THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 JUNE 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014824
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 14, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010004-2
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 56(15.121.M
declassified cor4 on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010004-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012700010004-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
June 14, 1975
Table of Contents:
Jordan-Syria: President Asad and King Husayn have
established a joint supreme committee to coor-
dinate policy. (Page 1)
USSR-Libya:
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(Page 3) 25X1
Egypt: Egyptian mechanized infantry units con-
duct Itrainina
(Page 5)
USSR: Brezhnev's speech yesterday included a re-
strained affirmation of interest in improved
relations with the West. (Page 6)
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2/nAI
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Western Europe
- Portugal: West
Europeans are con-
for Portugal.
Karami has
(Page 9)
sidering economic
(Page 7)
Lebanon: Prime
assistance
Minister - designate
a government.
yet to form
China:
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(Page 10)
Notes:
Korea;
Saudi Arabia -
Algeria; Greece 25X1
(Page 11)
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JORDAN-SYRIA
President Asad and King Husayn con-
cluded three days of talks in Jordan this
week by establishing a joint supreme com-
mittee to "coordinate military, political,
economic, and cultural policies." Al-
though the two principals underlined their
intentions to pursue closer military co-
operation, the final communique fell
short of announcing the creation of a
formal joint military command.
Both Husayn and Asad probably hope
to use their highly publicized and ap-
parently successful meeting to strengthen
their respective positions in the jock-
eying now going on among the Arabs. In
this sense, Asad's visit may have had as
much political and psychological impor-
tance as military.
Asad, in an effort to strengthen his hand in
dealings with Egyptian President Sadat, has been
trying for some time to promote closer ties be-
tween Syria and Jordan, as well as between Syria
and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Jordan
has become even more important to Asad as a polit-
ical and military ally over the past few months be-
cause of the smoldering antagonism between Iraq
and Syria.
Husayn, for his part, still wants to partici-
pate in the final disposition of the West Bank. He
has formally relinquished his negotiating role to
the PLO, but he remains hopeful of playing some
part because of the inability of PLO chief Yasir
Arafat to get the Palestinians invited to the Gen-
eva peace conference.
(continued)
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Contingency plans for greater Jordanian-Syrian
military cooperation in the event of a war with
Israel were probably a major topic of discussion.
Husayn has felt for some time that he damaged his
chances for regaining the West Bank by limiting
Jordan's role in the. 1973 war to the dispatch of a
few units to the Syrian front. Since then, he has
watched both Syria and Egypt regain some of the
territory they lost in 1967, while Jordan has all
but been shut out of negotiations. At the very
least, Husayn has probably concluded that he must
commit more of his forces sooner to the Syrian
front if there is another war.
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USSR-LIBYA
(continued)
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EGYPT
Egyptian mechanized
are conducting training
infantry units
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In April, a mechanized brigade
of the 6th
Mechanized Infantry Division
conducted
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an exercise designed to advance
nearly 40 miles
in
two days of fighting--about the distance Egyptian
units would have to advance from their positions
on the west bank of the Suez Canal to capture the
strategic Sinai passes. The brigade, which was
based in the Cairo area, reportedly moved to its
attack position at night and, with artillery rein-
forcements, moved forward
for two days until it
reached its oblective.
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The 6th Division's
attack scenario
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involves
an advance of nearly
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40 miles in two days while
destroying enemy brigades
in mobile combat. We doubt that an Egyptian brigade
would be a match for an Israeli tank or mechanized
brigade, particularly in combat involving consid-
erable movement. This is the kind of warfare at
which the Israelis excel. Moreover, Israeli artil-
lery is self-propelled and its air force well
trained
in providing rapid, accurate support
to
ground
forces.
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The most sianificant omissinn
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is the lack
of air defense by surface-to-air missiles. Al-
though the division has some air defense weapons
of its own, it would also require support from SAM
units if it hoped to avoid heavy losses from Is-
raeli air strikes.
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USSR
General Secretary Brezhnev yesterday
completed the round of republic election
speeches given by Soviet leaders with a
restrained affirmation of interest in im-
proved relations with the West. Brezhnev
stuck to familiar foreign policy themes,
as had President Podgorny and Premier
Kosygin earlier this week.
In the somewhat tougher tone evident since the
April 1975 party plenum, Brezhnev credited the re-
laxation in international tensions chiefly to Soviet
efforts and to a new correlation of world forces in
favor of socialism. He cautioned that some politi-
cians are paying only lip service to detente and
criticized those allegedly trying to win over right-
wing circles by feigning suspicion of detente. The
implication was that supporters of detente in the
West should be more forthright in defending it and
should not look for concessions from the Soviet Un-
ion to help them sell it at home.
