THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 31 MARCH 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014759
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 31, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
March 31, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category .513( 1),(2).13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
a.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
March 31, 1975
Table of Contents
South Vietnam: Political repercussions in Saigon
are mounting. (Page 1)
Cambodia: US airlift operations into Pochentong
resumed Saturday; the insurgents meanwhile
continued their rocket and artillery attacks.
(Page 4)
Arab States - Israel: The Egyptian multi-service
communications exercise "Abu Rudays" began on
Saturday. (Page 5)
Egypt: President Sadat set forth a policy of sur-
prising moderation on Saturday. (Page 6)
Suez Canal: The waterway will have less capacity
than before, if it reopens as early as June.
(Page 8)
Saudi Arabia: The new Saudi monarch will retain
the titles of prime minister and foreign min-
ister. (Page 9)
Note: Turkey (Page 10)
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Political repercussions in Saigon
are mounting. Sentiment for removing
President Thieu is likely to escalate
as the dimensions of the government
collapse in the northern half of the
country and the present communist threat
sink in.
At the moment, Thieu's greatest strength ap-
pears to be the absence of a readily apparent alter-
nate leadership within either the military or the
political opposition. The President's position has
nevertheless been seriously, and perhaps irreparably,
damaged as a result of the decisions that set in
train the massive and disorganized government re-
treats in the northern military regions.
disclosed fairly widespread criticism
of Thieu, especially from the more senior officers.
Dissatisfaction is certain to be substantially
higher among commanders and officers farther north.
Some fairly close associates of the President,
are deeply pessimistic
over both the general military situation and Thieu's
ability to remain in power.
Thieu
must step down in favor of a new government pre-
pared to reach a political solution with the commu-
nists.
The South Vietnamese Senate reportedly will
soon consider a motion asking Thieu to resign and
another that censures the President for his conduct
of the war. There appears to be a good chance that
at least the latter will carry.
Although a number of prominent political oppo-
sition leaders have stepped up their demands for
Thieu's departure and the formation of a new "gov-
ernment of national union," there is little agree-
ment either on a successor for Thieu or on policies
that a new government might adopt. Widespread or
(continued)
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NORTH
VIETNAM
Demilitarized Zone
.Da Nang
MR 1
THAILAND
Viod Nhon
MR 2
Tfy Hoa
CAMBODIA
Tonle
Sap
110
Mekong
TUYEN
Da tat
DUC
NUNN
THUAN
PHNOM PENH?
-10
Can The
Gulf of
Thailand
114
557580 3-75
MR 4
Capital Special Zone
196 198
South
China
Sea
170
MILES
16-
14-
12-
10-
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
enthusiastic backing appears to be lacking for for-
mer vice president Ky, General Duong Van "Big" Minh,
or any other potential opposition rallying point.
For the time being, the political opposition will
probably have little choice but to remain on the
sidelines, watching for some sign of a significant
move within the military to arrange Thieu's resig-
nation or ouster.
Military Situation
An estimated 16,000 government troops, includ-
ing much of the marine division, have been evacuated
from Da Nang and the northern provinces to Cam Ranh,
where they are being regrouped and refitted before
assignment to potential battlefronts in the southern
half of the country.
General Truong, the Military Region 1 commander,
has joined his troops, but his future plans or as-
signment are unknown. President Thieu has blamed
Truong for the loss of Da Nang, saying that Truong
disobeyed orders to defend the city to the end.
There is no accurate estimate of how many ci-
vilians have been evacuated from Da Nang, but the
number probably runs to more than 50,000. The North
Vietnamese closed the port yesterday by firing rock-
ets at boats in the Da Nang harbor. Many people
are stranded on offshore islands and in small boats
along the coast.
Communist successes in cutting Route 1 along
the coastal strip in both the northern and central
provinces have cut off the refugee flow. Many thou-
sands of displaced persons continue to clog Qui
Nhon, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh as well as
smaller towns along the coast.
The South Vietnamese are desperately trying to
control the rapidly slipping situation in the seven
remaining provinces of Military Region 2. On Satur-
day, the military command structure was reorganized
into four separate commands in Order to better de-
fend the areas still held by the government. Last-
minute organizational changes, however, are unlikely
to reverse the current battlefield situation.
