THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014906
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 19, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
September 19, 1975
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?
a
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 19, 1975
Table of Contents
USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev's meeting with
Konstantin Zarodov suggests that the secretary
feels sufficiently vulnerable to criticism
from his more doctrinaire colleagues to make
a gesture in their direction. (Page 1)
Lebanon: The security situation in Beirut deteri-
orated yesterday as fighting spread to almost
every section of the city. (Page 3)
Portugal: A new cabinet has been formed and will be
installed today. (Page 4)
Angola: The National Front, backed by several hun-
dred Zairian troops, has launched a counter-
offensive to retake Caxito. (Page 5)
USSR: The Soviets are moving ahead with programs
to modify silos for ICBMs. (Page 6)
Notes: Greece-NATO; Argentina; India (Pages 9 and 10)
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USSR
General Secretary Brezhnev's meet-
ing on Wednesday with Konstantin Zarodov,
the author of a hard-Zine article on
communist party tactics, suggests that
Brezhnev feels sufficiently vulnerable
to criticism from his more doctrinaire
colleagues to make a gesture in their
direction. The fact that this was
Brezhnev's first publicly announced ap-
pearance since his return from vacation
on August 3g, and that he usually shies
away from such ideolpgical matters, adds
to the significance of the meeting.
Zarodov's article, with which Brezhnev now is
associated, appeared in Pravda on August 6. It
argued that communist parties should put revolution-
ary integrity ahead of cooperation with non-communist
parties and should not let democratic procedures
stand in the way of seizing power. The article drew
criticism from West European parties, and Yugoslav
media have taken sharp issue with the central theme.
Some Soviet officials, apparently embarrassed
by the impact of the article, tried on several oc-
casions over the past month to pass off the Zarodov
diatribe as a "mistake." Brezhnev's meeting with
the author presumably will end this effort.
What political pressures caused Brezhnev to
take this step is an open question. One possibility
is that the declining fortunes of the Portuguese
Communists, following the Chilean debacle, have left
a very sour taste in the mouths of those leaders
troubled by the conflicting priorities of promoting
detente and maintaining the health of the inter-
national communist movement. The Sinai II agree-
ment may have made those most closely associated
with detente more vulnerable. Brezhnev's decision
ostentatiously to protect his ideological flank
may be the result.
(continued)
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There was a message in the Brezhnev-Zarodov
meeting for the French and the Italian Communists
who have practiced and defended political alliances
with non-communist parties. In addition it probably
will be read by Portuguese Communist leaders as sup-
port for a tougher stance as they deal with the new
government in Lisbon.
Whether or not a signal also was intended for
the US and the West in general, Brezhnev must have
assumed it would be read as a toughening of the
Soviet attitude across the board.
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LEBANON
The security situation in Beirut de-
teriorated yesterday as fighting spread
to almost every section of the city.
Fires, kidnapings, and sniper fire were
widespread. Both sides reportedly had
agreed to a cease-fire tate yesterday,
but the fighting continues today in
many areas of Beirut, long after the
truce was scheduled to take effect.
As of late yesterday, Prime Minister Karami,
fearful of a sharp fedayeen-leftist reaction, con-
tinued to oppose the use of the army to end the
fighting. Interior Minister Shamun told an embassy
official, however, that he and several other members
of the cabinet had told Karami that if the crisis
were not solved early today, Shamun as interior min-
ister had the authority to order the army to inter-
vene and would do so. Shamun also said that he did
not believe the use of the army would prompt the
Syrians to intervene.
The use of the army could bring the more mod-
erate organizations into the conflict against the
government. Until now, Fatah, the principal feda-
yeen organization, has attempted to play a mediating
role. Its leaders have expressed the fear that
Fatah might become involved in the fighting if the
army should fire on leftist elements.
Yesterday, for the first time during the cur-
rent round of fighting, the right-wing Phalanges
Party militia exchanged fire with Lebanese leftists
and radical fedayeen. The Phalangists, who were
deeply involved in the fighting in June, have been
increasingly unhappy that the government has not
called in the army.
Lebanese security officials believe that the
leftists and the radical fedayeen are responsible
for the sudden escalation of the fighting. These
groups may feel that the continued strife eventu-
ally will overturn the present system of government,
delicately balanced among Lebanon's religious com-
munities, and pave the way for a Muslim, leftist-
dominated regime more sympathetic to the Palestin-
ians.
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PORTUGAL
The Revolutionary Council announced
this morning that the new government has
been formed and will be installed later
today. Portuguese Socialist leader
Soares told Ambassador Carlucci last
night that the Socialists will receive
four portfolios, and the Popular Demo-
crats and the Communists will each get
two.
The three major political parties will control
only half of the total number of cabinet posts, but
most of the military and civilian appointees are
expected to follow the Socialists' lead. Soares
described the new cabinet as a "humiliating defeat
for the Communists."
The Communists have already begun to criticize
the cabinet and claim that they are participating
only to prevent the formation of an "openly rightist
government." The Communist-dominated Portuguese
Democratic Movement--which has been represented in
the last two cabinets despite meager popular sup-
port--has scheduled an anti-government rally for
September 28, the anniversary of the ouster of former
president Spinola.
emocra ic Tovement or e Li eration o
Portugal has canceled plans for a "happening" this
Saturday. The group's leadership may have diffi-
culty in communicating the change of plan to activ-
ists who are inside Portuaal and scattered along
the Spanish border, the cancel-
lation is largely the result of pressure by Western
governments.
