THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 JUNE 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014831
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 23, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
June 23, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption categoix.51311),(2).(3)
declassified only on alsProval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
June 23, 1975
? Table ' of ' Contents
Israel: Prime Minister Rabin is firmly committed
to a hard line on another interim agreement,
according to a commentary in a leading Israeli
newspaper. (Page 1)
Portugal: A broad policy statement issued by the
Armed Forces Movement encourages "direct links"
to the people that eventually could threaten
the existence of political parties. (Page 2)
Angola: The weekend agreement by the three top
nationalist leaders to ease tensions amounts
to little more than an uncertain truce.
(Page 4)
Note: Eritrea-Ethiopia (Page 5)
At Annex we discuss Narcotics: The Latin American
Connection
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ISRAEL
A recent commentary in a leading
Israeli newspaper depicts Prime Minis-
ter Rabin as firmly committed to a hard
Zine on Israeli requirements for another
interim agreement and determined not to
give up the eastern ends of the Gidi and
MitZa passes without a clear Egyptian
commitment to non-belligerency?
The Prime Minister reportedly is convinced that
the concession he offered on the Abu Rudays oil
field during his Washington visit makes it impossi-
ble for Israel to be accused of intransigence and
puts President Sadat under pressure to come up with
an appropriate counter-concession.
The commentary says Rabin believes:
--The principle of mutuality of concessions
must be preserved.
--Retention of part of the passes is necessary
as long as there is any doubt of Cairo's in-
tentions.
--He cannot reverse the position on the passes
he took in March without destroying his credi-
bility among members of his party and the
opposition.
Regarding US-Israeli relations, Rabin is de-
scribed as being in an excellent bargaining position
because Egypt and the US are under the pressure of
time to reach another interim agreement. Moreover,
he believes Israel is sufficiently strong to survive
without an interim agreement, if Tel Aviv's position
is rejected by Egypt.
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PORTUGAL
The broad policy statement issued
over the weekend by the military rulers
preserves the existing multiparty poli-
tical system, but it also encourages the
establishment of "direct links" between
the Armed Forces Movement and the people.
If such links are established, they
could pose a threat to the existence of
Portugal's political parties.
The long-awaited document reassessing Portu-
gal's revolutionary course states that the country
will go through several phases:before'it reaches
its final objective--a classless.society. The docu-
ment notes, however, that during the current tran-
sitional phase, political parties will play a valu-
able role. This statement should set aside--at
least temporarily--attempts by radicals within the
Movement to abolish all parties..
The Revolutionary Council's communique says
it will support the establishment of political links
with all grassroots organizations whose objectives
correspond to those of the Movement. It character-
ized such organizations as the "embryo of an experi-
mental system of direct democracy." The statement
implies that once these organizations are working
properly political parties will be unnecessary.
The statement emphasizes, however, that armed civil-
ian organizations will not be tolerated and repu-
diates the establishment of socialism in a violent
or dictatorial way.
A large part of the communique is devoted to
the country's "grave" economic condition. It ad-
mits that if the present trend continues the coun-
try's foreign exchange reserves will be "practically
exhausted" by the end of the year. It calls upon
the cabinet to put aside differences and develop an
economic strategy by the end of July to reverse the
decline in production and rise in unemployment. In
a scarcely veiled warning, the Council refers to
these discussions as an "in-depth test of the coali-
tion's viability."
(continued)
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The Movement also announced that it will exert
greater control of the nation's media and take over
at least one newspaper to ensure accurate coverage
of the Movement's policies.
Specific issues such as the Republica affair,
the election of trade union officials, and agrarian
reform were not addressed, but the Revolutionary
Council is expected to resume debate on these matters
this week.
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ANGOLA
The agreement to ease tensions that
was reached over the weekend by the three
top nationalist leaders amounts to little
more than an uncertain truce. Holden
Roberto, Agostinho Neto, and Jonas Savimbi
met almost continuously last week in Kenya
to hammer it out.
The measures agreed upon to end the fighting
merely restate past agreements that have failed.
The key to any effective implementation will depend
on whether Neto's Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola and Roberto's National Front for the
Liberation of Angola will refrain from further at-
tacks on each other.
The recent fighting, however, has left Neto's
group with certain advantages over the National
Front that could spark Roberto into further action.
The Popular Movement, for example, now has the up-
per hand in several areas north of Luanda, which
severely limits the National Front's access to the
capital city.
