THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 MAY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014807
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 26, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
May 26, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5Bf I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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26 May 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI, D/OCI and D/NIO
SUBJECT : Revised Lebanon Item
1. I didn't hear until this morning when I was already
at the White House that the briefing appointment had been re-
scheduled to 2 p.m. The delay gave us an opportunity to re-
place completely the Lebanon piece and late item.
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2. The printed late item was removed altogether from
the President's book, and I stapled the new typescript Lebanon
article over the original (to preserve the map on the opposite
side of the page). I also gave Brent Scowcroft a copy of
the new piece.
3. The Director is aware of this rip-and-staple job.
draft arrived just before the DCI's copy was
to be taken to him, so I sent a copy of the draft along with
a buck slip explaining that it was substantially what we
would send the President in a revised late item.
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? ? ?
Late Item
LEBANON.
Lebanese Prime Minister Rifai and members
of his predominantly military cabinet resigned
today. President Franjiyah accepted their re-
signations but asked them to stay in office until
a new cabinet can be formed. Although Franjiyah
is under intense pressure to install a new govern-
ment quickly, this process has often taken as lorig
as several weeks.
The President is likely to turn again to civilian
politicians in his search for a new prime minister. His
gamble with a military cabinet drew intense criticism from
Lebanese leftist and Muslim leaders, and was strongly
opposed by the Palestinians and Syrians. Franjiyah almost
certainly hopes, however, that the brief experiment with a
military cabinet will at least have frightened the politicians
into being more assertive and responsible in dealing with the
country's deteriorating security situation.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam played an active role
in the negotiations in Beirut that led to the resignation
of Rifai. On his departure for Damascus today, he expressed
confidence in President Franjiyah.
The most likely choice for prime minister is nqw
Rashid Karami, a leftist member of parliament who served
as prime minister on several occasions between 1955 and
1970. He would be acceptable to the Palestinians and to
the Syrians, althou4h not to the right-wing Christian
Phalanges Party.
6
The scattered fighting last night in Beirut between
Phalangists and radical fedayeen was the heaviest and most
widespread of the current crisis. The US embassy estimates
that 80 persons have been killed in the past week.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LATE ITEM
Lebanese Prime Minister Rifai and members of
his predominantly military cabinet submitted their
resignations today, according to early press reports.
It is possible that President Franjiyah will not
accept their resignations; if he does, however, he
will presumably turn again to civilian politicians
in an effort to find someone to form a successor
government. The President almost certainly hopes
that the brief experiment with a military cabinet
will convince the civilians that they should be
more assertive in dealing with the country's deteri-
orating security situation.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
May 26, 1975
Table of Contents
Lebanon: Pressure on President Franjiyah and Prime
Minister Rifai for the resignation of the new
military government is intense. (Page 1)
Israel-Lebanon: Israeli and Lebanese military
forces clashed yesterday. (Page 2)
Laos-Thailand: Harassment of Americans is increas-
ing. (Page 3)
North Korea: We present the key judgments of a
National Intelligence Estimate on "North Korean
Military Capabilities and Intentions toward
South Korea." (Page 5)
Japan: Japan
international commodity agreements.
Notes: USSR; Thailand (Page 8)
policy on
(Page 7)
Annex: We review Soviet programs to modify silos
for their new ICBMs.
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LEBANON
Lebanese President Franjiyah and
Prime Minister Rifai are under consider-
able pressure for the resignation of the
new military government. A number of Mus-
lim political figures, including leaders
of both the Sunni and Shia Muslim sects
and of the Druze community, met on Satur-
day and demanded the Prime Minister's im-
mediate resignation. Statements by oppo-
sition leaders were relatively moderate
and appeared designed not to complicate
the situation any more than necessary.
The Prime Minister has defended the Pres-
ident's decision to form a military gov-
ernment and has indicated that he will
make a further public statement today in
reply to Muslim criticism.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam and Syrian air
force chief Jamil met with President Franjiyah on
the evening of May 24. They probably delivered a
message from Syrian President Asad protesting the
composition of the present government. Lebanese
leftist political leader Kamal Jumblatt, with whom
Khaddam also talked, claims President Franjiyah
told Khaddam he was ready to replace the military
government if the civilian politicians can agree on
a successor government willing to try to restore
order.
Scattered fighting continued yesterday.
No area of Beirut is
considered safe, and main avenues are barricaded.
The US embassy estimates that 50 have been killed
in the latest fighting.
