THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014771
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 14, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
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April 14
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category 58(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
c fr:r
ii
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 14, 1975
Table of Contents
Cambodia: The communists are preparing for a major
push against Phnom Penh; they may have begun
it this morning. (Page 1)
South Vietnam: Heavy fighting continues in the Xuan
Loc area. (Page 2)
Egypt: The cabinet resigned yesterday to clear the
way for President Sadat's anticipated economic
program. (Page 4)
Syria-Iraq: Relations continue to deteriorate.
(Page 5)
USSR-Iraq: Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn begins a
visit to the Soviet Union today. (Page 6)
Portugal: The Revolutionary Council announced its
intentions to continue nationalizing "basic
sectors" of the economy amid rumors of a new
power play. (Page 7)
Note: Turkey (Page 8)
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Phnom Penh .
? -Woo* ,o p ot
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CAMBODIA
Intercepted communications continue
to reflect communist preparations for a
major push against Phnom Penh; uncon-
firmed press reports suggest the push
began this morning. The new leadership
in Phnom Penh appears determined to hold
on as long as possible.
Intercepted messages have indicated a buildup
of communist units in the capital area and last-
minute preparations for an assault. According to
press reports, insurgent gunners began shelling
Phnom Penh early this morning and communist ground
forces were advancing on the city from several
directions.
Sak Sutsakhan, president of the governing
"Supreme Council," announced over Phnom Penh radio
this morning that a T-28 fighter aircraft had
dropped two bombs on the general staff headquarters
compound in the capital. Sak said that he and his
colleagues were unhurt, but that seven persons had
been killed and a number of others wounded. He
called on the populace to remain calm and imposed
a 24-hour curfew. The bombing appears to be the
act of a lone individual, rather than a revolt by
the air force; the air force's commander is a mem-
ber of the seven-man ruling council.
In announcing the formation of the Supreme
Council and the imposition of martial law over the
weekend, Sak Sutsakhan and Council Vice President
Long Boret both pledged to strengthen the military
and political position of the government with the
aim of achieving a "peaceful solution" through
negotiations. Despite its resolution, the govern-
ment will run out of the wherewithal to continue
fighting within two weeks.
Government defenses around the southeastern
provincial capital of Svay Rieng reportedly col-
lapsed on Saturday in the face of heavy insurgent
attacks. Some government units were still holding
on yesterday, but local officials reported that the
fall of the city was imminent.
Cambodian army officers described the situa-
tion at the southwestern provincial capital of
Kompong Speu as "critical."
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124
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
Heavy fighting continues in the Xuan
Loc area. The city's reinforced defenders
have beaten back strong communist attacks.
Effective air and artillery support has
contributed significantly to the South
Vietnamese efforts to stand and /fight.
Route 1 connecting Xuan Loc and Saigon is still
blocked by communist forces. The regional commander,
however, has decided to launch a major operation to-
day, involving two armored task forces and an infan-
try regiment, to reopen the highway. Meanwhile, the
South Vietnamese are using the C-130 to bomb enemy
troops massed around Xuan Loc, and along interdicted
sections of Route 1 west of the city.
In the delta, strOng counterattacks by elements
of the government's 7th Division have forced the
North Vietnamese to curtail temporarily their drive
to cut Route 4 southwest of Saigon. Three regiments
of the North Vietnamese 5th Division are committed
to the effort to interdict the highway, which is
?the rice lifeline to Saigon.
The communists are moving additional forces
into position for an assault on .the western approach
to Saigon. Most of the North Vietnamese 9th Divi-
sion and supporting air defense units have been
detected shifting into northeastern Hau Nghia Prov-
ince. The communists now have almost three full
divisions--the 3rd, 5th, and 9th--along Saigon's
western defense perimeter, and this could force the
South Vietnamese to shift reinforcements to this
front.
The most significant action over the weekend
in Military Region 4 was in the central delta. Gov-
ernment counterattacks against two communist regi-
ments which had been blocking Route 4 just north of
Can Tho in Vinh Long Province succeeded in reopening
the highway early this morning. Communist losses
were described as heavy.