The three leaders committed themselves to make
the transitional government more effective. The
government that was set up by an agreement with the
Portuguese in January has proved unworkable, but
the new agreement seems unlikely to make the gov-
ernment any more effective than before in maintain-
ing order.
Neto, Savimbi, and Roberto apparently will go
ahead and try to hold national elections in Octo-
ber for a constituent assembly that will select a
head of government to assume office on the Novem-
ber 11 independence day. Whether the elections can
be held is questionable. New violence is likely
to accompany the campaign in the countryside, par-
ticularly in those areas where no faction predomi-
nates.
In effect, the agreement merely postpones an
eventual confrontation between Roberto and Neto.
All three leaders seem to acknowledge this, however,
by agreeing to meet again in November to arrange
for the transfer of power if the October election
fails to take place.
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NOTE
Eritrean rebels on Saturday staged a one-hour
attack on selected Ethiopian targets in Asmara.
This incident may mark the beginning of in-
creased activities by the insurgents, who have been
lying low for more than two months.
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ANNEX
NARCOTICS: THE LATIN AMERICAN CONNECTION
During the past few years, govern-
ments in Latin America and the Caribbean
have increased their efforts to control
the flow of illicit narcotics. These
governments have been made aware and
concerned, mainly by the US, that their
countries play significant roles in the
drug abuse problem in this country.
Still, the production and smuggling of
heroin and cocaine from the area con-
tinues to flourish. There are no ac-
curate statistics available, but the
Latin American connection almost cer-
tainly accounts for the largest amount
of illicit narcotics now entering the US.
The key trouble spots are islexico, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Ilexico is the major
source of heroin. Colombia and Ecuador are the
key cocaine processing and trafficking countries.
Peru and Bolivia are the world's largest producers
of coca, the plant from which cocaine is derived.
Drug traffickers in the area have increased
their operations in the past few years mainly in
response to three developments: tighter enforce-
ment controls on heroin trafficking in Western
Europe, the 1971 ban on opium production in Turkey,
and a rise in the use of cocaine in the US.
Mexico has supplanted Turkey as the major
source of the heroin consumed in the US. Roughly
60 to 70 percent of the heroin seized in the US in
the last year was either produced in or shipped
through Mexico. The European - Latin American
connection is used to exchange South American co-
caine for heroin refined in Europe, though ap-
parently this traffic has lessened in recent years
because of the stricter measures in Europe. Opium
poppy fields have been found in Ecuador, Peru, and
Colombia, but they apparently are not widespread
nor are these countries large producers of heroin.
(continued)
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The trafficking of cocaine from Bolivia, Peru,
Colombia, or Ecuador has increased dramatically.
US seizures of cocaine--almost all of it from these
countries--have increased 700 percent since 1969. ?
Marijuana and its derivatives, mainly from
Mexico, Jamaica, and Colombia, but prevalent in
many other countries, are smuggled in huge quantities
throughout the hemisphere.
Some Headway
Many governments in Latin America and the Carib-
bean have made some headway in fighting the problem.
In some cases, they have formed narcotics police
units, launched large eradication and interdiction
campaigns with some success, and toughened drug
laws.
Eventually, progress will probably be realized
in the more advanced and politically sophisticated
countries. Leaders of Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela,
and Argentina are intent on taking further steps
to control the situation. Their sense of urgency
will probably increase as drug abuse spreads among
their own populations.
Progress in other countries will vary widely.
Traffickers will continue to shift their operations
to those countries where law enforcement and gov-
ernment resources are weakest.
Stemming the flow of heroin is a more likely
possibility in the longer term since it is recog-
nized as the most harmful narcotic, and growing the
opium poppy plant is illegal in all Latin American
countries. Cocaine traffic will be more difficult
to deter since the coca leaf has been used by In-
dians in the high plains of the Andes for centuries.
Even should inroads be made on the many problems,
controlling the flow of narcotics into the US will
be a slow and difficult process as long as demand
remains close to present levels and trafficking in
narcotics remains so extraordinarily profitable.
(continued)
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Why It Is So Easy? -
Smuggling is endemic throughout Latin America.
Enormous quantities of contraband goods--whiskey,
cigarettes, TV sets, guns, and precious gems--are
easily transported from one country to another.
Sometimes such items move across three or more bor-
ders before they reach their destination. Under
such circumstances, illicit drug trafficking is at-
tractive and relatively easy. Because smuggling
and contraband are fairly commonplace, it is diffi-
cult to arouse the public and the authorities
against such trafficking when it involves drugs.
