THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014764
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 5, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
April 5, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1 ),(2)(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 5, 1975
Table of Contents
South Vietnam: President Thieu has blamed recent
government setbacks on the lack of US polit-
ical and economic support, the undisciplined
actions of military commanders, panicky ci-
vilians, and Viet Cong infiltrators among the
refugees. (Page 1)
Cambodia: Acting president Saukham Koy is deeply
concerned about developments in Battambang.
(Page 3)
Greece: The Greeks have informed our embassy in
Athens that they are lodging a strong protest
in Ankara against unauthorized Turkish over-
flights of Greek islands. (Page 5)
Portugal: Prime Minister Goncalves has stated in
an interview that Portugal will not permit the
US base in the Azores to be used against Arab
countries. (Page 6)
USSR
- Southeast Asia: Moscow is still treating
communist successes in South Vietnam in a way
intended to mitigate any possible backlash on
relations with the US. (Page 6)
Notes: Ethiopia; Saudi Arabia (Page 9)
At Annex we present an assessment of the military
situation in South Vietnam.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
President Thieu, in a public ad-
dress yesterday, blamed recent govern-
ment setbacks on a variety of causes--
the Zack of US political and economic
support, the undisciplined actions of
military commanders, panicky civilians,
and Viet Cong infiltrators among the
refugees. Be faulted everyone but
himself.
Thieu maintained he had not made any secret
deal with the communists and, to push this point
home, claimed he would not agree to a coalition
government. He did say, however, that his new
government would be willing to resume discussions
in Paris as called for in the cease-fire agreement.
Thieu appealed to the people to rally behind
the government and maintained he would soon be
meting out stiff punishment to those army command-
ers who abandoned their posts. He warned that ad-
ditional communist attacks could be expected soon
and that the government must be prepared to defend
its remaining territory.
His speech did not have the ring of a man who
intends to resign. Moreover, it comes in the wake
of additional arrests yesterday morning of individ-
uals charged with coup plotting. The only person
of any prominence among the nine or ten people ar-
rested was Nguyen Van Ngan, Thieu's former polit-
ical adviser and organizer. Ngan is believed to
have been associated with efforts by Senate pres-
ident Tran Van Lam and General Nguyen Cao Ky to
force Thieu from office. The arrests were quickly
announced over Saigon radio, probably as a warn-
ing to others who might be entertaining similar
ideas.
Thieu also announced during his speech that
Prime Minister Khiem had resigned and that lower
house leader Nguyen Ba Can had been appointed to
form a new government. Thieu did not provide any
details on who is to be in the new cabinet.
(continued)
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106
NORTH \
VIETNAM
Demilitarized Zone
Hue.
'1/4 \T.
Da Nang
MR 1
?10
Gulf of
Thailand
1S6
62.
MR 3
VPhan Thiet
Capital Special Zone
110
MR 2
South
China
Sea
$15111 Communist controlled
territory
16-
14-
10--
13
MILES 1110
557630 4-75
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The North Vietnamese are rapidly deploying
major command and combat units to take advantage
of the new situation in the south. The North Viet-
namese 1st Corps, for example, appears to be moving
south from its normal garrison area in Thanh Hoa
Province, and the 2nd Corps, which has been active
in South Vietnam's two northern provinces for more
than a year, has also begun shifting farther south.
Several North Vietnamese SA-2 surface-to-air missile
units and antiaircraft artillery units are moving
south.
The level of communist military action con-
tinues to rise in the delta provinces. For the
first time in several years, the communists fired
four rockets into Can Tho City. Sharp fighting
erupted in Vinh Long Province early on April 4,
and communist units have penetrated the defenses
of Minh Duc district town.
Military Region 4 officials are becoming in-
creasingly concerned about the communist threat to
Can Tho City. Commanders are now less confident
that their forces will be able to contain strong
communist attacks because they suspect that morale
may be unsteady and that their forces could fall
apart under heavy communist pressure. They fear
that, if any one of their seven regular battalions
facing the North Vietnamese 4th Division should
break, panic will set in and the entire city de-
fense would collapse within hours.
In addition to the current threats to Can Tho
and My Tho cities, regional commanders are now
anticipating a major attack against Moc Hoa, the
capital of Kien Tuong Province. Three regiments
of the North Vietnamese 5th Division may be in
place to attack the city. Regional officials feel
there is good reason to believe that government
forces defending Moc Hoa will hold, but they quickly
point out that, if they do not, the 9th Division
which is defending the town could become ineffec-
tive as a fighting unit. A defeat of this division
could seriously undermine the confidence of other
government units in the delta.
