THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 JULY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014854
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 21, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
July 21, 19 75
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category, 5 B( I ).(2)A.3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
July 21, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: The Socialists put on an impressive show
of public support in rallies over the weekend.
(Page 1)
Notes: CSCE; Egypt-Israel (Page 2)
At Annex we present an Intelligence Alert Memorandum
on the Possible Implications of Egypt's Action
on the United Nations Emergency Force.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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PORTUGAL
Portuguese Socialists put on an im-
pressive display of public support over
the weekend, demonstrating that they are
a force that cannot be ignored by the
military government or the Communists.
The Socialists brought out more than 70,000
supporters for a rally in Oporto Friday, and even
more for a demonstration in Lisbon Saturday. Com-
munist efforts to block the demonstrations were un-
successful. There were only a few clashes between
Socialist demonstrators and Communists manning road-
blocks.
At the Lisbon rally, Socialist leader Soares
called for the resignation of Prime Minister Gon-
calves. Soares was probably trying to encourage
moderates in the Revolutionary Council! 25X1
/The moderates
hope to force Goncalves to offer his resignation by
frustrating his attempts to form a new cabinet)
The Portuguese Communist Party is using its
influence over the news media to support Goncalves,
claiming he is essential to the unity of the Armed
Forces Movement.)
//If Goncalves loses Commu-
nist support, his days will be numbered.
The Communists are increasingly concerned
about their waning popularity in conservative north-
ern Portugal. Troops have been used several times
to disperse mobs bent on storming and sacking Com-
munist Party offices in the north.
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NOTES
Negotiations at the European Security Confer-
ence reached agreement on military-related confi-
dence-building measures and several other issues
early Saturday morning to make possible final ac-
ceptance of July 30 as the opening date for a sum-
mit conference in Helsinki.
The
order of speakers at the summit was determined by
lot on Friday. Prime Minister Wilson will be first,
General Secretary Brezhnev is thirteenth and you
will be twenty-sixth.
Egyptian military forces apparently remained
on alert during the weekend, and yesterday an Is-
raeli broadcast reported that Israeli troops in
Sinai were ordered to alert status.
General military activity appeared normal in
Egypt.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT
We present an Intelligence Alert
Meliorandum on the Possible Implications
of Egypt's Action on the United Nations
Emergency Force.
The announcement last week of Egypt's refusal
to extend the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) mandate in
the Sinai Peninsula has thus far raised little stir.
There have been no charges that Egypt is readying
itself for war, despite the fact that its armed
forces are on an increased state of alert. Israel
has apparently not mobilized its forces, although
it is closely watching Egyptian forces. Many
Israelis, at least in public, are interpreting the
Egyptian move as a pressure tactic that can be
waited out and that will in the end prove to have
been only another empty threat.
This memorandum examines the immediate impli-
cations of the Egyptian move--the possibility that
the Egyptians are not bluffing, that they will order
UNEF's removal if th?e- UN Security Council does not
within a week or so adopt a resolution of some sub-
stance, and that they recognize and perhaps intend
that this removal will heighten the possibility of
military clashes. The memorandum is meant not
necessarily to predict, but to call attention to
the dangers inherent in the Egyptian actions.
At the UN
Egyptian spokesmen have demanded, as the price
for UNEF's continued presence, that the UN Security
Council adopt a resolution on Israeli withdrawal
that would "break the present stalemate" and con-
stitute a "major step toward peace." What pre-
cisely this would entail has been left unclear.
Egypt's UN ambassador has insisted on a "clear-cut,
unambiguous" resolution imposing sanctions on
Israel.
This memorandum was prepared July 19, 1975, by
CIA and reviewed by appropriate analytical elements
of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)/
Department of State, DIA, and NSA. INR believes the
memorandum is excessively pessimistic regarding the
imminence of a Sadat decision to abandon the nego-
tiating track or to order the withdrawal of UNEF.
(continued)
Al
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In a more moderate vein, Egypt's second-ranking
diplomat at the UN has said Cairo will seek a reso-
lution that defines one of UNEF's duties as the
supervision of Israeli withdrawals. Whether moderate
or more hard lining, the resolution Egypt seeks would,
at a minimum, be less ambiguous than past resolutions
on the Arab-Israeli situation.
