THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014780
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 24, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
April 24, 1975
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25X1
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 24, 1975
Table of Contents
South Vietnam: The communist attack toward Saigon
has slowed. (Page 1)
Egypt-Syria: Presidents Sadat and Asad may have
papered over some differences during their
summit, but serious disagreements apparently
continue. (Page 3)
Syria-US: President Asad reportedly has affirmed
his intention to pursue improved relations.
(Page 4)
Notes: USSR-Portugal; PLO (Page 5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
The communist attack toward Saigon
has slowed. Communist units are re-
portedly still having difficulty moving
supplies forward, and there could be some
additional delay before some units are
ready to resume the attack. Most evi-
dence, however, points to direct assaults
on Saigon's outer defenses this week or
by the end of April at the latest.
It is difficult for battalions to coordinate
their arrival at assembly and attack positions, and
a lull of several days before an attack by a number
of divisions is not unusual. The communists must
also have in mind that a pause, following Thieu's
resignation, allows Saigon leaders time to move to-
ward a surrender.
North Vietnamese counterattacks against govern-
ment positions in Tay Ninh Province again closed
the road to the provincial capital. The South Viet-
namese were also forced from the Rach Kien District
town in Long An Province just ten miles southwest
of Saigon. A regiment of the North Vietnamese 8th
Division--one of the two that led the communist
sweep on the east side of Route 4--has been ordered
to mount an attack against Saigon, according to re-
cently captured prisoners.
On the central coast, the North Vietnamese are
moving supplies and equipment by sea into ports as
far south as Nha Trang. Aerial photography of April
21 shows a number of small coastal vessels and
barges unloading there. Similar activity had pre-
viously been noted at Qui Nhon and Da Nang, and the
North Vietnamese will probably soon begin using
their newly acquired port facilities farther south,
including those at Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Thiet.
Hanoi Radio announced yesterday that Lt. Gen-
eral Nguyen Vinh Nghi and Brig. General Pham Ngoc
Sang have been captured. General Nghi was the com-
mander of the Military Region 3 Forward Command,
and General Sang led the South Vietnamese air force
6th Division--both headquartered at Phan Rang.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
These officers and their staffs were unable to fly
out of Phan Rang when it fell to the communists
last week because rebellious Rangers seized and
took off in the only available escape aircraft.
South Vietnam's new President, Tran Van Huong,
still appears to be trying to open some sort of
political dialogue. He met twice yesterday with
the French ambassador to Saigon and recalled his
chief negotiator in Paris, Ambassador Phong, for
"urgent" discussions.
Huong appears hopeful that the Viet Cong will
accept some offer of political dialogue short of
surrender discussions. The French government, which
has been in contact with communist representatives
in Paris, apparently still believes such talks can
be arranged. Ambassador Phong, whose opinion prob-
ably has been influenced by the French, shares that
view.
Most political opposition leaders believe that
the communists will not negotiate with the remnants
of the Thieu regime and that the first order of
business is to organize a government that might meet
communist specifications. ,There is, however, con-
siderable disunity within the opposition. Four
principal leaders--Catholic Father Thanh, General
"Big" Minh, former senate chairman Huyen, and Bud-
dhist activist Vu Van Mau?met yesterday to prepare
a joint statement demanding that President Huong
step aside and allow a new cabinet to take charge,
but the four were unable to agree on the procedures
under which a new cabinet would operate.
Moreover, we are not certain that the military
would support any arrangement on which the polit-
ical opposition could agree. Despite the precar-
ious situation in South Vietnam, the support of
the military--or at least its agreement not to in-
terfere--is still needed before a new government
can be formed.
President Huong accepted the resignation of
the Can cabinet yesterday. Huong says he hopes
to have a new government formed by Friday.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT-SYRIA
Presidents Sadat and Asad may have
papered over some differences during
their two-day summit in Saudi Arabia's
capital, but the Zack of specifics in the
communique issued yesterday suggests con-
tinuing serious disagreements.
The communique affirmed that "political action
during the coming stage demands the establishment of
the closest cooperation between Syria and Egypt."
It noted that "any action"--presumably meaning any
negotiated agreement--on a particular front should
be "part of" similar action on all fronts. These
assertions are obviously designed to mollify Presi-
dent Asad, who has consistently demanded that Sadat
refrain from making his own agreements with Israel
and instead pursue an overall settlement that satis-
fies all Arab territorial demands.
