THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 JUNE 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014814
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 3, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
June 3, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 511(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
June 3, 1975
? .Table ' of: Contents.
Israel-Egypt: Israel's announced reduction of
forces on the Egyptian front is primarily a
political gesture. (Page 1)
Portugal: The government apparently is not yet
making preparations-to counter any move by
Azorean separatists, despite continued rumors
in Lisbon that a separatist move may be immi-
nent. (Page 3)
Cambodia:. A conference of Khmer Communist Party .
officials on Thursday probably will mark the
end of the initial period of domestic consol-
idation. (Page 4)
Notes:. Laos; UK (Page 6)
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ISRAEL-EGYPT
Prime Minister Rabin's announcement
yesterday that Israel would unilaterally
reduce the size of its forces facing Egypt
is primarily a political gesture and is
not likely to produce a militarily
sig-
nificant troop reduction in the area.
Initial Egyptian reaction to the Israeli move
has been highly favorable. Terming the action a
step in the right direction, an Egyptian spokesman
with President Sadat in Salzburg said that Sadat
would look favorably on Israeli "use" of the canal
if his military commanders conclude that the thin-
ning out is "serious and not propagandistic."
The spokesman did not explain whether "use"
would entail the transit of Israeli flag vessels or
only of Israeli cargoes on ships flying other flags.
The reference is in any case the first public Egyp-
tian acknowledgment that Israel might be allowed
access to the canal in any way.
The announced pullback actually will result in
little shifting of Israeli forces. The Israelis
have few military units stationed within 30 kilome-
ters of the canal, and there are fewer tanks and
significantly fewer troops in the limited-armaments
area than permitted by the agreement.
In response to the announcement, Israel might
have to move, at most, elements of two or three
armored battalions, which have about 100 tanks, and
portions of several mechanized companies that might
be within 30 kilometers of the canal. No artillery
is now stationed within 32 kilometers of the canal,
and no Israeli surface-to-air missiles appear to be
located within 40 kilometers of the UN buffer zone.
Despite the obvious propaganda benefits to be
gained, Prime Minister Rabin apparently followed
only reluctantly the urgings of Defense Minister
Peres and Foreign Minister Allon that the government
announce a thinning out of its military forces be-
fore the Suez Canal is opened.
(continued)
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Israel
must make some gesture to balance the propaganda
windfall Cairo might reap by reopening the canal.
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Furthermore, it could create a more
congenial climate
for Israel in Washington and
even
Cairo.
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delaying
the
announcement would
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lessen Tel Aviv's ability to
use
it to influence
the policy decisions regarding Middle East peace
negotiations Washington and Cairo might be making
over the next several weeks.
The suspicion is also strong in Israel that
President Sadat might try to exploit the canal re-
opening to reinforce Egyptian troop strength on the
east bank in violation of the disengagement agree-
ment. Rabin may hope that Israel's decision to re-
duce its troop strength near the canal will block
such an Egyptian attempt by undercutting its most
likely rationale--that Cairo was doing so solely to
protect international shipping in the canal. When
he announced the decision yesterday, Rabin pointedly
stated that Israeli forces in Sinai will honor free-
dom of navigation through the canal and the Gulf of
Suez.
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PORTUGAL
The Portuguese government apparently
is not yet making preparations to counter
any move by Azorean separatists, despite
continued rumors in Lisbon that the sepa-
ratists may declare the Azores independent.
An aide to President Costa Gomes has admitted
that Portugal has serious problems in the Azores
that must be solved. He stressed, however, that
these problems require a political rather than a
military solution. The aide said he was not aware
of any mainland security forces being dispatched to
the islands, and observers in Lisbon have not noticed
any unusual military activity, although a number of
trucks and jeeps reportedly were unloaded in Ponta
Delgada within the last two weeks.
In order for any separatist effort to present
a viable threat to Lisbon's control of the Azores,
the separatists would need the support of military
units on the islands.
the Azorean Liberation Front will
soon attempt to seize power even if military coop-
eration is not assured.
A small military force could probably hold out
on the main islands for a short time if it could
capitalize on Portugal's lack of preparedness and
the element of surprise. In the end, however, the
separatists are counting on international political
support if they are initially successful.
In Lisbon, the multiparty constituent assembly
elected on April 25 held its first meeting yester-
day. President Costa Gomes opened the assembly with
what appeared to be a warning against replaying the
political disputes that have disrupted the govern-
ment. He called on the deputies to subordinate party
interests to the greater national interest.
Although the Armed Forces Movement is likely to
monitor its deliberations very closely, the assembly,
which is dominated by the moderate Socialists and Popu-
lar Democratic parties, could provide an effective
forum for political moderates in the next few months.
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CAMBODIA
A major conference of Khmer Communist
Party officials that convenes in Phnom
Penh on Thursday probably will mark the
end of the initial period of domestic con-
solidation.
The leadership can be expected to outline its
long-term policies and goals and to obtain rubber-
stamp approval from the party rank and file. The
covert party apparatus has been functioning as a
shadow government--a role it will undoubtedly con-
tinue to play after a government is formally in-
stalled.
Propaganda has exaggerated progress in restor-
ing production
In addition to the possibility, of famine,
cholera has broken out in some areas, and, given
the lack of medical personnel, supplies, and facil-
ities, ?the communists could be faced with an epi-
demic.
The party leadership and the relatively small
pool of trained cadre have had their hands full im-
plementing the massive changes that have been de-
creed for Cambodian society. This probably explains
in part the delay in installing a national admin--
istration.
The US embassy in Bangkok, on the other hand,
has suggested that a power struggle may have para-
lyzed the leadership.
neither Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan nor
Information Minister Hu Nim--the only two leaders
to emerge publicly since the communist take-over--
has issued any statements in over two weeks. If a
power struggle is under way, any communiques or
statements issued when the conference adjourns should
provide some' hints.
(continued)
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Sihanouk's future is sure to be discussed at
the conference. Party leaders consider the Prince
an unscrupulous and adroit political operator and
probably want their administrative apparatus firmly
entrenched before allowing him to return, The longer:
Sihanouk is kept cooling his heels abroad, the
greater the possibility that he might of his own
accord decide to end his association with the com-
munists and go into permanent exile. While this
might suit some leaders, others.probably argue that
Sihanouk's foreign support--particularly that of
China--is sufficiently valuable that he should be
brought back to the country soon.
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NOTES
Both Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and
his Pathet Lao deputy, Phoumi Vongvichit, apparently
are doing their bast to prevent any anti-American in-
cidents during Assistant Secretary Habib's visit in
Vientiane.
put an immediate stop to the
wave of anti-US propaganda being broadcast by Lao
National Radio because such broadcasts would compli-
cate negotiations for continued US assistance.
the Pathet Lao
directed the capital's police force to escort and
protect Habib during his visit. In addition, radical
activist students and political organizations were
ordered not to stage any anti-US demonstrations.
We continue to believe that voters in the
United Kingdom will vote "yes!' in the referendum
on EC membership to be held on Thursday.
Pro-EC forces hope that at least half of the
electorate will vote so that the issue of Britain's
European connection can be put aside and the coun-
try can turn its attention to its mounting economic
problems. Opinion polls indicate that 60 percent
of the electorate plan to vote, but public apathy
may reduce the turnout.
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