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Phnom Penh
Communist troop? ?
concentration sighted ? ?
?
Village
abandoned
Tuol
Leap.
557628 4-75 CIA
SfatutetMiles
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CAMBODIA
Ambassador Dean called on acting
president Saukham Koy yesterday and
found him deeply concerned about re-
cent developments in the northwestern
provincial capital of Battambang--
Cambodia's second largest city.
Communist forces have been closing in on Bat-
tambang for the past few weeks, and Koy reported
that students there have issued a resolution call-
ing for the surrender of the city and the return
of Prince Sihanouk. If Battambang surrenders, Koy
fears that government forces in other areas of the
country will rapidly follow suit.
Koy also said that Lon Nol had delayed his
departure too long and that it was impossible to
reverse the current trend of events. In response
to Ambassador Dean's questions about possible con-
tingency plans, Koy said that, if a "solution" is
not found soon, the remaining leaders in Phnom
Penh may have to flee the country. Prime Minister
Long Boret and Foreign Minister Keuky Lim are plan-
ning to return to Phnom Penh over the weekend, but
their arrival will probably do little to boost
morale. By that time, many Cambodians will presum-
ably know of the partial US withdrawal from Phnom
Penh.
Government troops yesterday abandoned a vil-
lage four miles northwest of Pochentong Airport,
giving the communists another foothold within easy
rocket and artillery range of the airfield. Nearby,
other army units also pulled back from a position
on the dike forming part of Phnom Penh's northern
defenses, but repulsed insurgent efforts to push
closer to the city.
about 1,000 communist troops near Route 5 some ten
miles north of Phnom Penh. These may have been
(continued)
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some of the troops recently called in from the
provinces to participate in increased attacks
against Phnom Penh. Only six tactical aircraft
were available to strike this troop concentration.
In addition to the two aircraft destroyed by
rocket fire against Pochentong on Thursday, four
others suffered shrapnel damage.
Intercepted messages continue to reflect com-
munist preparations for increased artillery attacks
in the Phnom Penh area. Artillery emplacements are
being constructed and howitzer ammunition--includ-
ing some captured at Banam and Neak Luong--is being
moved toward the capital.
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GREECE
The Greek government has informed
our embassy in Athens that it is lodging
a strong protest in Ankara against the
unauthorized Turkish overflights of Greek
islands on Thursday.
The protest may go beyond an earlier Greek
warning to the Turks that in the event of further
overflights Athens would take "all legitimate meas-
ures" allowed under international law. The Greeks
are considering including in the demarche a warning
that Greek aircraft will intercept Turkish aircraft
if there are any further incidents. Athens will
make parallel demarches in a number of other capi-
tals.
The Turks, meanwhile, continue to deny any
violation of Greek airspace. The press in Ankara
announced yesterday that the Turkish air force will
continue to fly in international airspace over the
Aegean. It said Athens would be responsible for
"serious consequences" if it attacked Turkish air-
craft.
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PORTUGAL
Portuguese press and radio are replay-
ing a story from a Beirut magazine in which
Prime Minister Goncalves is quoted as stat-
ing that Portugal will not permit the US
base in the Azores to be used against the
Arab countries. In the same interview,
Goncalves also hedged for the first time
on Portugal's continued participation in
NATO.
Goncalves said that Portugal would never adopt
a hostile attitude toward the Arab people and would
never consent to such an attitude being adopted
"from or through our territory." He probably em-
phasized this issue for his Arab audience, but his
statement was the most explicit yet made by the
Portuguese leadership on this subject. Goncalves'
remarks also are in tune with the Third-World ap-
proach to foreign policy that is expected to get
increasing play under newly appointed Foreign
Minister Melo Antunes.
On Portugal's commitment to NATO, Goncalves
reiterated the standard line of respecting treaty
obligations, but added a qualifying phrase that
NATO membership could not be imposed on the Portu-
guese people. "The people" are to make the decision
through a parliament which Goncalves said would be
elected soon.
Up to this time, Portuguese leaders have con-
fined themselves to unqualified assurances that
Portugal would continue to adhere to its NATO com-
mitments. There has nevertheless been some irrita-
tion over NATO's attitude to-
ward Portuguese policies and Portugal's exclusion
from the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.
