (Page 5) Notes: Morocco - Spanish Sahara; USSR; West Ger- many (Refugees); West Germany - West Berlin; China; Cuba-Angola (Pages 6, 7, and 8) 25X1 25X1 25X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY LEBANON Prime Minister Karami reportedly has gotten the acquiescence of Syrian President Asad and leaders of the Pales- tine Liberation Organization to a plan to impose a cease-fire in Beirut. The plan also calls for Palestinian forces to withdraw from Muslim areas of the city in order to avoid an army-fedayeen clash. President Franjiyah and Interior Minister Shamun, both Christians, pledged to support his peace plan and would not tolerate violations of the cease- fire by Christian Phalangists. Asad agreed to the plan, provided Yasir Arafat went along with it. Arafat was scheduled to meet with other Palestinian leaders to get their agreement. Palestinian forces are more in evidence in a peace-keeping role. In addi- tion, a flurry of political activity has led to widespread expectation in the capital that more ef- fective action is being taken to end the fighting. however the fighting will not end unless some fundamental changes are made in Lebanon's current political balance that would give the now politi- cally favored, but outnumbered, Christians a lesser role. Radical leftists among the Muslims appear determined to continue the fighting; responsible Muslims are attempting to control them, but at the same time cannot allow the leftists to be crushed. Inevitably, even the Muslims will be drawn into supporting the leftists if the Chris- tians continue to refuse to make political conces- sions. The Phalangists remain intransigent, fearing that concessions will lead to their political de- mise. Many Christians also believe that the US and other Western powers will come to their rescue no matter how far they push the sit- uation. 1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25)(1 25X1 25X1 25X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY LEBANON We present below the major judg- ments of an Interagency Memorandum on Lebanon. --The spiraling cycle of violence in Lebanon has thrown the country's traditional political system seriously out of balance and has brought Lebanon the nearest it has been to national collapse. --The need for fundamental changes in the 1943 Na- tional Covenant, which provides for a distribution of political posts that favors the Christians over the country's Muslim majority, is the central issue in the crisis. Whether the country drifts further into chaos depends primarily on some immediate con- cessions by the Christian leadership to the moderate Muslims' demands for greater political power, and a scaling down of leftist reform proposals. --The principal stumbling blocks to a workable com- promise appear to be the continued intransigence of the Muslim extreme leftists and the Christian Pha- langist leader Pierre Jumayyil. The extreme left- ists, abetted by the more radical Palestinian feda- yeen "rejectionists," are seeking to overturn the political system through violence and see little reason to stop now. Jumayyil, on the other hand, is seeking to preserve the status quo and is making it difficult for the old-line Muslim and Christian leaders to cooperate by his refusal to discuss any changes in the 1943 Covenant. --If the so-called Committee for a National Dia- logue fails to reconcile soon some of the competing demands of Muslims and Christians, and the extrem- ist groups are not curbed, the situation is likely to disintegrate into even more widespread violence leading to all-out civil war. --Prolonged civil strife carries a high risk of military intervention by Syria and Israel, and the possible dismemberment of the country. --Thus far, Israel has reacted with restraint, and Syria, along with Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat, has attempted to play an active mediating role. No major Lebanese Christian or Mus- lim leader appears deliberately bent on provoking Syrian or Israeli intervention, and no leader is actively seeking partition of the country. (continued) 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY --A return to public order in the short term is dependent largely on the ability of Syria and the less radical fedayeen organizations to curb the small but dangerous extremist groups, restraint by Jumay- yil's Phalangist militia, and the curbing of arms supplies to both Muslims and Christians. --A joint Arab military force reportedly has been proposed by moderate Lebanese Christian and Muslim leaders to enforce a truce while a political com- promise is negotiated. Such a force will be diffi- cult to organize and deploy very soon and the ef- fectiveness of such a force, if it materialized, would be questionable. --A sense of national self-interest may overcome divisive forces, as it has in past Lebanese crises, but Lebanon is clearly at a crossroads. In the short term, the Muslims probably will not curb their demands for basic modifications in the Covenant, and the Christians may not agree to compromise under the duress of continued fighting. --Even if compromise is achieved, the prospect for any quick return to stability is bleak. The govern- ment has shown no ability to exercise effective au- thority during the current crisis or to utilize the army to provide basic security. The communal ten- sions that have been inflamed over the past six months will not easily subside. Over the longer term, a more ideological division may develop with- in the country as moderate Christians and Muslims gravitate toward their more militant co-religionists. --The Soviet Union has been attentive to the tur- moil in Lebanon, but apparently has not tried to exacerbate it. As the divisions sharpen, the Soviets will be compelled to increase their assis- tance to the left and press the moderates for con- cessions. In the event of full civil war, or Syrian and Israeli intervention, Moscow probably would try to match any US role in dealing with the crisis, supporting Syria and the leftists and seeking to expose Sadat and moderate Arabs as insufficiently militant. However, we do not believe this would extend to direct Soviet intervention so long as the affair was restricted to Lebanon. 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY USSR 4 25X1 25X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY PORTUGAL Government leaders continue their tough public line against leftist- inspired disorders and military indis- cipline, but so far they have taken no decisive action. A joint meeting of the cabinet and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was under way most of yesterday. The session, called by the cabinet to work out measures to restore order, has apparently not yet ended. In its statement on Thursday calling for the joint meeting, the cabinet did announce the replace- ment of the leftist officials who had been in control of the Bank of Portugal. This is a vital step toward adoption of more realistic economic policies and a clear sign that Prime Minister Azevedo is still in- tent on reducing Communist influence in the govern- ment. The military mutiny in Porto continues, and some 150 radical military policemen are said to have gone there to reinforce the dissident troops. There are some signs that the government is moving ahead in assembling the military interven- tion force it announced two weeks ago. Loyalist commandos are to form the backbone of the new force, which may ultimately grow to four battalions of 400 men each. Such a force could be a major help in restoring the government's authority. The leader of the Popular Democratic Party, one of the two anti-Communist parties in the government, called on President Costa Gomes yesterday to give up his post as armed forces chief of staff. He said such a move would aid the government's effort to re- store order. The President has been criticized by some anti-Communists for indecisiveness during the present turmoil, and the party leader presumably shares this view. 5 25X1 25X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012800010036-6 0 300 MILES CANARY ISLANDS 1 558611 10-75 PORTUGAL ? - C7 o ) 1 /.../EPtaitin SPAN IS H ci SAH A FRANCE ITALY MAURITANIA Nouakchott ..,