THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 JULY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014858
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 25, 1975

_
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T0093-6A012700010038-5
The President's Daily Brief
July 25, 1975
5
--Top fserre-t--25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. I 1652
exemption category 513( I ),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
July 25, 1975
Table of Contents
USSR: Continuation of a severe drought in most of
the spring grain land has reduced sharply our
estimate of this year's crop to 185 million
metric tons and has prompted the Soviets to
buy 14.5 million tons of grain. (Page 1)
Turkey: The Demirel government expects to come
under pressure from the press and opposition
to take a strong stand on retaliation for the
refusal of the US Congress to lift the arms
embargo. (Page '2)
Portugal: Prime Minister Goncalves still has a
mandate to form a new government, though mod-
erates are engaged in a last-ditch effort to
keep him from remaining in power. (Page 3)
Notes: Egypt; USSR; Argentina; Japan - South Korea;
West Germany (Pages 5 and 6)
At Annex we present an assessment of some funda-
mental problems in Soviet-Arab relations.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
Continuation of a severe drought in
most of the USSR's spring grain land has
reduced sharply our estimate of this year's
crop to 185 million metric tons and has
prompted the Soviets to buy 14.5 million
tons of grain.
The drought has been more widespread than in
1972 and, as a result, the spring grain harvest
probably will be lower. An expected record harvest
of winter grains, however, should ensure a total
crop above the 1972 level of 168 million tons, which
led to imports of 31 million tons.
The current crop forecast is 15 million tons
under cur end-of-June prediction. If the drought
continues, the prospects for the harvest of spring
grains that have not yet matured, such as corn,
will worsen.
Problems also exist with other crops--particu-
larly hay and other forage crops--in the drought-
stricken area. A serious shortfall in fodder pro-
duction would increase Soviet demand for grain.
This year's grain crop will be well under the
normal grain requirement of about 210 million tons.
Although it has purchased large quantities of for-
eign grain recently, Moscow will not necessarily
try to fill the entire gap between domestic needs
and production with imports. It is likely to dip
to some extent into grain reserves. Livestock
could be slaughtered to curb grain demand, but the
high priority of Brezhnevis meat program makes this
option unattractive.
Of the 14.5 million tons of grain recently
purchased by the USSR, 9.8 million tons are con-
tracted with US companies and will be largely
filled from the US crop. The other contracts are
with Canada, Australia, and France. Moscow may
soon withdraw from the market to assess the evolu-
tion of both its own crop and world grain supplies.
A new round of Soviet buying is likely later.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
TURKEY
The Turkish cabinet will meet today
in what some government officials describe
as a mood of muted anger over the refusal
of the US Congress to lift the arms em-
bargo. The Demirel government expects to
come under pressure from the press and the
opposition to take a strong stand.
25X1
LOA!
if Ankara has
25X1
to obtain
arms
the army will
25)(1
require
an entirely new training program
which
could take about five years.
The Turkish National Security
Council is
25X1
divided over what form retaliation should
25X1
take.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Alternatives
include the
suspension of operations or the closing of certain
US bases Demanding mon- 25X1
etary compensation for use of the bases was another.
The Turks, whatever their final decision, are likely
to put the US installations on some sort of provi-
sional status, pending renegotiation--scheduled to
begin the end of July--of the defense cooperation
agreement.
The action of the US Congress will be welcome
in Greece. The Greeks believe that continuation
of the embargo will eventually take its toll on
the Turkish armed forces and increase Turkish flex-
ibility on Cyprus. They also think it will help
limit what they view as Turkish expansionist ten-
dencies in the Aegean.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PORTUGAL.
Prime Minister Goncalves sti,GC has
a mandate to form a new government,
largely because President Costa Gomes
failed to ask for his resignation. Mod-
erate members of the Revolutionary Coun-
cil are engaged in a last-ditch effort
to keep Goncalves from remaining in
power.
The moderates' hope of unseating Goncalves
was buoyed earlier this week when a caucus pre-
ceding the army assembly voted 56 to 1 against
Goncalves.
Goncalves' fate now hangs between the Revolu-
tionary Council
/and the Armed Forces General
Assembly, which is dominated by radical leftists.
