THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 MAY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014790
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 6, 1975

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
The President's Daily Brief
0
May 6., 1975
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category. 5B(11,12),(3)
declavilled only on approval of
the Director of Ceptral Intelligence
V 'V I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
May 6, 1975
Table: :of .Contents.
Thailand: Informal arrangements with
the US regarding the US military presence are
beginning to unravel. (Page 1)
Australia:/
//(Page 2)
China: The reappearance last month of Chairman
Mao Tse-tung does little to clarify the Chair-
man's relations with the rest of the Chinese
leadership. (Page 8)
USSR-Libya: Premier Kosygin apparently will pay
a five-day visit to. Libya latex this month.
Libya began receiving MIG-23 fighters On May 4.
(Page 7)
Notes: Italy; USSR-Vietnam; USSR-China; Cuba
(Pages 8 and 9)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THAILAND
Informal arrangements
between Thailand and the US regarding
the US military presence are beginning
to unravel. Factors behind this break-
down include:
--A belief that a US military presence is
no longer in Thailand's interests because
of the expansion of communist influence
in Indochina.
--A growing sense of Thai nationalism.
--Fopu-tar mistrust of agreements reached
by the discredited former Thai military
regime.
The Thai government, nevertheless, remains
willing to cooperate with the US on secu-
rity matters if it can avoid being held
publicly accountable.
The Thai are anxious to play down publicly the
extent of their cooperation with the US during the
Vietnam war in order to put themselves on the best
possible terms with the emerging communist govern-
ments in Cambodia and Vietnam. Thai officials,
moreover, were dismayed that Thai-based US aircraft
were not committed to stem communist advances in
Indochina. They have reluctantly concluded that
US security commitments to Thailand are no longer
credible.
agreements reached with the Thai
prior to the collapse of military rule in Thailand--
regardless of their merits or legality--now may be
called in question in ways that will make them un-
enforceable. Thai students will be quick to pro-
test what they regard as US special privileges and
immunities from Thai law. Government officials, who
might otherwise defend agreements with the US, tend
to be intimidated by threats from politically active
youth.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
25X1
7X1
25X1 ?
25X1
2oAl
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
AUSTRALIA
(continued)
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Foreign Investment
The Whitlam government is determined to in-
crease domestic control over Australia's mineral
resources. It has tightened controls on foreign
investment, increased taxes on mining, and pressed
for more domestic processing of ores. These policies,
combined with currency changes 'that, have made invest-
ment more expensive for foreigners, have caused a
dramatic decline in direct investment by foreigners--
approximately one third of which comes from the US.
In 1973-74, foreign investment averaged $600 million,
compared with $1.4 billion annually from 1968 to 1972.
Continued discouragement of foreign investment
in the mining industry ultimately will have a major
impact on world mineral supplies. For example,
Australia has accounted for nearly half of the in-
crease in world output of iron ore and bauxite since
1968.
(continued)
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8 .
25X1
25X1
.25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Exploration and development of oil and gas
reserves have all but stopped. Canberra has refused
to join the International Energy Agency because it
feels Australia would not benefit from an oil-sharing
arrangement; it thus is unwilling either to make
a commitment toward conservation or to meet require-
ments for stocks.
At the same time, Canberra has participated in
forming producer groups for bauxite and iron ore.
Although it believes these organizations can
strengthen the hand of raw material exporting coun-
tries, Australia has been a moderating influence.
4
LY112 "1"1_11 DDL'C'Tru7N77" fINTT V
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHINA
The reappearance last month of Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung, who has been out of pub-
lic sight since mid-January, does little
to clarify the Chairman's relations?with
the rest of the Chinese leadership.
Mao returned to Peking in April for the first
time since last June, primarily to meet with visit-
ing North Korean President Kim Il-song. Official
Chinese accounts of the meeting failed to specify,
however, that the meetings took place in Peking;
this raises the possibility that the Chairman will
.soon return to the provinces.