(continued)
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Despite sustaining some heavy losses, the North
Vietnamese 3rd Division is moving dangerously close
to Qui Nhon, and the South Vietnamese airborne bri-
gade was forced to pull back from its blocking posi-
tion northwest of Nha Trang yesterday. Commanders
in Military Region 2 are now concerned about a grow-
ing communist threat to the southeastern provinces
of Binh Thuan, Ninh Thuan, and Tuyen Duc--where the
city of Da Lat is located.
No major fighting has been reported in the
provinces close by Saigon or in the delta over the
weekend. Fears are rising, however, that new commu-
nist pressure may soon be applied to the two re-
gions, and that the collapse of military and civil-
ian morale that occurred in the two northern re-
gions may spread south.
The communists are continuing to concentrate
their forces in the northern and central delta prov-
inces, especially around the region's major city of
Can Tho. The communists can now also move several
divisions to the provinces north of Saigon. Early
major communist attacks in these two areas would
make it difficult for the government to consolidate
and redeploy its forces for the defense of military
regions 3 and 4.
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stung Chinif
Taal Leap.
Pochentong
r
Banam
Neak
Luong
K
BAIE DEOMPONG
557582 3-75
MILES 25
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CAMBODIA
US airlift operations into Pochen-
tong resumed on Saturday following a
24-hour suspension. The insurgents
meanwhile continued their rocket and
artillery attacks.
Over the weekend at least 44 107-mm. rockets
and two 105-mm. howitzer rounds landed in the vi-
cinity of the airport. A communist headquarters
in the Phnom Penh area yesterday requested imme-
diate delivery of 200 howitzer rounds for use
against the airfield.
The communist attacks on Pochentong are not
only disrupting the airlift, but are also inter-
fering with government air force operations. Main-
tenance has been slowed, and shrapnel damage has
sidelined a number of aircraft--six on Saturday
alone.
The government's operation west of Pochentong
to retake Tuol Leap and to push the insurgents out
of rocket and artillery range has been blocked.
Northwest of Phnom Penh, government forces
stabilized the situation after the insurgents
failed to exploit a significant break in the capi-
tal's defense perimeter.
The insurgents cut the enclave at Neak Luong
and Banam in half over the weekend. The communists
have massed 6,000 to 7,000 troops against some
4,000 government troops. Should Neak Luong and
Banam fall, the insurgents would probably send
many of these troops to Phnom Penh's southern de-
fense perimeter.
In the far northwest, communist forces have
moved even closer to the provincial capital of
Battambang and now pose a direct threat to the
city itself and the nearby enclave.
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ARAB STATES - ISRAEL
The Egyptian multi-service communi-
cations exercise "Abu Rudays" began on
Saturday, and elements from each of the
armed forces appear to be participating.
The exercise is scheduled to continue
through April 3.
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EGYPT
In his speech to the nation on
Saturday, President Sadat set forth
a policy of surprising moderation,
apparently designed to demonstrate
his continued desire for peace. He
also signaled some limits to his
patience.
Sadat deliberately played down militant themes
He said he had decided to extend the UN Emergency
Force mandate and to reopen the Suez Canal by June
because of his concern about the reaction of "the
world." He said he had rejected the angry and
emotional response to the breakdown of disengage-
ment negotiations that most expected from him. He
explained that he believed that Egypt could not be
responsible for confronting the "international com-
munity" with a sudden crisis by not renewing the
UN mandate when it expires on April 24.
Using a similar rationale for reopening the
canal, Sadat said that Egypt cannot deprive the
"peoples of the world" of an important trade route
when the canal had been closed through "no fault"
of theirs. Sadat issued a warning, however, in
both instances. He said that, in agreeing to ex-
tend the UN mandate for three months rather than
the usual six, he wanted to make clear that there
is a limit to both time and patience. He emphasized
that Egypt is able to protect the canal and will
use its "deterrent capability" if Israel infringes
on either the canal or the territory adjacent to
it.
Sadat avoided strident recriminations against
Israel, speaking in a low-key fashion of Israel's
"weakness" rather than of its "intransigence," ?but
he seemed intent on demonstrating that Egypt is more
interested in peace than is Israel. He spoke re-
peatedly of the need to explore all avenues.
Sadat undoubtedly intended that his moderation
would put a burden on Israel both to move toward
peace and to refrain from military provocation. A
(continued)
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reopened canal could restrain both sides from re-
newing warfare, and the decision to extend the UN
mandate will place equal obligation on each side
to abide by the cease-fire.
