THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014760
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 1, 1975

_ Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
The President's Daily Brief
April 1, 1975
To ecret 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B( I ),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
ep w
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 1, 1975
'Table of Contents,
Vietnam: The communists are pressing their drive
southward along: South Vietnam's central coast..
(Page1)
Cambodia: Government units have plugged the gap in
the defense line north of Pochentong Airport.
(Page 2)
USSR-Portugal: Moscow gave front-page coverage to
Portuguese Labor Minister Costa Martins when
he visited the USSR last week. (Page 3)
Iran-Iraq: The two countries have pledged to work
for closer cooperation. (Page 4)
Notes: Turkey; Cyprus (Page 5)
Annex: A Look at the Khmer Communists
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
106
NORTH
VIETNAiri'N
NI,Demilitarized Zone
10.S.
Da Nano-?
\\ MR 1
BINH
DINH
- -12
PHNOM PENH
'
GON
My Tho
'CCon Tho
Gulf of
Thailand
104
106
-
/MR 3
\ Capital Special Zone
110
.pipi Nhon
MR 2
N
.Nha Trang
ipnm Ranh
vrc,'
South
China
190
MILES
14 .-
11:1
557587 4.-75
$II
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
k A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
The communists are pressing their
drive southward along South Vietnam's
central coast. Qui Nhon was abandoned
by government forces last night. The
South Vietnamese 22nd Division, which
had been defending the city, was all
but shattered in heavy fighting. The
government's territorial forces in the
Qui Nhon area appear to have heeded
communist calls for an uprising and
joined in attacks on the 22nd Division.
Near Nha Trang, an airborne brigade has taken
heavy losses and been forced to pull back. About
9,000 members of the marine division are now at Cam
Ranh, but it is doubtful they can.be reorganized in
time to come to the rescue of Nha Trang. Some troops
have deserted from Cam Ranh, taking their weapons
with them to Nha Trang, where they are adding to
the panic and confusion, much as armed stragglers
did in Da.Nang.
Government forces in Military Region 2 have
lost all 12 of their 175-mm, guns, all 54 of their
M-48 tanks, and well over half of their 54 155-mm.
guns. Although some attempts were made to destroy
ammunition and fuel, large quantities are now in
communist hands.
Regional commanders in the delta are expecting
strong communist attacks against Can Tho and My Tho
cities at any time. These commanders have been try-
ing to prod their regular units to break up commu-
nist formations moving into place for the antici-
pated attacks, but without much success. Even if
major attacks against the cities are slow to develop,
the communists appear to have the major South Viet-
namese units on the defensive and are likely to con-
tinue to make territorial gains.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Cambodia: Lower Mekong
0
Prek
/ (
,
Tuol Leaps
Gov't Forces
Bolster Defenses
PHNOM
PENH
4
15
0,.
? Banam
Neak Luong
0 Miles
557564 3-75
10
SOUTH VIETNAM
557590
4-75 DA
Ir
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
25X1
Declassified in Peri - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Cambodian army units have plugged
the gap in the defense line north of
Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport. This
action reduces the threat of a communist
ground penetration toward the airfield,
but was achieved only by the diversion
of some units from the operation to re-
take TuoZ Leap and to eliminate insur-
gent artillery and rocket sites in the
area.
The airlift continued at a near record pace,
even though nearly 40 rockets struck around Pochen-
tong. Several rockets also fell near the US embassy
in the southeastern section of Phnom Penh; damage,
however, was slight, The Japanese and Thai embas-
sies in Phnom Penh plan to close later this week,
and the South Vietnamese embassy has requested space
for its personnel aboard US airlift flights return-
ing to Saigon.
President Lon Nol departed from Phnom Penh to-
day. Prince Sihanouk told newsmen in Peking yester-
day that ?Lon Nol's departure would not alter his or
the Khmer communists opposition to negotiations.
Sihanouk reportedly said that Lon Nol was leaving
"under pressure from the US" and that the move was
a "trap" into which neither he nor the communists
would fall. The Prince predicted a."100-percent"
victory for the insurgents.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-PORTUGAL
Moscow, which is trying to strengthen
its ties with Portuguese leaders, gave
front-page coverage to Portuguese Labor
Minister Costa Martins when he visited
the USSR last week.
Costa Martins, who is a member of the ruling
Armed Forces Movement, met for three hours with So-
viet Premier Kosygin. The Premier, speaking "on
behalf of the Soviet leadership," expressed solidar-
ity with the Portuguese government and the Armed
Forces Movement, Costa Martins subsequently told
the press that Kosygin had promised Soviet aid to
Portugal. Moscow heretofore has been notably re-
luctant to give the Portuguese, including Communist
leader Cunhal, reason to believe that substantial
economic aid is a possibility.
