THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 JUNE 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014820
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 10, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
June 10, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified onli on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
June 10, 1975
Table of Contents
Korea: The South Koreans have moved a portion of
their west coast fishing control line northward.
(Page 1)
Laos: The Pathet Lao are continuing to neutralize
the non-communist Royal Lao Army as an effec-
tive fighting force. (Page 2)
Notes:
USSR; Saudi Arabia - Egypt; Portugal;
Belgium; Angola (Pages 3, 4, and 5)
Annex: We review the problems accompanying Angola's
move toward independence.
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KOREA
The South Koreans have moved a
portion of their west coast fishing
control Zine northward
The line
has been kept well south of the dis-
puted islands for over a year, al-
though in previous years it has been
moved north in May and June to allow
the South Koreans to fish spawning
grounds in the area. The western
portion of the line now extends west
from the tip of Paengnyong-do Island
and is the northernmost extension
thus far.
The South Korean government probably will in-
crease naval patrols in the area--a step that could
lead to incidents between North and South.
Yesterday morning at least two MIG-21s, both
reconnaissance versions, overflew Paengnyong-do.
The North Koreans rarely overfly any of the UN-
onnfrnllpa islands in ths. Ypllnw Spa
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LAOS
The Pathet Lao are continuing to
neutralize the non-communist Royal Lao
Army as an effective fighting force.
Having already succeeded in driving most of
the army's competent commanders into exile, the
communists are now busy conducting "thought reform"
seminars for non-communist officers who have not
yet been purged. The tone of the presentations is
strongly anti-US and strongly pro-North Vietnamese.
The communists also are planning to reorganize
and streamline the Royal Lao Army. "Acting" Defense
Minister Khamouane Boupha will be in overall charge
of the army, and Pathet Lao officers will share
authority throughout the chain of command. In ad-
dition, the army will
be reduced from its present strength of approxi-
mately 46,000 to form an integrated army with the
Pathet Lao of some 30,000 men. This reduction will
be accomplished by demobilizing entire non-communist
units--including all former irregular forces.
the new integrated
army will total 28,000 men, including 12,000 troops
from the Royal Lao Army, 10,000 Pathet Lao, 4,000
pro-communist neutralists, and 2,000 non-communist
neutralists.
I the Royal Lao Army has been effec-
tively destroyed by the Pathet Lao with the willing
acquiescence of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.
effective control of the army is now in
communist hands and "all is now lost."
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NOTES
Saudi Arabia has agreed to provide Egypt with
a $600-million emergency loan to help meet Cairo's
immediate cash needs.
The Saudi loan, along with other available for-
eign exchange, will permit Egypt to meet an esti-
mated $1.7-billion current account deficit this
year. President Sadat, gambling that Arab sources
would make cash available to him, had avoided cut-
backs in imports this year that would have increased
public restiveness. The new Saudi commitment brings
emergency aid pledged to Egypt by Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Abu Dhabi, and Iran so far this year to about $1
billion--one fourth of OPEC members' total aid to
developing countries in 1975. Fulfillment of these
commitments, combined with those made at the Rabat
Arab Summit last October, will bring OPEC disburse-
ments to Egypt in 1975 to more than $1.5 billion.
(continued)
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Socialist Party leaders have announced their
intention to remain in Portugal's coalition govern-
ment.
The Socialist truce with the Revolutionary
Council may last no longer than the end of the week
when the Socialist newspaper Republica is expected
to resume publication. The Socialists reportedly
have begun court action against the pro-communist
workers responsible for the attempted take-over of
the paper in the hope of forcing them to resign and
find other jobs. The military government, however,
has ruled that the workers can be transferred to
other papers only if they request the change them-
selves.
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Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans' decision to
buy the F-16 fighter has been rejected by one of
the components of his three-party coalition gov-
ernment.
The Walloon Rally Party, a backer of the
Mirage aircraft, has 13 members in parliament and
the loss of their support would deprive the govern-
ment of a majority. Tindemans will be in trouble
if today's scheduled debate on the F-16 is followed
by a no-confidence motion. Even if the government
squeaks by with the aid of some opposition support,
the Walloon Rally Party's withdrawal from the coal-
ition would force the Prime Minister either to con-
tinue with a mino'rity government or resign. Tinde-
mans has succeeded in keeping his government
together through adroit manipulation and compromise,
but his talent may be sorely tested this time.
(continued)
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Fighting in Luanda, primarily between An.gola's
two main nationalist groups, subsided yesterday.
The Portuguese army, which had intervened somewhat
more aggressively in the latest round of fighting,
early today raided the armories of the two main
protagonists.