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Mediterranean
Mezzeh. Damascus
Israel
\ a ifa Tiberias,.
reth
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ISRAEL-LEBANON
Israeli and Lebanese military forces
clashed yesterday near a border village
some 15 miles southeast of Tyre. Accord-
ing to UN sources, the incident occurred
when an Israeli patrol crossed the border
in search of fedayeen and was fired on by
Lebanese army units. Some members of the
Israeli patrol reportedly were surrounded
by Lebanese.
Israeli aircraft were active throughout the
incident, providing air cover for the patrol and
reconnaissance of the area. The Israelis bombed at
least four Lebanese artillery batteries; two were
said to have been destroyed.
UN forces eventually arranged a cease-fire,
and the Israeli patrol was allowed to withdraw from
Lebanon. At least seven Lebanese soldiers were
reported killed and another eight missing. The
Israelis suffered two dead and several wounded.
Lebanese forces have fired on Israeli patrols
inside Lebanon in the past, but those incidents
were minor. The scope of the clash yesterday ap-
pears to reflect Lebanese sensitivities arising
from the current political situation in Beirut.
Both sides apparently would prefer to avoid inci-
dents of this size.
2
???
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS-THAILAND
Harassment of Americans, obviously
government inspired, is increasing, but
no one has actually been harmed. The Lao
National Radio has now announced that
Pathet Lao troops will conduct an "inspec-
tion" of all American homes and installa-
tions tomorrow.
The minister of economy yesterday gave the US
charge a proposal for the return of the AID compound
to US control. A meeting is planned this morning
between embassy representatives and spokesmen for
the government and students to discuss the proposed
settlement.
Nearly 500 American dependents and other non-
essential personnel left for Thailand by charter
aircraft over the weekend, and more flights were
scheduled. Some 348 Americans were still in Vien-
tiane yesterday.
The Thai National Security Council,
has approved the following
policy guidelines having to do with General yang
Pao and Meo refugees who have fled from Laos to
Thailand:
--Those Meo who are in no danger of reprisal
from the communists will be encouraged to re-
turn to Laos.
--Efforts will be made to slow down or halt
the flow of additional Meo from Laos.
--Meo who refuse to return will be resettled
in Thailand if the US agrees to foot the bill
and if the refugees are willing to resettle in
several different areas rather than at one lo-
cation.
--yang Pao and other well-known Meo leaders
will not be offered safehaven in Thailand at
this time because of the "political situation"
and must go elsewhere.
(continued)
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The acceptance of these recommendations by
Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot is by no means cer-
tain. He may will be influenced by Thai press
attacks against Meo refugees and press speculation
that the Thai army plans to support a Lao resistance
movement.
4
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JAPAN
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH KOREA
Following are the key judgments of a
National Intelligence Estimate on "North
Korean Military Capabilities and Inten-
tions toward South Korea" which was ap-
proved on May 22, 1975 by the US Intelli-
gence Board. The estimate covers the
period through the end of 1975.
The modernization and expansion of North Korea's
armed forces in recent years have bolstered its de-
fenses and given Pyongyang an improved and more
flexible offensive capability. The North is devel-
oping this capability in order to achieve unifica-
tion through military action should propitious cir-
cumstances arise. This intent has been particularly
evident in the construction of tunnels in the DMZ,
the development of an amphibious capability, and,
more recently, in the forward positioning of armor
concentrations.
The factors that have restrained Pyongyang from
launching major hostilities continue to do so. These
are the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, the presence of
US troops, the lack of an across-the-board superior-
ity over ROK forces, especially if they are supported
by US tactical air and naval elements, and the need
for support from either Moscow or Peking in a sus-
tained, large-scale conflict.
Recent events in Indochina have probably
strengthened Kim's determination to press for re-
moval of US forces. They may also have caused him
to question the US commitment to South Korea, there-
by increasing the attractiveness of limited acts of
force to probe American resolve. But, at least
until after the General Assembly vote on the Korean
issue, political considerations seem likely to be
more important to him than any military move that
he believes would portray North Korea as responsi-
ble for disturbing the peace of the peninsula.*
*The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air
Force believe that these political considerations
will not preclude limited but deliberate acts
of force designed to probe US and ROK resolve and
that such acts are likely within the period of this
estimate.
(continued)
5
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With heightened tension on the peninsula, there
is an increased prospect that small incidents, de-
liberate or otherwise, might escalate into conflict
between naval vessels or even aircraft. This is
especially likely in the waters around the Western
Islands.
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JAPAN
Japan hopes to complete
a review of its policy on international
commodity agreements by July. The Japa-
nese heretofore have generally opposed
such agreements, preferring free market
determination of raw material supplies
and prices.
The Ministry of Finance apparently opposes any
form of commodity agreement because of the cost in-
volved, but the ministries of foreign affairs, in-
ternational trade and industry, and agriculture are
willing to make some accommodations to the produc-
ing countries.
