THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 JULY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014845
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 10, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
The President's Daily Brief
July 10, 1975
5
To t 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 51301,121,13)
declassified onlY on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
Declassified in Part': Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
July 10, 1975
'Table of Contents,
USSR: Brezhnev's repeated references to new Soviet
strategic programs suggest that the Soviets
are developing or at least considering a new
submarine and a new bomber. (Page 1)
USSR-Somalia: A sense of unease is beginning to
creep into Soviet media treatment of the Ber-
bera revelations. (Page 2)
Lebanon:. The authorities expressed cautious opti-
mism last night that Colonel Morgan will soon
be released. (Page 3)
Cuba-US: Castro implied in mid-June
that the US failure to respond positively to
his overtures could lead to a toughening of
the Cuban position. (Page 5)
Iran: Although the Iranian balance of payments re-
mains strong, government officials are giving
the impressions that foreign aid and economic
development will have to be held down because
of the decline in oil earnings this year.
(Page 6)
Notes: Turkey; USSR; Italy; Panama; India; Cambodia-
Vietnam; Ethiopia (Pages 7, 8, and 9)
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
General Secretary Brezhnev stated
during a conversation with US Senators
last week that he did not have any
specific "super-weapons" in mind during
his recent speech calling for a ban on
new weapons. Brezhnev did mention to the
Senators, however, a proposal that the US
cancel the Trident submarine and B-1 bomber
programs in return for which the Soviets
would forgo construction of the "Typhoon"
submarine and the "IL-22" bomber.
Brezhnev's efforts to discuss these issues with
the Senators may be part of a Soviet strategy to
develop informal lobbying channels with Congress.
His comments also parallel constant Soviet efforts
at the strategic arms limitations talks to terminate
or restrict the development of Trident and the B-1.
The General Secretary has referred to new So-
viet strategic programs on several occasions in the
context of further limitations on strategic offen-
sive arms. The bomber was first mentioned in March
1974 during a meeting with US officials and again
in November 1974 at Vladivostok.
Brezhnev's repeated references suggest that
these are actual programs that the Soviets are de-
veloping or at least considering.
On six occasions during
the recent round of the strategic arms limitations
talks, Soviet representatives have mentioned a new
bomber being developed or to be developed with char-
acteristics similar to the B-1. They said it could
count toward the aggregate ceiling of 2,400 delivery
vehicles agreed upon at Vladivostok.
If the Soviets are developing a new submarine
and a new bomber
Brezhnev's statements indicate that the Soviets
are not yet fully committed to these programs.
1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-SOMALIA
A sense of unease is beginning to
creep into Soviet media treatment of the
Berbera revelations.
One Soviet broadcast last week came close to
owning up to the presence of Styx missiles in the
Berbera area, emphasizing their age and relative
ineffectiveness. There were also hints that the
missiles are destined for Somali patrol boats.
Other Soviet commentators have engaged in verbal
gymnastics to convey the idea that American journal-
ists and Congressmen found no bases in Berbera.
In addition to their public relations problem,
the US inspection trips may also cause problems for
Soviet relations with Somalia. Some Somali nation-
alists may urge President Siad to curtail Soviet
activities. The Soviets themselves are likely to
be upset if, as seems likely, Siad made the visita-
tion offer without first consulting Moscow and then
was too free in granting the visitors access.
Widespread acceptance of the US reports will
make the facilities a political liability for both
Moscow and Mogadiscio. The Soviets' investment in
Berbera is sizable, however, and they will curtail
their operations there reluctantly, if at all.
Their inclination probably will be to hang on in
the expectation that the worst of the embarrassing
public disclosures is now behind them.
Much will depend on the Somalis. The odds are
that Siad has too much at stake in his relationship
with Moscow to turn back now, although he might use
the current situation to press Moscow for more
assistance. On the other hand, Siad has shown him-
self to be unpredictable and impulsive at times,
and his response to this current embarrassment could
involve some unpleasant surprise for Moscow.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LEBANON
Authorities in Beirut last night ex-
pressed cautious optimism that Colonel
Ernest Morgan has not been harmed and
will soon be released, despite the expira-
tion of the kidnapers' deadline yesterday.
The Lebanese acknowledge, however, that
they have made only indirect contact with
those now holding Morgan, and that they
do not know where he is.
//The Lebanese government has on several
occasions in recent years negotiated successfully
with the principal fedayeen groups, but never with
the radicals, and any deal could easily fall through.
Leaders of the major fedayeen and leftist
groups met in Beirut yesterday to consider the Mor-
gan case. In a joint communique issued last night,
they called on "all quarters to turn over those
being sought" and indicated that the perpetrators
of such incidents will be dealt with as a threat to
the Palestinian and leftist cause. According to
the communique, Morgan was originally seized by mem-
bers of two radical fedayeen groups, but is now in
the hands of a largely fictitious organization
created to cover the "irresponsible and anarchic"
practices of certain fedayeen and Lebanese radicals.
Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman
Yasir Arafat almost certainly arranged for the joint
statement in order to isolate and put pressure on
Morgan's captors. Arafat has publicly condemned
the kidnaping on several occasions, and is surely
embarrassed that repeated sweeps by his security
forces through refugee camps and houses in Beirut
have failed to free the officer.