Casualties in the Luanda fighting number in
the hundreds, according to press reports. The
National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola, a third group which has tried to stay
neutral, was for the first time caught up in the
fighting between its much bigger rivals and clashed
briefly with the Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola. Nevertheless, Union President Jonas
Savimbi is not ready to align himself with the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of Angola against
the Popular Movement. He has, instead, been instru-
mental in arranging a meeting next Sunday in Kenya,
where he hopes to get all three groups to try to
stem the continuing drift toward full-scale civil
war. Meanwhile, in Cabinda, representatives of the
three groups are said to have signed a formal truce.
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CONGO
Brazzaville
Bolo, bora
URUNDI
Ii
Kinshasa
CAB INDA
\
1.Ambrizete
kLuanda
)
1
(
TANZANIA
Dar es Saistam
ANGOLA
IQUE
WALVIS SAY
MEP OF S./4
SOUTH-WEST
AFRICA
IWTERNATMNALTERRITORNI
Windhoek
558045 6-75
ANGOLAN NATIONALIST GROUPS
Group
Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA)
National Front for Libera-
tion of Angola (FNLA)
National Union for the
Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA)
Leader
Agostinho Neto
H olden Roberto
Jonas Savimbi
Military
Strength
8-10,000 in Angola proper;
2-3,000 in Cabinda
Major
Backers
Comment
USSR, Congo Strong Marxist orientation;
Neto well-known
throughout third world.
8-10,000 in Angola proper; Zaire, China
approximately same num-
ber in training in Zaire;
2-300 in Cabinda
3,000 in Angola proper; No major
3-4,000 undergoing train- backers;
ing; 200 in Cabinda seeking
support
Pro-Western; poorly defined
political philosophy.
Pro-Western; moderate,
largely inactive and little
known outside Angola
during the anti-Portuguese
insurgency.
558047
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ANGOLA
Angola is likely to lurch toward
independence next November plagued by
intermittent clashes among contending
liberation groups. If one of the two
principal groups perceives that it has
gained a clear military advantage, it
may initiate all-out war against the
other before independence is achieved.
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola and the National Front for the Liberation
of Angola are on a collision course. The two
groups have repeatedly clashed during the past two
months in the northern part of the country as well
as in Luanda and the oil-producing exclave of Ca-
binda. The Popular Movement appears determined
to establish military superiority over its long-
time rival. Neither the Popular Movement nor the
National Front has the supplies or mobility to wage
a sustained military campaign throughout the coun-
try, but both appear to be preparing for that event-
uality.
Last week, the Popular Movement also began at-
tacks in Luanda on units of the smaller National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which
then retaliated. Until this episode the National
Union had maintained a neutral stance vis-a-vis the
other groups.
The rivalry between the Popular Movement and
the National Front dates back to the late 1950s.
Throughout the insurgency against Portugal, which
began in 1961, the two groups fought each other
almost as much as they engaged Portuguese troops.
The rival groups competed for scarce financial
and military support available from individual
countries or through the Organization of African
Unity. In the early years of the insurgency, the
National Front was the dominant movement and was
favored by the OAU. By the late 1960s, however,
the Popular Movement was able to swing the OAU
behind its cause and also was receiving steady sup-
plies of military assistance from the Soviet Union.
(continued)
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At the time of the coup in Lisbon, both groups were
showing the strain of more than a decade of fight-
ing. In addition, the Popular Movement was afflicted
by bitter internal factionalism that has yet to be
resolved.
Transitional Government Fosters Split
The transitional government that was installed
in Luanda last January has probably done more to
encourage competition than cooperation. It has a
complex system of checks and balances in which mem-
bers of one liberation group find themselves work-
ing, as government officials, with subordinates from
the other groups. Portuguese officials are often
ineffective because they are caught in the middle.
The integrated political, military, and police
organizations have failed to maintain order because
the individual interests of the three participating
liberation groups are often in conflict.
Military Build-up
The independence agreement with Portugal allows
the liberation groups to maintain individual armies.
Although they are also required to contribute to an
integrated national army, each group has shirked
this commitment and instead has steadily built up
its own military force, particularly in the northern
half of the territory and in and around Luanda. The
countryside is dotted with garrisons of the three
groups living in uneasy coexistence.
Both the National Front and the Popular Move-
ment draw the bulk of their tribal support from
northern Angola and maintain their heaviest con-
centrations of troops there. Portugal still has
about 24,000 troops in the territory, but the bulk
of these are stationed in and around Luanda. The
Portuguese forces are anxious to go home and prob-
ably would be unwilling to intervene in prolonged
fighting between the two groups.
The National Front and the Popular Movement
have established important bases in northern Angola
that dominate major supply routes to Luanda. The
National Front also has gained control of the port
of Ambrizete, in northwestern Angola, partially re-
lieving it of its dependence on Zaire as a trans-
shipment point.
