THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014782
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 26, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
April 26, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(11,1 21,13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 26, 1975
Table of Contents
South Vietnam: President Huong has asked the Na-
tional Assembly to decide whether he should
turn over power to General "Big" Minh. (Page 1)
Cambodia: There is still no sign that the new re-
gime has been formally installed in Phnom Penh.
(Page 4)
Greece-NATO: The Greeks are showing new flexibility
on their future role in NATO. (Page 5)
Thailand: We present the principal conclusions of
an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thai
Foreign Policy in the Post-Vietnam Period.
(Page 6)
Note: Portugal (Page 8)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
President Huong asked the National
Assembly today to decide whether he
should turn over power to General Duong
Van "Big" Minh. He appealed to the leg-
islators to support his own efforts to-
ward peace, but indicated he would resign
so that Minh could become president if
the assembly so votes. Huong has been
under heavy pressure by influential Viet-
namese of all political persuasions to
step down in favor of Minh, and the as-
sembly is likely to ask him to do so.
The Minh government's raison d'etre would be
promptly to seek and accept whatever terms the com-
munists offer. Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang
says that Minh's return to power would be only to
"hoist the white flag." It is no longer possible
to do more than "save the furniture."
To emphasize this point, Minh already has ten-
tatively selected a government of surrender featur-
ing leaders of South Vietnam's previously vocal
opposition movements. Senator Nguyen Van Huyen,
a moderate southern Catholic and outspoken Thieu
opponent, has been chosen vice president in charge
of negotiations. This selection is obviously de-
signed to reassure Catholics and conservatives and
encourage their support. Senator Vu Van Mau, rep-
resenting the militant An Quang Buddhists, would
serve as prime minister and foreign minister con-
currently. In an obvious gesture of accommodation
to the communists, Madame Ngo Ba Thanh--an American-
educated lawyer and longtime leftist gadfly who has
been involved for years in various antigovernment
organizations--would become minister of justice.
The Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment, through its foreign minister, Madame Nguyen
Thi Binh, has indicated that it would consider ne-
gotiations with a government headed by Minh. Minh's
selection of individuals for his government complies
with a PRG demand that the new Saigon administration
must represent a clean break from the former regime
and include no one who was sympathetic to former
president Thieu. The communists also probably feel
that Minh would accept their other demand that all
US military support and personnel be withdrawn.
(continued)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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CAM:
TNAIVI
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44
VIETNAM
likt
AIGON
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
In a statement on April 24, the PRG used a
formulation that at least suggested the communists
might allow a residual US diplomatic presence to
continue in Saigon; it stated that any new govern-
ment must. demandthe immediate. withdrawal of all
American "military and intelligence personnel."
This appears to. be a refinement of earlier state-
ments that the communists viewed all American ci-
vilians in South Vietnam as "disguised" military
advisers and that all these must also be included
in the total withdrawal.
The communists are maintaining pressure on
Saigon's outer defenses with 'small-scale attacks
along the main approaches to the city. As the com-
munists continue to secure avenues of attack toward
the capital, South' Vietnamese bases and outposts
west of Saigon are prime targets, and the shelling
of these positions is heavy.
virtually all South Viet-
namese artillery at two major government positions
was destroyed. The Bien Hoa airbase and other tar-
gets northeast of Saigon are also being shelled reg-
ularly, and the South Vietnamese training camp on
the city's outskirts has come under attack.
Pressure is increasing on the port of Vung Tau.
One regiment of the North Vietnamese 325th Division
with supporting armor is moving down Route 2, just
outside the Phuoc Tuy Province capital of Phuoc Le.
This force could move against Phuoc Le at any time,
but it will be difficult to move beyond Phouc Le
to Vung Tau--a distance of 12 miles down a narrow
peninsula that has only one road. An advance sec-
tion of the North Vietnamese 320th Division has
shown up to the north along Route 15, the main road
linking Vung Tau with Bien Hoa and Saigon. This
division could act as a blocking force in its pres-
ent-position, or it could move to attack Bien Hoa
from the south or even shift westward toward Saigon.
Despite the relatively low level of combat on
the battlefronts around Saigon, there has been no
letup in indications of communist planning for in-
creased fighting, which could lead to direct as-
saults on Saigon itself.
(continued)
2
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The communists reportedly were planning for a
major attack against the South Vietnamese 25th Div-
ision at Cu Chi just 15 miles northwest of Saigon
to begin late yesterday. Preceded by heavy shelling,
the main thrust is to include armor and infantry at-
tacks. Prisoners from the newly arrived North Viet-
namese 316th Division have said that tanks and
heavy artillery are being moved forward and will be
used.
Communist radio messages also continue to dis-
cuss preparations for attacks on Saigon and the Tan
Son Nhut-airbase. One command recently requested
"targeting charts" for areas close to the city so
that "when we have a mission we will be able to
develop it and prepare to. move down into the area
when conditions are right for the advance."