Moscow's public coverage of the abortive coup
of March 11 and its aftermath suggests that its
qualms about Portugal are ebbing. Against this are
reports circulating in Lisbon and elsewhere that
the Soviets are still fearful that the Portuguese
political situation may get out of hand and that
the Soviets are doing what they can to counsel mod-
eration. These reports help Moscow deal with ex-
pressions of concern it has received from the West
Germans, the Italians, and others regarding the di-
rection of political events in Portugal.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
V ,r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
IRAN-IRAQ
The communique that concluded the
visit of Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda
to Iraq last week pledged both sides to
work for closer cooperation in all areas
and affirmed that the Persian Gulf re-
gion should be "spared all foreign in-
terference." The Shah has frequently
indicated his desire to arrange closer
security cooperation among Gulf coun-
tries. Until now, he had excluded Bagh-
dad from those with whom he has sought
to cooperate.
The Shah has supported US naval activity in
the Persian Gulf as a-counter to Soviet naval ac-
cess to Iraqi facilities. He regards Soviet influ-
ence in Iraq as a threat to Iranian and Gulf secu-
rity, and the reduction of that influence has-been
a major foreign policy goal. To the extent that
the Shah now presses Iraq to reduce its ties to the
Soviet Union, he in turn will.be-under pressure
from his Arab critics to indicate that Iran is not
closely tied to US policy in the region.
Iran and Iraq, meanwhile,, have completed joint
preparations to seal their border at the expiration
today of the cease-fire-between Iraq and the Kurdish
rebels that was announced on March 13. Beginning
today, Iraqi Kurds--both civilians and fighting men--
will no longer be allowed to take refuge in Iran.
The Iraqi army is expected to resume its offensive
against pockets of remaining rebels.
Baghdad has, however, extended until the end
of April the amnesty it has offered to Kurdish re-
fugees in Iran who return to Iraq. Few refugees
are expected to return.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Peri - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Suleyman Demirel took the reins of government
in Turkey, yesterday.
The Justice Party leader now has a maximum of
one week to prepare a government program for a par-
liamentary vote of confidence. The shaky founda-
tion of the new government may have already been
weakened; four independents are reported to have
withdrawn their support. No sharp turns are likely
in major Turkish policies, but there will be pres-
sure on Demirel to harden the policy toward Cyprus.
Turkish and-Greek C riot forces in Nicosia
exchanged fire laFT?Tsig t before UN forces suc-
ceeded in restoring the cease-fire.
Turkish troops may have been reacting to
shots fired by Greek Cypriots who reportedly were
celebrating the 20th anniversary of the guerrilla
campaign against the British. The Turks, who claim
to have information that the Greek Cypriots will
soon initiate a guerrilla campaign against the
Turkish sector, may be attempting to react strongly
to any provocation to dissuade the Greek Cypriots
from such a venture.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T60936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
A LOOK AT THE KHMER COMMUNISTS
With the Cambodian conflict now ap-
proaching what may be its final stages,
the insurgent leaders and their adminis-
trative apparatus stand ready to take the
reins of power in Phnom Penh. The hand-
ful of leading insurgent figures known
in the West probably will assume promi-
nent positions in a successor regime,
but actual power in post-war Cambodia
will be held by the covert Khmer Commu-
nist Party.
The overt political and military organizations
of the Cambodian insurgency are the National United
Front of Cambodia and the Cambodian People's Na-
tional Liberation Armed Forces, both of which were
created five years ago. Sihanouk's Royal Govern-
ment of National Union so far has had no signifi-
cant role inside Cambodia, but has been used as a
channel for the insurgents' external relations.
Actually controlling and directing the insur-
gent apparatus is the Khmer Communist Party. It
assumed formal identity in 1961, but it traces its
origins to the early 1950s and Ho Chi Minh's Indo-
china Communist Party. The Khmer party has ex-
panded to a membership of over 10,000, led by a
central committee of about 20 members.
The composition of the central committee has
remained a closely guarded secret. Sihanouk's
"defense minister" and "deputy prime minister"
Khieu Samphan is the best known of the senior lead-
ers, but it is generally believed that Saloth Sar
is top man in the party. Ieng Sary--who now han-
dles most direct contacts with Peking and Hanoi--
also appears to occupy a position of strength.
Other central committee members have been identi-
fied with varying degrees of certainty. These in-
clude such well-known individuals as Hou Yuon and
Hu Nim and a variety, of civilian leaders, insurgent
military commanders, and regional party chairmen.