If the issue comes to a vote in the Armed Forces
General Assembly, Goncalves probably will get a
vote of confidence. If the Council moderates
forestall a meeting of the assembly scheduled for
today, their efforts to get rid of the Prime Min-
ister may still succeed.
Although Costa Gomes has clearly made a deci-
sion to allow Goncalves to try to form a cabinet,
the President thinks Goncalves will fail to form
a government or that, if he succeeds, he will later
be brought down by the country's accumulating
problems.
Lp._If Goncalves' power and influence are per-
petuated, it will be interpreted in Portugal as
a significant consolidation of Communist power.
There is a good chance of a strong reaction from
forces attempting to prevent a continuing move to
the left; reaction among the Socialists and in
the north of the country could be violent.
(continued)
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
In the last few days, allegations of US sup-
port of or involvement in the separatist movement
in the Azores have become an important factor in
the Lisbon maneuvering.
earlier this week, a member of the President's
household staff expressed the view that without
the Azores, Portugal was of little consequence to
the US. He added that, but for the Azores, the
US might be willing to "allow" Portugal to go
Communist in order "to vaccinate Europe" as a
whole.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Egypt's
NOTES
MOSCOW has reacted gingerly to moves to sus-
pend TY70777 from the UN and may be working privately
to discourage the Arabs.
Moscow would ob-
viously prefer to avoid having to cast this vote.
A vote in favor of suspension would be such a one-
sided action that it would undercut Moscow's ef-
forts to win a role for itself in the Middle East
negotiations. A vote against suspension, on the
other hand, would damage Soviet standing in Arab
capitals.
Pressure is increasing on Argentine President
Peron to resign.
She has been absent from her offices for
several days with what press aides describe as the
"flu," and several politicians have called for an
official explanation of the state of the President's
health. These politicians apparently are demanding
that she make a choice between resuming her daily
duties or handing them over. A resignation for
reasons of health may be the best way out for all
concerned. For the moment, none of the opposition
forces wants to assume the onus for forcibly re-
moving the President
(continued)
5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Declassified in Pail - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa's two-day
trip to South Korea this week has helped clear the
troubled atmosphere surrounding bilateral relations.
25X1
25)(1
strongly empha-
25X1
sized the need for US-Japanese-Korean cooperation.
Specifically, the South Koreans pressed
25X1
support South Korean membership in
25X1
the UN; Seoul is considering making its application
next month
The South Koreans urged
a UN strategy that tacitly links the applica-
tions of the two Vietnams with the bids of the two
Koreas.
West German Chancellor Schmidt intends to
continue
personal contact on economic and monetary matters,
Schmidt
feels that heads of government must coordinate
and co-
operate
on plans for economic recovery.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
25X1
25X1
zox1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR - MIDDLE EAST
When Brezhnev discusses the Middle
East with you next week in Helsinki, he
will have some fundamental problems in
Soviet-Arab relations on his mind. We
present below an assessment of these
problems.
The last few years--and particularly since the
October 1973 war--have been tough ones for the So-
viets in the Middle East. A major reason for Soviet
difficulties has been the dominant US role in the
effort to seek a solution to the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. Soviet gains in the Middle East have come
when the Arab leaders had nowhere else to turn for
support. Now, many of the Arabs are hoping that
the US role as an intermediary will get them what
Russian arms have failed to obtain.
The Soviets also have had to contend with the
new international influence the Arabs derive from
their oil money. Bankrolled by conservative nations
such as Saudi Arabia, the Arabs are generally more
independent and can turn to the West for some of
their arms.
Many of Moscow's difficulties in the Middle
East are, of course, of its own making. The Arabs
became disillusioned when they saw that Moscow would
subordinate Arab aims to Soviet interests. The
strongly nationalist Arabs have been suspicious of
long-term Soviet intentions and disturbed by Moscow's
support of Communists and other leftists. The So-
viets also have been inept and heavy handed in many
of their dealings. Moreover, the quality of their
military and technical aid has not stacked up well
against that of the West.
Most of these factors are at the root of Mos-
cow's problems with Egypt and President Sadat. In-
deed, the single most helpful development to the
Soviet position in the Middle East probably would
be Sadat's departure. Moscow resents Sadat's criti-
cism of Soviet policies, opposes his reliance on the
US and Saudi Arabia, and sees his moderate domestic
policies undercutting the USSR's natural "progres-
sive" allies. Since the October war, the Soviets
have sought to bring Sadat back into the fold by
withholding economic and military aid.