(continued)
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The fighting that broke out in northern Angola
on May 28 was initiated by the Popular Movement in
a coordinated offensive to drive the National Front
out of areas where the Movement's ethnic support
predominates and to disrupt the Front's supply routes
to Luanda. The offensive apparently was timed to
pre-empt a suspected similar operation planned by
the National Front.
Reliable estimates of the troop strengths of the
respective groups are difficult to obtain. The lib-
eration groups inflate or deflate their own reports
according to political necessity.
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It would appear that at present each of the two
major groups has about 8-10,000 troops in Angola,
the bulk of which are in northern areas. In addition,
the Popular Movement apparently has several thousand
troops in Cabinda, where it has long been active.
The other two groups have much smaller forces there.
The Movement has demonstrated in the recent fighting
that it can quickly mobilize large groups of well-
armed irregulars in Luanda that give it a distinct
advantage there.
In recent months, the Popular Movement has been
receiving increased supplies of arms and other mater-
ial from the Soviet Union. The Soviet supplies are
offloaded in Congo--long an important exile base for
the Popular Movement--and forwarded to Angola)
In addition to its troops in Angola, the Na-
tional Front may have another 10,000 troops in Zaire
being trained by Zairian military in-
structors. It is also recruiting former Portu-
quese army officers(
The National Front's support from Zaire, on the
other hand, has fallen off because of President
Mobutu's financial difficulties. Support from China
and to a lesser extent Romania has not made up the
(continued)
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difference and appears insufficient to enable Front
president Holden Roberto to achieve his goal of
having 10,000 trained men ready to enter Angola in
the next month or so./
The leaders of neighboring states have a major
interest in seeing that civil war is avoided in
Angola, but their ability to influence events there
is limited. Both Zaire and Zambia rely heavily on
rail and port facilities in Angola to ship their
copper. Zambian President Kaunda is convinced that
large-scale fighting and turmoil in Angola will
hamper his efforts to promote a settlement in Rho-
desia. He has been unable, however, to convince
fellow African leaders to support an embargo on
arms shipments to the liberation groups.
Zairian President Mobutu, whose own country
suffered years of civil war, military revolts,
and secessionist rebellions upon independence, is
particularly sensitive to the prospect of similar
turmoil in Angola. Mobutu remains adamantly opposed
to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement gaining con-
trol of the government of Angola, but he can no
longer provide the Front with the support it needs
to attain military superiority.
The Cabinda Problem
The three liberation groups and the Portuguese
regard the exclave of Cabinda, long administered as
a district of Angola as an integral part of the
territory despite its geographic separation. The
Organization of African Unity supports this posi-
tion.
(continued)
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Mobutu, however, would like to see Cabinda de-
tached from Angola and is pushing the view that the
Cabindans should be allowed to decide for themselves
the district's future political status. He has al-
lowed a small Cabindan separatist group to establish
a headquarters in Kinshasa and has given it modest
financial and technical support./
A rival faction of the separatist group is
also based in Brazzaville. Both factions have rep-
resentatives in Cabinda, where they enjoy some pub-
lic support. At present, however, they do not have
the strength to challenge the liberation groups
for control of the exclave.
Political Problems
None of the three Angolan liberation groups
has enough popular support to win a majority in the
elections to a constituent assembly that are sup-
posed to be held before the end of October. The
assembly is to select a head of government to assume
office upon independence.
The National Front suffers an additional po-
litical disadvantage because of Roberto's refusal
to appear in Angola. Roberto fears assassination
and realizes that he probably cannot attract crowds
of the size that Agostinho Neto of the Popular
Movement and Jonas Savimbi of the National Union
have.
Roberto is finding it increasingly difficult
to coordinate his group's political and military
operations from Zaire and will probably have to
move into Angola in the near future. He apparently
intends to use the Front's military stronghold in
northern Angola as his headquarters.
The liberation groups could agree to postpone
national elections, which would eliminate some of
the immediacy of the competition between the Move-
ment and the Front. Only the Popular Movement,
however, seems to favor such a move at the present
time.
(continued)
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All three liberation groups as well as the
Portuguese are standing firm on the date for in-
dependence. Unless a compromise head of govern-
ment is agreed upon, Angola will become independent
without a strong central leader. Even with a com-
promise candidate, it is unlikely that the govern-
mental structure can be refashioned in a way to make
it responsive to the demands of independence.
According to a Kenyan announcement late last
night, the leaders of the three liberation groups
have agreed to meet in Kenya, beginning next Sunday,
to discuss these issues. Jonas Savimbi, the leader
of the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola, the smallest of the three liberation groups,
who has remained apart from most of the fighting,
could emerge as a compromise head of state. Unless
Holden Roberto and Agostinho Neto are willing to
subordinate their rivalry for the sake of Angolan
unity, however, any compromise arranged at such a
summit is likely only to postpone the final conflict
between the two principal antagonists.
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