THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014783
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 28, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
April 28, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category, 513( I
declassified only on approval of
the, Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 28, 1975
Table of. Contents
South Vietnam: The National Assembly has voted to
turn the government over to General Duong Van
"Big" Minh. (Page 1)
Jordan:
(Page 3)
Portugal: The moderates, led by the Socialist Party,
won a resounding victory over the Communists
in the national constituent assembly election
last Friday. (Page 5)
Cyprus: Negotiations will resume today in Vienna
under the auspices of UN Secretary General
Waldheim. (Page 7)
Thailand-Cambodia: Bangkok is looking to diplomacy
to avert a potential threat to its border from
the new Cambodian government. (Page 9)
Notes: Korea-China; China (Page 10)
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SOUTH
VIETNAM
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The National Assembly voted unani-
mously yesterday to turn the government
over to General Duong Van "Big" Minh.
The final vote followed a sharp escala-
tion of communist military pressure,
including the first rocket attack on
Saigon in almost three years?presumably
a North Vietnamese signal that it wants
to hear from the new government quickly.
Minh is scheduled to be sworn in today. He
reportedly plans to announce cabinet appointments
today or tomorrow. His new government can do little
more than arrange for surrender under the guise of
a "political solution."
Initial communist reaction to his appointment
has so far been a "no comment." A spokesman for
the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment in Saigon, when questioned by the press Sunday,
only said that the communists insisted on three
basic conditions: the removal of Thieu and his
"clique," the complete withdrawal of the US, and
the "elimination of the war machine." This last
demand, broadcast for the first time Saturday over
the Viet Cong's Liberation Radio, appears to be a
call on the new Minh government to make it an early
order of business to call on South Vietnam's mili-
tary establishment to "stack arms" and cease further
resistance.
The communists, meanwhile, are putting new
pressure on Saigon's outer defenses, and the cities
of Bien Hoa, Vung Tau, and Tan An may fall shortly.
Northwest of Saigon, near the Cambodian border, Tay
Ninh City came under attack last night by an esti-
mated four communist regiments. The opening round
of the new fighting began Saturday, when the North
Vietnamese launched a series of strong attacks em-
ploying units from at least two divisions on Sai-
gon's eastern front. These units cut Route 15 be-
tween the Vung Tau and Saigon and then moved north
and south toward the two cities.
(continued)
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Sunday's action began with a six-round rocket
attack on Saigon. The North Vietnamese expanded
their holdings southeast of the capital, overrunning
the capital of Phuoc Tuy Province and pressing
closer to the city of Vung Tau. They also closed
in on the government's logistic base at Long Binh,
pushed along the Route 1 corridor to within sight
of Bien Hoa, and moved infantry and armor into at-
tack positions just north of the Bien Hoa air base.
Communist military activity also increased ,
southwest of Saigon along Route 4. A major commu-
nist attack yesterday cut the highway both north and
south of the Long An Province capital of Tan An and
forced the government defenders to retreat from a
number of strongpoints.
Tan An was to be attacked
and the city would fall at any time.
These weekend gains tighten the communists'
grip around Saigon. The port city of Vung Tau is
cut off from Saigon and is under attack; the major
link between Saigon and the delta is probably per-
manently cut. The communists have also set up ad-
vance artillery positions from which they can direct
more accurate fire on Saigon, Tan Son Nhut air base,
Saigon's river access to the sea, and all remaining
important government holdings in the Saigon area.
The headquarters of Military Region 3 at Bien
Hoa planned to pull out for Saigon this
morning. The pressure on Bien Hoa has created some
panic, and a number of government troops have been
reported looting in Bien Hoa city. Communist ac-
tivity along Route 1 on the outskirts of Saigon
early this morning temporarily disrupted traffic
between Bien Hoa and the capital.
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JORDAN
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PORTUGAL
Portuguese moderates, Zed by the So-
cialist Party, won a resounding victory
over the Communists in the national con-
stituent assembly election last Friday.
The Socialists' tally exceeded the party's
highest expectations; they showed remark-
able strength in all areas of the country.
Unofficial results gave the three moderate
parties more than 70 percent of the vote: the So-
cialists received 38 percent, the center-left Popu-
lar Democrats 26 percent, and the moderate right-
wing Social Democratic Center 8 percent. The Com-
munists and their allies took a total of 20 percent,
with 13 percent won by the Portuguese Communist
Party. Over 90 percent of the registered voters
turned out, most exercising the right to vote for
the first time.
The Socialists' impressive showing will in-
crease their political influence, even though lead-
ers of the ruling Armed Forces Movement say the
election was nothing more than a "pedagogical exer-
cise." The terms of the constitution to be approved
by the constituent assembly are a foregone conclu-
sion, but that body's deliberations could have an
impact on the policies of the military government.
The Socialist are assured of over one third of the
seats. Altogether, the moderate parties may con-
trol as much as 80 percent of the assembly.
The Socialists cannot exercise their status as
the dominant civilian political force without the
consent of the Armed Forces Movement.
party chief Mario Soares
is uncertain about how the Movement will react to
the Socialist victory. He is trying to make it pal-
atable to the Movement by describing it as a victory
for "progressive" forces.
Although press reports indicate that Soares
may, be interested in forming a common front with
the Communists and the Popular Democrats,
the party will make no for-
mal alliances. Soares intends instead to emphasize
the Socialists' independence and popular strength,
and to build the party's support.