(continued)
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
A
X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T0093-6A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Sadat recently has begun to counterpunch with
greater vigor. He has placed restrictions on So-
viet port rights. The Soviets now fear he may move
against their advisers and technicians who are still
in Egypt and that he might cancel the Soviet-Egyp-
tian treaty--which Moscow still regards as an im-
portant symbol of its presence in the Arab world.
Faced with a further deterioration in relations,
the Soviets seem to have flinched. They invited
the Egyptian Finance Minister to Moscow this week
25X1
but Soviet distrust of Sadat and dissat-
isfaction with his policies run so deep that Moscow
is unlikely to offer major concessions on military
aid.
The Soviets also have problems with Iraq--here-
tofore Moscow's stronghold on the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqis have at least temporarily ended their
civil war with the Kurds and eased their conflict
with Iran. These were the major factors propelling
Baghdad into dependence on Soviet arms. Since early
last year, Iraq has used its oil money to order
more than $800 million in Western arms and is in-
creasingly turning to the West for technical assist-
ance on its ambitious development plans.
Even Moscow's remaining friends in the region,
such as Syria, are showing signs of restlessness.
The Soviets have been unhappy that their substan-
tial military and economic aid has not bought them
more influence over Syria's negotiating policies
toward Israel. Syrian President Asad has long re-
sisted Soviet requests that he sign a friendship
treaty, and he too has recently been looking to the
West for help with some economic projects. Moscow
is ready to go to considerable lengths, however,
to keep its relationship with Syria in fairly good
shape.
The Palestinians present a different kind of
problem. In some ways, Arafat is too conservative
for Soviet tastes, and Moscow has sought to build
up Palestinian leftists as potential challengers.
The Soviet Union, nonetheless, has been frustrated
in dealing with the fractious fedayeen groups and
knows that identification with Palestinian extrem-
ism harms the Soviet image in the West.
(continued)
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T0093-6A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
At present, Brezhnev can point to Libya as a
plus. Substantial arms sales to Tripoli during
the past year or so have tion Moscow an opening to
develop closer relations. But Moscow and Libya
base their relationship on shaky ground--their com-
mon opposition to Sadat--and it could collapse
under Libyan suspicions of Soviet intentions.
With this many problems, Drezhnev realizes he
is dealing with a weak hand when he talks to you
on the Middle East. The Soviets have not been
able to come up with an effective alternative to
our diplomacy. Their own effort to get the Geneva
conference going this spring did not get off the
ground.
Brezhnev badly wants a Soviet role in the
Middle East negotiations. He needs this for rea-
sons of Soviet prestige and to keep homegrown cri-
tics of his Middle East policies at bay. He seems
willing to accept even the appearance of consulta-
tions, and he is sure to try to pin you down to an
ironclad commitment to go to Geneva after the cur-
rent disengagement talks run their course.
Brezhnev also is likely to stress the dangers
inherent in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He has
boasted that he harped on this point to President
Nixon until late into the night at San Clemente in
the summer of 1973. He has claimed that if Presi-
dent Nixon had listened, war might have been averted.
Brezhnev's stress on; this point is partly
tactical--to underscore the need for the US to work
with Moscow for a settlement. But a good portion
is also genuine. The Soviets have little enthusiasm
for a new round of fighting in the Middle East. It
would confront them with an expensive effort to aid
the Arabs--who they think would lose--and entail
the risk of a confrontation with the US. There
still would be no guarantee that Soviet influence
in the region would prosper after the war. Indeed,
the Soviets have considerable anxiety that it would
not.
(continued)
A3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T0093-6A012700010038-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
While Brezhnev is probably disillusioned about
the value of the USSR's Middle East investment and
may be lowering his sights, he has not given up
hope that events will eventually run his way. He
probably judges that a comprehensive settlement is,
at best, a long way off. Israel and its "foreign
supporters" can be held accountable and, perhaps
out of discouragement, the Arabs will again turn
to Moscow for support. In the meantime, the Soviets
will energetically use their considerable assets--
military aid, economic support, responsive politi-
cal groups, and clandestine operations--to preserve
their position in the region.
A4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010038-5