Brezhnev's specific references to the US and
to you were uniformly favorable. He praised on-
going steps toward a new strategic arms limitation
agreement but was imprecise on the timing of the
summit, saying only that it would take place this
year.
Brezhnev devoted a major portion of his for-
eign policy remarks to reviewing broad Soviet arms
control measures. He reiterated Moscow's interest
in reducing military budgets and proposed an inter-
national agreement to ban the manufacture of new
weapons systems of mass destruction. The Soviets
have previously raised with the US their interest
in restricting such systems, but Brezhnev urged
consideration of it in a multilateral forum. As
such, it may become a featured part of Soviet pro-
posals at the UN or in international disarmament
discussions.
Brezhnev briefly mentioned the European secu-
rity conference, simply noting that its conclusion
was "not far off." His comment on force reduction
talks was a typical Soviet jibe at alleged NATO ef-
forts to seek one-sided advantages.
6
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WESTERN EUROPE - PORTUGAL
West Europeans are considering eco-
nomic assistance for Portugal in an effort
to bolster Portuguese moderates and stave
off another move to the left in Lisbon.
The EC Commission this week prepared a set of
proposals that includes a "community action" pro-
gram to channel substantial financial assistance
from EC member states to Portugal on an urgent
basis. The recommendations also provide for im-
proved access to EC markets for Portuguese exports,
technical assistance, industrial cooperation, Por-
tuguese access to the European Investment Bank, and
increased benefits for Portuguese workers in the
Community.
Aid to Portugal has been a thorny problem for
the Community, and the EC foreign ministers may re-
gard these terms as too generous when they take up
the Commission's proposals on June 24. In any
event, they will probably insist that the size and
pace of aid be tied to the development of democratic
institutions in Portugal. The "community action"
proposal will fit this demand because, as a unilat-
eral EC commitment, it could be terminated quickly
if the Portuguese situation should take a turn for
the worse.
The chances that the EC foreign ministers will
approve a substantial aid package for Portugal ap-
pear to have improved as a result of the visit of
Portuguese President Costa Gomes and Foreign Minis-
ter Antunes to Paris last week. These two relatively
moderate members of the Armed Forces Movement re-
portedly had some success in convincing French Pres-
ident Giscard that moderates still have a chance to
control Portugal's future and that their cause
would be advanced by West European economic aid.
(continued)
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Social Democrats in West Germany and Sweden re-
portedly are considering aid to Portugal with a more
direct political impact. West German party leaders
are said to have reacted favorably to a proposal by
Portuguese Socialist leader Soares that lower rank-
ing Portuguese officers be invited to West Germany
for political training. The Swedes also have a
plan to bring officers of the Armed Forces Movement
to Sweden to familiarize them with European demo-
cratic socialism.
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LEBANON
Lebanese Prime Minister - designate
Rashid Karami has yet to form a govern-
ment.
For the past three weeks, he has been unable
to wring concessions from either leaders of the
right-wing Phalanges Party, who demand that they be
represented in the new cabinet, or from leftist
leaders, who insist that the Phalangists be excluded
as punishment for their role in the recent fighting.
Karami's task has been complicated by the fact
that President Franjiyah has avoided pressing the
Phalangists to compromise and may in fact be rein-
forcing their hard-line position. Franjiyah ap-
pointed Karami only reluctantly and would take some
satisfaction from Karami's failure to form a gov-
ernment.
The continued delay in forming a government is
increasing the risk that the public will lose con-
fidence in Karami, widely considered Lebanon's
"last hope," and that widespread street fighting
will resume. Sniping and kidnaping have occurred
in several areas of Beirut during the past week,
despite the general adherence by both sides to the
cease-fire.
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CHINA
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NOTES
Both North and South Korea have applied for
formal membership in the nonaligned movement and
are focusing on the Conference of Nonaligned Coun-
tries scheduled to be held in Lima this August.
Pyongyang has a good chance of being accepted
at the Lima conference; Seoul is likely to fail.
A victory for North Korea at Lima would increase
the chances that the UN this fall will vote a reso-
lution calling for an end to the US and UN roles in
South Korea.
Saudi Arabia provided Algeria with $400 mil-
lion in long-term loans late last week to help meet
Algeria's growing balance-of-payments difficulties.
Lower oil prices and falling oil production
have reduced Algerian export earnings, while ambi-
tious development plans and a poor harvest have re-
quired more imports. Algerian officials have been
seeking up to $2 billion to avoid further depletion
of foreign exchange reserves, but have encountered
stiff terms in international money markets.
The Greek parliament will elect a new presi-
dent of the republic next Thursday under the coun-
try's new constitution.
The three candidates are loyal supporters of
Prime Minister Karamanlis and can be expected to
step down should Karamanlis wish to move up to the
presidency at a later date.
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Top Secret
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