THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 AUGUST 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014889
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 30, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
August 30, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category_ 513(
declassified onl,V on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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August 30, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: The appointment of Admiral Azevedo as
prime minister and General Goncalves as chief
of staff is a setback for the anti-Communist
Antunes group, which has not yet reacted.
(Page 1)
Peru: A coup has placed General Morales Bermudez
in power. He will be less radical than Velasco
and may seek smoother, relations with the US.
(Page 3)
Saudi Arabia - Iran: Saudi Arabia and Iran appar-
ently remain seriously divided on the issue
of an oil price rise, but we believe OPEC will
try to work out a compromise involving a price
increase of perhaps 10 to 15 percent. (Page 6)
Egypt-USSR: Moscow has taken some additional steps
in its prolonged war of nerves with President
Sadat. (Page 8)
Note: USSR (Page 9)
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ATLANTIC
OCEAN
558403 8-75
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PORTUGAL
The anti-Communist faction of Melo
Antunes, which spearheaded the drive
against Goncalves, has so far not re-
sponded to the appointment yesterday of
Admiral Azevedo as prime minister or to
Goncalves' being named armed forces chief
of staff. But the appointments may have
moved the country a step closer to civil
war.
The US embassy reports that the Antunes group
had already decided that these changes were unsatis-
factory. The embassy says that actions of the mil-
itary in northern Portugal in the past two days may
be seen as part of the Antunes group's strategy for
gaining power. It is designed to start in the
north, gather military and civilian support, and
gradually isolate Lisbon. The Antunes group claims
to have near-total support in both the northern and
central military regions. Units elsewhere remain
a question.
Yesterday, Central Military Region Commander
Charais, who is a staunch supporter of the Antunes
group and who could emerge as a strong man, issued
a communique stating his units will guarantee that
Portugal does not revert to a totalitarian regime.
He called on the civilian population to give un-
equivical support to his troops.
The communique and a letter signed by officers
in Porto, demanding that General Corvacho not be
reinstated as northern region commander, are both
seen as in keeping with the Antunes strategy.
The Antunes group, while admitting Admiral
Azevedo is no Communist, sees him as weak and sus-
ceptible to manipulation. Azevedo, 58, is report-
edly a close friend of President Costa Gomes and
was named navy chief five days after the Armed
Forces Movement overthrew the Caetano regime in
April 1974. He has retained that post throughout
the hectic 16 months that have followed--no mean
task.
(continued)
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Azevedo clearly
he is not as extreme
The Admiral has been
regarding the US and
favors a leftist course, although
in his views as Vasco Goncalves.
not unfavorable in his comments
NATO.
Melo Antunes and his closest supporters may
have committed themselves too far to turn back now,
although the Portuguese capacity to procrastinate
has seemed endless. The support Antunes will at-
tract to any effort to oust the new government will
depend to some extent on aspects of President Costa
Gomes' compromise package that have not yet been
released. The make-up of the cabinet, for instance,
and the government program adopted may affect the
willingness of the less-committed to lend their sup-
port to an effort to change things by force.
The Antunes group must now decide whether to
try to upset the new arrangement or forfeit any
chance of changing the direction the country is
heading.
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PERU
The coup that brought General Morales
Bermudez to power in Peru appears to have
been well-planned and timed to coincide
with the closing session of the nonaligned
conference. Morales Bermudez apparently
commanded the coup from the southern city
of Tacna.
General Velasco is said to have accepted his
ouster. Lima and the rest of the country are re-
ported calm. Some police officials are concerned
about violence in the capital's slum areas, where
Velasco enjoys some support. Police and military
units should be able to put down any demonstrations.
Morales Bermudez appears firmly in command of
the situation. A number of generals who have been
long-time supporters of General Velasco have not
yet been heard from, but it is unlikely that they
will oppose the new President, given the wide sup-
port he enjoys.
The US embassy reports that the nonaligned
conference is stalled as delegates attempt to
follow events and, perhaps, seek instructions from
their governments concerning recognition. Some
delegates have speculated that President Morales
Bermudez might even address the meeting.
General Morales Bermudez has long been dissat-
isfied with former president Velasco's radical,
often arbitrary exercise of power. The new Presi-
dent's political views are somewhat less extreme
(continued)
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than those of his predecessor. He is likely to
seek a less rancorous relationship with the US and
probably will tone down Velasco's stridently anti-
imperialist foreign policies.
We do not believe that any one event prompted
Morales Bermudez to move now. In fact, he had
been steadily taking over the effective reins of
power since last February, when Velasco was tem-
porarily incapacitated by a stroke.(
Morales Bermudez served as finance minister
from 1968 through 1973 and as army chief of staff
from 1973 until he became prime minister last Feb-
ruary. He has a reputation as an honest, method-
ical leader. He appears sensitive to the concerns
of his fellow officers, a welcome change from
Velasco.