Indications of mutual recriminations between
Mao and important elements of the Chinese leader-
ship continue to surface. Some of the criticism of
the Chairman within China may occur with fairly
high-level acquiescence. Limited public criticism
of Mao in Kwangtung Province has gone unpunished,
by Lin Piao to describe Mao in 1971.
a much-reported rumor that China's regional
military commanders, many of whom were targets of
last year's anti-Confucius campaign, had refused
to meet with Mao last summer
(continued)
5
25X1
25X1
25X1?
25X1
25X1
FOR THE. PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
the
Chairman's imprimatur was obviously needed to pro-
vide proper weight to the discussions with the North
Korean President. The current criticism of Mao is
nevertheless unprecedented, and goes well beyond
the rather furtive criticism that surfaced in 1960-
61 after the failures of the Great Leap Forward.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-LIBYA
Premier Kosygin apparently will pay
a five-day visit to Libya later this
month. He will be accompanied by Foreign
Trade Minister Patolichev, who may seek
agreement on how the Libyans, with their
declining oil income, will pay for such
arms purchases as the advanced MIG-23
fighters that they began receiving on
May 4.
Despite the USSR's arms shipments, its rela-
tions with Libya are marked by mutual distrust and
conflicting approaches to the Arab-Israeli question.
Kosygin, when bringing the Libyans up to date on
Soviet efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference,
will probably try to blunt Libyan attacks on the
'idea of Arab discussions with Israel. The Soviets
may also hope to make Cairo uneasy by demonstrating
that the USSR has options in the Arab world, in-
cluding an opening with Egypt's most vocal Arab
critic. The Libyans, who have been urging Moscow
to send a high-level visitor, will be especially
pleased to see Kosygin at a time when Libyan-Egyp-
tian relations have been deteriorating.
Kosygin's visit will take place about a year
after Libyan Prime Minister Jallud visited Moscow
to discuss a $250-million arms accord that was
wrapped up late last year. The MIG-23s now being
delivered under that ?accord will not immediately
improve Libyan air defense capabilities. Libyan
air crews have a poor record even on less-sophisti-
cated equipment.
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Your coming visit to Italy has drawn veiled
criticism from Italian Communist leader ?Enrico
Berlinguer.
On Saturday, Berlinguer asserted that the dom-
inant Christian Democrats would try to use the visit
to enhance their image on the eve of the nationwide
regional and local elections scheduled for June 15,
The Christian Democrats are expected to lose some
ground to the left in those contests. Militant
leftists may stage demonstrations against the visit,
but the Communists will probably not take the lead
in organizing anti-US protests. As part of their
strategy for achieving a direct voice in the na-
tional government, the Communists recently have
been signaling in various ways their Willingness
to accept Italy's security ties with the US. Ber-
linguer has also taken steps--such as his criticism
of the Portuguese Communists--to underline his
party's claim that it is not subservient to Moscow.
The USSR is increasing civilian aid shipments
to Vietnam.
Tass announced yesterday that two Soviet ships have
arrived in Da Nang with rice and diesel fuel--the
initial delivery of promised humanitarian assist-
ance to South Vietnam. The rapidity of the Soviet
response is a clear indication of the USSR's inter-
est in strengthening its relationship with the Viet-
namese communists, particularly vis-a-vis China.
(continued)
8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
?
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The chief Soviet negotiator at the Sino-Soviet
border talks, Leonid Ilichev, has returned home
after three months of apparently fruitless discus-
sions in Peking.
The negotiations appear to have foundered once
again on Peking's demand that the USSR acknowledge
that the border areas claimed by the Chinese are
"disputed territories," and withdraw Soviet secu-
rity forces from them before demarcation of the
frontier can be discussed.
Cuba is reorganizing its ministry of foreign
affairs, apparently to prepare for eventual recon-
ciliation with the US
A new department will be created late this
summer to deal with North American affairs. It
will be headed by one Jose Raul Viera Linares, a
capable official who was partly educated in the US
and served for six years with the Cuban UN mission
in New York. The Cubans are still thinking of nor-
malization of relations in long-range terms, however,
and probably do not envision the resumption of ties
prior to 1976 at the earliest.
9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part --Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010027-8