Corruption is widespread. In many countries it
is almost a way of life; without payoffs and bribes
many of the everyday government functions, from is-
suing auto permits to export licenses, could not be
accomplished. Profits from drug trafficking are so
great that it is worthwhile to bribe low-ranking
police and government officials to look the other
way. Often the very officials who are responsible
for suppressing smuggling are themselves deeply in-
volved. Influential families and community leaders
in many countries also participate.
The geography of many Latin American countries
is ideal for drug production and smuggling opera-
tions. The long borders, difficult terrain, rivers,
hidden bays and inlets, and myriad airstrips enable
the narcotics trafficker to choose among routes and
methods.
Most governments do not have enough equipment,
money, and trained personnel to cope with the prob-
lem. The US has supplied training and large amounts
of equipment--aircraft, vehicles, and communications,
but virtually all the countries still do not have
enough equipment or expertise to make major progress
toward stopping production and trafficking. They are
still incapable of carrying out an effective enforce-
ment program without continued US technical support
and? participation.
Law enforcement against narcotics violators
is weak in many countries. Police forces are
generally inexperienced in drug matters, and most
governments do not have a central agency for handl-
ing drug violations. Rivalries and jealousies
among bureaucrats dealing with narcotics hinder
progress. Coordination and exchange of intelligence
is many times sorely lacking.
(continued)
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?Yuma
is
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United States
ort Worth
iudad Juarez
Del Rio
Piedras Negra;
La P.
uevo
aredo
Mazatlan
Pacific Ocean
Mexico
Drug Smuggling Routes
udadtVictoria
(ampico
/N:71\7
Gulf of Mexico
Puerto _War
111q0 Principal surface routes from
opiate producing areas to border zone
?4.4- West Coast air smuggling routes
Flow of narcotics from Europe
and South America
NULSmuggling by fishing boats and other small craft
A Check point
558096 6-75
9 190 290 390 Wes
6 100 200 360 Kilometers
a mala
Honduras
SOLINDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
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Well-entrenched, well-organized, and well-
financed criminals run the international traffick-
ing networks. In many areas they operate with
near impunity. They have shown considerable
flexibility in shifting their operations to coun-
tries where law enforcement is weakest.
Judicial systems ip many countries are weak
and many times slow to act on narcotics offenses.
Lenient sentencing of drug dealers is common.
Extradition treaties with some Latin American
nations do not cover narcotics.
Regional programs, regional cooperation, and
a complete and honest exchange of information among
the Latin nations on narcotics matters are gener-
ally lacking. One of the few regional meetings
in recent years, a conclave of representatives from
six South American nations, is scheduled for this
summer in Bolivia. Another, sponsored by the Bra-
zilian Federal Police, is planned for Brasilia in
the fall.
? The Traffickers' Routes
Heroin from Mexico and Europe and cocaine
from South America find their way into the US over
a vast variety of routes. The techniques used by
traffickers are limited only by their imagination.
(continued)
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TO
MEXICO
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CARIBBEAN SEA
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13
BARBADOS
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ATLANTIC OCEAN
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Buenos
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ATLANTIC OCEAN
South America
Illicit Traffic in
Heroin and Cocaine
Transshipment point
Flow of narcotics
500 1000 Miles
500 1000 Kilometers
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In Central and South America, practically all
of the major cities have served as stopping-off
points for narcotics destined for the US. The
main ports of entry for European heroin are Buenos
Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Montevideo, and
Asuncion.
Heroin smuggled into Buenos Aires, for ex-
ample, may travel by river to Paraguay, where it
is loaded aboard private aircraft and flown to
Brazil. In Brazil it may be shipped directly to
the US by sea or commercial aircraft or be diverted
to Colombia, Ecuador, or Panama via Santiago,
Chile. Cocaine from Peru or Bolivia is frequently
funneled directly to the US through Santiago, Val-
paraiso, and Arica, Chile; La Paz, Bolivia; Lima
and Callao, Peru; Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Cali,
Bogota, Turbo, and Barranquilla, Colombia. Large
amounts go through Panama, Central America, and
Mexico. Large shipments go by sea or air; smaller
quantities are carried by couriers, many of them
Colombians, who account for the greatest part of
the traffic.
Many islands of the Caribbean also play impor-
tant roles in the illicit traffic. Aruba and,Cur-
acao, in the Netherlands Antilles off the coast of
Venezuela, are active transshipment points for
European heroin, much of it originating in the Dutch
ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The islands may
also be a way station for South American cocaine
on its way to Miami and New York.
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Top Secret
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