THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014762
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 3, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
April 3, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category. 513( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 3, 1975
Table of Contents
Vietnam: North Vietnam is continuing to commit new
troops to consolidate its hold in South Viet-
nam and to augment its forces around Saigon.
(Page 1)
Cambodia: Government units around Phnom Penh can
now do little more than react to communist
initiatives. .(Page 3)
Thailand: The Thai do not believe that a commun-
ist take-over in Cambodia and Vietnam would
pose an immediate threat to their own secu-
rity. (Page 4)
Laos: Communist leader Souphanouvong may be en-
hancing his stature as a national leader.
(Page 6)
Middle East: Egypt wants at least one" nonaligned
country to participate in a reconvened Geneva
conference. (Page 7)
Syria-Israel:
Note: Greece (Page 9)
At Annex we present an intelligence community as-
sessment of "Likely Political Developments in
Vietnam."
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Demilitarized Zone
Htlee.N.
MR 1
rBan-Me
Thuot
Gulf of
Thailand
1' 4
MR 4
/ MR 3
'Capitol Special Zone
1: 1
MR 2
South
China
Sea
190
MILES
557610 4-75
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VIETNAM
North Vietnam is continuing to send
manpower to consolidate its hold over the
northern two thirds of South Vietnam and
to augment its forces around Saigon.
In addition to maintaining a moderately heavy
rate of troop infiltration--more than 1,000 men per
day and far more than is needed to replace losses--
Hanoi has now dispatched the fourth of its seven
strategic reserve divisions. The recent move south
by the 338th follows the dispatch of the 320B Divi-
sion--parts-of which are already around Hue. These
two divisions could arrive in Military Region 3 in
less than two weeks, especially if they move down
Route 1 to attack Saigon's eastern flank,
Hanoi sent south its first strategic reserve
divisions during February. The 341st is now in the
area north of Saigon and the 316th is in the south-
ern portion of Military Region 2, where it helped
capture Ban Me Thuot in mid-March. The other three
strategic reserve divisions--the 308th, 308B, and
the 312th--have remained in their normal bases in
North Vietnam. There have been tenuous indications,
however, that the 312th Division may be preparing
to move south.
A large number of air defense units have moved
to southern North Vietnam in conjunction with the
shift of air defense forces already present in
northern South. Vietnam, and intercepts suggest
Hanoi may be moving additional artillery or anti-
aircraft--possibly as much as a full division--to
the southern portion of South Vietnam,
Details on developments in military regions
1 and 2 are trickling south, despite the govern-
ment's jamming of communist broadcasts and its
efforts to prevent refugees from reaching major
cities like Saigon and Can Tho.
The panic that contributed so much to the col-
lapse in the north has not yet seized Saigon's
troops in military regions 3 and 4. At the moment,
the government has an edge in numbers of troops and
(continued)
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in firepower, and, while the regional commanders
are worried, they are trying to gird their forces
near Saigon for a stand. The general commanding
the 25th Division defending Tay Ninh city is stay-
ing with his division in the field, making personal
visits to his units, and taking care to rotate his
battalions from the front lines periodically. East
of Saigon, the 18th Division has been conducting
small, but successful, operations to reopen routes 1
and 20. In the delta, senior officers are appre-
hensive about a communist attack against Can Tho
city, and are actively preparing their defenses.
Their main concern is to protect the major towns
and Route 4, which connects Saigon with its rice
supplies.
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
51
5
Prek
errun by
iRmmunists
Tuol Leaps
PHNOM
PENH
15
P k
Re
30
Captured by
Communists
eak Luong
Miles to
'(
SOUTH VIETNAM
557606 4-75 CIA
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CAMBODIA
Cambodian army units around Phnom
Penh can now do little more than react
to communist initiatives, all the while
suffering losses of territory and erosion
of their defenses.
The Khmer communists are expected to shift an
estimated 4,000 to 5,000 troops, previously coa-
mitted to operations along the .lower Mekong, to
Phnom Penh's southern--defenses-within a week. Un-
derstrength government unitsin-this sector proba-
bly cannot withstand attacks by such a force.-
The communists are continuing to fire 107-mm.
rockets at Pochentong Airport, and they resumed ar-
tillery fire yesterday. A DC-8 was hit by machine
gun fire west of the airport.
Defenses northeast of Phnom Penh have been
weakened because units have been withdrawn to rein-
force the northwest. The communists broke into the
defense perimeter at a point some five miles north-
west of Phnom Penh last night; more government re-
inforcements have been-sent-to the area.
Communist forces overran a government posi-
tion on the east bank of the Mekong on Tuesday.
Farther north, government troops withdrew from a
position on the east bank of the Tonle Sap. De-
fenders in this area are becoming increasingly
vulnerable to numerically superior insurgent forces.