(continued)
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Movement leaders are pleased that the election
was peaceful and that it boosted Portugal's inter-
national image. So far, they have played down the
moderates' victory and stressed the political na-
ivete of the Portuguese people. A spokesman said
the Movement interpreted the vote as a victory for
the Movement because the Socialists and the other
top vote-getters had previously agreed to its plat-
form.
The election may hasten the growth of faction-
alism in the Revolutionary Council.
the division between moderate and
radical factions that existed before the unsuccess-
ful March 11 coup have become more complex.
How the Movement reacts to the moderate victory
will largely depend on which faction comes out on
top. A moderate election victory was feared most
by the radical officers. Prime Minister Goncalves
may well suffer politically as the result of the
vote; he made no secret of his support for the Com-
munist-dominated Portuguese Democratic Movement.
Pres-
ident Costa Gomes is most likely pleased at the out-
come, but he and the moderates still probably lack
the power to turn the situation to their advantage.
The Communist Party and the Portuguese Demo-
cratic Movement stand to lose the most as a result
of the election. After spending more money than any-
one else and using their organization to get their
supporters to the polls, they can hardly complain
that the people were not aware of their program.
The party will probably not protest the election,
but will most likely complain that the "anticommu-
nists" and "antidemocratic forces" sabotaged their
campaign.
Communist leader Alvaro Cunhal summed up his
party's approach by contending that its strength
by far exceeds what is shown in the election figures.
The Communists will encourage the Movement to be-
little the election results; their success in the
near future depends on their continued ability to
influence the Movement leaders.
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CYPRUS
Greek and Turkish Cypriots will re-
sume negotiations in Vienna today under
the auspices of UN Secretary General
Waldheim. There are indications that
both sides may be more flexible than in
previous rounds, but mutual suspicions
and differences in approach could lead
to more snags.
Greek Cypriot negotiator Glafkos Clerides and
Turkish Cypriot negotiator Rauf Denktash will try
to reconcile their respective position papers, which
they submitted just prior to the suspension of the
talks in mid-February. The documents, which reflect
the maximum demands of the two sides, have few
points in common and agreement will be difficult.
The Greek Cypriot proposals call for the es-
tablishment of a multiregional federation with a
strong central government. The more vaguely worded
Turkish Cypriot proposals call for a biregional
federation with a weak central government.
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Clerides,
however, seem prepared to accept a biregional solu-
tion, provided the Turks are willing to make sub-
stantial concessions in other areas. Karamanlis
and Clerides appear to have persuaded President
Makarios at least to consider such a solution.
So far, the new government in Ankara--as a re-
sult of prodding from Washington--appears willing
to consider a limited withdrawal from the territory
it controls on Cyprus. It has been reluctant to
provide specific details, however, and has empha-
sized that no concessions will be made except in
the course of negotiations.
An immediate impasse could arise in the talks
if Denktash insists that Clerides accept the prin-
ciple of a bizonal federation as a precondition to
further discussions. It is almost certain that the
Greek side would not commit itself in advance to a
bizonal federation unless the Turkish side is will-
ing to give some idea of the amount of territory it
is prepared to give up and the number of refugees
that would be permitted to return to their homes.
(continued)
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Such an impasse might be avoided if the Greek
side can be persuaded to give tacit acceptance to
the idea of biregionalism in return for concrete
proposals by the Turkish side on other issues. Even
without a snag over this issue, however, the nego-
tiations are expected to be long and arduous.
The Vienna sessions will last a week, after
which the talks will likely be transferred to Nico-
sia. Ultimately, the final settlement is likely to
be determined by direct negotiations between Ankara
and Athens, possibly as part of a more general set-
tlement of outstanding differences between the two
countries.
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THAILAND-CAMBODIA
Bangkok is looking to diplomacy to
avert a potential threat to its border
from the new Cambodian government.
The Thai are clearly worried that their close
association with the Lon Nol regime, in addition to
their poor relations with Sihanouk during the 1960s,
will prompt the new Cambodian government to take a
hostile attitude toward Bangkok. The Thai
are now fearful
of Cambodian support for Thai insurgent bands oper-
ating near the Cambodian border. These groups have
never presented a serious security problem to Thai-
land, but government officials in Bangkok are now
concerned that an influx of Cambodian-provided arms
and men could quickly heat up the situation.
In order to avoid any trouble with Cambodia,
the Thai has decided to
avoid contact with Cambodian dissident groups form-
ing in Thailand; provide economic aid to the new
Cambodian government; return refugees, with the ex-
ception of former high-ranking government officials,
to Cambodia; and seek ways to get the US, the So-
viet Union, and China to counter North Vietnamese
domination of Cambodia.1
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NOTES
South Korean President Pak Chong-hui? is con-
tending that North Korean President Kim 11.-song's
visit to China indicates Peking's tacit support for
North Korean military adventures against the South.
1 Pak's views on North Korean provocation
have been provided to the Seoul press.
China has extended its first formal invitation
to a US manufacturing group to visit Peking.
Officials of the Electronic Industries Associ-
ation have accepted and will go to Peking in late
July. In the past, Chinese dealings with US manu-
facturers have been limited to individual firms.
The decision to invite the electronics manufactur-
ing group probably stems from Peking's need for
large quantities of modern electronic and telecom-
munications equipment and its desire to sound out
the US market potential for Chinese-manufactured
components. The Chinese may also attempt to lobby
the US delegation for liberalized export restric-
tions, as well as for most-favored-nation treatment.
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