THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 JUNE 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014825
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 16, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
June 16, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B(I ),OW/
declassified onbi on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
June 16, 1975
? Table ' of ' Contents
Turkey: The Turkish national security council will
meet today to consider retaliation against the
US arms embargo. (Page 1)
Israel Lebanon: Another border clash. (Page 2)
Note: West Germany (Page 3)
Annex: We analyze the effect of Soviet acquisition
of advanced Western technology in four selected
areas.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
TURKEY
The Turkish national security coun-
cil will meet today to consider retalia-
tion against the US for the arms embargo.
Prime Minister Demirel said at a press confer-
ence yesterday that Turkey cannot be expected to
carry out bilateral agreements that have been uni-
laterally abrogated by the US. He called on NATO
to "heal the wounds" caused by the arms embargo and
hinted that if the West European allies are unwill-
ing to help fill Turkey's armaments gap, Ankara.
might
might consider reducing or ending its participation
in the alliance.
Demirel reportedly has become convinced that
the US Congress will not lift the embargo. He may
see the threat of firm action as Turkey's only means
of bringing pressure on the US to change its policy.
To make the threat more credible, Demirel may be
willing to take the first steps toward reducing the
US presence.
To take any such action, however, Demirel will
need the agreement of Turkish military leaders.
They have so far demonstrated considerable reluc-
tance to take any irreversible steps. Turkish gen-
erals, most of whom believe Ankara has no alterna-
tive to its alliance with the US and Western Europe,
are likely to argue in today's council session for
a very gradual approach. This might begin with a
request to the US that it begin preparations to
withdraw from those facilities
that benefit Turkey least.
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Mediterranean
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ISRAEL-LEBANON
Israeli aircraft and artillery ate-
tacked fedayeen concentrations near Mount
Hermon in southeastern Lebanon yesterday
in retaliation for a guerrilla raid on
the Israeli border village of Kefar Yuval.
The Israeli action is the first inside Lebanon
since forces from the two countries clashed three
weeks ago. The strikes followed the penetration of
an Israeli border village by four Arab guerrillas
who seized six Israeli hostages. All four guerril-
las were subsequently killed; at least two Israelis
died, and six were wounded.
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NOTE
West German
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USSR
Analysis of four selected techno-
logical areas--transport aircraft, semi-
conductors, digital computers, and air
traffic control systems--indicates that
the Soviet Union will eventually profit
militarily by acquiring advanced Western
technology. It is impossible to say with
confidence, however, to what degree and
at what rate this will occur because of
the multiple sources of the technology
and because of uncertainty regarding the
ability and intent of the USSR to adapt
the technology for military purposes.
The cumulative effect of increased technology
transfers from the West will result in some selec-
tive improvements in the Soviet strategic military
posture over the next five to ten years. Appreci-
ably greater improvement would occur if the rate
and scope of such transfers were to increase sharply.
Channels for the transfer of technology
to the USSR have expanded greatly since 1972.
The Soviets, given the continuation of detente
and relaxation of controls by the Coordinating Com-
mittee on Export Controls, will acquire Western
technology of most interest to them in piecemeal
fashion, but at an increasing rate
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nology will flow to the USSR directly 25)(1
and through other countries, including advanced
Western states outside of the Coordinating Commit-
tee as well as through Eastern Europe. Such coun-
tries will also sell to the USSR technology they
have developed by themselves, straining the Coor-
dinating Committee's structure and resulting in
added pressure on the US government to relax its
unilateral controls.
(continued)
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A major obstacle to the Soviets' achievement
of military gains through the use of civilian West-
ern technology appears to be the Soviets' difficulty
assimilating and adapting such technology for ex-
tensive military production. They can overcome
this obstacle only to the extent they can get hold
of advanced technology for production of systems
and components. Such technology may be considered
obsolete by Western standards, but could be used by
the Soviets to improve considerably their military
production capabilities.
Transport Aircraft
Soviet nego-
tiations on wide-body aircraft have
explored many possibilities for transfer of technol-
ogy, including production licenses and aircraft pur-
chases. Information acquired by the Soviets since
1972 probably has been insufficient to use in rede-
signing Soviet production lines.
Close study of design and fabrication practices
evident from purchased aircraft would probably have
only limited value because of shortcomings in So-
viet manufacturing capabilities. A licensing agree-
ment, whether for aircraft or engines, would per-
mit the export of necessary data and give the So-
viets an opportunity to become self-sufficient in
production of such Western designs.
Semiconductors
Soviet integrated circuit production technol-
ogy, particularly with respect to quality control
and contamination protection, lags behind
Access to Western
production technology, sought extensively by the
Soviets since 1970, would be of great benefit to
the Soviet military within a relatively short time.
It could possibly be used in strategic missiles,
anti-submarine warfare detection systems, cryptog-
raphy, and computer equipment. Barring substantial
relaxations in the embargo of this technology, So-
viet development of an advanced semiconductor in-
dustry will remain slow.
(continued)
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Digital Computers
Soviet general-purpose computer technology is
generally behind that of Western countries,
although a limited number of the more advanced mod-
els probably are available for military use. Sub-
stantial progress in some important military uses
of computers, such as command and control and possi-
bly anti-ballistic missile defense, will require
computer technology beyond the USSR's likely capa-
bilities in the near future.
the Soviets will probably acquire from
various sources the know-how and equipment that
will make their own general-purpose computers suit-
able for full-time military uses. Soviet acquisi-
tion of production technology for minicomputers,
microprocessors, and associated equipment over the
next decade or so is a serious potential threat
in terms of what it could do toward improv-
ing the Soviet strategic posture.
Air Traffic Control Systems
Probably the greatest potential mili-
tary benefit would result from the use of such
equipment to demonstrate the organizational and op-
erational techniques of automated command and con-
trol systems and to permit extensive training in
the actual operation of such systems.
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