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THAILAND
The Thai do not believe that a com-
munist take-over in Cambodia and Vietnam
would pose an immediate threat to their
own security, but they believe that the
long-run implications will make it nec-
essary for them to make foreign policy
adjustments.
These adjustments are likely to include:
--Sharply accelerating Thailand's efforts to
move away from identification with US policy
in Indochina, a process that began several
years ago.
--Exploring alternatives to Thailand's long
reliance on the US for its security.
Khukrit Pramot's government, in office less
than two weeks, has already signaled its intent to
dissociate itself from US policies toward Indochina.
Convinced that Phnom Penh's collapse is inevitable,
Thai officials have made much publicly of opposing
the US airlift of arms to Cambodia from bases in
Thailand. Prime Minister Khukrit is
willing to look the other way while the flights con-
tinue, but this position could change suddenly if
he feels himself under public pressure. His for-
eign minister already argues that halting the
flights will put Thailand in a better position to
deal with a communist regime in Phnom Penh.
Some officials
have begun to explore possible
alternatives, to reliance on the US for Thailand's
security. Top policy planners in the Thai foreign
ministry have concluded that the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, still a fledgling regional
organization, may be Thailand's-only-possible alter-
native. Foreign-Minister Chatchai apparently has
accepted their recommendation to convene an immedi-
ate meeting of the five nations of the association--
the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore,
and Thailand--to discuss the impact of the Indo-
china situation on their countries. In this forum,
Chatchai will probably push his idea of getting the
big powers to endorse Thailand's neutrality. This
concept could easily be. widened to include all of
Southeast. Asia.
(continued)
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The Thai will probably make stronger efforts
to improve relations with their communist neighbors.
They may push ahead their timetable on recognition
of Peking. There is evidence that in recent days
the Thai have renewed their approaches to Hanoi in
an effort to open a dialogue, although there is al-
most certainly little optimism in the Thai foreign
ministry that such efforts will soon overcome Hanoi's
basic hostility toward Bangkok.
US interests in Thailand are certain to come
under critical scrutiny in the months ahead. The
Khukrit government already is on record as favor-
ing the withdrawal of all US forces from Thailand
within one year. On this issue, too, Khukrit and
Chatchai have indicated to US officials that the
government's private position is more flexible than
its public posture, but their views may stiffen once
the impact of the situation in Indochina sinks in.
Even the Thai military, who have been the
staunchest defenders of the US presence, have been
expressing their disappointment in recent days that
Thai-based US aircraft have not been sent into ac-
tion over Indochina. Having long identified these
aircraft with the US security commitment to Thai-
land, they may now begin to question the utility of
keeping the US bases.
There is little reason to believe that a com-
munist take-over in Indochina will cause the Thai
to seek a complete reversal of their long-standing
close relations with the US. The Thai continue to
see even a limited US presence and involvement with
Southeast Asia as a useful counterbalance to the
interests of Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi. Moreover,
the Thai still harbor immense goodwill toward Wash-
ington, and they will look to the US for basic sup-
port for their armed forces, especially badly
needed spare parts.
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LAOS
Communist leader Souphanouvong has
gained a role in connection with King
Savang that may enhance Souphanouvong's
stature as a national leader and poten-
tial next prime minister.
The coalition cabinet recently announced that
King Savang has accepted Souphanouvong's invitation
to pay an official visit to the communist zone this
year, and that the King has also decided to be
crowned formally no later than the end of 1976.
Souphanouvong is to be in charge of arrangements
for both the King's visit to Sam Neua, which may
take place soon after the Lao New Year's festivi-
ties in mid-April, and for his coronation.
Since his accession to the throne in 1959,
the King has maintained that he would be crowned
only when Laos was unified under a single adminis-
tration. The announcement that he now intends to
proceed represents a sharp break with his past at-
titude and has little relationship to the real sit-
uation in the country,
The 67 year-old King, however, may have come
to view a coronation--with Lao communist involve-
ment--as a means of ensuring the survival of the
monarchy beyond his reign. He may also feel that
a visit to Sam Neua would be a symbolic gesture
welcoming the Lao communists as loyal subjects
back into the national fold.
The King's recently announced decisions prob-
ably evolved from lengthy discussions with Sou-
phanouvong and Prime Minister Souvanna during the
Prime Minister's extended convalescence in the
royal capital of Luang Prabang. For his part,
Souvanna probably is attracted to the idea of in-
volving the King--who is held in awe and respect
by all Lao groups and factions--in what could be
major steps toward national reconciliation. Such
an involvement might also help to dispel long-
standing rightist distrust of the Lao communist
leader and improve Souphanouvong's chances of be-
ing accepted by non-communists as a future head
of government.
Souvanna has consistently maintained that
Souphanouvong is more of a Lao nationalist than
communist. Recent battlefield developments in
South Vietnam and Cambodia will have only rein-
forced Souvanna's conviction that a policy of po-
litical accommodation with the Lao communists is
the only alternative to a communist military take-
over.