Press reports from Lisbon indicate that Portu-
gal's political parties yesterday refused to endorse
the guidelines presented to them two days ago by the
Armed Forces Movement for a transitional constitu-
tion. The guidelines provide, among other things,
that:
(continued)
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--Most of the legislation of a future parlia-
ment will have to be approved by the all-
military Revolutionary Council.
--The Revolutionary Council will define and
enforce domestic and foreign policy and rule
on the constitutionality of laws.
--The armed forces will approve candidates for
prime minister and for the ministers of defense,
economy, and internal administration.
Members of the center-left Popular Democratic
Party claim they are supported by the Socialists,
the center-right Social Democratic Center, and the
center-left Popular Monarchist Party in opposing
restrictions on the future parliament. One extreme
left-wing group refused to sign because it does not
recognize the authority of the Armed Forces Movement.
If the parties do not agree to the guidelines,
they risk being criticized as opponents of the Move-
ment. If they sign, they will have agreed to mili-
tary domination of the government for the next three
to five years.
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USSR - SOUTHEAST ASIA
Moscow is still treating communist
successes in South Vietnam as justified
retaliation for Saigon's violation of the
peace accord, no doubt to mitigate any
possible backlash on US-USSR relations.
In a recent conversation with diplo-
mat, the deputy chief of the Southeast Asia divi-
sion of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Y.
Kuznetsov, argued that recent events were more the
result of South Vietnamese collapse than of a major
North Vietnamese offensive. Kuznetsov avoided crit-
icizing the US role in Indochina and
that Moscow would welcome any US initiative on nego-
tiating a settlement.
Kuznetsov acknowledged, however, that Moscow
backed the Provisional Revolutionary Government's
position on negotiations, including the requirement
for President Thieu's removal. Kuznetsov said that
Moscow still favored a political rather than a mili-
tary solution in South Vietnam, but he gave no in-
dication that the Soviets were making such an argu-
ment in Hanoi.
The Soviets are also still talking about nego-
tiations in Cambodia, although they clearly view
them as nothing more than a means to transfer power
to the communists. Kuznetsov said that Moscow rec-
ognizes that Prince Sihanouk will probably play some
role in Phnom Penh after a communist victory. He
denigrated Sihanouk's importance over the long haul,
however, and repeated long-standing Soviet complaints
of Sihanouk's unreliability.
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NOTES
The Ethiopian government's military situation
in Eritrea Province has improved in recent weeks
as fighting has dropped off sharply from the high
level that prevailed in February.
Government forces now control Asmara and as
much of the countryside as they choose to occupy
in force at any given time. Army operations have
denied the rebels sanctuaries and food supplies
near Asmara. Nevertheless, the rebels continue to
enjoy overwhelming popular support and remain a
formidable guerrilla force. Elsewhere in the coun-
try, the overextended army and police are encounter-
ing new security problems. Intercepted Ethiopian
messages show that a number of relatively small
groups are active, and they are probably gaining
strength as a result of the opposition to the ruling
military council's land-reform program.
Saudi Arabia
Crown
Fri-nee
Fahd told Ambassador Akins on April 1 that he
wanted Khalid to retain the title of prime minister
because it would look bad if Khalid were to lose
all of Faysal's titles and powers and become a mere
figurehead. Fahd claimed he will be the person who
will review all governmental decisions and be the
final arbiter. There is no indication as yet that
Fahd will be seriously hampered in the exercise
of power by the necessity to defer to Khalid in
some respects, but the situation is potentially
disruptive. At best, there will be a period of
maneuvering before a new balance of relationships
emerges.
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VIETNAM
We present below an intelligence
community assessment of The Military
Situation and Prospects for South Viet-
nam.
South Vietnam's military fortunes
continue to decline. Its armed forces
have relinquished well over half the
country, lost nearly half of their reg-
ular combat forces, and suffered ex-
tremely heavy equipment and supply
losses. The military leadership is de-
moralized, and the morale and discipline
of remaining government forces are open
to serious question. Taking all factors
into account, the only question over the
defeat of the Republic of Vietnam is
timing--whether it will collapse or be
militarily overwhelmed in a period of
weeks or months.
The Current Situation
The North Vietnamese have recognized South
Vietnam's vulnerability and appear determined to
take rapid advantage of it.
