THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 AUGUST 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014885
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 26, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936Af:012700010065-5
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The President's Daily Brief
August 26, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
August 26, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: Military leaders continued meeting yes-
terday, but there is still no sign of action
to remove pro-Communist Prime Minister Gon-
calves. The President may be searching for a
compromise to avert the risk of armed conflict.
(Page 1)
USSR: We now estimate the Soviet grain harvest to
be 170 million metric tons. (Page 2)
Notes: Saudi Arabia; China; Greece (Pages 4 and 5)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PORTUGAL
Military leaders continued their
high-level meetings yesterday, but
there is no clear sign of any action
to remove pro-Communist Prime Minis-
ter Goncalves.
President Costa Gomes may be trying to hammer
out a compromise formula under which Goncalves
would be replaced as prime minister in return for
certain concessions to his supporters. The Presi-
dent may be convinced that any other solution would
risk provoking armed conflict among factions of the
armed forces. We cannot exclude the possibility,
however, that Costa Gomes is engaged in delaying
tactics designed to drain the anti-Goncalves group
of its energies and resolve.
Whatever his motivation, the result of Costa
Gomes' efforts has been to provide Goncalves and
his supporters with an opportunity to strengthen
their position. Last week, the Communist Party was
clearly worried about its future. By Sunday, it
was again on the offensive. Yesterday, the Commu-
nists announced that they have joined in a united
front with seven extremist revolutionary groups to
carry out "offensive action." The group plans a
mass demonstration in Lisbon tomorrow to kick off
nationwide rallies to support "unity of the revolu-
tionary forces."
The Communist move seems calculated to rally
support behind Goncalves and to divide his oppon-
ents. The newly formed front group announced that
it favors a government program combining the posi-
tions of the Goncalves forces with those of the
faction led by security chief Otelo de Carvalho.
Just last week, the Carvalho group was reported to
have joined the anti-Communist Antunes group in de-
manding Goncalves' removal.
1
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USSR: Major Grain Growing Regions
558371 8-75 CIA
,
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USSR
Our end of August estimate of the Soviet
grain crop is 170 million metric tons, up
slightly from the previous forecast of 165
million tons.
The revision reflects more the receipt of new
information than an improvement in Soviet crop
conditions. Recent rains improved the outlook for
potatoes and sugar beets, but came too late to give
much relief to grains. This year's conditions,
marked by the worst drought in the past two decades,
make an estimate of the crop unusually uncertain.
The Soviets have been unusually reticent in pub-
lishing information on crop conditions and yields,
even at the local level, and have kept this year's
large grain imports a secret at home.
The total shortfall in Soviet production in
relation to expected requirements will probably be
about 50 million tons, much more than the world
market can provide. Since mid-July the Soviets
have purchased 15.3 million tons of grain, in-
cluding 9.8 million tons from the US. Confirmation
of rumored purchases would boost the total to more
than 16.5 million tons. Moscow apparently con-
tinues to search for available grain2
In addition, the USSR will limit its grain
shipments to client states. Eastern Europe's grain
import requirements in FY 76 will be about 9 million
tons, close to the average for past years. Moscow
usually supplies about one half of these require-
ments, but most or all of this year's needs probably
will be filled by the US.
Moscow asked Eastern Europe to look to the
West for all of this year's grain imports, with
financing to be provided by the USSR. Such a re-
quest by Moscow is unprecedented but is plausible,
given the present US hold on grain sales to the
Soviets. Moreover, Yugoslavia reportedly is in
the market for 1 million tons of wheat, even though
both our estimates and Belgrade's own statements
(continued)
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show no domestic need for such a transaction. The
Yugoslays may be seeking the wheat on behalf of the
Soviets.
Soviet imports are not constrained by port
capacity. Assuming reasonable scheduling, ports
in the USSR can handle up to 36 million tons of
grain imports a year. Total deliveries in 1973
reached 24 million tons, two thirds of present
port capabilities, with no major delays reported.
Although the domestic transport system can handle
grain shipments of these magnitudes, there would
be a diversion of freight cars from other uses
and consequent short-term economic disruptions.
3
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NOTES
Saudi Arabia
China again has publicised the dispatch of
troops to factories in Chekiang Province, apparently
to warn other provinces of the consequences of
factionalism that disrupts production. Peking has
not used troops in this capacity since the upheavals
of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s.
Over 10,000 troops have been sent to factories
in the provincial capital of Hangchou since July
19 to quell long-standing factional disputes that
have been disruptina production and causina civil
disorder.
(continued)
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The speed with which the Greek government an-
nounced yesterday that the death sentences imposed
on the three leaders of the 1967 military coup
would be commuted to life imprisonment suggests that
Prime Minister KaramanZis is more concerned about
heading off adverse reaction by some elements of the
military than he is about criticism from the polit-
ical opposition.
Prolonged suspense as to whether the three de-
fendents would be actually executed might prompt
reaction from supporters of the junta who are still
in the military. Although opposition leaders have
reacted angrily to the haste with which the govern-
ment announced the eventual commutation of the sen-
tences, they lack the parliamentary votes to capital-
ize on the issue.
5
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Top Secret
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