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EGYPT
In announcing Egypt's official re-
quest on Tuesday that the US and the
USSR reconvene the Geneva conference,
Foreign Minister Fahmi also expressed
Cairo's desire that France, the UK,
and "at least one" of the nonaligned
countries participate. Fahmi recently
met with the ambassadors of Yugoslavia
and India to discuss a possible role
by those countries in negotiations.
President Sadat fears that participation by
only the US and the USSR would immediately doom
the conference; the Soviets would support the
Arabs and the US would back the Israelis. Sadat
apparently believes that broader participation
will place greater pressures on Israel and might
provide a safeguard against what he calls "polari-
zation" of the superpowers positions at Geneva.
He wants the US to play the role of mediator, not
only defender of Israel, and he is equally deter-
mined to avoid having Moscow alone speak for the
Arabs.
The addition of the other countries Sadat
and Fahmi have mentioned would have the undoubted
benefit for Egypt of stacking the deck against Is-
rael. The French, the nonaligned countries, and
to a lesser extent the British, support the basic
tenets of the Arab position. The UK and France
are nonetheless far less rigid in their backing
of the Arabs than the Soviets, and Sadat may be-
lieve that their presence would prevent polariza-
tion and assure the US more room for maneuver in
attempting to accommodate Arab as well as Israeli
positions.
By being first on the list with a formal re-
quest for a reopened conference, the Egyptians
undoubtedly also hope to steal a march on the Syr-
ians and other Arabs who have disparaged Sadat's
reliance on US mediation, and who will be still
more suspicious of rumors that both Egypt and Is-
rael are interested in reviving the bilateral talks.
Whatever Sadat's intentions, the addition of
outside participants is likely to complicate rather
than facilitate negotiations.
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SYRIA?ISRAEL
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NOTE
Returns from last weekend's municipal elec-
tions indicate that the urban electorate in Greece
may lean more strongly toward the center-left par-
ties than the parliamentary election last November
suggested.
Candidates in the larger cities backed by the
left opposition significantly outpolled conserva-
tives and nonpartisans. The opposition has been
trying to make political capital out of the results
even though these elections did not affect the gov-
ernment's overwhelming majority in Parliament.
The strength of extreme leftist and centrist forces
which are collaborating at the moment, will be
tested again in parliamentary by-elections on
April 20.,
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VIETNAM
We present below an intelligence
community assessment of Likely Political
Developments in Vietnam.
The political viability of the pres-
ent government in South Vietnam has rested
heavily on strong US support of President
Thieu and his effective resistance to a
communist takeover, To most Vietnamese,
these conditions no longer exist. As a
result we believe that major political
changes will occur in coming weeks and
may be imminent; these changes would
eventually lead to a settlement on com-
munist terms. If the South Vietnamese
military situation is not stabilized,
however, Saigon may collapse militarily
before arrangements to replace Thieu or
to attempt negotiations can materialize.
Thieu's prestige has been irreparably damaged
by the military debacle in the northern half of the
country and his effectiveness undermined by a grow-
ing sense of inevitable communist victory. Decisive
and visible leadership is needed, but Thieu appears
isolated from his own government and increasingly
suspicious of the loyalty of his senior commanders.
For example, he has placed Military Region 3 com-
mander General Toan under surveillance since a meet-
ing last weekend between Toan and General Weyand.
Thieu's suspicions are understandable; criti-
cism of the president is mounting within the mili-
tary establishment.
--The Chairman of the Joint General Staff,
General Vien, reportedly is agitating in senior
military circles for Thieu's removal.
--Close associates of the president, such as
his Special Assistant for Military and Security
Affairs, General Quang, appear deeply pessimis-
tic over Thieu's ability to remain in power.
--General Truong, the Military Region 1 com-
mander, is bitter over Thieu's decisions which'
led to the collapse of his command.
(continued)
Al
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We have no evidence, however, of a concrete
move afoot within the military to replace Thieu.
The most important point in the president's ?favor
is the absence of any rival strong enough to oust
the president and willing to step into his position.
But, given the dissatisfaction that now exists within
the military, a move to force Thieu's resignation or
ouster by an individual or group of military officers
could occur at any time. The likelihood of such a
move will increase the longer political indecision
continues and military deterioration is unarrested.
There is little agreement within the civilian
opposition on a successor to Thieu. Former South
Vietnamese leaders, such as Nguyen Cao Ky, Duong
Van "Big" Minh, or former premier Pham Huy Quat,
do not command enough support to serve as a rally-
ing point. Moderate nationalists--such as labor
leader Tran Quoc Buu, Senator Tran Van Lam, and Dep-
uty Prime Minister Pham Quang Dan--who have contin-
ued to support Thieu while maintaining a degree of
independence, probably hope that a new military suc-
cessor government would have a place for them. But
they are not likely to be prime movers in any imme-
diate change of political leadership in Saigon.