Government holdings in coastal Ninh Thuan and
Binh Thuan provinces are likely to be seriously
challenged soon. Elements of the North Vietnamese
968th Division were detected on April 11 along
Route 1 near Cam Ranh. This division has moved
south to link up with the North Vietnamese 10th
Division, apparently in preparation for attacks on
(continued)
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the cities of Phan Rang and Phan Thiet. The South
Vietnamese believe the North Vietnamese 320th Divi-
sion may also be moving- into attack positions west
of Phan Rang.
The government is making. considerable progress
in rebuildingthe combat units' extracted from north-
ern and central South Vietnam, and many of them will
soon be ready for combat. The best of these units,
the Marine Division,- already: has two brigades ready.
-
A third brigade is scheduled-to. complete its reor-
ganization in a week, and a fourth about a week
later.
The 2nd Division has four operational battal-
ions, and several others are scheduled to be ready
for combat late this week. Parts of two reorganized
regiments have been dispatched to Phan Rang and Phan
Thiet cities.
The 3rd Division has only one battalion ready
for combat so far. Three ranger groups should be-
come operational later this month, and new artil-
lery units are being created for assignment to the
rebuilt infantry regiments and divisions.
President Thieu's principal economic adviser
has stated that your address to Congress implied
that the US wants South Vietnam to "do all it can
to stabilize the military situation," and that "some
military victories" before April 19 would improve
chances of Congressional approval of the aid pack-
age. Such an attitude probably explains in part the
large numbers of troops and amounts of equipment the
South Vietnamese are committing to the battle for
Xuan Loc.
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong media are giv-
ing more attention to the evacuation of Americans.
Both have charged that the "protection of the safety
of Americans" is a pretext for military interven-
tion and warn that such a scheme will be "severely
punished." In a statement broadcast yesterday, the
Provisional Revolutionary Government maintained that
if the US would withdraw its personnel from South
Vietnam immediately, these withdrawals "will cer-
tainly not encounter any difficulties or obstacles."
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EGYPT
Prime Minister Hijazi and members of
the cabinet submitted their resignations
to President Sadat yesterday. This ac-
tion apparently is intended to clear the
way for the President's anticipated "in-
ternal action program" to treat the coun-
try's economic ills.
According to Cairo radio, the President will
address the nation today to outline the required
work on the domestic front "in the coming phase."
Sadat may also announce the composition of a new
cabinet, although this step could be delayed several
days. Even the promise of cabinet changes would
serve his immediate purpose, which is to draw atten-
tion away from the breakdown of peace negotiations
toward his plans for economic development.
The future of Prime Minister Hijazi, who has
had overall responsibility for the economy, is un-
certain. He has been doing a good job recently, and
the President has few obvious alternative candidates
from whom to choose. Cairo newspapers report that
Sadat has turned aside suggestions that he should
assume the post of prime minister as he did in 1973
and 1974. The most extensive cabinet changes prob-
ably will come in the technical and economic minis-
tries.
The most important figures in the cabinet--For-
eign Minister Fahmi and War Minister Gamassy--are
likely to retain their posts. Sadat has gone out
of his way recently to demonstrate his regard for
Fahmi; only last week he announced that the foreign
minister would go to Moscow on April 19.
According to the Cairo press, Fahmi will dis-
cuss with the Soviets preparations for a possible
resumption of the Geneva peace conference. Fahmi
reportedly is preparing for comprehensive talks that
will range from the nature of a final settlement to
such procedural questions as how to arrange Pales-
tinian participation in the conference.
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SYRIA-IRAQ
Syrian-Iraqi relations continue to
deteriorate. Syrian Foreign Minister
Khaddam has rejected Iraq's call for a
meeting of Arab foreign ministers to
discuss Baghdad's charges that Syria is
diverting water from the Euphrates River,
although he did agree to consider the
dispute at a technical level. Syria
probably is withholding water from Iraq
to retaliate for Baghdad's apparent in-
volvement in a recent attempt to over-
throw Syrian President Asad.
Syria does not want relations to worsen to
the extent that Iraq might refuse military support
to Damascus in the event of renewed hostilities
with Israel. Unless Damascus receives some indi-
cation that Baghdad plans to limit its interference
in Syria's domestic affairs and to moderate its
propaganda attacks on Asad, however, Syria is unlikely
to allow technical experts to "solve" the water dis-
pute.