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NGO
Brazz
Kinshasa
Barra do Dande
lfande
Sa zero
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Henrique
Carvalho
Vila Teixeira
Nova Redondo
Lobito
Benguel
1?.11a
Li boa
havuma
Cassin
,tOndangua
SOU\kH-WEST AFRICA
(Interriational Territory)
12 16
558528 9-75 CIA
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ANGOLA
The National Front for the Libera-
tion of Angola
apparentby has
launched a counteroffensive to retake
Caxito, which it surrendered to the
Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola two weeks ago.
Information on the fighting is sketchy. Por-
tuguese military officials in Luanda said on Wed-
nesday night that clashes between the two groups
were taking place "north of the Caxito - Barra do
Dande front." Both liberation groups are claiming
significant victories in the area.
The present fighting is very likely to become
one of the most serious campaigns yet in the terri-
tory because the National Front is virtually fight-
ing for its survival. Isolated in the north and
with less than two months before Angola is granted
independence, the National Front must move rapidly
and strongly to restore its military credibility
with both the Portuguese and the Popular Movement
in order to obtain a political role in the indepen-
dent government. The recapture of Caxito is vital
to the National Front's credibility.
The Popular Movement, for its part, is making
a determined effort to show that it is the only
nationalist group capable of running the territory.
It cannot afford to let the National Front make
even minimal gains and may decide to try to push it
out of Angola entirely.
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USSR
The Soviets are moving ahead with
programs to modify silos for new ICBMs.
All six SS-9 and the twelve SS-11 mis-
sile complexes are involved; work at
the single SS-13 complex probably will
begin soon.
Converting to SS-18s
Recent satellite photography shows that work
on the conversion of 18 SS-9 silos for the SS-18
probably will be completed before the end of this
year. Another eight new silos are being built at
the same locations. In addition, the Soviets should
complete the conversion of 36 other SS-9 silos and
the construction of eight SS-18 silos by mid-to-late
1976.
Work on a group of ten missile silos at the
Dombarovskiy complex was finished late last year.
The 55-18 Mod-1 is now in these silos.
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(continued)
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SS-11s to SS-17s
The Soviets are converting SS-11 silos for the
SS-17 at the Yedrovo complex. Although work is under
way at only one group, launch control silos under
construction for three other groups indicate that
more silos will be converted shortly.
The first and so far only SS-17 group was com-
pleted in June, and missiles have been installed.
All 110 SS-11 silos could be converted for the SS-17
by late 1977.
Conversion for SS-19s
A total of five groups of SS-11 silos at three
complexes are.being converted for the SS-19. Three
of these groups should be completed before the end
of this year. Work on seven other SS-19 groups has
been completed at two of the complexes.
At the Tatishchevo complex, the Soviets could
begin converting SS-11 silos for the SS-19 at any
time. SS-19 silo components have been stockpiled
there for more than a year.
By 1979, all 350 SS-11 silos at the four com-
plexes could be modified for the SS-19. In addition,
60 new SS-19 silos built at two of the complexes
since late 1970 now contain SS-11 variants, but these
missiles will probably be replaced by the SS-19
within the next year.
At the Kostroma complex the Soviets apparently
intend to convert the SS-11 silos for either the
SS-17 or the SS-19. The rail support facilities are
being expanded to stockpile new silo components,
and a launch control silo is under construction.
Until the new silo components are actually delivered,
it cannot be determined whether the SS-17 or SS-19
will be installed in the 90 silos at this complex.
(continued)
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Modernizing the 55-11
Silos at the remaining six SS-11 complexes
are being modernized for the SS-11 Mod-2 and Mod-3.
Work on all 420 will probably be completed by late
this year or early next year.
The Mod-2 carries a single re-entry vehicle
and possibly two penetration aids, and the Mod-3
has three re-entry vehicles.
Still to Come: the SS-X-16
The Soviets probably will begin replacing the
60 SS-13 missiles with the SS-X-16 at the Yoshkar-Ola
complex before the end of this year. It is believed
that few if any modifications will be necessary be-
fore installing the SS-X-16, and that the missile
could be installed in all 60 silos within a year.
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NOTES
Greece apparently intends to stall substantive
negotiations on its relationship with NATO in order
to prod the alliance into taking a more active role
in resolving bilateral issues between Athens and
Ankara.
Prior to the North Atlantic Council meeting on
September 17, NATO representatives were cautiously
optimistic that Athens was prepared to discuss con-
crete proposals for reintegrating Greece into the
military side of NATO. Greek Ambassador Theodoro-
poulous instead emphasized that "progress in the
negotiations will be a function of the overall po-
litical situation within the alliance."
Athens would proceed cautiously in the talks, and
that any stalling or equivocation would be a tac-
tic aimed at buying time to prepare the Greek pub-
lic for re-entry into NATO. It is clear that Athens
also wants to maintain pressure on Turkey.
Argentina's Acting President Luder's strong
exercise of authority in reorganizing the cabinet
on Monday is having a positive impact on the pol-
iticians and the military.
Luder apparently forced the resignation of the
controversial interior minister and also removed
President Peron's private secretary. According to
our embassy's sources, he is going to continue to
restructure the administration, taking advantage
of the President's absence to undermine her remain-
ing political strength and possibly to launch a
bid of his own to retain the office./
(continued)
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Indian Prime Minister Gandhi may be worried
about the armyts loyalty. She has is-
sued orders barring the army from conducting maneu-
vers in the New Delhi area without first obtaining
specific government authorization.
Some military officers may be unhappy about the au-
thoritarian steps Gandhi has taken during the past
three months, but most officers, like most of the
Indian public, have appeared to be supporting or
at least acquiescing in her actions.
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Top Secret
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