All of the individuals whose membership in the
central committee is fairly well established are in
their 40s. Most qualify as Cambodian intellectuals,
having been educated during the 1950s in France--
where they absorbed their leftist if not their com-
munist ideology--and having subsequently worked as
(continued)
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
y
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
journalists or teachers. Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon,
in fact, have doctorates in economics. A signifi-
cant number have had considerable experience in pol-
itics: Khieu Samphan and at least two others held
cabinet portfolios under Sihanouk during the 1960s.
Almost.all the known or suspected party leaders are
remembered as tough nationalists and unyielding
ideologues even before their involvement in the in-
surgency. Another collective trait is long-standing
opposition, and in many cases personal enmity, to-
ward Prince Sihanouk.
The party has directed the insurgency with co-
hesiveness and determination. Evidence of internal
friction has appeared, however, particularly on the
matter of the party's relationship with the Vietnam-
ese communists.
Relationship with Hanoi And Peking
Hanoi nurtured the Cambodian party while Sihan-
ouk was in power, and ties became even closer during
the initial years of the current conflict when the
Vietnamese increased their support. From the begin-
ning, however, Hanoi has had to deal with an under-
current of Khmer distrust; Khmer suspicions and con-
tentiousness grew as the Khmer Communist Party ex-
panded and assumed responsibility for its own mili-
tary and political affairs.
The lines of division on the issue are murky,
but Ieng Sary--who, along with several other top
leaders, is supposed to have received training in
North Vietnam--is frequently identified as the lead-
ing proponent of close ties with. Hanoi. Khieu Sam-
phan is often reported as heading a more national-
istic faction, which has apparently had some suc-
cess in its efforts to strengthen the party's ties
with Peking as a balance to Hanoi's influence.
China, for its part, has appeared eager to cul-
tivate ties with the insurgents. It apparently has
the dual intention of preventing Vietnamese domi-
nance over the Cambodians and foreclosing any pos-
sible intrusion of Soviet influence.
The party's already discernible drift toward
some middle ground between Peking and Hanoi may in-
volve practical-considerations. North Vietnam's
ability to extend postwar reconstruction aid to a.
communist-controlled Cambodia would be limited,.
while China would be in a position to provide help
to rebuild the country's war-torn economy. The
(continued)
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
party, in fact, seems keenly aware of the major
problems it would encounter in the period immedi-
ately following-an end to the fighting and has been
careful to keep open all potential sources of for-
eign aid. A policy statement issued by a recent
"congress" of party front organizations, for exam-
ple, juxtaposed a promise of an "independent and
nonaligned foreign policy" with a statement that
it would accept all "unconditional aid."
Attitude Toward Slhanouk? ?
The leadership's current policy toward Sihan-
ouk also appears to have been developed with an eye
to the future. It now seems fairly certain that
the party plans to retain Sihanouk as a nominal
leader if and when the insurgents win a total mili-
tary victory or the Lon Nol government capitulates.
Party leaders have long recognized that the Prince
has given their movement a legitimacy both inside
and outside Cambodia that otherwise it would not
have had. During a period of post-war consolidation,
Sihanouk's value as a domestic rallying point and
his ability to attract international recognition
and economic support will be important. The
Prince's close relationship with Chinese leaders
is probably also a consideration. The party may,
in fact, have been under some pressure from Peking
to retain Sihanouk.
Sihanouk, for his part, appears painfully
aware of the party's exploitative attitude toward
him. His recent claims that he will involve him-
self after the war only in foreign relations may
reflect arrangements he has been forced to accept.
Similarly, Sihanouk's frequent references to the
possibility of early retirement probably reflect an
awareness that his usefulness will decline and pres-
sures to jettison him will increase as the party
gains confidence in its administrative ability and
as the country's international position becomes es-
tablished,
Post-War Domestic Policy
The party's professed aim is to impose its own
brand of Marxism on Cambodian society. Essentially
(continued)
A3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
this will mean the implementation on a country-wide
basis of programs long under way in the communist
zone. These include:
--Destruction of the traditional administrative
system and its replacement by a centralized
government controlled by the party.
--Confiscation of privately owned land and the
establishment of government-run communes.
--Nationalization of all industry and commerce.
--Gradual replacement of Buddhism by communist-
controlled mass organizations.
Although the Khmer Communist Party leadership
lacks the pool of well-trained cadre possessed by
its Asian allies, it can be expected to push re-
lentlessly its efforts to regiment and collectivize
Khmer society, using force where necessary.
A4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6
Declassified in Part --Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T60936A012500010039-6
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010039-6