THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 AUGUST 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014887
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 28, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
August 28, 1975
To
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
August 28, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: The political chasm separating Lisbon
and most of the rest of the country was made
clear again last night by two political rallies,
one in the capital and the other in the north-
ern port city of Porto. (Page 1)
Notes: Portugal-Indonesia-Timor; Japan; Philippines;
Rhodesia (Pages 3 and 4)
At Annex we present a military assessment of the
present situation in Angola.
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PORTUGAL
The political chasm separating Lisbon
and most of the rest of Portugal was made
clear once again last night by two politi-
cal rallies, one in Lisbon and the other
in Porto.
In the capital, a crowd estimated at between
15,000 and 35,000 led by the newly formed united
front of Communists and fellow-travelers marched
to the presidential palace chanting support for
Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves.
An appeal by President Costa Gomes for toler-
ance and a broadening of the new front to include
less radical political groups brought boos, cat-
calls, and cries of "death to the church." Mean-
while, at a Socialist-sponsored rally in the north-
ern port city of Porto 200 miles away, 50,000
marchers screamed for Goncalves' dismissal and re-
jected the return of a pro-Communist officer as
head of the Northern Military Region.
The mood of the people outside Lisbon appears
to be growing increasingly ugly.
aays, Leiria has been the scene
Communist violence, leaving one
ously wounded.
In the past few
of bitter anti-
dead and ten seri-
The headquarters of the pro-Communist 5th Divi-
sion of the armed forces general staff, which has
strongly supported Goncalves, was occupied yesterday
by the security forces. They expelled the officers
in the headquarters and conducted a thorough search.
The 5th Division is the propaganda and information
service of the armed forces. By itself, the seizure
of the unit appears to be a reversal for Goncalves,
but the move may also stem from a political compro-
mise worked out by military leaders earlier this
week. According to the US embassy in Lisbon, the
raid on the military propaganda and information
service was carried out on a direct order from the
office of President Costa Gomes.
(continued)
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The suspension of propaganda and information
activities was part of a package announced by the
Revolutionary Council on Monday. The package in-
cluded reinstatement of the pro-Communist commander
in the north and a restructuring of the Council by
the Armed Forces General Assembly. The swift ac-
tion against the 5th Division and apparent decisive-
ness of the security forces was unexpected. This
may reflect Costa Gomes' irritation over the unit's
dissemination Sunday of two official communiques
without his authorization.
There appears to be growing support for com-
promise among Portugal's military leaders. There
were additional reports yesterday that army Chief
of Staff Fabiao had withdrawn his bid to form a new
government. It is possible he agreed to do this in
exchange for neutralizing the propaganda service.
A somewhat grimmer scenario was drawn yester-
day for US Ambassador Carlucci by Emidio Guerreiro,
interim secretary general of the left-of-center
Popular Democratic Party. Guerreiro, who is be-
lieved to be well-informed, said Goncalves had
flatly refused to step down and that he and the
Communists had threatened to use armed paramilitary
groups in Lisbon if the Antunes group did not de-
sist. Also, according to this account, the Antunes
group is unsure of its support among the military
rank and file, and this is why it has been hesitant
to take decisive action against Goncalves.
According to a report received this morning
from the US embassy, a source close to the Antunes
group says President Costa Gomes has decided to re-
move Prime Minister Goncalves today. Costa Gomes
reportedly told Antunes on Tuesday that Goncalves
would have to resign today or he would fire him.
The source says the Antunes group has not decided
upon a successor to Goncalves, now that General
Fabiao is out of the running, but that Brigadier
Pedo Pezarat Correia, commander of the Southern
Military Region, is the leading candidate.
If Costa Gomes does take the action against
Goncalves, there will be
a strong reaction from pro-Goncalves forces in the
Lisbon area.
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NOTES
Portuguese President Costa Gomes' decision
against endorsing unilateral Indonesian military
intervention in Timor to restore order probably is
too late to prevent an Indonesian invasion.