The Egyptians have been careful to avoid refer-
ence to the US in their focus on the UN; they have
made it clear that they want the US to continue
efforts to mediate an interim Sinai agreement. An
Egyptian UN diplomat has specifically stated that
Cairo wishes to avoid provoking a US veto. The
Egyptians would almost certainly extend the UNEF
mandate if an interim agreement could somehow be
concluded or firm agreement reached on some major
aspect of it before the mandate deadline on July
24. If no concrete progress is evident by that
time, however, and the issue does in fact come
before the Security Council as more than a pro
forma mandate extension, the Egyptians may then use
the debate as the acid test of the efficacy of
US-managed negotiations. President Sadat will
probably make some accommodation to avoid a US veto,
but he may have reached the point of impatience at
which he would be less willing to accommodate and
would no longer shy away from putting the US on the
spot.
Beyond the Security Council
It is quite possible that the UN debate could
be drawn out beyond the mandate deadline in order
to postpone any Egyptian decision finally to request
the evacuation of the Sinai buffer zone. The
decision--if in fact the situation comes to this
point--could also be taken, however, by the July
24 deadline, and Egyptian and Israeli forces could
be meeting head-on in at least small-scale clashes
in the buffer zone by the end of the month. If
the UNEF buffer is withdrawn, it is expected that
the Israelis and Egyptians will patrol the vacated
zone, raising the risk of clashes that could escalate
into major hostilities. Both sides may well increase
their force dispositions and mobilize reservists.
(continued)
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In the event an extension resolution satis-
factory to the Egyptians is negotiated within the
next week or so, the danger of accidental clashes
would of course largely be obviated. But success-
ful maneuvering on this resolution would, in the
absence of a further disengagement, only postpone
the danger of military action. Sadat seriously
intends that his action on UNEF should signal his
impatience with the pace of negotiations, and any
extension now is likely to be brief--no more, per-
haps, than a month. At that time, if he were still
unsatisfied in negotiations, Sadat would be even
more likely to follow through with an order to
evacuate the UNEF zone; the danger of clashes, ac-
cidental or otherwise, would then be even greater.
A grave danger in the current situation lies
in the possibility that Sadat will perceive that
his action on UNEF is not being taken seriously by
either the Israelis or the US and that he will run
the risk of war, exploiting this lack of concern
to mask his military preparations. Sadat is acutely
conscious of the fact that because he did bluff,
and fail to follow through, in the years before the
1973 war, he became a laughing stock of the Arab
world and lost the attention of the superpowers.
He is proud of the fact that with the war he sur-
prised the world with his seriousness--proved, as
he puts it, that the Arabs were not a "dead
corpse"--and he is not likely again to risk a repu-
tation for empty posturing. Sadat's action on
UNEF is a gambit to gain attention and exert pres-
sure for more rapid movement in negotiations, but
he is not unaware that, if it is unsuccessful, he
must either take further action or lose credibility
and diplomatic leverage.
The Egyptians have lost no time in calling -
attention to the parallels between the situation
now and that in the summer of 1973. At that time,
Sadat took his final test of the US to the UN Se-
curity Council and, when the US vetoed a resolu-
tion condemning Israel, he set in motion his war
machine while seeming to be concentrating only on
diplomacy. Sadat is a two-track strategist; in
1973 he showed that he was working on a military
track while simultaneously giving diplomacy a
chance to work, and in the years of negotiations
since the war, he has seriously prepared for the
eventuality of hostilities.
(continued)
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He is most likely to focus on the military op-
tion again when he perceives that his diplomatic
efforts are not having effect and, equally impor-
tant, that his political pressure is not being taken
seriously. He would not signal his choice of a
military over a diplomatic option, and he would not
necessarily implement it immediately. The October
war came more than two months after Sadat's final
serious try at diplomacy through the Security
Council debate in July 1973.
Sadat has said frequently that he would again
take his case to the UN, if negotiations do not
succeed, before going to war. If his Security
Council effort fails, either next week or next
month, he could decide that nothing more remains
to be tried on the diplomatic track.
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