(continued)
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The demonstration of independence and opera-
tional skill by the radicals comes at a particularly
bad time for Arafat. The radicals, emboldened by
substantial infusions of Libyan money and political
support, have recently been criticizing him for
"currying favor with America," sacrificing basic
Palestinian interests to win a seat at the Geneva
peace conference, and selling out to the Lebanese
by working to calm unrest in Beirut.
The communique makes much of the fact that the
Iraqi-supported Arab Liberation Front, ordinarily
part of the rejection front, is cooperating with
the main body of the PLO in working for Morgan's
release.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CUBA-US
Fidel Castro implied in
mid-June that the US failure to respond
positively to his overtures could
strengthen forces in the Cuban leader-
ship that are less inclined than he is
to favor negotiations with the US, and
that this could lead to a toughening of
the Cuban position.
.1 Castro claimed he had made a number of fruit-
less gestures to demonstrate his willingness to
negotiate, mentioning specifically the return to
Southern Airways of the $2 million the Cubans con-
fiscated after an airplane hijacking. He probably
also had in mind the release of a number of US
citizens held in Cuban prisons for a variety of
offenses.
Castro was angered by a comment by a US
official--whom he did not identify--to the effect
that "there is no reason to reconsider US policy
toward Cuba."
Deputy
Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriquez, Cuba's
leading proponent of detente objected
to portions of Assistant Secretary of State Rogers'
Congressional testimony of June 11. Rodriguez ap-
parently interpreted the testimony as a further
indication of lack of US seriousness about improv-
ing relations.
More recently, the Cubans may have changed
their minds about our intentions. Foreign Minister
Raul Roa last week communicated to the US in effu-
sive terms his appreciation that a Cuban delegation
was permitted to attend an agricultural conference
in California. This may be Havana's belated recog-
nition of our policy since last December to liber-
alize issuance of visas to Cubans to attend non-
governmental gatherings in the US.
It is possible that the Cubans made known their
irritation in order to keep pressure on the US.
They probably are looking for some sort of response
from Washington during or after the OAS conference
in San Jose this month.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
I RAN
Iranian government officials and the
press--at the instigation of the Shah--are
giving the impression that foreign aid and
economic development efforts will have to
be held down because of the decline in oil
earnings in 1975. Actually, the Iranian
balance of payments remains strong.
Tehran told the International
Monetary Fund that it was considering a delay in
making its full $1-billion commitment to the oil
facility pending examination of the balance of pay-
ments later in the year.
Although Iran's export earnings declined by
5 percent in the first half of 1975, compared with
the previous half, they should pick up in coming
months because of seasonal factors and the recovery
in world economic activity. We believe that oil
revenues will be only $600 million lower in 1975
than in 1974, in contrast to the $3.5- to $4-billion
drop recently forecast by the Minister of Interior.
Even with imports rising 50 percent in value, we
expect Iran to achieve a $10-billion current-account
surplus in 1975.
Iran's lending and investments this year will
approach a record $4 billion--roughly double the
1974 level. Even with these outflows, Iran should
rack up a payments surplus of $6 billion in 1975,
boosting foreign reserves to $15 billion.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Turkey continues to weigh policy reassessments
and options for action against US bases in the event
the US arms embargo is maintained beyond the July
17 deadline set by Prime Minister Demirel.
USSR
A severe
arougilt centered in the Volga Valley recently has
reduced grain prospects in the USSR, but the So-
viets still could harvest more than 200 million
tons. Imports of about 10 million tons should
cover Soviet grain requirements and provide the
amounts required--even in a record year--to cover
shortfalls in certain types of grains and to ship
grain directly from North America to Cuba and other
client states and to the Soviet Far East.
(continued)
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A012-700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Italian
Panama's General Torrijos is apparently laying
the groundwork for a campaign to demonstrate his
frustration over the delay in negotiations on a
new canal treaty.
He released for publication in a Panamanian
newspaper this morning a statement resulting from
a meeting he held yesterday with local student lead-
ers on the canal treaty situation. The statement
makes clear his strong irritation at the US, but
does not break his commitment to keep details of
the negotiations confidential. Torrijos thinks he
has a strong rapport with the students and he may
decide to use carefully controlled student demon-
strations--perhaps involving minor harassment of US
citizens--to show his unhappiness.
Both houses of India's parliament have been
convoked for July 21 to endorse the recent procla-
mation of a state of emergency. The Ruling Congress
Party's parliamentary majority ensures easy. approval.
The decision to summon parliament now rather
than next month, as had been generally expected,
suggests that Prime Minister Gandhi believes parlia--
ment's rubber stamp will give her a strong political
position should she need to overcome a Supreme Court
decision against her. The court will take up her
case on Monday. Although a full written decision
is unlikely before late summer, an oral judgment may
be issued much sooner because of the importance of
the case.
(continued)
8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Art - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T009-36A012-700010025-9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Cambodian and Vietnamese communist officials
appear to be making progress in resolving their bor-
der problem.
Several recent intercepts have mentioned meet-
ings between Cambodian and Vietnamese officials to
discuss both the mainland border problem and the
status of disputed offshore islands. The communist
headquarters in eastern Cambodia has ordered units
to pull back at least a mile from the border and
cooperate with their Vietnamese counterparts in ef-
forts to sort out overlapping claims. lthough the
Cambodians appear to feel that agreement is near,
isolated clashes may continue for some time because
lingering local animosities will probably complicate
efforts to implement the decisions reached at higher
levels.
25X1
Ethiopia
25X1
25X1
9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010025-9