Indonesia must move carefully to avoid being
accused of aggression. He had hoped that Portugal
would endorse Indonesian intervention. Despite the
announcement from Lisbon, he probably will go ahead
anyway and make it appear that he is acting on be-
half of the Portuguese. Recent worldwide publicity
about the deteriorating situation in Timor and
Portugal's admission that it has lost control will
work to Jakarta's advantage. Unilateral Indonesian
action, undertaken in the name of ending the blood-
shed and with the appropriate disclaimers about
territorial ambitions, probably will not cause
sharp international criticism.
Japan has sold $750 million in US dollars this
month to prevent the yen from rising above a rate
of 298 to the dollar. The yen has fallen almost
4 percent since February, but most of the drop has
come in the past two months.
The yen has been under pressure, partly be-
cause interest rates in Japan are declining rela-
tive to those in the US and Western Europe. As a
result, the net movement of foreign capital into
Japan is declining sharply. The country's export
slump also is contributing to the weakening of the
yen. The value of exports has fallen 15 percent
since the beginning of the year, reducing the de-
mand for yen to finance trade. The Japanese trade
surplus, nonetheless, remains high, amounting to
$4.1 billion during the first seven months of 1975,
because imports have been falling faster than ex-
ports.
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(continued)
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Philippine President Marcos' state visit to
the Soviet Union apparently will be postponed until
next year.
The onus for the failure of the settlement
talks between Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith
and the black nationalist leaders earlier this
week appears to rest on Smith, despite his state-
ments blaming the nationalists.
The nationalists had long maintained they
would not hold discussions inside Rhodesia, but
reversed themselves and agreed to meet in commit-
tees there. Smith, probably taken aback by this
unexpected concession, refused a long-standing
nationalist demand that he guarantee safety
from arrest for two key nationalist leaders to
return to Rhodesia for the committee sessions.
South Af-
rican Prime Minister Vorster, whose heavy pressure
on Smith was largely responsible for the meeting
at Victoria Falls this week, has not yet reacted
to the meeting's collapse.
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ANGOLA
The Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola has made substantial ter-
ritorial gains in central and southern
Angola in recent weeks, but the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola and
the National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola may yet be able to
squeeze the Movement between them. In
order to accomplish this, however, the
Movement's rivals will have to overcome
quickly a number of basic deficiencies.
The Portuguese, for their part, are un-
able to reassert their authority over
the territory.
The Popular Movement established its military
and political dominance in Luanda and the exclave
of Cabinda some time ago. As a result of recent
fighting, it has gained control of Lobito, Angola's
major port, and secured control over most, if not
all, of the important towns and cities along
Angola's central coastal region between Luanda and
Lobito. It also has pushed its rivals out of Sa da
Bandeira, a city deep in National Union territory
in the southern part of the country.
The National Front is still in control of
northern Angola and has established a strong pres-
ence at Caxito, some 40 miles northeast of Luanda.
It has now pushed its way to within 20 miles of the
capital.
The National Union still holds the dominant
position in the central highlands--the area around
Nova Lisboa and Silva Porto. It is making a major
effort to retake Luso in eastern Angola, and ap-
parently is planning an offensive to recapture
Lobito, without which it has no effective resupply
point.
The Popular Movement
Much of the Popular Movement's success to date
is due to the fact that its troops and cadre are
better trained and organized than those of its
rivals.
(continued)
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The Movement also has been able to recruit
large numbers of black Angolans who formerly fought
with the Portuguese during the insurgency. As a
result, the Popular Movement has gained a well-
trained and well-disciplined group of officers and
non-coms, in addition to those who received training
in communist countries in past years.
The Popular Movement's Marxist, urban-based
origins have provided its leaders with the experi-
ence to mobilize and organize popular support. The
Movement is now setting up paramilitary People's
Defense Committees in Luanda and
recruited several thousand students
lutionary Instruction Centers it is now operating
in eastern and central Angola.
for two Revo-
Despite these advantages, the Popular Movement
is by no means invincible. Its urban orientation
works to its disadvantage in the countryside. More-
over, it may be overextending itself. In some
areas it is already stretched thin. In addition,
the Movement can no longer count on political sup-
port from leftists in Lisbon who are now preoccu-
pied with their own political survival.