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
More than a week has passed since
Phnom Penh's surrender, and there is still
no sign that the new regime has been for-
mally established in the capital.
Intercepted messages indicate that senior com-
munist figures have been busy directing the occupa-
tion in Phnom Penh and provincial urban centers,
and this may explain the delay in the formal inves-
titure of a new government. Several recent messages
do reflect, however, the movement of "national
front" figures and "guests from the outside," sug-
gesting that the new leadership may be gathering
for some sort of a formal takeover ceremony in the
near future.
Two Chinese Boeing 707s flew into Phnom Penh
on Wednesday and Thursday, but so far there is no
sign that Prince Sihanouk was aboard either aircraft.
Phnom Penh radio has been broadcasting special
programs as part of an official three-day "victory
celebration," but has made no mention of Sihanouk's
arrival or the presence of any.other notables. The
broadcasts earlier in the week by Deputy Prime Min-
ister Khieu Samphan and Information Minister Hu
Nimm were recorded.
Sihanouk has said he is delaying his departure
from Peking to be at the bedside of his ailing
mother, Queen Kossamak, The Khmer communists may
be deliberately keeping the Prince waiting both to
prevent his stealing the "victory" show and to allow
timer for the communist administrative apparatus to
become firmly entrenchecL.
Although a recent communist message mentioned
"deporting foreigners," a number of Westerners ap-
parently are still in the French embassy compound
in Phnom Penh. A message from the embassy on Tues-
day disclosed that French personnel from a hospital
in the capital also have taken refuge at the com-
pound. The French have reportedly been given food
and water, but they are still seeking permission for
an aircraft to fly into Phnom Penh with supplies.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
GREECE-NATO
The Greek delegate to NATO has out-
lined Athens' views on the future of the
military relationship between Greece and
NATO. A paper he presented yesterday to
a private meeting of select NATO repre-
sentatives is tentative and sketchy, but
it indicates a flexibility on the Greek
military role that Athens has previously
not shown.
The paper states that, as a general rule, Greek
forces will be under national command, but that in
the case of a "clear threat" of aggression such
forces as will be mutually agreed upon can be con-
sidered NATO reserve forces. In the event of im-
minent or actual aggression these forces would be
assigned to NATO. ,
In order to facilitate the cooperation of
Greek forces in NATO, the paper proposes that Greece
participate in those NATO activities in peacetime
that are "essential to the fulfillment of its agreed
NATO mission." The paper does not define the nature
and scope of this participation. The Greek delegate
asked for an informal dialogue with the NATO rep-
resentatives on the paper and for their suggestions
on points that need to be clarified.
Issues such as the extent of peacetime coop-
eration are bound to be sticky. The Greek repre-
sentative appeared most forthcoming on this point,
but the Karamanlis government will have to move
carefully in reestablishing open military coopera-
tion with NATO if it wishes to avoid provoking
strong parliamentary opposition. The NATO repre-
sentatives are scheduled to discuss the paper again
on May 12,
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THAILAND
We present below the principal con-
clusions of an Interagency Intelligence
Memorandum on Thai Foreign Policy in the
Post-Vietnam Period.
--The speed of the communist takeover of Indo-
china has deeply shocked the Thai and acceler-
ated trends away from reliance on the US secur-
ity commitment.
--Events are still moving too fast for the
Thai to have come to any firm conclusions on
long-term adjustments of their foreign policy,
but we believe that they will clearly move
toward a neutral position.
-This is likely to be the case whatever gov-
ernment is in power.
--The special Thai-US rapport has ended.
-The Thai will probably attempt to keep a
relatively close relationship with the US;
in particular they will continue to look to
the US as an important economic partner and
for military assistance.
-Even so, we believe the Thai government will
stick to its demand that US forces be with-
drawn within 12 months.
--Other US security interests in Thailand
will probably sur-
vive for two or three years if the US provides
substantial military assistance to Thailand.
--As the Thai put more distance between them-
selves and the US, they will move toward im-
proved relations with Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow.
-Diplomatic relations with Hanoi seem prob-
able; but not before US forces are withdrawn.
(continued)
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-Although there is general agreement on the
need to improve relations with China, pres-
sure from the military to go slow and problems
over the status of Chinese aliens make it un-
likely that formal ties can be established
before the end of the year.
-The Thai are probably prepared now to make
some gestures in the direction of closer re-
lations with the Soviet Union, primarily as
a means of enhancing Thailand's neutralist
credentials in the eyes of competing commu-
nist powers.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTE
Unofficial but nearly complete returns from
Portugal's election yesterday show the combined
votes of the three moderate parties at about 70
percent. The Communist Party and its close ally,
the Portuguese Democratic Movements have a combined
total of about 17 percent.
Over 90 percent of registered voters went to
the polls, only about .8 percent of them casting
blank ballots. A carnival-like atmosphere prevailed
in Lisbon, and only a few incidents of violence were
reported.
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Top Secret
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