The communique pointedly did not mention the
Geneva conference, however, and made scant mention
of the Palestinians. These omissions suggest that
the two presidents found little common ground on the
issues that are most basic to any formulation of a
joint strategy. The communique referred only in
passing to ensuring the "legitimate rights" of the
Palestinians, but avoided standard Arab formulations
on establishing a Palestinian state and guarantee-
ing the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation at Geneva.
Sadat has been attempting to devise a formula
that would defer the issue of PLO participation in
the conference and, even when this is agreed upon,
obscure the PLO presence by absorbing it in a
broader Arab delegation. He has apparently had no
success in pressing this position on the Palestin-
ians and may have run into difficulty with Asad as
well. The Syrians have hinted broadly in the past
that they might boycott the conference unless the
PLO is invited to attend from the start.
Following Asad's departure from Riyadh yester-
day, Sadat began a brief round of bilateral consul-
tations with King Khalid and the new Saudi leader-
ship; he then flew to Tehran for a meeting with the
Shah. He is scheduled to return to Cairo today.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SYRIA-US
President Asad reportedly affirmed
his intention to pursue improved rela-
tions with the US during the unpublicized
sessions of the recent Syrian Baath Party
congress. Asad sought to relieve the ap-
prehensions of individual party members
by offering assurances that his approach
was advantageous to Syria and posed no
threat to Syrian interests.
Syrian Army Chief of Staff Shihabi told Ambas-
sador Murphy, in recounting the proceedings, that he
had never before heard Asad address the issue of US-
Syrian relations so categorically and that Asad's
views dominated the discussion. At past party con-
gresses, delegates had vied with one another in at-
tacking the US.
Asad reportedly attempted also to inject a
note of realism into the party's discussion of the
extent of Syrian backing for the Palestinians. He
said there is "no prospect of Israel changing its
character as a Jewish state" and no possibility
that Israel can be destroyed. The President re-
peated, however, that Israel must withdraw from
all territory occupied in 1967 and that Palestin-
ians should have the right to establish a Pales-
tinian state on the West Bank and Gaza.
Shihabi could well have exaggerated Asad's po-
sition in hopes of favorably impressing the US dur-
ing the current Middle East policy review. It would
also be prudent for Damascus to preserve good rela-
tions with the US at a time when Syria's relations
with Egypt are uncertain and when Asad has grown
increasingly realistic about the limited chances
for dramatic gains at a resumed session of the Ge-
neva talks.
Asad's remarks on Israel are consistent with
his private acknowledgment last February that he
was ready to sign a long-term peace treaty, provided
that the Israelis withdrew to the pre-June 1967 bor-
ders and accepted a Palestinian state. References
by Asad to "historical realities" and to the inde-
structibility of Israel accord with other indica-
tions that Damascus is reluctant to take on Israel
militarily and that Asad believes that negotiations--
however difficult--provide the best chance for re-
gaining occupied territory.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
There is no conflict between detente and So-
viet support for Portugal's "progressive" polit7cal
course, according to articles in Pravda and Izvestia
this week.
The Soviets cast themselves in the articles as
the true supporters of democracy in Portugal and
blame the West for meddling in Portuguese affairs.
The Pravda commentary is particularly critical of
social democratic leaders in West Europe, whom it
accuses of undermining the Communists in order to
advance the cause of the Portuguese socialists.
The Soviet line is probably intended for domestic
consumption, but it also puts the West on notice
that detente considerations will not keep Moscow
from assisting, and benefiting from, Lisbon's left-
ward movement.
The Palestine Liberation Organization is seek-
ing permanent observer status at the Paris-based UN
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
as a means of further expanding its international
representation and acceptability.
UNESCO has formerly permitted only non-member
states--such as the Holy See--and intergovernmental
organizations to appoint permanent observer dele-
gates; no national liberation movement has ever ap-
plied for such standing. The PLO and their front
men in Paris, the Tunisian delegates, may be en-
countering more opposition than they had expected.
Black Africans are concerned that introduction of
this issue, coming so soon after the controversy
aroused by the actions taken against Israel last
November, could further damage the organization,
which, for the first time, is headed by an African.
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Top Secret
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