THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 AUGUST 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014871
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 9, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
The President's Daily Brief
August 9, 1975
5
To et 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
or ? s
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
August 9, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: The new cabinet headed by Prime Minister
Vasco Goncalves is dominated by radical mili-
tary officers and by front men and sympathizers
of the Portuguese Communist Party. (Page 1)
USSR: The Soviets' handling of issues relating to
the Helsinki summit shows an effort to pre-
empt anticipated accusations from the West that
they are violating the Helsinki agreements.
(Page 2)
Syria-Israel:
(Page 3)
OAS: The San Jose conference to amend the Rio
Treaty and subsequent consultations on ending
the Cuban sanctions provide a perspective on
the state of US - Latin American relations.
(Page 4)
Notes: USSR; Turkey; Jordan; China (Pages 5 and 6)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PORTUGAL
The new Portuguese cabinet headed
by Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves is
dominated by radical military officers
and by front men and sympathizers of the
Portuguese Communist Party. The composi-
tion of the cabinet is almost certain
to alienate further large segments of
Portugal's already aroused populace.
The most immediate threat to the new
government, however, comes from the
strong dissident group within the
Armed Forces Movement itself which
on Thursday publicly attacked the pro-
gram of the present leadership.
Now that a group of non-radical officers has
publicized its irreconcilable differences with
Goncalves' regime, the two camps would appear to
be on a collision course. The dissidents include
a large number of the original leaders of the April
25 revolution and the commanders of two of the four
Portuguese military regions. Assuming that wide-
scale arrests or purges may be imminent, the dis-
sidents are actively canvassing additional support
throughout the military.
A key factor in the success or failure of the
dissidents will be the stand taken by General Otelo
de Carvalho, head of the security forces. Carvalho
is an opportunist, and if he is convinced of the
success of the opposition move, he will support it.
The document issued by the dissidents on Thurs-
day provides a rallying point for non-radical ele-
ments outside the military, including the democratic
parties. Socialist leader Mario Soares, who yester-
day called the new government "crypto-communist,"
reportedly has given the document his enthusiastic
support. It is also likely to have broad appeal to
the clergy and to the militant anti-communists who
have participated in recent incidents of violence
in the north.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
25X1
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
Since Helsinki, Soviet news commen-
tators are saying that the summit has
created a climate conducive to ongoing
disarmament negotiations, including SALT.
The Soviets already show signs of using
the Helsinki document for their own pur-
poses.
The Politburo communique blessing CSCE refers
to the humanitarian exchanges within the "observ-
ance of the law and traditions of each country"--
wording specifically rejected by the West during
the negotiations and not included in the final
document.
The Soviets used the non-interference clause
of the CSCE document in Pravda on August 7 to ex-
coriate the EC for what Moscow argues is the West's
interference in the internal affairs of Portugal.
This approach is clearly intended to be pre-emptive.
Moscow has already shown its sensitivity to charges
that it is materially supporting the Portuguese
Communists and the radical elements of the Armed
Forces Movement. The USSR presumably anticipates
that the West will sooner or later claim that the
Soviets are violating the Helsinki agreements.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012760010051-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SYRIA?ISRAEL
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012760010051-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
The San Jose conference to amend
the Rio Treaty and the subsequent con-
sultations on ending the Cuban sanc-
tions provide a perspective on the
state of US - Latin American relations.
Despite the long-standing "natural" alliance
between the US and the rest of the hemisphere,
Latin American countries seem to find their inter-
ests at odds with those of the US. This ambivalence
is evident in the frequent contrast between a
country's style in dealing directly with Washington
and its confrontational tactics in multilateral
forums.
Latin American countries, which in concert
have regularly deplored US influence and involve-
ment in their affairs, have now in effect acknowl-
edged that their basic security is naturally and
inevitably linked with that of the US. After
critically reviewing the Rio Treaty for two years,
the Latin governments wanted only small alterations
of the 28-year-old document, and endorsed the pact
essentially as it is.
One change in the treaty addressed a politi-
cal flaw magnified by the Cuban issue--the require-
ment that sanctions imposed by a two-thirds vote
can be removed only by the same procedure. For
the last two years this requirement has been ig-
nored by over half the signatories in their rela-
tions with Cuba. Efforts to bring the treaty's
dictum in line with reality were repeatedly stymied
by a vote of one-third-plus-one. The two-thirds
rule technically remains in force until the San
Jose amendments are ratified by two thirds of the
member governments. As an interim expedient, a
"freedom of action" resolution was adopted at the
subsequent meeting that leaves each members' rela-
tionship with Cuba a purely bilateral affair.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A0127-00010051-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
The Turkish government has informed the US em-
bassy of further restrictions at US bases including
the closing of base exchanges and commissaries.
A Foreign Ministry official has explained that
these restrictions are provisional and possibly can
be changed when negotiations for new defense ar-
rangements are undertaken. US C-130 aircraft land-
ing at Diyarbakir and Cigli air bases yesterday were
assessed landing fees, and Erhac and Samsun bases
have informed us that fees will be required there.
The landing fees have varied at each base. Mean-
while, Foreign Minister Caglayangil yesterday pub-
licly rejected any possibility of reactivating the
bases under NATO. His hard line is probably an ef-
fort to cope with continuing opposition criticism
that the government has been indecisive on the
bases issue.
(continued)
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T0093-6A0127-60010051-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Jordan's King Husayn is trying to portray the
Hawk air defense sale as a test of US support for
the more moderate Arab states.
Husayn originally said he would turn to an-
other Western state if the Hawk deal fell through,
but on Thursday he told several US correspondents
that he would have to go to the Soviet Union be-
cause he did not think any of the European states
could meet Jordan's air defense requirements. Hu-
sayn said he did not want Soviet technicians in
Jordan, but that Jordanians might be sent to the
Soviet Union or Syria for training if Soviet equip-
ment were bought. Husayn does not want Soviet mis-
siles and is probably trying to pressure Congress
to approve the original Hawk package.
6
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010051-0