The more radical opposition leaders such as the An
Quang Buddhists' Thich Tri Quang and the militant
Catholic priest Father Thanh could precipitate an
early military move if they take to the streets in
all-out opposition to Thieu.
Thieu's departure would not in itself neces-
sarily lead to an immediate unraveling of South
Vietnamese morale and will to resist. A new mili-
tary leadership, perhaps with some infusion of ci-
vilian opposition elements to broaden its base,
might make at least temporary headway in shoring
up public confidence and rallying the South Viet-
namese armed forces. But in our judgment, such a
change of leadership at this time could not reverse
the fundamental political and military trends now
running against Saigon. Even if the South Vietnam-
ese are successful in rallying their forces and
consolidating their immediate military position,
the respite will be brief because Hanoi now is de-
ploying overwhelming military force for a coup de
grace.
Given this situation defeatist sentiment in
South Vietnam is bound to snowball. This process
is already well under way as refugees and news of
successive military reverses trickle south. As a
consensus begins to emerge in Saigon that communist
victory is in sight, there should be no shortage of
(continued)
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individuals eager to protect their personal inter-
ests or their various political and religious groups
as best they can by participating in a settlement
on communist terms. In time, we believe mounting
demoralization will lead to military acquiescence
in the formation of another government prepared to
seek and accept the best terms it can obtain from
the communists. In the event of a rapid South Viet-
namese military collapse, however, even the possi-
bility of a transitional non-communist administra-
tion would disappear.
One by-product of the demoralization process
now under way has been a rising level of anti-
American feeling. Anti-US feeling already appears
to be running high among the military units and
refugees escaping from the north. As hope for more
US assistance fades, President Thieu or any succes-
sor would have little reason to resist the tempta-
tion to point to US responsibility for the present
situation.
The Communist View
Hanoi almost certainly was surprised by the
extent and rapidity of the South Vietnamese mili-
tary collapse. The tone of its propaganda and the
speed with which it has redeployed its forces to
take advantage of the South Vietnamese retreat,
however, make it apparent that Hanoi now sees vic-
tory as certain. Indeed, Hanoi is continuing to
move additional elements of its strategic reserve
to the South.
Hanoi clearly senses that the possibility of
a final psychological and political collapse in the
South would allow it to realize its final objectives
without the cost of a major assault against Saigon.
The communists are offering amnesty to South Viet-
namese military and government personnel who join
the "revolutionary side." And in an obvious effort
to encourage political upheaval in Saigon, the com-
munists have been emphasizing their willingness to
reopen negotiations. Hanoi is indicating, however,
that the cost of peace will be high--Thieu must be
removed and a new South Vietnamese government formed
that is prepared to accept "national concord and
strict application of the Paris Agreement" before
negotiations can begin. Furthermore, communist
statements make no mention of the coalition govern-
ment envisioned by the Paris Agreement, but only
declare that new negotiations would result "in the
speedy settlement of the affairs of South Vietnam."
(continued)
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This terse offer reflects the radically altered
strategic situation in Vietnam. Hanoi no longer
sees the need for a lengthy intermediate stage of
negotiations and coalition rule in the South prior
to the achievement of its basic objective--the uni-
fication of Vietnam under communist rule. Although
North Vietnamese strategy probably still involves
the establishment of a transitional southern gov-
ernment, perhaps with token participation by neu-
tralist "third force" elements, it seems fairly
clear that Hanoi is now interested in providing
only the merest fig leaf for a North Vietnamese
takeover in the South.
In the event of such an arrangement, there
would undoubtedly be a fairly widespread elimina-
tion of key South Vietnamese government and armed
forces personnel, particularly those who had been
closely associated with the US. In addition, many
thousands of others would be killed, either by
conscious communist policy or by the action of
zealous local communist commanders and troops.
The prospect would generate massive efforts to
escape Vietnam, involving hundreds of thousands
of people. Nonetheless, the communists would be
faced with the massive problems of trying to re-
establish order out of chaos and panic, and they
would probably keep some functionaries in place
for the task.
Hanoi's shortened timetable in the South has
obvious implications for the role of the Viet Cong's
Provisional Revolutionary Government. We believe
that there has been a basic downgrading of the pro-
visional government in North Vietnamese thinking.
The North Vietnamese will soon have little incentive
to maintain it as a separate political entity.
We believe Hanoi intends to push its military
advantage forcefully, but we are unsure as to the
exact timing. We expect sharp communist attacks
in the provinces around Saigon and in the delta in
the next few weeks and believe that the communists
intend to maintain or escalate military pressure.
We believe that in a matter of months, if not weeks,
Saigon will collapse militarily or a government
will be installed that will agree to a settlement
on communist terms.
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