The National Front
Before its rivals can effectively challenge
the Movement, they will have to overcome some
serious deficiencies. The National Front is vir-
tually isolated in northern Angola. It must rely
on Zaire for food and military supplies. Although
the area is highly populated, the population is
widely dispersed and difficult to organize.
Front leader Holden Roberto's long refusal to
leave his headquarters in Zaire until after his
organization had been pushed out of Luanda in late
June was a severe morale blow to the Front and
created serious command problems.
Roberto is now leading the Front's
operations in the Caxito area, however, and this
may help overcome past leadership weaknesses.
Reliable sources in Luanda have informed the
US consul that the National Front is undertaking a
major build-up of heavy arms in northern Angola.
The Zairian military is giving the Front sizable
quantities of arms from its own stocks.
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The National Union
The National Union too is in a difficult posi-
tion. It has always been the smallest and most
poorly armed of the three liberation groups and has
the largest area to defend. Because of its military
weakness, the National Union apparently expended the
best part of its effort during the insurgency toward
political organization rather than clashes with the
Portuguese. As a result, the Union has strong po-
litical support in central Angola, but needs a large
supply of arms if it is to build a significant mili-
tary force.
To date, Union leader Jonas Savimbi's recogni-
tion that he lacks a strong military base and his
misgivings about the staying power of the National
Front have kept him from formally aligning with the
Front. Savimbi has ordered his troops against the
Popular Movement only as a last resort. His re-
luctance has cost him a certain degree of respect
among the local population and his own troops, who
appear to be well motivated and well led and regard
his position as one of weakness rather than politi-
cal expediency.
The recent fighting, however, apparently has
convinced Savimbi that he has no real choice but to
take an unequivocal military position against the
Popular Movement.
The Portuguese
The Portuguese are drifting aimlessly in An-
gola, despite recent announcements that Lisbon in-
tends to reassert its authority over the territory.
Lisbon has declared the agreement signed last Jan-
uary with the three liberation groups null and void
and has assigned full legislative and defense powers
to the acting high commissioner.
The Popular Movement has challenged that dec-
laration. Its officials in Luanda are operating as
if the transitional government continues to function.
Using the authority derived from the economic port-
folios they held in the transitional government,
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Movement officials in recent weeks have nationalized
Luanda's banks and insurance companies and have
signaled their intention to nationalize the Angolan
airline in the near future.
The 22,000 Portuguese troops remaining in the
territory are demoralized and distracted by the
political struggle in Lisbon and are themselves
divided politically. By and large, they have pulled
out of the countryside to regroup in the large
coastal cities in order to protect the evacuation
of whites and prepare for their own eventual with-
drawal. The Portuguese cannot maintain order out-
side of these cities.
What Next?
Portuguese officials are attempting to sell a
modified transitional government to the three lib-
eration groups. They are also sending delegations
to neighboring African heads of state to enlist
their support for a return to a coalition-type
government in which all three liberation groups
would participate, although with diminished author-
ity. The acting high commissioner said yesterday
that the senior representatives of the Popular
Movement and the National Union in the former tran-
sitional government are currently in Lisbon to dis-
cuss the possibility of reviving the transitional
government structure.
In the final analysis, the best the Portuguese
can hope for is to get the whites out, maintain a
semblance of authority, and establish some structure
that will pass for a government and survive at
least through the ceremonies transferring indepen-
dence on November 11.
The Popular Movement appears set on gaining
control over as much of Angola as possible between
now and independence day. Movement leaders are
probably well aware that their sympathizers in the
government and the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal
are under intense pressure and may not be able to
force whatever government is in office in Lisbon at
the time to recognize or support a declaration of
independence for the territory under the Movement's
banner. In that event, Movement leaders undoubtedly
want to be in the best possible military position
to take over the territory by force come November.
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The Popular Movement is caught, however, be-
tween the Front in the north and the Union to the
south. These groups could tighten the vise on the
Movement if they can gain the necessary momentum
without undue delay. Even if they can take the
initiative away from the Movement, however, the
best they may be able to achieve is a stalemate,
forcing it to return to a coalition government that
could assume independence from Portugal in November.
Such a government, however, would be unlikely to
survive much beyond independence day.
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