THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 JULY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014851
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 17, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
July 17, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
July 17, 1975
? Table of ' Contents
Egypt-Israel: Cairo now seems to be taking a some-
what harder line on what it will require to
permit the continued presence of UN forces in
the Sinai beyond the expiration of the UN man-
date on July 24. (Page 1)
Spain: Madrid appears likely to maintain its tough
line in next week's round of base negotiations
with the US. (Page 3)
Portugal: Moderate officers plan to use the with-
drawal of the Popular Democrats from the gov-
ernment to remove Prime Minister Goncalves
and other radicals. (Page 5)
Notes: Lebanon; Japan; Portugal-Angola (Page 6)
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EGYPT-ISRAEL
Egypt now seems to be taking a
somewhat harder line on what it will
require to permit the continued pres-
ence of UN forces in the Sinai beyond
the expiration of the UN mandate on
July 24.
In announcing the decision not to extend the
mandate, Foreign Minister Fahmi had implied that
Egypt might not object if the UN Security Council
extended the mandate without explicit Egyptian ap-
proval. Subsequent statements by Fahmi and other
officials, however, indicate that Egypt may insist
on some new substantive action by the Security
Council.
Waldheim
himself has announced that it is his understanding
that the Egyptians want a resolution that will as-
sist in "implementing" previous Security Council
decisions on Israeli withdrawal. It is not clear
from this statement if Waldheim intends to make a
distinction between "implementing" or merely "call-
ing for an Israeli withdrawal. We do not know if
the Egyptians would be satisfied with a Security
Council resolution that only advocated a pull back
without taking steps to effect it.
At his press conference on Tuesday, Fahmi sug-
gested obliquely that economic or other sanctions
might be invoked against Israel. The Egyptians may
insist that the imposition of sanctions--which they
could interpret as tangible pressure on Israel to
"implement" a withdrawal--is the only Security
Council action that would induce them to permit
continuation of the UN presence in Sinai.
Fahmi himself took a more categorical position
in a statement issued yesterday in response to
Israel's request for a six-month extension. Using
language that left less room for flexibility than
anything he said on Tuesday, he labeled the Israeli
(continued)
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request ridiculous unless it implied that a with-
drawal would precede the UN extension. For now,
Fahmi declared, the UN forces "are stationed on
Egyptian territory and cannot remain without the
approval of the Egyptian government."
Tel Aviv has so far continued to
take a low-key approach in reacting to
the Egyptian statements.
Prime Minister Rabin's handling of the issue
in the Knesset yesterday was. restrained, and he
reiterated Israel's determination to continue to
seek another interim agreement. He reminded his
colleagues that Israel's adherence to the January
1974 disengagement agreement is based on reciprocal
Egyptian adherence. Characterizing the UN force as
an "integral" part of that agreement, the Prime
Minister called on Cairo to continue to, respect
the existence and authority of the force if it wants
to preserve the agreement.
The Israeli press continues to emphasize that
Cairo's pressure tactics will not stampede Tel Aviv
into concluding a new interim agreement. Commenta-
tors are emphasizing that there may be an element
of bluff in the Egyptian position; one of Israel's
largest dailies editorialized yesterday that only
"fools" would take seriously Egypt's threat not to
extend the UN mandate.
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SPAIN
Madrid appears likely to maintain
its tough line in next week's round of
base negotiations with the US.
According to a Spanish foreign ministry offi-
cial, Foreign Minister Cortina still believes that
France, West Germany, and the US--acting in concert--
should be able to overcome the opposition of NATO's
small north European members to a link with Spain.
Cortina's optimism on this score appears to be based
on his meeting with French President Giscard last
month.
It is unlikely that Giscard made any specific
promises of French support. Cortina's impression
may be based on a misreading of the French restate-
ment of their endorsement of eventual Spanish ties
with the EC and NATO. France wants to expand its
commercial relations with Spain, but rules out
closer political ties while Franco remains on the
scene.
In earlier negotiating sessions, the Spanish
civilian negotiators have appeared intent on obtain-
ing major political objectives. They now profess
to realize that they cannot get a security guarantee
from the US. They say they will concentrate instead
on obtaining recognition of Spain's contribution to
Western defense through a link to NATO. The civil-
ian negotiators believe that if neither of these po-
litical objectives can be obtained, the US presence
in Spain must be sharply reduced. The latest Span-
ish proposal involves the loss of all US air base
facilities in Spain, with only the naval facilities
at Rota to be retained.
The military negotiators appear to have a more
realistic approach to their chances of achieving
Spanish objectives.(
/the Span-
iards realize that neither a mutual defense treaty
with the US nor full membership in NATO is possible
now, and they would settle for some form of strate-
gic coordination between Spain and NATO. If none
of these objectives can be obtained, the US must
grant Spain sufficient military aid to justify per-
mitting the US to maintain military bases in Spain.
(continued)
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At the seventh negotiating session early this
month, Madrid presented an extensive list of equip-
ment it wants, totaling some $2 billion. Spain's
military leaders wish to establish a direct link
between their aid requests and extension of US base
rights in Spain. They envision a one-to-one rela-
tionship--a specified amount of equipment for each
principal facility desired by the US. Spanish in-
sistence on this linkage would severely complicate
negotiations.
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PORTUGAL
Moderate officers in the Portuguese
Revolutionary Council?with the approval
of President Costa Gomes- are
planning to use the Popular Democrats'
withdrawal from the government to remove
Prime Minister Goncalves and other radi-
cal officers from the government.
After the Popular Democrats withdrew from the
cabinet last night, the military dissolved the pro-
visional government. According to press reports,
Goncalves has been charged with forming a new cabi-
net; an official military spokesman said it will
"not be a coalition or exclusively military."
pcne moaerates plan to frustrate Goncalves' ef-
forts to form a new cabinet th r
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Ithe moder-
ates now have a majority in the Council lined up
against Goncalves.
The moderates' move is by no means assured of
success. The Prime Minister was forewarned by an
effort Foreign Minister Antunes made last week to
unseat him. The more moderate officers in the Armed
Forces Movement, moreover, have in the past lacked
the strength or the will to overcome the radicals.
If they make anything less than an all-out effort
this time, they are likely to fail. Another lurch
to the left by the government would almost certainly
follow.
The moderates' chances would be enhanced if
the security forces commander, General Otelo de
Carvalho--who also opposes the Prime Minister--joins
their effort. The Socialists, who have sympathetic
contacts with the Revolutionary Council, are prob-
ably delaying any showdown with the military until
the Council moderates make their move. They have,
however, called a series of rallies throughout the
country during the rest of the week.
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NOTES
Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami on July
15 won a parliamentary vote of confidence more
quickly and by a wider margin than any Lebanese
prime minister in recent years.
The vote does not reflect any particular en-
thusiasm for the substance of Raramils-policy state-
ment. Rather, it demonstrates the eagerness of the
country's normally disputatious politicians to calm
the tense political and security situation in Beirut.
Japan
Portuguese troops are patrolling Luanda,
Angola, to prevent looting and further hostilities
between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola and the National Front for the Liberation
of Angola.
Portuguese officials in Luanda are anxiousto
repair the shattered structure of the transitional
government. They have been in touch- with officials
of the Popular Movement, although as of yesterday
they had not made contact, with Agostinho Neto, whom
apparently they still believe is in charge of the
Movement.
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