A consensus seems to be developing within the
bureaucracy on several aspects of the subject:
--Agreements on a product-by-product basis are
preferable to a general agreement on all com-
modities as proposed by the UK.
--Agreements on tropical agricultural products
would be less objectionable than those on in-
dustrial raw materials such as copper.
--Payments from a multilateral agency such as
the International Monetary Fund to producers
whose export earnings fell below an agreed
level are preferable to setting commodity floor
prices.
--Negotiations should be held outside the UN
or other forums dominated by the developing
countries.
Consideration is being given to membership in
the International Tin Council as a sign of coopera-
tion with Malaysia, Indonesia, and other East Asian
producers. Discussion is also under way on reach-
ing a separate agreement on commodities with mem-
bers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singa-
pore) that could serve as a model for a larger
agreement. These countries are not only vital to
Tokyo's economic and political interests, but are
more moderate in their demands for greater control
over commodity markets. No approach has been made
to this organization, however, and a decision in
the near future is not likely.
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NOTES
The Soviet Soyuz spacecraft, which was launched
Saturday from Tyuratam, docked yesterday with the
orbiting Salyut-4 space station.
The docking apparently proceeded without diffi-
culty. If no problems develop, the two cosmonauts
may remain aboard the space station for about four
weeks.
Thai Prime Minister Khukrit is considering a
reshuffle of his cabinet to reduce bickering within
the government.
Personal animosities and competition for polit-
ical influence have led to serious strains within
the seven-party coalition. Khukrit has kept the
two-month-old government in line chiefly by threat-
ening to dissolve the National Assembly and call
new elections--a prospect few parties either desire
or can afford just now. A parliamentary challenge
to Khukrit seems relatively unlikely at this time
chiefly because his handling of the Mayaguez inci-
dent has so increased his prestige.
8
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USSR
The Soviets are moving ahead in their
programs to modify silos for their new
ICBMs. Silos at all six SS-9 complexes
are being converted for the SS-18, and
three distinct programs are under way to
modify SS-11 silos for deployment of new
missiles. One SS-11 program entails re-
latively minor changes in preparation for
deployment of the SS-11 Mod 2 or Mod 3.
A second program consists of a complete
rebuilding of the SS-11 silo for deploy-
ment of the SS-19. The third SS-11 pro-
gram involves major modifications to the
launch silo for installation of the SS-X-17,
now nearing operational capability. Most,
if not all, of the ,5%5-11 silos deployed
are expected to be modified before 1980.
SS-9 Conversion Program
The SS-9 silo modifications take about 18 months
to complete. They involve the removal of the old
silo liner, headworks, and door and the installation
of new, more survivable silo components for the
SS-18. There are SS-9 silos
SS-18 silos
by 1982 all
for the SS-18.
We anticipate that
SS-9 silos will have been modified
The Soviets have
the
liauid-propellant SS-18 missile.
(continued)
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SS-11 Modification Program
Modernization for deployment of the SS-11
beaan in 1973.
Until
the
1974 the program was confined to
easternmost SS-11 complexes.
It then was expanded
the central and western USSR--
All silos
to
have now been modernized.
SS-19 Program
Silo conversion for the SS-19 began
The modifications, which take about
a year to complete, involve dismantling the SS-11
silo and constructing the SS-19 silo in the same
excavation.
SS-19 silo better able to withstand the effects of
a nuclear blast.
silos
Four, and possibly five, groups of converted
probably contain SS-19 missiles.
In addition, there are other groups
undergoing conversion
(continued)
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The Soviets
the SS-11 silos
SS-19.
intend to convert
for the
SS-11 silos in
the SS-19 program, and it is estimated that all of
them will be converted for the SS-19 by mid-1979.
In addition to the SS-19 silos created by con-
version of SS-11 silos, the Soviets have
the SS-19 -
these silos began
ban on new silo construction
until July 1972). The first
tional status in late 1973.
SS-19 was not then available
missiles were
in 1970 (the SALT
did not take effect
of these reached opera-
Probably because the
for deployment, SS-11
installed as an interim
SS-X-17 Program
In
of SS-11 launchers
SS-X-17.
1974 the Soviets began conversion
for the
tions--which include
building up the silo
and installing a new
months to complete.
The silo modifica-
reinforcing the silo wall,
apron to lengthen the silo,
plug-type door--will require
SS-X-17 program is limited to the silos
it probably could be
three years.
Unmodified Complex
The Soviets
SS-11 silos
SS-X-17 or SS-19.
completed in two or
intend to convert the
for either the
The Soviets have made similar expansions
at SS-11 complexes
before converting silos for the SS-X-17 or SS-19.
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