As of last week, Syrian authorities reportedly
had arrested approximately 400 Syrians for their
involvement in the alleged Iraqi-sponsored conspir-
acy to oust or assassinate Asad.
The Iraqi ambassador and his staff are reported
to be under 24-hour surveillance, and lower level
Iraqi diplomats are being harassed by Syrian author-
ities. The Syrian Baath Party congress last week
condemned the Iraqi government for collusion with
Iran, sabotage of Arab solidarity, and abandonment
of the Palestinians.
Syria reportedly has moved two armored regi-
ments and some paramilitary units into the Euphrates
Dam region to forestall any Iraqi military thrust
in the area.
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USSR-IRAQ
Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn begins
an official visit to the Soviet Union to-
day--his fifth since 1970. Providing a
background to his talks is the USSR's
concern that its influence in Iraq may
decrease. Just now, the Soviets' worry
is focused on the agreement Iraq signed
with Iran last month in Algiers.
Moscow presumably sees its anxiety over the
accord justified by the rapid collapse of the Kurd-
ish rebellion and the easing of Iraqi-Iranian ten-
sions. Even before the agreement in Algiers was
negotiated, the Soviets were upset with Iraq's ef-
forts to attract Western technical expertise and to
buy Western arms. Certainly over the short term,
however, Iraq will continue to look to the USSR for
military spare parts, technical assistance, and
training for its predominantly Soviet-equipped mil-
itary.
The two governments will probably maintain
their different approaches to Arab-Israeli affairs.
Baghdad has repeatedly refused Moscow's suggestions
that Iraq moderate its rigid opposition to a nego-
tiated settlement with Israel and support the So-
viet approach to the Geneva peace talks.
Iraq is likely to press for Soviet support in
its dispute with Syria over the water flow in the
Euphrates River. Baghdad complains that the Soviet-
built Euphrates Dam in Syria diverts Iraq's share
of the river. The Soviets, who once proposed an
agreement to Baghdad and Damascus to regulate the
water flow, may view mediation of the dispute as one
way to maintain influence in Iraq.
New economic agreements may be announced dur-
ing the visit. Iraq, which has over $300 million
in unused Soviet credits, has been negotiating with
Moscow recently on numerous irrigation projects.
Baghdad may give the Soviet Union a major role in
a $2-billion, five-year irrigation program.
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PORTUGAL
The Revolutionary Council an-
nounced this weekend intentions to
continue nationalizing "basic sectors"
of the economy. Rumors of a new power
play, now circulating in Lisbon, indi-
cate that political tensions are again
on the rise.
Leaders of the Armed Forces Movement have
designated private interests in communications and
transportation as next in line for nationalization.
The Revolutionary Council reiterated its concern
over Portugal's sagging economy; it has already
pledged that the new cabinet will present an emer-
gency economic plan within three weeks.
The US embassy reports that rumors of a new
power play are widespread in Lisbon although little
specific information is available. It is increas-
ingly clear that the Armed Forces Movement regrets
its promise to hold elections, now scheduled for
April 25, because of fear that the results will
show poor support for the Movement's program. Mod-
erates remain concerned that an effort will be
made to cancel or delay the elections, and there
are rumors that some Movement leaders are consider-
ing a roundup of opposition politicians of both
moderate and conservative persuasions.
The Movement has alienated several extreme
left-wing parties that have voiced opposition to
its institutionalization and to the election, pro-
cess. The Armed Forces Movement has banned one
party, prohibited another from participating in
elections, and suspended access to radio and tele-
vision to a third for five days.
Further contributing to the general tension
is the ambition of Admiral Rosa Coutinho to be
first among equals within the Movement's leadership.
Coutinho suggested last week that the performance
of the civilian political parties had been so poor
that the Movement should form its own party. He
proposed that ideologically it should lie somewhere
between the Communist and Socialist parties.
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Ar..?
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NOTE
In Turkey, the Demirel government--a four-party,
right-of-center coalition--won its initial parlia-
mentary vote of confidence on Saturday by a vote of
222 to 218.
The closeness of the vote illustrates the frag-
ile nature of the alliance Demirel has pieced to-
gether. It is questionable whether the weak govern-
ment can remain in power for an extended period.
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Top Secret
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