Israeli officials have reacted cautiously to
Sadat's decisions. Despite Prime Minister Rabin's
negative reaction to the short extension of the UN
mandate, other spokesmen have noted that the moder-
ate tone of the speech leaves the door open for
continued dialogue.
Sadat will almost certainly face criticism from
some Arab states. There is no indication that he
cleared his decision on the UN mandate with Syria,
whose mandate on the Golan Heights expires at the
end of May. Indeed, Damascus radio stated a few
hours before Sadat's speech that Egypt and Syria
had decided not to renew the mandates unless "tan-
gible" progress had been made toward achieving
Israeli withdrawal. The leader of the Syrian-
controlled Saiqa fedayeen organization said pub-
licly on Saturday before Sadat spoke that extension
of the mandate would amount to "surrender to Zionist
blackmail."
Sadat clearly indicated in his speech that he
anticipates criticism from the Arabs, but intends
to ignore it as long as he can. He apparently feels
that his rejection last week of Israel's terms for
non-belligerency proves his dedication to the Arab
cause sufficiently to permit some independence. In
his speech, he frequently said that Egypt must make
its own decisions.
He also signaled, however, that he cannot main-
tain Egypt's independence indefinitely. He said
that Egypt will submit a plan of action to the Arab
summit scheduled for June, which he "hopes" will be
agreed upon. Sadat has proved at past summits unable
to retain a free hand with his Arab allies. The
new July date for the expiration of the UN mandate
follows closely after the summit.
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SUEZ CANAL
If the Suez Canal is reopened as
early as June, the waterway will have
less capacity than it had before it was
closed in mid-1967. Night transits
will be impossible and day operations
curtailed because new navigation lights
and systems for ship monitoring and
communications are unlikely to be in-
stalled before October.
Ships using the waterway during the first
months after it reopens will be limited to drafts
of 35 feet, rather than 38 feet permitted before
the canal was closed.
The Canal Authority has worked out a tempo-
rary traffic control system and has trained a cadre
of pilots. In a dry run during the first week in
March, operations reportedly went smoothly. Be-
fore June, the British are to carry out a pre-
cautionary final sweep for explosives. This check
is intended to reassure potential users and to
dispose of any explosives thrown into the water-
way by Egyptian land forces who cleared the shore-
line.
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SAUDI ARABIA
Khalid, the new Saudi monarch, has
decided to follow the precedent estab-
lished by King Faysal, and will retain
the titles of prime minister and for-
eign minister.
The US embassy in Jidda believes, however,
that Crown Prince Fahd, who was advanced from sec-
ond to first deputy prime minister on Saturday,
will in fact exercise the functions of prime min-
tster.
Khalid will, direct the
council of ministers to act under Fahd's instruc-
tions and report directly to Fahd.
Khalid made several other top-level personnel
decisions on Saturday. National guard commander
Prince Abdallah, generally regarded as
backer of Khalid was des-
ignated second deputy prime
a strong
minister.
Perhaps to balance this, Prince Nayif--a
younger full brother of Fahd--was advanced from
vice minister of interior to minister of state for
interior affairs. Nayif will run the ministry on
a day-to-day basis, although Fahd will officially
keep the ministerial title. In something of a
surprise, Saud ibn Faysal, 33-year-old son of the
late King, was named minister of state for foreign
affairs. This post has been held by an acting min-
ister since the death of Omar Saqqaf in 1974.
Prince Saud has been oil minister Yamani's deputy.
The three new appointees will be full members of
the council of ministers.
Although the structure of the Saudi govern-
ment seems set for now--Khalid has asked other
ministers to remain at their posts--there is likely
to be a great deal of maneuvering for power within
the hierarchy.
Meanwhile, the government announced on March
30 that the assassin of King Faysal was sane at
the time of the shooting. He will be tried ac-
cording to Muslim law.
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NOTE
Turkey's Justice Party leader Suleyman Demirel
is moving toward forming a right-of-Center coalition
government.
If President Koruturk, who does not care for
Demirel, does accept the proposed government, Dem-
irel will still have to submit a governmental pro-
gram to parliament for a vote of confidence. At
best, the coalition could muster a bare majority.
Demirel would then have to prove to the Turkish
military that he can rule effectively. The mili-
tary forced him to resign in 1971 because of his
inability to control political violence.
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