Mexican President Echeverria yesterday told
Ambassador Jova in Mexico City that, on the basis
of Fidel Castro's "glowing" comments about Morales
Bermudez, Echeverria would not be surprised to see
the new Peruvian leadership "take a sharp turn to
the left." If Cuban officials in fact made such
comments to Echeverria, they probably are indica-
tive of Cuban uncertainty, and perhaps wishful
thinking, rather than an objective assessment of
the new Peruvian leader. Our assessment is that
he will not move Peru further to the left domes-
tically, nor is he likely to move closer to Cuba
and other communist nations.
This is not to say that we expect Morales
Bermudez to swing the government to the right.
The new President remains firmly committed to the
seven-year-old "revolution," including its commit-
ment to an independent foreign policy. Thus, while
(continued)
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Morales Bermudez is expected to seek a smoother
relationship with Washington, the policies of the
two countries are likely to remain far apart on
many issues.
Morales Bermudez' widely-shared agreement with
Velasco's goals of improving the lot of Peru's
Indian masses and of redistributing national wealth
argues against any rapid or basic change in the
character of domestic policies. On the other hand,
Morales Bermudez appears disposed to allow a greater
degree of personal freedom, including a loosening
of the severe restraints on the press, and even-
tually more civilian participation in political
affairs.
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SAUDI ARABIA - IRAN
Saudi Arabia and Iran apparently
remain seriously divided on the issue
of an OPEC oil price rise in the fourth
quarter. The Saudis, in fact, may
attempt to thwart an increase at the
OPEC conference meeting on September
24, although we believe members will
try to work out a face-saving compro-
mise involving a price increase of
perhaps 10 to 15 percent.
Ambassador Akins was informed by Saudi Oil
Minister Yamani on Wednesday that Riyadh had de-
cided it must hold the line against any price in-
crease. Yamani further claimed that he told
Iranian Minister Amouzegar that if Iran insisted
on a large price increase, the Saudis would sell
at current prices and sharply increase production,
even at the risk of splitting OPEC.
Yamani
(continued)
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told Akins that Iran favored a compromise in the
neighborhood of 20 percent. In any case, he felt
that a final Saudi decision would be made after
Secretary Kissinger's visit to Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh has strong bargaining power. It can
bring almost 3 million barrels a day in unutilized
productive capacity into service, which would force
the rest of the cartel to cut production 1 to 2
million barrels a day in the fourth quarter. But,
like last year when Riyadh called off an oil auction
which would have lowered the price of oil, the
Saudis are unlikely to risk a breakup of OPEC. We
still expect a compromise, resulting in a price in-
crease of 10 to 15 percent.
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EGYPT-USSR
Moscow has taken additional steps in
its prolonged war of nerves with President
Sadat. The Soviets' distaste for Sadat's
policies, particularly his deepening ties
with the US, is so intense that they ap-
parently are willing to risk further re-
strictions on their remaining privileges
in Egypt.
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Moscow has canceled
military
to depart
trained in
for
the
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training courses for students about
the USSR. Few Egyptians have been
USSR since the October 1973 war
Moscow seems to be going out
of its way
to
show its displeasure with Cairo.
In what may well be another aspect of the So-
viet campaign against Cairo, an anti-Sadat manifesto
attributed to the central secretariat of the Egyp-
tian Communist Party appeared last month in a
radical paper in Beirut. The manifesto, which pre-
sented a detailed indictment of Sadat's foreign
and domestic policies, said that while the Communist
Party did not aim at the overthrow of Sadat, it
would seek to stimulate and organize opposition to
his policies. Egyptian Prime Minister Salim re-
cently confirmed that the document was drafted and
circulated by some Egyptian Communists. Salim dis-
missed the manifesto as insignificant and said the
Egyptian Communists are under control.
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NOTE
Soviet propagandists are playing up the need
for an Asian security conference similar to the
recently concluded European summit. The latest is-
sues of New Times and Izvestiya carry articles which
stress the applicability to Asia of the principles
agreed to at Helsinki.
Not surprisingly, the principle the Soviets
deem most relevant for Asia is the inviolability of
frontiers. The Izvestiya article attacks Maoists
and "revanchists" in Japan for favoring territorial
revision, and claims that most Asian countries, in-
cluding India, favor resolving frontier disputes by
peaceful means. Izvestiya also seems to imply that
the Middle East should be included in the area to
be covered by the new security arrangement The
Soviets' renewed emphasis on Asian collective secu-
rity not only is a logical follow-on to the Euro-
pean security conference, but also appears to be
part of a new propaganda campaign against China.
The Soviets are arguing that anti-Sovietism is be-
coming institutionalized in China and probably will
continue after Mao dies.
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