At present, there are eight well-equipped and
well-supplied North Vietnamese army infantry divi-
sions in Military Regions 3 and 4 and an additional
ten divisions farther north in South Vietnam. More-
over, Hanoi is committing the bulk of its remaining
reserve forces to South Vietnam. The communists
could deploy a decisive force to the battle area in
about a month, if a crash move were ordered. Their
logistic capabilities are sufficient to support such
forces.
South Vietnam has seven infantry divisions,
rangers, territorial forces, and the remnants of
three divisions extracted from the north. Addi-
tional combat units will be formed from South Viet-
namese forces evacuated from MRs 1 and 2, but their
combat effectiveness, except perhaps for the ma-
rines, will be doubtful. Some territorial forces
are now being integrated into regular Vietnamese
army units. Finally, South Vietnam still retains
a sizable air force.
We now see two general communist courses of
military action.
(continued)
Al
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--The application of massive force to inflict
final defeat.
--Envelop Saigon, cut off its supplies, and
thereby bring the government of South Vietnam
to its knees.
The communists would have two options within
the first course of action. In one, the North Viet-
namese army could choose to exploit to the maximum
their current military momentum and the weaknesses
of South Vietnamese forces. This would involve the
rapid, albeit piecemeal, reinforcement of MR 3 and
continuous large-scale attacks beginning at any
time. This would entail risks for the communists
because it would not confront the government of
Vietnam with overwhelming force at the outset. More-
over, communist losses might be high, thereby weak-
ening their military punch.
As a second option, the communists could delay
an assault on the capital for a month or so, while
consolidating their gains in the northern half of
the country, deploying additional infantry divisions
south, and preparing the battlefield. This would
give Saigon time to rally its forces and population
and to reconstitute some of the units evacuated
from the north. With their backs to the wall, many
South Vietnamese units would fight well. South
Vietnamese confidence would be bolstered by accel-
erated US assistance and by evidence that the US
will send more. Correspondingly, the deterioration
and ultimate collapse of the Saigon government would
be accelerated by a negative response on the part
of the US.
Considering Hanoi's ability to mass greatly
superior forces, however, we believe that under
either of these options, the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment would collapse or be defeated by the end
of June, if not considerably sooner.
The other major course open to the communists
would be to envelop Saigon with augmented forces,
cut off its supplies, and simultaneously attrite
defending forces. The recent movement of elements
of two North Vietnamese divisions from Tay Ninh
Province to the northern delta is in line with such
a strategy. At present, these units and others al-
ready in MR 4 are threatening major cities and the
important rice distribution route from the delta to
Saigon. This would add to the already formidable
pressures on the city. We believe that this limited
course of action might alone be successful so that
the South Vietnamese government would fall by the
end of June.
(continued)
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Hanoi recognizes that political and military
factors will continue to interact. Governmental
changes in Saigon, South Vietnam's military perform-
ance, and the evolving state of public and South
Vietnamese army morale will condition its final
planning. The fact that there is little room for
retreat may stiffen the resolve of Saigon's forces.
Nonetheless, a sudden psychological unraveling along
the lines that occurred in the northern half of the
country is distinctly possible. In such an event,
a communist victory would follow in short order.
In this regard, Hanoi probably hopes that a
combination of the above factors will make unneces-
sary a final direct assault on Saigon. This would
spare the communists the problems of feeding and
housing the population of a city destroyed by a
pitched battle. And it would minimize damage to
vital facilities and resources which Hanoi would
prefer to capture intact. These interests seem re-
flected by recent communist propaganda and by the
10-point policy toward "liberated areas" broadcast
by the communists on April 3. Although primarily
designed to bring order and stability to newly con-
quered regions as fast as possible, these pronounce-
ments were probably also designed to increase pres-
sures in Saigon for a "negotiated" settlement and
to hasten the political crumbling that is already
in train. Furthermore, the political advantages
gained by South Vietnam's collapse without a major
battle for Saigon would be substantial.
In sum, Hanoi is in good position to take what-
ever action it considers necessary to win the war.
While a quick, decisive military stroke may be in
the works, we believe that Hanoi will opt for a
less costly and politically more expedient alterna-
tive, calculating that a South Vietnamese collapse
from within is near at hand. At the same time, how-
ever, communist units will position themselves for a
final attack should their preferred course fail.
Whatever the case, South Vietnam's fate appears to
be sealed. Taking all factors into account, the
only question is timing--whether weeks or months.
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